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[2025] NSWCA 194
procedural. The notice of motion filed on 18 August 2025 was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the first and second respondents' costs.
6 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The applicant wanted the Court of Appeal to urgently hear a motion before a property auction scheduled for 23 August 2025. Although he said he learned of the auction on 18 July, he did not apply to expedite until 18 August. The Court considered that delay, the practical difficulty of arranging a hearing at short notice, fairness to other litigants and respondents, and the parties' respective interests in the property's sale. It refused expedition and ordered the applicant to pay the respondents' costs.
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2,078 words · generated 06/10/2026
In this ex tempore procedural ruling, Price AJA considered Fahmid Rahman's application to expedite a motion concerning the proposed sale of a property in Roselands. The applicant's expedition motion was filed on 18 August 2025. It asked for his earlier motion, filed on 15 August, to be listed urgently before 23 August, or alternatively for interim orders restraining the trustees from marketing, auctioning, or otherwise disposing of Property 1A (paras [1]-[2]).
The related appeal matters were already listed for hearing before three judges of the Court of Appeal on 10 September 2025. They included an amended summons seeking leave to appeal and a June motion. The underlying complaints concerned decisions made in the primary proceedings and Adamson JA's earlier refusal to grant a stay (paras [3]-[5]).
Two Roselands properties were involved. Property 1 had been sold to the applicant and his daughter around 4 June 2025. Property 1A remained unsold, and its auction was scheduled for 23 August 2025. The applicant said that he learned of the auction on 18 July. He opposed the sale, contending that it would deprive him of an opportunity to purchase the property and cause irreversible prejudice (paras [8]-[11], [15]).
Price AJA expressly confined the reasons to whether the August motion should be expedited. The judge did not determine the substantive appeal, the underlying property dispute, or whether the sale should ultimately proceed (paras [5]-[6]). The motion was dismissed, with the applicant ordered to pay the first and second respondents' costs (para [29]).
The central consideration was the applicant's delay. The judgment states that more than two months had passed since Adamson JA's judgment in Rahman No 1, and more than a month since the applicant learned the auction date, before the expedition application was filed two days before the hearing date sought and five days before the auction (para [19]). The court saw no justification in the applicant's case for what it described as “egregious delay” (para [25]).
The chronology mattered. The court referred to directions hearings before the Registrar on 9 July and 21 July. At the 21 July hearing, the applicant's counsel indicated that urgency had gone out of the June motion. The Registrar gave directions for a further amended summons and a compliant white folder. The applicant subsequently sought more time to file the white folder and an adjournment of a directions hearing; the hearing was adjourned. On 13 August, the matters were listed for hearing on 10 September, but no expedition application had been made (paras [17], [20]-[24]).
The judgment also identified practical consequences of a last-minute application. The applicant was, in reality, seeking to have three judges convened to hear his appeal the following day. The court said applications brought at the “eleventh hour” may require other hearings to be displaced, creating unfairness to litigants who have complied with directions. It also considered that the delay prejudiced the respondents' preparation for the appeal (para [26]).
The applicant's asserted prejudice was considered but did not determine the result. He argued that a sale would remove his chance to buy Property 1A and render his motions and appeal nugatory (para [15]). The court noted that he would receive the balance of the net sale proceeds, that the first respondent would receive 64% of those proceeds, and that the applicant could bid at the auction. It also recognised the first respondent's interest in having the property sold at fair market value (para [27]). The reasons describe a balance of interests, not a finding that the applicant's concern was immaterial.
The judge applied the promptness emphasis in the authorities on expedition. The judgment records that both Elders and Unilever favour a flexible approach and identify non-exhaustive circumstances in which expedition may be appropriate, while stressing that a party should approach the court reasonably promptly. A late approach may make it impracticable to arrange a hearing (paras [12]-[13]). The judge also cited Valuer-General for the lesson that a party seeking expeditious disposal should act promptly and not allow time to pass (para [14]).
On the combined circumstances, Price AJA was not satisfied that expedition was required. The result rested on the significant delay, the practical and fairness consequences of the requested timetable, and the first respondent's interests, notwithstanding the importance the sale had for the applicant (para [28]).
The judgment does not announce a new rule of law or change the test for expedition. It applies an existing, flexible approach described through Elders and Unilever. Those authorities are presented as giving non-exhaustive circumstances relevant to expedition, rather than a closed checklist (paras [12]-[13]).
