RAB v A Magistrates Court of Queensland [2026] QSC 49

Queensland Police Service Legal Service for the third respondent

[1] By this application,[1] the applicant, Mr R,[2] seeks to challenge the validity of an order made by a Magistrate under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld), on the basis that there was no application before the Magistrates Court capable of invoking its jurisdiction. Mr R also seeks to challenge the validity of a later decision made by a different Magistrate, refusing to make an order for costs in his favour when the proceeding was discontinued (or withdrawn). Mr R's central argument turns on the proper construction of s 112 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act, the relevant version of which is the reprint current as at 18 March 2024 (the Act).

[2] On 13 March 2024, a police officer, Sergeant Amira, issued a police protection notice to Mr R, as the respondent, for the protection of Ms P, as the aggrieved. The police protection notice informed Mr R that he was required to appear in the Cairns Magistrates court on 19 March 2024 at 9.00 am. Mr R acknowledges that he was served with the police protection notice on 13 March 2024, and does not challenge its validity.

[3] Mr R appeared on 19 March 2024 before Magistrate Luxton, in person and with a Legal Aid lawyer. The lawyer appearing for Mr R informed the Court that Mr R opposed the application and would be seeking "filing directions" on that day, but that Mr R would "consent without admissions to a temporary order".[3] After hearing from the legal representatives for both Mr R and Ms P, Magistrate Luxton made a temporary protection order, and otherwise adjourned the proceedings to a date in May 2024 (for further mention), with directions for the filing of affidavits.[4]

[4] In general terms, by operation of s 113(3) of the Act, a police protection notice continues in force until a temporary protection order or domestic violence order is made; or pending making of such an order, while the proceedings are adjourned; or until the court dismisses the application. By operation of 98 of the Act, a temporary protection order continues in force until:

(a) a protection order is made (s 98(a) and (b)); or

(b) the court refuses to make a protection order (s 98(c)); or

(c) the application for a protection order is withdrawn (s 98(d)).

[5] The matter had not yet reached a date for final hearing when, on 11 June 2025, it was mentioned in Court, before Magistrate Dalton. On this day, the representative for the police indicated that the police wished to discontinue the application. The Magistrate ordered that the "application is withdrawn". Having regard to s 98(d), this meant that the temporary protection order, and the proceeding in the Magistrates Court, ended on this day.

[6] Mr R, who was representing himself, sought a costs order. The Magistrate refused his application, saying:

"No. There is no basis for you to do that. The law is clear. It has been subject of a ruling of Justice Henry that once the application is withdrawn, there is no basis to make a costs order. That has been recently considered last year. But - so it brings proceedings to an end, and that is the end of the matter."

[7] It is to be inferred the Magistrate was referring to s 157 of the Act and the decisions of this Court in KAV v Magistrate Bentley [2016] QSC 46 [7]-[9] and Grace v Peter [2024] QSC 69 at [66]- [71]. What those cases decide is that the discretion under s 157(2) to make an order for costs does not arise where the application is withdrawn or dismissed without being heard; instead, the default rule, that each party bears their own costs, applies (s 157(1)).

[8] On 27 January 2026, Mr R filed an application for a statutory order of review in this Court.[5] The application identifies the decisions sought to be reviewed as the decisions made by:

(a) Magistrate Luxton on or about 19 March 2024, determining that the Court had jurisdiction to proceed and making orders purportedly under the Act; and

(b) Magistrate Dalton on or about 11 June 2025, declining to consider Mr R's oral application for costs and purporting to conclude the proceeding.

[9] The application purports to rely on ss 20, 43 and 47 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld). The decision of a Magistrate is not amenable to judicial review under s 20. Ordinarily, a party dissatisfied with the decision of a Magistrate would appeal the decision. However, in some limited circumstances, the decision of a Magistrate may be open to review under part 5 of the Judicial Review Act (ss 41-47), within the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to grant relief in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or, relevantly, certiorari. One of the grounds on which that jurisdiction may appropriately be exercised is where it is said the decision is affected by jurisdictional error.[6]

[10] The basis for Mr R's challenge to Magistrate Luxton's decision is that the Magistrates Court had no jurisdiction to make any order, because there was no valid originating application for a protection order made under part 3 of the Act. Mr R also contends that Magistrate Dalton's decision, refusing his costs application, "constituted jurisdictional error".

