The applicant's complaint to the Commissioner was made 15 months after the applicant had been dismissed from her voluntary position as the Music Director at her Church, which she alleged in her complaint was discrimination on the grounds of age contrary to ss 85A and 85B of the EO Act. The applicant submitted that her delay in making the complaint was due to legal advice she received that informed her that the EO Act did not apply to voluntary positions. Her complaint was further delayed by personal health issues and repairs being conducted at her home.

The applicant told the Tribunal during proceedings that her integrity had been discriminated against in her dismissal, not her age or sex, and that she had been dismissed because people within the Church did not like her.

• The Tribunal is satisfied that the Commissioner's decision to refuse to extend time is not an incorrect decision: the complaint was not made within time, and the Commissioner had the power to refuse to extend the time within which to lodge it;
• The Tribunal is satisfied the Commissioner's decision to refuse to extend time within which to bring the complaint was a preferable as well as a correct decision;
• The Tribunal is satisfied that although the applicant had reasons for the delay in making the complaint, these are not sufficient in themselves to support an extension of time, because it would not be just and equitable to do;
• To extend the time within which the applicant could make the complaint would impose significant prejudice on the respondent and the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant's complaint has no prospect of success.

Equal opportunity - Preliminary Applications - Extension of Time - Good Reasons - Just and Equitable in the Circumstances

Equal Opportunity Act 1984 ss 85A, 85B, 93, 96B

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 34, 37

Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd [1989] WASC 174; [1989] 2 WAR 196

Ferdinands v District Court of SA [2010] SASC 265

Hall v City of Burnside [2006] SASC 86

Jackamurra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516

Sastre v Commissioner for Equal Opportunity and TAFE SA [2018] SAET 26

Made under the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 37(1)(a)

1. This is the determination of an application made by Frances Raggio for review of a decision made by the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity (the Commissioner) on 4 November 2024, to refuse to extend the time within which Ms Raggio could make a complaint to the Commissioner pursuant to the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (the EO Act).
2. By letter dated 21 August 2024 Ms Raggio made a complaint with the Commissioner alleging discrimination in the course of (voluntary) employment on the ground of her age, contrary to ss 85A and 85B of the EO Act. The letter was received on 30 August 2024. She alleged in her complaint that on 27 May 2023 she had been dismissed from her position by Father Benjamin Campbell and Father Sayed Elias, who had appointed her as Music Director at St Michael the Archangel Catholic Church (Society of Saint Pius X) (the Church).
3. On 4 November 2024 the Commissioner advised Ms Raggio that her complaint had been made approximately 14 months after the discrimination she alleged. The Commissioner noted that the complaint referred to events which had occurred on 27 May 2023, and that Ms Raggio had asked her to accept the complaint even though it had been made outside the prescribed time limit of 12 months. While noting that Ms Raggio had provided reasons explaining the delay in making the complaint, including that she had received misleading legal advice that she was unable to make a complaint under the EO Act because she was a voluntary worker, and because she had been ill and had some domestic disturbances, the Commissioner refused to extend the time within which the complaint could be made to her office.
4. The Commissioner also was not satisfied there was any causal link between Ms Raggio's age and the dismissal from her role with the Church, and concluded that the complaint was lacking in substance.
5. Section 93(2) of the EO Act provides that a complaint alleging contravention of the EO Act must be made within 12 months of the act constituting the alleged contravention (or the latest of those acts, if the alleged contravention is constituted by a series of acts). The Commissioner may extend the time for the making of the complaint, if satisfied there is good reason why the complaint was not made within the stipulated time period, and, that in all the circumstances of the case, it is just and equitable to do so.
6. Where the Commissioner has refused an application for an extension of time within which to lodge a complaint, s 96B of the EO Act permits a person to apply to this Tribunal for a review of the Commissioner's decision. That application to this Tribunal must be made within 1 month of the Commissioner's decision.
7. This application is for a review of the Commissioner's decision not to extend the time within which to make the complaint to the Commissioner. The application to the Tribunal was made within the prescribed time limit. The application is not directly for a consideration of the merits of Ms Raggio's complaint, but whether time is extended for her to make the complaint for the Commissioner's consideration.
8. However, in considering whether time should be extended for Ms Raggio to make her complaint to the Commissioner, the Tribunal must consider the merits of her complaint as they appear on the face of her complaint. This is because whether a complaint has apparent merit is relevant to a determination of whether an extension of time in which to make the complaint should be granted. It is trite law to note that, if the out of time claim is clearly on its face without merit, time should not be extended to permit the claim to be made, as it would be pointless to do, as it could not succeed.
9. Ms Raggio and counsel for the Commissioner have provided written submissions in respect of this application. At a directions hearing on 2 May 2025 both agreed this issue would be decided on the basis of the material already submitted.