The particular proposition emphasised here is that promptness matters. The authorities cited in the judgment warn that a party who leaves an expedition application until the “eleventh hour” may find that a hearing cannot practicably be arranged. Valuer-General is cited for the related lesson that a party seeking expeditious disposal should act promptly and not allow time to pass (paras [13]-[14]).
The ruling therefore illustrates the application of those principles to a tight timetable and a documented history of delay. It does not purport to displace or comprehensively restate the existing authorities. Nor does it decide how expedition should be treated in materially different circumstances, such as where the applicant acted promptly or where the urgency arose only shortly before the application.
A separate procedural point concerns the form of relief. Price AJA said that the single judge could not set aside the primary judge's substantive orders and could not grant relief that would essentially discharge or vary Adamson JA's prior orders. The judgment identifies s 46(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) and r 51.58 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) as the route for seeking relief from Adamson JA's judgment, referring to Collier and Litigation Fund WCX (para [5]). The court did not determine the merits of that separate avenue in this ruling.
The judgment records the respondents' submission that the applicant's delay was inconsistent with the overriding purpose in s 56 and the case-management objects in s 57 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (para [17]). It does not separately interpret those statutory provisions or make a distinct holding about their operation. The decision is thus best understood as a case-specific application of expedition principles, rather than a broader statutory ruling.
At [13], the judgment says that a party seeking expedition should act “reasonably promptly”. In plain English, a request for urgent treatment is assessed against the applicant's own conduct and the time available to the court. Waiting can make it harder to arrange an urgent hearing, even if the underlying event is important.
At [14], the judgment quotes Valuer-General: “The lesson to be learned is the necessity, where there is reason for expeditious disposal of an appeal, for the party concerned to act promptly, and not allow time to go by as occurred here.” This is an earlier court's statement, reproduced by Price AJA as relevant guidance. The current ruling applies that emphasis to the chronology before it.
At [25], Price AJA states: “There is nothing in the applicant’s case which justifies the egregious delay in bringing the application.” This is the judge's own assessment of the explanation before the court. It makes clear that the problem was not delay in the abstract, but delay that the applicant's case did not justify.
At [26], the judge explains that last-minute expedition applications “cause practical difficulties for the Court” and may displace other hearings, creating unfairness to litigants who complied with court directions. In practical terms, urgency for one litigant can affect the court's ability to manage other cases fairly. The court also identified prejudice to the respondents' preparation.
At [28], the judge recognises “the importance of the sale of Property 1A to the applicant” but weighs it with the significant delay and the first respondent's interests. The conclusion is that, on this combination of circumstances, the applicant had not shown that the court should expedite the matter. It is not a general statement that property sales can never justify expedition.
The ruling is most directly relevant to requests for expedition where the applicant knows of the event said to create urgency well before filing, but waits until close to the event to seek an urgent hearing. Here, the applicant said he knew of the auction on 18 July, while his expedition motion was not filed until 18 August, shortly before the 23 August auction (paras [10], [19]).
It is also relevant where a matter is already subject to court directions and has a scheduled hearing date, especially if earlier procedural opportunities to raise urgency were not used. In this case, the 21 July directions hearing included an indication that urgency had gone out of the June motion, and the related matters were ultimately listed for 10 September. The court considered the applicant's failure to seek expedition during that process (paras [21]-[24]).
A further relevant feature is whether the requested timetable would require the court to rearrange other matters or convene a larger bench at short notice. Price AJA considered that the application's practical effect was to seek a hearing before three judges the following day, and addressed the resulting fairness concerns (para [26]).
The case also shows that the court may compare the claimed harm from delay with the interests and position of other affected parties. Here, the court considered the applicant's claimed lost opportunity to buy, his share of net proceeds, his ability to bid, and the first respondent's 64% share and interest in a fair-market-value sale (paras [15], [27]). These are features of this ruling, not a universal formula for determining all expedition applications.
The supplied judgment contains no later judicial treatment of Rahman v Rahman (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 194. It was decided on 21 August 2025, and the text provided does not refer to any subsequent judgment applying, distinguishing, or criticising it. Accordingly, later treatment cannot be assessed from this source alone.
