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[2025] NSWCA 126
procedural. The applicant’s notice of motion filed 27 May 2025 was dismissed. He was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the motion. He was granted leave to file by 10 June 2025 an amended summons...
The Court of Appeal judge could consider whether to pause the primary judge’s orders, but could not set those orders aside on a motion before a single judge. Some of the requested stays would have done nothing practical, one request concerned a notation rather than an order, and the trustees had not been joined to the proceedings even though they were necessary parties to the application about their appointment. The judge also found no demonstrated basis for granting a stay. The motion was dismissed, but the applicant was allowed to amend his summons to join the trustees.
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2,461 words · generated 06/10/2026
The judgment concerns a short procedural application in the New South Wales Court of Appeal, not a final determination of the dispute about two Roselands properties. Adamson JA heard Fahmid Rahman’s notice of motion on 2 June 2025. Mr Rahman sought to stay, or have set aside, a series of orders made in ongoing Equity Division proceedings. The judgment records that a single judge could consider a stay, but could not set aside substantive orders made by the primary judge ([15]–[17]).
8 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The underlying proceedings arose after Family Court property-settlement orders made on 24 March 2023. Those orders included appointing Mita Rahman as trustee for the sale of two properties, referred to as Property 1 and Property 1A ([2]). The New South Wales proceedings began in October 2024 when Mr Rahman sought an extension of a caveat. The judgment says that the primary judge later raised whether Mrs Rahman should remain a trustee, and ultimately appointed independent trustees, Andrew Fleming and Stefano Calabretta ([5]–[8]).
The primary judge also made orders concerning possession, removal of Mr Rahman’s personal property from Property 1A, and the sale process ([9]–[10]). The parties’ daughter, Wafa Rahman, was involved as the purchaser of Property 1A. By the time of the Court of Appeal hearing, the trustees had issued her a notice to complete, and the deadline stated in the judgment was 3 June 2025 ([11]).
Mr Rahman sought to challenge five groups of decisions or directions: dismissal of his recusal application; appointment of the trustees; related orders concerning the properties; directions concerning his personal property; and a notation relating to a notice to complete ([19]). Adamson JA dismissed the motion, ordered Mr Rahman to pay Mrs Rahman’s costs, gave him leave to file an amended summons joining the trustees, and stood the matter over for further directions on 11 June 2025 ([28]).
The judgment gives both a general framework for stays pending appeal and reasons specific to each category of requested relief. It states that the powers to grant a stay derive from s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and r 50.7 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) ([18]). The principles quoted from Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gispac Pty Ltd are that an applicant must show serious issues for determination and a real risk of prejudice or damage if a stay is refused. If those matters are shown, the court then considers the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties ([18]).
A separate limit concerned the form of relief. Mr Rahman’s motion asked for orders to be stayed or set aside, but Adamson JA explained that a single Court of Appeal judge could not set aside substantive orders made by a primary judge. The Court would usually need to be constituted by three judges for that purpose. The motion before her was therefore limited to the possibility of a stay ([17]).
For the recusal decision, the judge focused on practical effect. Mr Rahman appeared to believe that staying the order dismissing his recusal application would prevent the primary judge from continuing to hear the proceedings. Adamson JA said that understanding was incorrect: a stay of the dismissal would have no effect and ought not be made ([21]). She also noted, by reference to Barakat v Goritsas, that generally no appeal lies from the rejection of a recusal application, although a refusal can conventionally be relied on as a ground of appeal concerning orders made by that judge ([21]).
The trustees’ absence from the appeal proceedings was a distinct obstacle. The judge held that they were not merely proper parties but necessary parties to an application about the order appointing them. Since they had not been joined, the application was not properly constituted and could not be dealt with unless and until they were joined ([23]). The court’s procedural order granting leave to amend the summons was consistent with that conclusion ([28]).
Adamson JA also considered why a stay of the trustees’ appointment was not warranted on the material before her. The trustees were engaged in selling the properties, and replacing them would cause considerable expense and disruption. The proceeds were to be placed in a fund for distribution in accordance with the Family Court orders, and the conflict between Mr and Mrs Rahman showed no sign of abating ([24]). The judgment therefore identifies practical consequences and the arrangements protecting the parties’ interests as relevant considerations.