1. In lodging her substantive complaint to the Commissioner, Ms Raggio applied for an extension of time within which to make the application. She states in her request for the time to be extended that she had sought legal advice concerning her complaint in September 2023, and had been advised that she would have no recourse under the EO Act, as she was "a volunteer and unpaid". Her lawyer had written to the Church but no response had been forthcoming, and he had advised her "just let it go". She states that she only found out in July 2024 that she could make a complaint to the Commission even though she was a volunteer. She then began preparing her complaint to the Commission, but was further delayed by health considerations, and tradespeople doing work at her home.
2. Ms Raggio states that these are "genuine reasons", and form the basis of her application for time within which to make her complaint to be extended.
3. Ms Raggio also made some submissions concerning the circumstances forming the basis of her complaint, and the impact on her of the events.
4. Ms Raggio states in both her complaint to the Commissioner and in her submissions to the Tribunal that she had been engaged by the Church as its Music Director in about 2019. She had previously been a member of the congregation of the Church when it was located elsewhere in Adelaide, and "had asked to be in charge of the music", and she led the singing and played the organ. This arrangement ended in about 2000. In 2016, when she was living in Melbourne, she had been contacted by a new priest at the Church and asked to "do the music" for the Easter ceremonies. She commuted to Adelaide from Melbourne each month to sing the Mass, and she also formed a children's choir, but this choir disbanded in about 2023. She also undertook other tasks within the Church, including cleaning, doing the flowers, and generally supporting the priest who flew in on weekends. In 2019 Ms Raggio had returned to live in Adelaide. She continued to work at and with the Church, and was an active contributor to the Church community.
5. Ms Raggio is a confirmed and committed Catholic, and her Catholic faith and worship is a central part of her life and identity. Her commitment is to the particular form of Catholic worship provided at the Church. There is no other church in South Australia which provides this form of worship.
6. Ms Raggio states that on 27 May 2023 the priest at the Church, Father Campbell, told her there had been an "investigation" concerning her conduct, and other members of the congregation had made reports concerning her conduct, and as a result of this Father Campbell had decided to remove her from her position as Music Director, a decision which had been endorsed by his superiors in the Church. Father Campbell said that no one wanted to work with her or join her choir, and a new musical director would be appointed. Ms Raggio said he gave three reasons: that she had a chip on her shoulder; that she was judgemental; and that no one wanted to work with her.
7. Ms Raggio states that she told Father Campbell this was unfair and any allegations were untrue, and that she should have been consulted about any complaints about her so she could respond to them.
8. Ms Raggio states that she was entirely devastated by the dismissal from her position and the allegations made by Father Campbell.
9. Ms Raggio wrote to Father Campbell on 2 June 2023. She sets out how she saw the events of 27 May, and how unfair the allegations and the dismissal from her position were. She denied the allegations made, and spoke of her feelings of despair and desolation at losing the position, and asserted she had been very poorly treated, without respect for or appreciation of her work for and commitment to the Church. She begged for the decision, which she saw as totally unjustified, to be changed. Ms Raggio wrote again to Father Campbell on 18 September 2023; to the Superior General of the Church on 25 October 2023; and to Father Black, the preceding priest at the Church, on 14 February and 20 February 2024. In all this correspondence she sets out her account of the events of 27 May 2023, and her position that the dismissal was unjustified and unfair, asserting it treated her without respect and gave her no opportunity to respond to wrong and anonymous allegations against her.
10. In September 2023 Ms Raggio sought legal advice, and her solicitor wrote to Father Campbell on 19 December 2023. In that letter the solicitor sets out Ms Raggio's account of the events of 27 May, her distress and "mortification" at the decision not to allow her to maintain her position as Music Director with the Church, and refers to Ms Raggio's "vehement protests" concerning the "unjust nature of [the] decision". The letter refers to "the combination of the anonymous investigation, the amorphous allegations, and the hearsay accounts of ridicule" which had left Ms Raggio "devastated", and that she felt "isolated, unwelcome, disrespected, and homeless" as a consequence.
11. The letter also refers to Ms Raggio's concern that she was undermined with the Church, and others were encouraged to undermine her, and that she was given no opportunity to address or rectify concerns about her conduct. It was clear the decision concerning her future had been made before she was spoken to by Father Campbell.
12. The letter states that Ms Raggio wished to reinstate her position with the Church through some form of conciliation process, and sought a formal apology.
13. Ms Raggio said there was no response to this letter, from the Church or Father Campbell.
14. In her submissions, oral and written, to the Tribunal, Ms Raggio has made it clear that she remains devastated by the actions of Father Campbell, supported, as she understands, by the Church. She told the Tribunal she felt that it was her "integrity", rather than her age, which had been attacked by Father Campbell when he dismissed her on 27 May. She said her "integrity had been discriminated against", and her rights had been denied. She conceded to the Tribunal that Father Campbell had "attacked my integrity, not my age, sex or music". She said he essentially told her, "we just don't like you, we don't want you".
15. Ms Raggio's complaint to the Commissioner was dated 21 August 2024, and she asserts in the complaint that the Church discriminated against her in dismissing her from her voluntary role with the Church on the ground of age. She sought reinstatement to her former position, and asserted the Church's conduct had caused her loss and damage. In her later submissions to the Tribunal, Ms Raggio states she has suffered acute mental anguish, including stress and torment, sleepless nights, isolation, anxiety, and "spiritual desolation", as she has nowhere to practise her faith and worship. She felt also that her canonical and constitutional rights had been violated.