The judgment itself does refer to earlier authorities. It describes Elders and Unilever as setting out the applicable principles, and refers to NSW Smallbore, Hannaford, and Daracon as further decisions concerning expedition (para [12]). It quotes the promptness warning in Valuer-General (para [14]). These citations show the authorities Price AJA used as the background framework; they are not later treatment of this decision.
The judgment also refers to Rahman No 1, which concerned the prior refusal of a stay, and to Collier and Litigation Fund WCX on the proper route for relief from a single judge's decision (paras [4]-[5]). Those cases form part of the procedural context and reasoning. They should not be described as subsequent treatment of the August 2025 expedition ruling.
The ruling does not determine the merits of the applicant's proposed appeal or the substantive complaints about the primary judge's decisions. It expressly limits its reasons to whether the August motion should be expedited (para [6]). The decision therefore does not establish whether the appeal grounds had merit or what would happen at the scheduled hearing on 10 September.
Nor does the ruling decide whether Property 1A would ultimately be sold, or whether the applicant would bid successfully. At the time of the hearing, the property had not been sold and the auction remained scheduled for 23 August (para [11]). The court's observation that the applicant could bid was part of its assessment of asserted prejudice, not a finding about the outcome of any auction.
The court did not determine the trustees' submission that postponing the auction would cause additional costs for renewed auction preparation, rates, and mortgage interest. That submission is recorded at [18], but the reasons do not identify it as a decisive ground in the final balancing at [28].
Finally, the judgment does not define a precise number of days after which an expedition request becomes too late. Its reasoning is contextual: it considers when the applicant knew of the auction, what occurred at directions hearings, the pending hearing date, and the practical effects of the requested timetable. The cited principles are expressly flexible and non-exhaustive (paras [12]-[14]).
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Rahman v Rahman (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 194
Hearing dates: 21 August 2025
Date of orders: 21 August 2025
Decision date: 21 August 2025
Before: Price AJA
Decision: (1) Dismiss the notice of motion filed on 18 August 2025.
(2) The applicant is to pay the first and second respondents’ costs.
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE – application for expedition – significant delay in bringing application – application dismissed
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 56, 57
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 46
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 51.12, 51.58
Cases Cited: Collier v Lancer [2013] NSWCA 185
Daracon Engineering Pty Ltd v Kelsall [2025] NSWCA 153
Elders Rural Finance Ltd v Smith (1995) 38 NSWLR 395
Hannaford v Cactus Imaging Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 260; (2008) 176 IR 426
Litigation Fund WCX Pty Ltd v Mitchell (No 3) [2025] NSWCA 67
NSW Smallbore and Air Rifle Association v Commonwealth of Australia [1996] NSWCA 405
Rahman v Rahman [2025] NSWCA 126
Unilever plc v Chefaro Proprietaries Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 587
Valuer-General of New South Wales v In Adam Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 306
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Fahmid Rahman (Applicant) (self-represented)
Mita Farjina Rahman (First Respondent)
Stefano Calabretta and Andrew Fleming (Second Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
J Brown (First Respondent)
Solicitors:
Marsdens Law Group (First Respondent)
Fleming Law Pty Ltd (Second Respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/202852
Publication restriction: Nil
PRICE AJA: The applicant, Fahmid Rahman, by notice of motion filed on 18 August 2025 (“expedition motion”) has brought an application seeking the expedition of his notice of motion filed on 15 August 2025 (“August motion”).
The orders sought by the applicant in his expedition motion are:
“1. That the [applicant’s] Notice of Motion filed on 15 August 2025 be listed for urgent hearing prior to 23 August 2025.
- Alternatively, that interim protective orders be made forthwith, namely:
a. The trustees be restrained from taking any steps to market, auction, or otherwise dispose of … [Property 1A in Roselands], pending determination of the appeal or further order.
b. Such further or other orders as the Court deems appropriate in the interests of justice.”
The applicant’s amended summons seeking leave to appeal filed on 4 June 2025 and notice of motion filed on the same day (“June motion”) are all listed to be heard in the Court of Appeal in less than 3 weeks on 10 September 2025.