The remaining requests had their own problems. The dates for compliance with the directions about personal property appeared to have passed, and Mr Rahman identified no basis for a stay ([25]). The notice to complete had already been served, and the judge described the relevant statement in the primary judge’s reasons as a notation, not an order capable of being stayed ([26]). The overall conclusion was that, independently of the joinder problem, Mr Rahman had not demonstrated a basis on which a stay could properly be granted ([27]).
The judgment does not present itself as changing the law on stays or recusal. It applies existing statutory and procedural powers and cites established stay principles. Its account of the stay test is taken from Michael Hill Jeweller, which in turn refers to earlier decisions, including Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd, Kalifair Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd, and Pamplin v Irwin ([18]). The judgment’s contribution is principally an application of those principles to the requested relief and the procedural state of this particular application.
Before this decision, as described in the judgment, a stay applicant was required to establish serious issues for determination and a real risk of prejudice or damage if the stay was not granted. Only if those requirements were satisfied would the court consider the balance of convenience and competing rights ([18]). The decision does not modify that sequence or formulate a different test.
The judgment also restates two procedural propositions in context. First, a single Court of Appeal judge could not set aside substantive orders of a primary judge, although the judge could consider a stay ([17]). Secondly, parties who are necessary to the application must be joined: without the trustees, the application concerning their appointment could not be dealt with ([23]). The result was not that the underlying appeal had been finally determined. Rather, the stay motion was dismissed, with leave to amend the summons to add the trustees and a later call-over for directions ([28]).
For recusal applications, the judgment records that generally no appeal lies from rejection of a recusal application, while noting that the refusal may conventionally be relied on as a ground of appeal concerning orders made by that judge ([21]). It does not decide any future appeal ground, nor does it determine whether the primary judge was, or appeared to be, biased. Its holding on the stay request was narrower: staying the dismissal would have no practical effect on the ongoing proceedings.
The judgment’s treatment of a notation is similarly confined. It states that the notation about the notice to complete was not an order that could be stayed ([26]). It does not establish a broad test for classifying all judicial statements, directions, or notations. The point is tied to the particular notation and the fact that the notice had already been served.
At [17], Adamson JA states: “A single judge of the Court of Appeal cannot set aside substantive orders made by a primary judge since this requires the Court to be constituted, usually, by three judges.” In plain English, the judge hearing this motion did not have power to grant the part of the requested relief that would undo the primary judge’s substantive orders. The motion could be considered only as an application for a stay.
At [18], the judgment sets out the stay principles: an applicant must show serious issues for determination and a real risk of prejudice or damage if no stay is granted. If those conditions are met, the court considers convenience and the parties’ competing rights. This is a summary quoted from Michael Hill Jeweller, rather than a new test created in this judgment.
At [21], the judge says that a stay of the recusal dismissal “would have no effect”. The practical explanation is that suspending the order dismissing recusal would not, by itself, prevent the primary judge from continuing to manage the ongoing proceedings. The judgment separately notes the position about appeal grounds and cites Barakat v Goritsas.
At [23], Adamson JA says the trustees were necessary parties and that the application “cannot be dealt with unless and until” they were joined. In plain English, the court could not properly determine the request to stay their appointment while they were absent from the proceedings. The order granting leave to amend the summons provided a procedural opportunity to add them; it did not itself determine the merits of a future application.
At [24], the judge explains that staying the appointment could cause expense and disruption because the trustees were already engaged in the sale. The judgment also points to the arrangement requiring sale proceeds to be held for distribution under the Family Court orders. This explains why the judge saw no warrant for interrupting the trustees’ work on the material before her.
At [26], the judge says: “A notation is not an order that can be stayed.” The notation concerned the possibility of the trustees issuing a notice to complete, and that notice had already been served. The court therefore treated the requested stay as both directed to a non-order and related to an event that had already occurred.