[11] For the following reasons, I find that Mr R's challenge to the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court in both respects is misconceived and without foundation, and so his application is dismissed.

[12] At the outset, I record that, contrary to a previous order of this Court which limited both parties to 10 pages of written submissions, Mr R filed a 10 page "case outline" (court document 53) as well as voluminous submissions in multiple separate documents, exceeding 400 pages. This approach to court proceedings is inconsistent with a party's overriding obligation under rule 5 of the Uniform Civil Proceedings Act 1999 (UCPR) to proceed in an efficient and expeditious way. It does not matter that Mr R is a self-represented party. The procedural rules apply equally to all parties regardless of whether they have a lawyer. As I was not aware, at the start of the hearing on 16 March 2026, of the order limiting the length of submissions, whilst I informed Mr R that what he had done was not appropriate, I said I would read his submissions. I have done so (court documents 53, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 77,[7] 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86 and 87). I respectfully observe that much of what Mr R has filed by way of submissions is misconceived, reflects a misunderstanding of the law, or is not relevant. There is also extensive repetition throughout the documents filed: by which I mean that Mr R essentially says the same thing many times either in the same way, or slightly different ways.

[13] I have also had regard to the affidavits relied on by Mr R,[8] although note that the only affidavits actually referred to during the hearing before me were the affidavit of Ms Ong (court document 51), which simply annexed transcripts of the decisions of each of the Magistrates,[9] and the affidavit of Mr R (court document 54), which exhibits the police protection notice and the statement under s 111(3) of the Act which were served on him.

[14] The third respondent relied on Ms Ong's affidavit, and brief written submissions.

The core of Mr R's argument as to lack of jurisdiction

[15] Despite the many pages of written submissions, the core of Mr R's argument can be simply stated.[10] It is that a police protection notice is not and cannot operate as an originating application to commence a proceeding in court under part 3 of the Act. Mr R submits that the exercise of judicial power under part 3 of the Act depends upon the existence of a "real originating act of application" - an application, under s 32, filed by an applicant identified in s 25 of the Act. Mr R submits that "compliance with s 25 is a jurisdictional precondition to the exercise of power under part 3" of the Act and that the only way in which a judicial proceeding may be commenced is by filing an application, in the approved form,[11] under s 32. Mr R submits that s 26 of the Act is a "jurisdictional gateway" which only enables a court to make a protection order if, relevantly, an application has been made by one of the persons mentioned in s 25. Mr R also submits that the jurisdiction conferred on a court by s 136 of the Act only arises if there is an "application made to the court". Mr R submits that a police protection notice, being what he describes as an "executive instrument approved within the police hierarchy", is not and cannot operate as a "part 3 originating application by which judicial power is invoked", because it is not an application in the approved form. Although s 112 of the Act states that a police protection notice is "taken to be an application for a protection order made by a police officer", Mr R submits those words are not sufficient to "deem"[12] the police protection notice to be an originating application in the approved form sufficient to invoke the Court's jurisdiction. Mr R submits s 112(1) merely creates a legal "fiction", that it "brings the matter to court" and creates some kind of "listing" in the Magistrates Court, but that in order to invoke the Court's jurisdiction an actual application under s 32 must be filed.

[16] The following summary of the argument appears in one of Mr R's documents:[13]

It does not invoke the Magistrates Court's jurisdiction.

It cannot displace the express commencement architecture of Part 3.

Section 112 is a confined deeming provision operating within the PPN machinery.

It cannot operate as the judicial gateway to adjudicative jurisdiction enacted in Part 3.

Unless some other statutory act satisfying sections 25 and 32 can be identified the Magistrates Court was not lawfully seized of jurisdiction."