It is apparent that the principal relief sought in the August motion is similar to that in the amended summons and the June motion. The complaints raised by the applicant in those documents relate to a number of judgments by Slattery J (“the primary judge”) in the primary proceedings in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and the dismissal of the applicant’s motion heard in the referrals list by Adamson JA, as a single judge of this Court, on 2 June 2025, where her Honour refused to grant a stay of various matters sought by the applicant pending the hearing of his appeal. Relevant to the expedition motion is that the applicant has already sought before Adamson JA, and was refused, a stay which would halt the sale by the second respondent, who are the trustees appointed by the primary judge in December 2024, of two properties in Roselands referred to as “Property 1” and “Property 1A” in Rahman v Rahman [2025] NSWCA 126 (“Rahman No 1”).
As Adamson JA explained in Rahman No 1 at [17], sitting as a single judge of this Court, I cannot set aside any of the substantive orders made by the primary judge and neither can I make the relief sought in Order 2 of the expedition motion which is what the applicant characterises as “interim protective orders”, since that would impermissibly require me to essentially discharge or vary the orders made by Adamson JA in Rahman No 1. The relief that the applicant seeks from Adamson JA’s judgment is properly to proceed under s 46(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) and r 51.58 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”), and is ultimately what is sought by the applicant in Order 1 of the June motion which, as it presently stands, is listed to be heard by three judges of this Court on 10 September 2025: Collier v Lancer [2013] NSWCA 185 at [19]-[20] (Beazley P, Ward and Leeming JJA); Litigation Fund WCX Pty Ltd v Mitchell (No 3) [2025] NSWCA 67 at [20] (Ball JA, Mitchelmore and McHugh JJA agreeing).
Accordingly, what follows in these reasons will be confined to the issue of whether the application for expedition of the August motion should be granted (as sought by the applicant in Order 1 of the expedition motion).
In Rahman No 1, Adamson JA conveniently summarised the factual background of the proceedings before the primary judge which arise out of a matrimonial dispute between the applicant and his wife, the first respondent, Mita Farjina Rahman, and my reasons today assume familiarity with her Honour’s judgment.
It is not necessary for the purposes of resolving the applicant’s application for expedition to recount much of the factual background except to mention that while the proceedings have involved the sale of two properties in Roselands, it is clear from the written submissions, the affidavit of the first respondent’s solicitor Jade Ellis dated 20 August 2025, and the affidavit of the trustee’s solicitor Andrew George Hack affirmed on 20 August 2025, that Property 1 was sold by the trustees around 4 June 2025 to the applicant and his daughter but Property 1A remains to be sold and is listed for auction in two days on 23 August 2025.
The applicant opposes the sale of Property 1A occurring and he sought to stop its sale by seeking the stay before Adamson JA in Rahman No 1 (except at that time, the auction for its sale had not been scheduled).
In the applicant’s affidavit dated 18 August 2025, he states he became aware on 18 July 2025 that Property 1A was listed for auction on 23 August 2025. He further states that the real estate agent is open to selling the property prior to the auction if someone is willing to pay $1.7 million for it.
In oral submissions, the parties have confirmed that Property 1A has at present not been sold and that the auction is still scheduled on 23 August 2025.
The applicable principles when determining whether to grant expedition was set out by this Court in Elders Rural Finance Ltd v Smith (1995) 38 NSWLR 395 (“Elders”), by reference to the guidance provided by the English Court of Appeal in Unilever plc v Chefaro Proprietaries Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 587 (“Unilever”): See also, NSW Smallbore and Air Rifle Association v Commonwealth of Australia [1996] NSWCA 405; Hannaford v Cactus Imaging Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 260; (2008) 176 IR 426 at [12] (McColl JA); Daracon Engineering Pty Ltd v Kelsall [2025] NSWCA 153 at [6]-[7] (Price AJA).
Whilst the Court in Elders at 400-402 (Kirby P, Priestley and Clarke JJA), and the English Court of Appeal in Unilever at 591 (Sir Thomas Bingham MR), set out a number of non-exhaustive circumstances where expedition will be appropriate and stated a flexible approach should be adopted when considering an application for expedition, both in Unilever at 591, and in Elders at 401, it was emphasised by their Honours that a party seeking expedition should act reasonably promptly to approach the court with such an application as “[w]hen the approach is left until the eleventh hour … it may well prove impracticable to arrange a hearing”.
