Rabbitquest & Stigsson [2025] FedCFamC1F 665 (28 August 2025)

1. Section 114Q of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) provides that it is an offence punishable by imprisonment for up to one year to publish or disseminate to the public or a section of the public any account of family law proceedings which identifies the parties, witnesses or other people concerned with the proceedings, unless specifically authorised by the Court.
2. If in any proceedings there are allegations of family violence and the provisions of section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) apply (see attached Family Violence Information Sheet), any unrepresented party will not be permitted to personally cross-examine the other party/parties.

1. Affected unrepresented parties may apply to the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme ("the Scheme") for representation but any such application must be made at least 12 weeks prior to the final hearing.

1. Further information about the legislation and the Scheme can be found at Part 4 of the attached Family Violence Information Sheet.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Rabbitquest & Stigsson has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are short-form oral reasons for decision pursuant to s 69ZL of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), as now in force, in respect of an Interim Application for parenting orders.
2. I note that the matter substantially resolved when it was before me, leaving only two outstanding matters and, in those circumstances, I will not go into the detail that would have been necessary, had the entire matter required determination.
3. In short compass, the issue is to determine the interim parenting arrangements for X (born 2020), and Y (born 2022) ("the children").
4. The applicant in the matter is the children's paternal grandmother, Mrs Rabbitquest, who is aged 54.
5. The first respondent is their mother, Ms Stigsson, aged 24.
6. The second respondent is their father, Mr Rabbitquest, aged 28.
7. I will just note, because it is relevant, that the father has a child from a subsequent relationship, B, who is one year old.
8. The mother and father commenced a relationship in around 2016 and separated on a final basis in mid-2023, following an argument in which there were serious allegations concerning the mother throwing a knife, and covering the father and his motorcycle in petrol and attempting to set him alight.
9. I will make no comment about that, but obviously, there are concerns about risks in the mother's household.
10. The father sought an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order ("ADVO"), and the mother was subsequently charged with breaching the ADVO and was incarcerated for a period of time.
11. The children remained in the father's care until November 2024.
12. At that time, the father allegedly shook his new child B, and in that context, because of the significant concerns about the father that alleged conduct raised, the Department of Communities and Justice ("DCJ") placed the children with the paternal grandmother. That was in November 2024.
13. The mother discovered that, and she took the children.
14. Proceedings were commenced by the paternal grandmother earlier this year.
15. Due to the significant risk issues, the matter was allocated to the Evatt List, and DCJ were invited to intervene, pursuant to s 91B of the Act. That was on 23 April 2025.
16. At that time, Orders were made the children to live with the mother, restraining paternal grandmother and father from removing the children from mother's care, and spending time or communicating with the children, unless otherwise physically ordered by the court or agreed between the parties, DCJ, and the Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL") in writing.
17. DCJ has intervened and took part.
18. The Court and the parties have the benefit of a Child Impact Report, it is obviously not a full Family Report. It has been prepared by Ms C, dated 26 March 2025.
19. That usefully summarises the many risk issues in the proceeding.
20. The parties, after spending a substantial amount of time discussing the matter when it was before me, substantially resolved the matter on what I consider to be very sensible terms and terms which I approved, and Orders were made in accordance with that agreement.
21. Those Orders which I made on 14 August 2025 are obviously relevant to what remains before me.
22. The substance of the Orders were that the mother would have sole decision-making responsibility, and the children would live with the mother, but that live-with Order was made conditional, as a parenting order may be, upon the mother complying with a series of Orders at 4 to 9.
23. The mother must do all things and acts to follow the family action plan provided by DCJ that she has signed, and she has to engage in the services and tasks as specified in that plan.
24. The mother also has to do all acts and things to comply with requests given by DCJ for her, including to attend random urinalysis, drug tests or hair follicle tests, ensure the children attend daycare no less than three days per week at their current daycare, which is to make sure independent people have eyes on them on a regular basis, and she must allow caseworkers or delegates of DCJ to inspect her home, allow them to attend the daycare, follow the reasonable directions of DCJ, accept any referrals, and is to provide DCJ with copies of drug tests.
25. Whilst the mother has sole decision-making responsibility and the children are ordered to live with her, in effect, based on the application of both ICL and DCJ, the Orders are effectively subject to the mother substantially engaging with and complying with DCJ's requirements.
26. This provides the court with comfort that the children may safely live with the mother at the moment, until there is a final hearing, by providing adequate ways to deal with the risk issues in the mother's household.
27. The parties also agreed that the children would spend supervised time with the father as directed and arranged by DCJ, with such time to occur "no more than once a month" providing that DCJ files an assessment as to how the risks will be mitigated.
28. That consent order, which I approved, was made in the context of, obviously, the risk issues and concerns that arose with the allegation that the father shook B, a very serious allegation.
29. The father's time with the children as ordered is inconsistent with the recommendation of the Court Child Expert ("CCE"), who said in the Child Impact Report at [50]:

It is reported by all parties there is a current no contact ADVO in place protecting the children from the father. Given no collateral material is currently available about the allegations made about the safety of the children in the father's care, the CCE does not support any interim arrangement of time for the children with the father. This risk issue will require a thorough assessment and the outcome of the Children's Court proceedings should be known before any time for the children with the father can be safely considered.

(Emphasis added)

1. Now, in the meantime, the father has been having some supervised time, as I understand it, with B, or time with B, and that is reported to be going well.
2. DCJ is aware of that, and it is in that context that DCJ, the ICL, and the parties proposed, and I agreed, the children could spend time with the father no more than once a month, and it would be supervised time.
3. The supervision is obviously to protect against physical risk, and, to some extent, psychological risk of the father saying inappropriate things, to the extent to which that can be controlled by supervision.
4. The father seeks more time. The issue about that proposal raised by both the ICL and DCJ is a concern about the children having more time with the father, in circumstances where it is not known what the ultimate position will be. I find that to be a reasonable concern.
5. However, I should also note that Order 14 was agreed, which is that the father and paternal grandmother were restrained by injunction from removing the children from the mother's care or any other place, and Order 14(b), which is:

14. That Mr [Rabbitquest] and the paternal grandmother are restrained by injunction from

...

b) spending time or communicating with the children unless otherwise specified by Order of the Court or by written agreement of the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice and the Independent Children's Lawyer and Ms [Stigsson].

1. So, as structured, the existing orders do allow the possibility, as Order 14(b) would supersede Order 10 when read together, that if DCJ and the ICL are satisfied that it is in the children's best interests, and that time is going well, and if DCJ and the ICL agree, for the father and paternal grandmother to spend more time with the children than is otherwise specified in the orders.
2. I note that there were, at Order 15, standard injunctions, and I also note the notation, which just indicates the home visits.
3. I approved those Orders and made those Orders on the basis that they are in the best interests of the children, and that leads me to decide two the outstanding issues.
4. The first outstanding issue is from the father; the father consented to Order 10 but on a without prejudice basis and, in effect, what he seeks is an Order which would be similar to what was the Order 11 as originally proposed by DCJ, but not pressed or made by consent.
5. What he sought was supervised contact no less than once per fortnight at a registered contact centre at a time agreed with the centre at his cost. What he is asking is for supervised contact no less than once per fortnight rather than no more than once per month.
6. The summary is that although the CCE was against any time, the parties and the court have accepted it is appropriate that there be supervised time.
7. The father says supervision meets all of the ICL's and DCJ's concerns.
8. The ICL and DCJ both indicated in submissions that they are concerned about consistency of attendance by the father, as I have just indicated about the extent of time given there is a real possibility on the available evidence that this could be ultimately be a no-time case. The need to balance the maintenance of a relationship against that possibility is met, the ICL and DCJ submit, by the consent orders.
9. That is the first outstanding issue and, obviously, although it is all contested, implicit in the consent terms, and implicit in the father's outstanding proposal, is the notion that the father represents an unacceptable risk of harm to the children, at least when engaging in unsupervised time.
10. The second outstanding issue is the paternal grandmother's application: she seeks orders in accordance with proposals 2, 3, and 4, of her Proposed Minute of Order as attached to her Case Outline filed on 25 April 2025, which is MFI 13:

2. The children spend time with the Paternal Grandmother as follows:

(a) On each alternate weekend from 4.00pm Friday until 9.00am Monday, commencing the first Friday after the making of these orders.