Finally, [27] gives the overall conclusion: even aside from the failure to join the trustees, Mr Rahman had not shown a proper basis for a stay. That makes clear that joinder was not the only reason the motion failed.
This decision is relevant to procedural situations where a party seeks a stay pending appeal in the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The specific framework described at [18] is engaged where an applicant asks the court to pause the effect of an order while appellate proceedings are pursued. The judgment directs attention to serious issues, a real risk of prejudice or damage, and, where the threshold matters are established, the balance of convenience and competing rights.
The decision is also pertinent where the requested relief is being considered by a single Court of Appeal judge. At [17], it distinguishes the power to grant a stay from the power to set aside substantive orders. It therefore illustrates why the precise relief sought and the constitution of the court matter procedurally.
Joinder is central where an application seeks to affect an order appointing or involving third parties. Here, the trustees were necessary parties because the motion sought to stay their appointment and they were not joined ([23]). The judgment’s specific result arose in the context of those trustees and that application; it should not be read as deciding which parties are necessary in every different dispute.
The case also illustrates the relevance of practical utility. A requested stay may lack utility if it would not change what happens in the underlying proceedings, as the judge found in relation to the recusal dismissal ([21]). A request may also fail to identify an operative order to pause, as with the notation at [26], or concern steps already taken or deadlines that appear to have passed ([25]–[26]).
The judgment does not decide whether a stay would be appropriate in a different factual setting, whether the appeal grounds had merit, or whether the primary judge should have recused himself. It is a procedural ruling on the motion and record before Adamson JA.
The supplied judgment contains no later judicial treatment of Rahman v Rahman [2025] NSWCA 126. It was decided on 5 June 2025, and the text records orders made on 2 June 2025. No later decisions applying, distinguishing, approving, or criticising this judgment are identified in the material provided. Accordingly, no account of its subsequent treatment can be drawn from this judgment alone.
The cases it does discuss are earlier authorities. Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gispac Pty Ltd is cited for the established stay principles ([18]). Barakat v Goritsas is referred to in connection with the general position on appeals from refusals of recusal applications ([21]). The judgment also reproduces citations to Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd, Kalifair Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd, and Pamplin v Irwin as part of the stay-principles passage ([18]). Those citations show the sources relied on for the propositions stated, not later treatment of Rahman.
The judgment also refers to Rahman v Rahman [2024] NSWSC 1616 as a source for the history of the proceedings below ([4]). It does not analyse that decision as an authority for the stay principles or the necessary-party ruling.
Several matters remained unresolved after this procedural decision. First, the judgment did not determine the application for leave to appeal or the merits of any proposed appeal grounds. It dealt with the notice of motion seeking a stay and made directions concerning amendment and a later call-over ([28]).
Second, the judgment did not decide whether the primary judge should have recused himself. It recorded the applicant’s complaints and held that staying the dismissal of the recusal application would have no effect. The observation about possible appeal grounds is not a determination of any such ground ([20]–[21]).
Third, the court did not decide what would happen after the trustees were joined. It granted leave to file an amended summons by 10 June 2025 and stood the matter over to 11 June 2025 ([28]). The judgment does not report the outcome of any later application or the sale process.
Fourth, the judgment does not determine the ultimate position concerning Property 1A, the purchaser’s completion obligations, or the distribution of sale proceeds. It reports the notice-to-complete process and the Family Court orders governing distribution, but does not decide the parties’ substantive rights in those matters ([11], [24]).
Finally, the court’s observations about the trustees’ necessity and the lack of utility of particular stays depend on the proceedings and orders before it. The judgment does not provide a comprehensive test for identifying necessary parties in other proceedings, nor a general rule that every recusal-related stay lacks utility. Its conclusions are tied to the specific relief and procedural circumstances described at [21]–[27].
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Rahman v Rahman [2025] NSWCA 126
Hearing dates: 2 June 2025
Date of orders: 2 June 2025
Decision date: 05 June 2025
Before: Adamson JA
Decision: (1) Dismiss the applicant’s notice of motion filed 27 May 2025.
(2) Order the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the notice of motion.