In Valuer-General of New South Wales v In Adam Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 306, Giles JA refused an application for expedition on the basis of the applicant’s delay in bringing that application. His Honour cautioned at [12] that:
“The lesson to be learned is the necessity, where there is reason for expeditious disposal of an appeal, for the party concerned to act promptly, and not allow time to go by as occurred here.” (emphasis added)
The basis for the applicant’s application for expedition is that if the auction on 23 August 2025 is allowed to proceed and Property 1A is sold, he will be deprived of the opportunity to purchase the property and suffer an irreversible prejudice. The applicant further submitted that if expedition is not granted the sale of the property will render the motions and his appeal nugatory.
The first respondent and the trustees oppose the application for expedition.
It appears to me that the respondents raise principally three arguments against expedition in their submissions and the affidavits of Ms Ellis and Mr Hack. Firstly, that the applicant has had multiple opportunities to seek expedition and has failed to do so in particular at the directions hearing before the Court of Appeal Registrar on 9 July 2025 and 21 July 2025, where the applicant’s counsel indicated that there was no urgency in the matters. Secondly, the applicant’s delay in bringing the application has made it impractical for a hearing to be arranged and counsel to be either obtained or prepared in time. It is further submitted on this point that the applicant’s delay does not accord with the overriding purpose in s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and the objects of case management under s 57. Lastly, there is no asserted prejudice to the applicant because the proceeds from the sale of the property will ultimately be distributed between him and the first respondent in accordance with the orders made by the Family Court.
A further argument against expedition raised by the trustees in the affidavit of Mr Hack is that if the auction is postponed additional costs will be incurred including from preparing the property for auction again, council and water rates, and interest on the mortgage secured over the property.
What is immediately apparent to me is that over 2 months have elapsed since Adamson JA’s judgment in Rahman No 1 was published on 5 June 2025 and more than 1 month since the applicant became aware that Property 1A was listed for auction on 23 August 2025. But despite being aware of the impending sale of the property the applicant has only just as of two days ago on 18 August 2025 brought his application for expedition.
Ms Ellis’ affidavit dated 20 August 2025 at paragraphs 15 to 36 reveals the lack of urgency with which the applicant has proceeded with his appeal. There have been many directions hearings before the Registrar from which it is apparent that delay has been occasioned by the applicant failing to file and serve a white folder in compliance with UCPR r 51.12.
Even though the applicant became aware of the auction on 18 July 2025, Mr Rogers who appeared on the applicant’s behalf on 21 July 2025, informed the Registrar to the effect that the urgency had gone out of the June motion. The Registrar made directions for the filing and service of a further amended summons seeking leave to appeal and a fresh white folder, and listed the matter on 30 July 2025 with a view of setting a hearing date.
Accordingly, I make the following orders:
Dismiss the notice of motion filed on 18 August 2025.
The applicant is to pay the first and second respondents’ costs.
**********
Rahman
Rahman
(1995) 38 NSWLR 395
(2008) 176 IR 426
The notice of motion filed on 18 August 2025 was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the first and second respondents' costs.
On 28 July 2025, the applicant by email to the Registrar sought a further extension of time to file a compliant white folder and sought an adjournment of the directions hearing listed on 30 July 2025, which the Registrar granted.
The proceedings were listed again before the Registrar on 13 August 2025 when further directions were made and the amended summons and motion were listed for hearing on 10 September 2025.
No application for expedition was made.
There is nothing in the applicant’s case which justifies the egregious delay in bringing the application.
Applications for expedition such as this brought at the “eleventh hour” cause practical difficulties for the Court and may require hearings to be displaced which creates unfairness to other litigants who have complied with court directions. What the applicant seeks in reality is for 3 Judges of Appeal to be convened to hear his appeal tomorrow. Furthermore, the applicant’s delay unfairly prejudices the respondents in their preparation for the hearing of the appeal.
The applicant’s contention that he will suffer irreparable damage if the sale proceeds has its limitations and must be balanced against the interests of the first respondent. The first respondent will receive 64% of the net proceeds of the sale and is entitled to have the property sold at fair market value. The applicant will receive the balance of the net proceeds of any such sale. The applicant may also bid at the auction.
In my view, despite the importance of the sale of Property 1A to the applicant, when considered in combination with his significant delay having waited until the “eleventh hour” to bring this application and the interests of the first respondent, I am not satisfied the applicant has demonstrated that the circumstances require the Court to grant expedition.