(b) From 4.00pm 25 December 2025 until 4.00pm 26 December 2025.

(c) At all other times as agreed between the Mother and the Paternal Grandmother in writing.

1. The children's time with the Paternal Grandmother shall be facilitated by the Mother and the Paternal Grandmother meeting at [Suburb F] McDonalds.

2. The children have videocall communication with the Paternal Grandmother as follows:

(a) On each Wednesday, together with calls on the children's birthdays, the Paternal Grandmother's birthday, Mother's Day, and at such other times as agreed between the Mother and the Paternal Grandmother in writing.

(b) Calls to occur between 5.00pm and 5.30pm.

(c) The calls are to be facilitated by the Mother calling the Paternal Grandmother.

1. The issue with the paternal grandmother is, in effect, that she has allowed the father to come into contact with the children, despite Orders that she not do so, or knowing that she should not do so.
2. No other issue is specifically raised about her capacity to parent or care. Nevertheless, that is a serious matter if established.
3. The children were in her sole care from 26 November 2024 to 4 February 2025.
4. DCJ's observations at those times were the children were well-cared for and happy, and the CCE did not seem to have too many issues with the paternal grandmother.
5. The paternal grandmother says that there is no reliable evidence that she has not complied with Orders restraining her from bringing the children into contact with the father.
6. DCJ raised concerns about her willingness to comply with that restraining Order, and while the paternal grandmother's submission was there was no real evidence, I do note Exhibit S1, which notes an interview with X on 11 February 2025. The handwritten note states:

Who at grandma when stay over?

[Mr D], [Ms E], daddy.

(As per the original)

1. I note there are further questions about who watched him do certain things, and again his answers included daddy, and there is another question where he said daddy.
2. Obviously, this is a very young child, but this is evidence based on which I accept DCJ and the ICL have formed concerns about the paternal grandmother's willingness to accept that the father presents an unacceptable risk of harm, and to ensure that father does not spend time with the children. Noting the limitations inherent on such hearsay evidence from a child, I nevertheless accept that it is sufficiently reliable to found a reasonable concern that the paternal grandmother may not, through failing to appreciate the gravity of the risk, have complied with the orders not to allow the children to come into contact with the father.
3. The principles are clear: each of the orders sought is a parenting order as defined in the Act; the court has power to make the parenting orders sought, in addition to those already made, as sought by the father and the paternal grandmother.
4. I note that there are significant factual issues, as always, in a parenting matter.
5. I am only going to, as I said, consider the matter briefly, noting what was said in Banks & Banks [2015] FamCAFC 36; (2015) FLC 93-637, that I only have two very small issues outstanding, and it is clear from the consent orders made, that certain matters are inferentially accepted.
6. I note that as the legislation has changed the specifics of the legislative pathway have changed since Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286, but the requirement to follow the legislative pathway as it place at the time of decision remains the same. Really, this is a matter about risk.
7. I note what was said by the Full Court in the SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 at [88], in particular.
8. I note what was said about temporary measures in Marvel & Marvel [2010] FamCAFC 101; (2010) 43 Fam LR 348 in particular, at [120]:
   1. 120. As has frequently been emphasised interim parenting proceedings, and orders made as a consequence, are a necessary but temporary measure until all the evidence can be tested, evaluated and weighed at a final hearing by the making of final parenting orders. Decisions judicial officers have to make in interim proceedings are difficult and, often for very good reason, a conservative approach, or one which is likely to avoid harm to a child is adopted. This is often to the understandable distress of a party who may not achieve the outcome he or she desires, or thinks to be in the best interests of their child or children. Interim parenting orders are frequently modified or changed after a final hearing, and any allocation of parental responsibility made at an interim hearing is disregarded at the final hearing (s 61DB).
9. As the Full Court has said on more than one occasion, in an interim proceeding, the conservative approach, or one which is most likely to avoid harm to a child is, for good reasons, generally adopted, and there are significant risk issues raised in this case.
10. In that context, I note what was said in Eaby & Speelman [2015] FamCAFC 104; (2015) FLC 93-654 at [18]:
    1. Her Honour early in her reasons referred to Goode & Goode for guidance as to the correct approach to the determination of interim parenting proceedings. It is true that in Goode & Goode, at [68], the Full Court said that the circumscribed nature of interim hearings means that the court should not be drawn into issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible. However, that does not mean that merely because the facts are in dispute the evidence on the topic must be disregarded, and the case determined solely by reference to the agreed facts.
11. I note Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82 at [61].
12. I also note what was said in both B & B [1993] FamCA 143; (1993) FLC 92-357 about balancing the risks and benefits to time with a parent, and what was said in Stott & Holgar [2017] FamCAFC 152 at [37] about the same question.