1. Ms Cianciosi for the Commissioner drew the Tribunal's attention to the legal principles applicable to the exercise of discretion to extend time limits. She refers to the Tribunal to s 93(2) of the EO Act which requires a complaint to the Commissioner to be made within 12 months of the act alleged to contravene the EO Act. The act to which Ms Raggio referred in her complaint occurred on 27 May 2023, and her complaint was dated 21 August 2024, and received by the Commissioner on 30 August 2024. Accordingly, it was made to the Commissioner more than 12 months after the relevant act occurred.
2. Ms Cianciosi submitted that an extension of time within which to make a complaint relies on s 93(2a) of the EO Act. The Commissioner has the power to extend time for the lodging of a complaint if satisfied that there is "good reason" why the complaint was not made within the stipulated time; and that "in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to do so".
3. Ms Cianciosi submitted that these requirements are cumulative, not alternative, so the Commissioner must be satisfied both that there were good reasons for the delay, and that it would be just and equitable to extend the time.
4. She referred the Tribunal to the four principal, non-exhaustive, factors taken into account in the courts in considering if an extension of time should be granted: the length of the delay; the reason for the delay; prejudice to the other party; and the merits of the substantive question to be ventilated.

1. In considering Ms Raggio's application for review of the Commissioner's decision not to extend the time within which she can lodge her complaint to the Commissioner, I have taken into account the written and oral submissions made by Ms Raggio, as well as the material contained in the s 35 documents filed with the Tribunal on 16 January 2025. The material before me includes a number of correspondences Ms Raggio made to various members of the Church, referred to above, as well as the letter her solicitor sent to Father Campbell. I have also had reference to the Commissioner's letter of 4 November 2024 to Ms Raggio, where she set out the reasons for her decision.
2. At the directions hearing on 2 May 2025 Ms Raggio told the Tribunal she believed she had said all she could about the reason why she wanted the time extended, and had also set out all her concerns about the matter in her written submission, and that the circumstances of the events of 27 May 2023 were clear from the other material provided to the Tribunal. She agreed that this matter should be considered on the papers and there was no need for any further hearings on this aspect of the matter.
3. I am satisfied there is sufficient material before me to determine this matter on the papers.