(3) Grant leave to the applicant to file by 10 June 2025 an amended summons joining the trustees as parties.
(4) Stand the matter over to the Registrar’s call-over for further directions on 11 June 2025.
Catchwords: APPEALS — leave to appeal — application for stay pending appeal — stay refused — Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 67 — Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 50.7 — lack of utility of stay
CIVIL PROCEDURE — parties — failure to join all necessary parties to proceedings — where trustees were necessary parties
COURTS AND JUDGES — bias — apprehended bias — lack of utility in granting a stay of primary judge’s dismissal of application for recusal
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 67
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), ss 74J, 74K
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), ss 43, 46
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 50.7
Cases Cited: Barakat v Goritsas [2012] NSWCA 8
Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gispac Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 128
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Fahmid Rahman (Applicant)
Mita Farjina Rahman (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
Self-represented (Applicant)
J Brown (Respondent)
Solicitors:
MIC Lawyers (Applicant)
Marsdens Law Group (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/202852
On 10 October 2024, Fahmid Rahman, the appellant, commenced proceedings in the Equity Division of this Court (the Court below) against his former partner, Mita Rahman. The proceedings concern, in part, sale of two real properties in Roselands (Property 1 and Property 1A).
The proceedings in the Court below had their genesis in Family Law proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (the Family Court) between Mr and Mrs Rahman. On 24 March 2023, the Family Court made orders giving effect to the final property settlement between the parties, including an order appointing Mrs Rahman trustee for the sale of Property 1 and Property 1A. At that time, Mrs Rahman and other family members occupied Property 1 and tenants occupied Property 1A, which was used by the couple as an investment property.
At some point, their daughter, Wafa Rahman (Ms Rahman) entered into a contract to purchase Property 1A from Mrs Rahman, as trustee.
It is not necessary to summarise the proceeding in the Court below in detail, nor was such detail evident in the notice of motion before me. It is sufficient for present purposes to note the following (which is principally derived from JusticeLink and Rahman v Rahman [2024] NSWSC 1616 (Slattery J), to which I was referred by Mr Brown, who appeared for Mrs Rahman). The proceedings in the Court below have largely been case managed and heard by Slattery J (the primary judge).
The proceedings in the Court below were commenced on 10 October 2024 when Mr Rahman filed a summons seeking an extension of a caveat pursuant to s 74K of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). I infer that an extension was required because Mrs Rahman had served a notice of lapsing of caveat under s 74J of the Real Property Act so that she could sell at least one of the properties. I infer that the caveat referred to the Family Court orders.
On 7 November 2024, the primary judge raised the question whether Mrs Rahman ought be removed as a trustee since the time which had elapsed between the Family Court orders tended to suggest that she did not understand her obligation as trustee to sell the properties in a timely way. Mr Rahman sought to be appointed trustee and said that he could sell both properties within two months. Ultimately, Mrs Rahman agreed to relinquish her position as trustee but only on the basis that independent trustees would be appointed in her stead. Also on that day, the primary judge directed Mrs Rahman to file and serve a cross-claim against the purchaser of Property 1A (who was Ms Rahman). On 13 November 2024, Mrs Rahman filed a cross-claim against Ms Rahman who thereby became a party to the proceedings.
On 28 November 2024, the primary judge dismissed Mr Rahman’s application that he recuse himself from hearing the matter further.
On 16 December 2024, the primary judge appointed Andrew Fleming and Stefano Calabretta as trustees for sale of the Roselands properties (the trustees).
On 18 February 2025, the primary judge made an order for possession in favour of the trustees against Mrs Rahman in respect of Property 1A and ordered Mr Rahman to withdraw a caveat over Property 1, in order that the trustees could sell the properties.
On 9 April 2025, the primary judge made orders which included the following:
1. GRANTS liberty to Mr [Fahmid] Rahman to attend the premises [at Property 1A], for the purposes of inspecting, identifying, collecting and removing such property and chattels that remain there that he identifies as his own.