1. Dealing first with the father's application for additional orders.
2. I note that any time is against the recommendation of the CCE, that the parties have agreed to an amount of time, and provisions where time might increase.
3. I note very serious risk issues raised concerning the father, and though in dispute, I am required to take a conservative approach.
4. I note it is a case where DCJ and the ICL might well, on the evidence, have sought no time, and I would have given serious consideration to such applications in these circumstances on the material before me.
5. I think, looking at the children's best interests, that the arguments and submissions of the ICL and DCJ are persuasive. I find that the consent orders, which allow regular but not significant, ongoing supervised time, best balance the psychological risks to the children of a loss a relationship and the maintenance of the relationship where there is a real possibility of an ultimate no-time order.
6. According, I dismiss the father's application for further orders for time with the children.

1. As I said, the paternal grandmother's submission was that there is no real, or no reliable, evidence that she has brought the children into contact with the father. I do not accept that. There is evidence.
2. The weight to be attributed to the evidence is in dispute, but the same principles I have just referred to apply.
3. I give some weight to Exhibit S1 and find that though it is sufficient to give rise to a genuine basis for concern that the paternal grandmother has allowed the children to spend time with the father when they are with her.
4. The paternal grandmother also relied on eight videos. Videos show the mother live-streaming. They are concerning.
5. As far as I can tell in Video 1, the mother says, "Daddy dog", then, "Daddy gay", and it may be that the child then says, "Dada a dirty cunt", in response.
6. It is quite unclear.
7. Video 2, the mother appears to say, "As long as she's leaving me alone, I don't care"", in regard to giving the child a, "Bot-bot".
8. Video 3, she seems to ask the child, "Do you have a dad?" to which the child answers, "No".
9. In Video 4, the child appears to say something, and then, "Fucking cunt".
10. In Video 5, the child appears to say, "love my fucken mum".
11. In Video 6, another adult in the live stream, a young adult, seems to say, "Suck my dick, cunt", in front of both children.
12. Video 7, it is not clear how that is relevant.
13. Video 8, someone, possibly the mother, is talking, apparently to the world at large, and says words to the effect of, "Whose kids are they then? Not fucking yours, so you can't sit there and tell me how to parent kids". It is not clear what she says after that. And then, "I'm a lot less worse than what their mother is", and she appears to stick her middle finger up to the camera, with the child on her lap.
14. None of these things are ideal parenting, but that does not go to the risks in the paternal grandmother's house. It really goes to the many risks in the mother's house, which have been addressed by the conditional order; the children live with the mother, subject to, effectively, the right of DCJ to extensively determine how she should parent the children.
15. As I have said, based on the available evidence I have concerns about whether or not the paternal grandmother is able to act protectively with regards to the father. I say that noting the very positive things that were said about the paternal grandmother in the Child Impact Report.
16. Applying the principles I have mentioned, and SS & AH and Dieter & Dieter in particular, I think that the paternal grandmother's proposal does not ameliorate risks in the mother's house but does create unacceptable risk in her house or care.
17. In those circumstances, I also dismiss the paternal grandmother's application or additional orders.
18. Dismiss both outstanding applications and any extant applications.
19. Those are my reasons.

I certify that the preceding eighty-seven (87) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex-tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Smith.