1. Accordingly, I make the following findings on the basis of this material:
   1. The act in respect of which Ms Raggio made her complaint occurred 27 May 2023.
   2. Father Campbell, the presiding priest at the Church, called Ms Raggio into his office and told her the Church no longer wanted her to be its Music Director, and intended to appoint a new music director. Father Campbell told Ms Raggio that there had been an investigation about her conduct as Music Director, and some members of the congregation had made complaints against her. He told her members of the congregation did not want to work with her, that she had "a chip on her shoulder", and was "judgemental". Ms Raggio denied these allegations had any truth, and objected to the decision and process, telling Father Campbell the decision and the process were unfair and not respectful of her. She asked for the decision to be reversed. Father Campbell did not do so.
   3. Ms Raggio subsequently wrote to Father Campbell on 2 June 2023 setting out her account of the events of 27 May and her objections to the decision and the process, and the impact of the decision on her. She later wrote similar letters to the Superior General of the Church, further to Father Campbell, and to the former superior Father Black.
   4. Ms Raggio sought legal advice in September 2023, and was advised her circumstances were not covered by the EO Act. Her solicitor wrote to Father Campbell on 19 December 2023 setting out Ms Raggio's concerns, and advising that she sought a reconciliation with the Church by way of conciliation, and an apology.
   5. All these correspondences set out in detail the circumstances of Ms Raggio's "dismissal" and the discussions at that time, and her shock and distress at her dismissal and its impact on her.
   6. In none of these correspondences or accounts is there any reference to the "dismissal" being made on the ground of or with any reference to Ms Raggio's age.
   7. All these correspondences refer to Ms Raggio's shock and distress at the allegation that some unidentified members of the congregation asserted that "some people" did not want to work with her; there had been "investigations" which had not involved her and were therefore unfair; and that she had a suspicion that another person of whom she disapproved, might replace her. Her complaint in these correspondences and accounts is that she was treated unfairly, disrespectfully, and without respect or appreciation or proper acknowledgement, and had been accorded no right to respond to the alleged complaints.
   8. In early 2024 Ms Raggio first made inquiries to the Commission.
   9. Later in 2024 Ms Raggio experienced some ill health and was admitted to hospital. She was also inconvenienced in her home by water damage which required tradespeople to attend.
   10. Ms Raggio made a complaint to the Commission dated 21 August 2024, alleging discrimination in the course of her voluntary employment on the ground of her age, contrary to ss 85A and 85B of the EO Act. She alleged that on 27 May 2023 she had been dismissed from her position as Music Director at the Church on the ground of her age.
2. I note that the complaint to the Commissioner is the first reference or suggestion that Ms Raggio's dismissal as Music Director of the Church was on the basis of her age.
3. Before the Tribunal Ms Raggio acknowledged her concerns were for what she identified as an attack on her integrity, and the unfairness of the way in which the Church had acted against her, giving her no opportunity to respond, or to be aware of the nature of the complaints against her, or the identity of the complainants. She told the Tribunal she believed the source of her dismissal was a conspiracy of unknown people among the congregation, probably involving the priests, and, in her view, certainly Father Elias, including "fake accusations resulting in my position being taken from me".
4. In a written submission to the Tribunal dated 18 December 2024, Ms Raggio explained why she had referred to age as the basis of her complaint, stating "I thought my age was behind [T]he actions taken against me ... the priests acted unjustly towards me. Furthermore they [E]ngaged someone to take my place who is very young, inexperienced, and who I [S]pent 3 weeks training in 2022... but who lied to the priests about me to support their own lies, and now he has my position ALL WITHOUT KNOWING ME OR ANYTHING ABOUT ME which heavily flaws any reason for my dismissal...".
5. Ms Raggio told the Tribunal, and set out in her written submissions, that her primary concerns were "the false accusations" against her, and what she characterised as an attack on her integrity and good name. She told the Tribunal she felt that it was her "integrity", rather than her age, which had been attacked by Father Campbell when he dismissed her on 27 May. She said her "integrity had been discriminated against", and her rights had been denied. She conceded to the Tribunal that Father Campbell had "attacked my integrity, not my age, sex or music". She said he essentially told her, "we just don't like you, we don't want you".