2. ORDERS Mr Rahman to remove all property and chattels from [Property 1A] by no later than 29 April 2025.
3. GRANTS liberty to Mr Rahman to provide a list of personal property and chattels which he claims were in his possession at the time of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Orders of 23 March 2023 which were not at [Property 1A] at the time of his inspection pursuant to ORDER 1.
4. ORDERS that on and from 30 April 2025, the Trustees are at liberty to dispose of all remaining chattels and personal property left at [Property 1A] with any fees and disbursements incurred in doing so to be deducted from the sale proceeds.
5. NOTES that the Trustees are going to seek an advice from an Agent as to the best method of selling [Property 1A] with a view to maximising the value of the property and will report to the Court and the parties on the next mention date as to their proposal for selling that property.
It would appear that Ms Rahman entered into a contract to purchase Property 1A from Mrs Rahman. In any event, on 14 May 2025, the primary judge noted that if the sale of Property 1A did not settle on 16 May 2025, the trustees were at liberty to issue a notice to complete to Ms Rahman, as the purchaser. I was informed that as Ms Rahman failed to complete, the trustees issued a notice to complete on 16 May 2025 which was due to expire at 2pm on 3 June 2025 (the day after the hearing of the notice of motion).
On 27 May 2025, the primary judge made orders which included the following:
DIRECTS the Trustees to file and serve a Notice of Motion for relief in relation to any alleged conduct of Mr Rahman together with any affidavit material in support by Wednesday, 28 May 2025.
I infer that this direction derives from an allegation by the trustees that Mr Rahman did not comply with the orders made by the primary judge on 9 May 2025.
On 28 May 2025, the primary judge extended the time within which the trustees were to file the notice of motion referred to in the order of 27 May 2025 to 30 May 2025 and listed that motion for hearing before his Honour on 11 June 2025.
On 27 May 2025, Mr Rahman filed a summons for leave to appeal in this Court. He also filed a notice of motion on that day seeking that orders made by the primary judge on 28 November 2024, 16 December 2024, 18 February 2025, 9 April 2025 and 14 May 2025 be “stay[ed]/set aside, to the extent they adversely affect the appellant and his children and a stay of the entire proceedings until the determination of this appeal or further order of the Court.” These documents were filed on Mr Rahman’s behalf by his solicitor, Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, who is the solicitor on the record for Mr Rahman.
The motion came before me, as a single judge, on a referral from the Registrar’s list. Mrs Rahman opposed the stay. As a family tragedy had necessitated Mr Chaudhry’s absence from Australia, Mr Rahman appeared on his own behalf, as is his entitlement. Mr Rahman has also appeared for himself in the Court below.
A single judge of the Court of Appeal cannot set aside substantive orders made by a primary judge since this requires the Court to be constituted, usually, by three judges: ss 43 and 46 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). My powers on the motion are, in the circumstances, limited to granting a stay of orders made by the primary judge.
The powers of this Court to grant a stay pending appeal derive from s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and r 50.7 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). The relevant principles were summarised by Payne JA in Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gispac Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 128 at [5]:
The principles governing the grant of a stay pending an appeal are well-settled, as the parties on this application agreed. They are analogous to those which govern the grant of interlocutory relief before trial: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 694-5, Kalifair Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 737; [2002] NSWCA 383 at [18]. A party applying for a stay must show, first, that the appeal raises serious issues for determination by the appellate court; and secondly, that there is a real risk that the appellant will suffer prejudice or damage if the stay is not granted. If an appellant prevails on those two questions, then the Court is to consider the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties: Pamplin v Irwin [2024] NSWCA 112 at [11] per Leeming JA.
It became apparent in the course of his oral submissions that the matters in respect of which Mr Rahman sought relief in this Court before me on 2 June 2025 concerned:
the order made by the primary judge on 28 November 2024 dismissing Mr Rahman’s application that he recuse himself;
the order made by the primary judge on 16 December 2024, appointing trustees for sale of the properties (this occurred over Mr Rahman’s objection as he wished to be appointed trustee for sale);
orders made in relation to the properties on 18 February 2025 (see above);
the orders made by the primary judge on 9 April 2025 requiring Mr Rahman to take action to identify and remove his personal property from Property 1A; and
the notation made on 14 May 2025 that if Ms Rahman did not complete the contract for the purchase of Property 1, the trustees were at liberty to serve a notice to complete.