1. The Tribunal's capacity to review the decision of the Commissioner not to extend the time in which Ms Raggio could make her complaint to the Commission is set out in s 96B of the EO Act.
2. Section 96B provides that in reviewing a refusal to extend time, the Tribunal exercises its review jurisdiction set out in s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (the SACAT Act).
3. The Tribunal's role under s 34 of the SACAT Act is to determine if the decision the subject of review is a correct or preferable decision. Determining if a decision is correct entails being satisfied it is made in accordance with applicable legal principles, including relevant legislative requirements. Determining if the decision is preferable entails a consideration of the possible alternative decisions that may have been open to the decision-maker, and which best advances the purposes and policies of the Act pursuant to which the decision was made, in this case, the EO Act.
4. Sections 93(2) and (2a) of the EO Act govern decisions concerning complaints made under the EO Act.
5. Section 93(2) requires complaints to the Commissioner to be lodged within 12 months of the date on which the contravention of the EO Act is alleged to have occurred (s 93(2)(a)).
6. Section 93(2a) permits the Commissioner to extend the time within which to make the complaint:

(2a) The Commissioner may, on application, extend the time for making a complaint, even if the time for lodging the complaint has expired, if the Commissioner is satisfied -

(a) that there is good reason why the complaint was not made within the stipulated time period; and

(b) that in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to do so.

1. The application of s 93(2a) was considered by Dolphin PJ in Sastre v Commissioner for Equal Opportunity and TAFE SA ([2018] SAET 26 at [39]), where he considered that the requirements of good reasons for the delay, and that in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to extend the time, are cumulative requirements: that is, both requirements of s 93(2a) must be satisfied. With respect, I adopt this view, which is clear from the use of the conjunctive "and" between s 93(2a)(a) and (b).
2. The factors to be considered in determining if a time limit should be extended have been considered numerous times by superior courts. Four principal factors are identified as relevant considerations: the length of delay; the reasons for delay; any prejudice to the other party, and the merits of the substantive matter. In this case, the substantive matter is Ms Raggio's complaint of unlawful discrimination under the EO Act: that is, whether there is an arguable case in the complaint the subject of the out of time complaint.
3. In Hall v City of Burnside ([2006] SASC 86), Bleby J (at [32]) set out the main reasons to grant an extension of time:

In considering the exercise of discretion ... in granting an extension of time, there are, generally, four factors to consider, namely the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the applicant's prospects of success and the extent of any prejudice to the respondent by extending the time.

4. The identification of these factors as the primary concerns in considering an extension of time is supported in Jackamurra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 [6-8], [66]; Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd [1989] WASC 174; [1989] 2 WAR 196 at 198; and Ferdinands v District Court of SA [2010] SASC 265 [19] per Gray J.

1. Ms Raggio's complaint to the Commissioner was just over three months out of the time prescribed by s 93(2)(a) of the EO Act.
2. I am satisfied that the Commissioner's decision to refuse to extend time is not an incorrect decision: the complaint was not made within time, and the Commissioner had the power to refuse to extend the time within which to lodge it. The Commissioner provided reasons for her decision, as required by s 93(2b) of the EO Act, which demonstrated she had considered both aspects set out in s 93(2a). The issue before the Tribunal is, therefore, whether the Commissioner's decision was, in the circumstances, a preferable decision.
3. Ms Raggio provided the Commissioner with the reasons for her delay in making the complaint, and she provided the same reasons to the Tribunal. These reasons were that she had sought legal advice in about September 2023, and had been advised her complaint would not come within the EO Act. She did not contact the Commission herself until early 2024, and she then apparently decided to make a complaint to the Commissioner. However, she was delayed in doing so because of ill health, and then domestic disturbances when she had to have repairs done to her home. She made her complaint to the Commissioner in a letter dated 21 August 2024, and received by the Commission on 30 August 2024.
4. It is difficult to assess whether these constitute "good reason" for the delay in lodging the complaint. I accept these were genuine reasons for the delay, but whether they are "good reasons" for the purpose of extending time must be considered in the context of the additional requirement that any extension of time must be "just and equitable" in all the circumstances.
5. It is clear that Ms Raggio's solicitor did not pursue a complaint pursuant to the EO Act. Ms Raggio told the Tribunal (and the Commissioner) that he had advised her that the complaint did not come within the EO Act. The precise terms of his advice are not before the Tribunal. It is clear he took other action on Ms Raggio's instructions, and wrote to Father Campbell in December 2023, but with apparently no response. I accept that until she contacted the Commission Ms Raggio believed she had no recourse to the Commission under the EO Act.
6. Nor is it clear when Ms Raggio contacted the Commission herself. She was still corresponding with various Church authorities in September and October 2023, and in February 2024. She did not obtain any positive response (from her perspective) from these contacts, and it may be that she took the view then that she had exhausted her opportunity to resolve the issue by direct contact and negotiation. At this time however she was still well within the prescribed time in which to make her complaint to the Commission. After about that time, the delays appear to stem from her ill health and the distraction from her home repairs.
7. The second leg of s 93(2a) requires a determination of whether in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to extend the prescribed time. The remaining factors set out above are relevant to this consideration.
8. The delay in this matter was just over three months: it was received by the Commission in August 2024. The EO Act prescribes a 12 month time limit. While three months is not a long period to be out of time in an absolute sense, it is one quarter of the time prescribed by the EO Act, and this places the length of the delay in a different perspective.
9. The issue of prejudice in this context relates to the disadvantage the respondents to Ms Raggio's substantive complaint might face if the time within which to make the complaint is extended. The identity of the respondent in this matter is not entirely clear: Ms Raggio's complaint is made against Father Benjamin Campbell and Father Sayed Elias, at the Church. It is not clear if there is any legal entity associated with the Church. The priests named, and the Church, have not been given any notice of these proceedings before the Tribunal, so there are no submissions before me concerning the issue of prejudice to them. I understand they have not had notice from the Commissioner of the complaint made by Ms Raggio in August 2024, as she did not accept the complaint.
10. I am satisfied however that the respondents (the two priests and the Church) are aware of Ms Raggio's concerns, through her various correspondences in 2023 and 2024, and from the letter from her solicitor of 19 December 2023. They have been made aware of her grievance concerning her dismissal, and her desire that it be rectified and that she be reinstated in her position.
11. In my view, the respondents would experience some prejudice if the extension of time sought is granted. While it is the case they must be well aware of Ms Raggio's grievance, it appears the most recent correspondence from Ms Raggio was in early 2024, and, having heard nothing more since then, they may have assumed she had decided not to pursue the matter further. To permit an extension of time prejudices any arrangements they made depending on this possible assumption.
12. In addition, I have noted above that Ms Raggio did not assert to the respondents in any of her correspondence with them (including in her solicitor's letter to them) that they had discriminated against her on the ground of her age, contrary to the EO Act. This assertion first appeared in her complaint to the Commissioner. The respondents were not aware of this dimension of Ms Raggio's grievance, despite the ongoing correspondence from Ms Raggio, and to extend the time within which to make a complaint not previously made constitutes, in my view, prejudice to the respondents.
13. The final factor referred to in the broader discussion of granting an extension of time is the merits of the substantive matter, the prospects of success of the primary complaint to be litigated. The issue of whether the case is an arguable one is determined, in these circumstances, solely on the basis of the material presented by Ms Raggio.
14. This issue is of significance in deciding whether to extend time because, if there is no, or little, merit in the substantive complaint, there is no utility in extending the time, and also significant prejudice to the other party. If on the basis of the material before the decision-maker, there appears no or minimal chance of success in the prosecution of the substantive complaint, this consideration must militate against extending the time. To do so would impose significant prejudice on the respondent, who would then, beyond the time prescribed by the EO Act, have to respond to and defend a case which is unlikely to succeed; and in addition, would impose costs on the Commission to address a complaint not made within the prescribed time, and which appears to have little merit. To pursue this approach is contrary to the public interest. The time limit for making a complaint to the Commission is for a purpose, taking into account issues such as these.