As to (1), Mr Rahman submitted that he did not want the primary judge to continue to hear the matter and supervise the sale of the properties through the trustees. He said that the primary judge interrupted him, had difficulty understanding him (by contrast to other named judges) and did not allow him to explain himself. He said that he endeavoured to deal with this problem by preparing written submissions but this was not always possible. Furthermore, Mr Rahman took great exception to the circumstance that the primary judge had directed Mrs Rahman to file a cross-claim against Ms Rahman and described as “unacceptable” that a mother be “advised” to sue her daughter.
I understood from Mr Rahman’s submissions that he was under the misapprehension that if I were to stay the primary judge’s dismissal of his application to recuse himself, his Honour would no longer be permitted to hear the matter (the matter is ongoing in the Court below). This is not correct. A stay of the first order would have no effect and therefore ought not be made. I note further that, conventionally, a refusal by a judge to accede to an application for recusal can be relied upon as a ground of appeal with respect to any orders made by that judge. However, generally, no appeal lies from the rejection of a recusal application: see the discussion of the issue generally in Barakat v Goritsas [2012] NSWCA 8 (Basten JA).
As to (2) and (3), Mr Rahman appeared to believe that if I were to stay the order appointing Mr Fleming and Mr Calabretta as trustees for sale, it would have the effect that they could not terminate the contract for sale to Ms Rahman if she failed to complete her purchase of the property on 3 June 2025 and, accordingly, she would not be at risk of forfeiting the deposit. Mr Rahman may also believe that if this order is stayed, he will be appointed trustee for sale. Mr Rahman would also like to be in a position to assist Ms Rahman to complete the purchase of Property 1A, notwithstanding that the Family Court orders provide that the funds are not to be distributed until all properties have been sold.
For the reasons given above, I made the following orders on 2 June 2025:
Dismiss the applicant’s notice of motion filed 27 May 2025.
Order the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the notice of motion.
Grant leave to the applicant to file by 10 June 2025 an amended summons joining the trustees as parties.
Stand the matter over to the Registrar’s call-over for further directions on 11 June 2025.
**********
Rahman
Rahman [2025] NSWCA 126
(1985) 2 NSWLR 685
(2002) 55 NSWLR 737
The applicant’s notice of motion filed 27 May 2025 was dismissed. He was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the motion. He was granted leave to file by 10 June 2025 an amended summons joining the trustees as parties. The matter was stood over to the Registrar’s call-over for further directions on 11 June 2025.
However, there is an insuperable obstacle to the grant of a stay of that order. The trustees are not only proper parties to such an application; they are also necessary parties and they have not been joined to the proceedings in this Court. Thus, the application is not properly constituted and cannot be dealt with unless and until it is.
In any event, there is no warrant for a stay of the order appointing the trustees since they are engaged in selling the properties and it would cause considerable expense and disruption were they to be replaced. The parties are protected by the requirement that the proceeds of the sale of the properties will be put in a fund to be distributed to them in accordance with the orders of the Family Court. The conflict between Mr and Mrs Rahman, which was a significant reason why the primary judge appointed independent trustees for sale, does not show any sign of abating.
As to (4), Mr Brown’s instructions were that issues related to these items of property had arisen in the past but they had been resolved by time, the dates for compliance having already passed. The form of the directions made on 9 April 2025 would tend to suggest that he is correct. Mr Rahman said that the date for Mr Rahman’s compliance was extended until 13 May 2025. However, Mr Rahman indicated that the matter was before the primary judge on 11 June 2025. He reiterated his objections to the primary judge continuing to hear that matter. No basis for a stay has been identified.
As to (5), once again this notation relates to an event which, it was common ground, has already occurred in that the trustees have already served a notice to complete on Ms Rahman. A notation is not an order that can be stayed.
Even aside from his failure to join the trustees to the motion, Mr Rahman cannot succeed on his application for a stay since he has failed to demonstrate the basis on which one could properly be granted.