15. I have heard no formal direct evidence concerning the substantive complaint. However, Ms Raggio has set out in considerable detail her account of the events to which her complaint relates, both in her written and oral submissions to the Tribunal, and in the various letters she has written to the respondents and others. These accounts are all before the Tribunal. Her accounts are clear and consistent. It is my view there is sufficient material upon which I am able to make an assessment of the arguability of Ms Raggio's substantive complaint, which is that she was subject to unlawful discrimination on the ground of her age in her dismissal from her position as Music Director of the Church.
16. Taking into account the material before me, in particular Ms Raggio's own submissions before the Tribunal, it is my view this complaint has no likelihood of success. Ms Raggio has made it clear before the Tribunal that her position and argument is not that she was discriminated against on the ground of her age: her position is that she was treated unfairly, without respect, and her integrity was challenged and undermined. Her perceptions in this respect may well be correct: however, these are not grounds of unlawful discrimination under the EO Act.
17. In all her correspondences concerning the events of 27 May 2023, with the respondents and other Church officials, Ms Raggio makes no allegation or assertion that she was discriminated against on the ground of her age, and in her accounts of the conversation she had with Father Campbell on that day there is no reference to her age. The reasons given (and which so offended Ms Raggio) related to her personality, her conduct, and her relations with others. Nor is there any reference to or assertion concerning her age in the solicitor's letter of 19 December 2023.
18. I have noted above that the first time the issue of Ms Raggio's age is mentioned is in her complaint to the Commissioner.
19. Further, and most pertinently, Ms Raggio told the Tribunal she did not think she had been discriminated against on the ground of her age, but rather that her "integrity had been discriminated against", and her rights had been denied, telling the Tribunal that Father Campbell "attacked my integrity, not my age, sex or music", and told her, "we just don't like you, we don't want you".
20. For a complaint under the EO Act to be successful, for it to "have merit" or "substance", the complaint must identify an act of discrimination made unlawful by the EO Act. Only some acts of discrimination are made unlawful by the EO Act: only discriminatory acts on the basis of sex, race, disability, age, disability, and other specified grounds; and in certain circumstances, including in employment (including voluntary employment), education, in the provision of goods and services and accommodation, and certain other specified circumstances. Other acts which may discriminate against a person on grounds not prescribed in the EO Act, or in circumstances not specified in the EO Act, may indeed represent real discrimination and cause damage, but they do not constitute unlawful discrimination under the EO Act.
21. I am satisfied that Ms Raggio's position is that she was subjected to unfair and disrespectful conduct, and the respondents discriminated against her (insofar as they singled her out for particular treatment), and this has resulted in significant damage to her, by way of distress, acute mental anguish, isolation and "spiritual desolation", and that her rights had been violated.
22. These complaints, although matters of great significance to Ms Raggio, do not establish a cause of action, or an arguable case, under the EO Act. This is a significant relevant consideration in deciding if the time within which a complaint to the Commissioner could be made should be extended. The Commissioner took the view that Ms Raggio's claim was "lacking in substance", and that there was "no causal link" between her age and the dismissal from her position.
23. I am satisfied the Commissioner's decision to refuse to extend time within which to bring the complaint was a preferable as well as a correct decision.
24. I am satisfied that although Ms Raggio had reasons for the delay in making the complaint, these are not sufficient in themselves to support an extension of time, because it would not be just and equitable to do so. If time were extended in this matter to enable Ms Raggio to make her complaint to the Commissioner, that would disregard the prejudice to the respondent (however defined), which has had no notice that her dispute relates to age discrimination.
25. Most significantly, Ms Raggio has conceded to the Tribunal that her complaint is not that she was discriminated against on the basis of her age, but that she was subject to disadvantage by unfair and disrespectful conduct by the respondent which disregarded her contribution to the Church, and did not accord her procedural fairness in enabling her to be aware of and respond to the allegations against her, and she has suffered damage as a consequence of this behaviour. She does not now assert this treatment was based on her age. This is not an argument which can succeed under the EO Act, as this is not conduct which is unlawful under the EO Act. To extend time to permit Ms Raggio to make such a complaint to the Commissioner would have no utility, as it would be dismissed as lacking in substance.
26. Ms Raggio's complaint itself does not disclose any ground for success, and her subsequent submissions, oral and written, make it clear that her position is that the decision was made on basis of undisclosed complaints about her and possibly personal animus against her, not because of her age. Regardless of any submission a respondent might make, there is no substance in a complaint that this conduct is unlawful under the EO Act.
27. Under these circumstances, I am satisfied there is no basis for extending time. I note Ms Raggio's reasons for the delay in making the complaint, but I am not satisfied these are "good reasons" in the circumstances of this matter. More particularly, I am not satisfied it would be just and equitable to extend the time in which to make the complaint. To do so would impose significant prejudice on the respondent (however identified), and I am satisfied, on the basis of the written and oral submissions before the Tribunal, that her complaint has no prospect of success. To extend the time within which to make this complaint is not in accordance with the purposes of the EO Act.
28. I will affirm the Commissioner's decision in this matter, being satisfied her decision is both correct and preferable.

1. This decision the subject of review is affirmed.