[17] The third respondent[14] submits that Mr R's application ought to be dismissed, first, because the relief he seeks is now futile or hypothetical - because the proceeding has been discontinued; and, in any event, because the Magistrates Court plainly had jurisdiction, because s 112 of the Act is an express provision which deems a police protection notice to be an application for a protection order made by a police officer.

[18] The question raised by Mr R's application is, what is the proper construction of s 112 of the Act?

[19] In answering that question, the task is to ascertain the intended meaning of the words used, a process which must be undertaken by consideration of the words of the provision itself, having regard to the context for and purpose of the provision.[15]

[20] The main objects of the Act are set out in s 3, as follows:

(a) to maximise the safety, protection and wellbeing of people who fear or experience domestic violence, and to minimise disruption to their lives; and

(b) to prevent or reduce domestic violence and the exposure of children to domestic violence; and

(c) to ensure that people who commit domestic violence are held accountable for their actions.

(a) allowing a court to make a domestic violence order to provide protection against further domestic violence; and

(b) giving police particular powers to respond to domestic violence, including the power to issue a police protection notice; and

(c) imposing consequences for contravening a domestic violence order or police protection notice, in particular, liability for the commission of an offence."

[21] Part 1 of the Act contains the objects and general interpretation provisions. Part 2 of the Act contains provisions setting out the meaning of core concepts (such as what is "domestic violence" and what is a "relevant relationship") and, in division 4, an "overview" of domestic violence orders, including:

(a) who is an aggrieved and who is a respondent (s 21) - relevantly:

(i) an aggrieved is the person for whose benefit; and

(ii) a respondent is the person against whom,

a domestic violence order, or a police protection notice, is in force or may be made under the Act;

(b) what orders a court can make to prevent domestic violence (s 23) - a court can make a "domestic violence order" against a respondent for the benefit of an aggrieved, which means either a protection order or a temporary protection order;

(c) who can apply for a protection order (s 25) - in this regard, s 25(1) provides:

"(1) An application for a protection order can be made only by -

(a) an aggrieved; or

(b) an authorised person for an aggrieved; or

(c) a police officer under section 100(2)(a); or

(d) a person acting under another Act for the aggrieved."

(d) when a court can make a protection order (s 26) - relevantly, s 26(a) provides that:

"A court can make a protection order if - (a) an application for a protection order is made to the court by any of the persons mentioned in s 25(1)."

(e) when a court can make a temporary protection order (s 27) - relevantly, this includes if the court adjourns a proceeding mentioned in s 44(1)(a) (the hearing of an application for a protection order).

[22] Part 3 of the Act contains more detailed provisions in relation to domestic violence orders. Section 32 provides:

(1) An application for a protection order may be made to a Magistrates Court by -

(a) an aggrieved; or

(b) an authorised person for an aggrieved; or

(c) a police officer under section 100(2)(a); or

(d) a person acting under another Act for an aggrieved.

(a) be in the approved form; and

(b) state the grounds on which it is made; and

(c) state the nature of the order sought; and

(d) if the applicant is not a police officer - be verified by the applicant by a statutory declaration (a verification declaration); and

(e) be filed in the court.

(3) However, subsection (2)(d) does not apply to an applicant if the clerk of the court agrees to grant the applicant's request under section 36(2)(b)."[16]

[23] More detailed provisions in relation to temporary protection orders are set out in part 3, division 2, ss 44-50 (I have already referred to s 44 above). Division 11 of part 3, ss 96-99, contains provisions dealing with the duration of domestic violence orders (and I have already referred to s 98 above).

[24] Part 4 of the Act is headed "police functions and powers". This part begins with s 100 (division 1), which imposes an obligation on police offers to investigate complaints of domestic violence. Section 100(2) provides that if, after the investigation, the police officer reasonably believes domestic violence has been committed, the police officer must consider (a) whether it is necessary or desirable to take action under s 100(3); and (b) what is the most effective action to take immediately to protect the person (at risk). Under s 100(3), a police officer may, relevantly: (a) apply to a court for a protection order under part 3, division 1 (see s 32 and following); or (c) issue a police protection notice under [part 4] division 2. The note below s 101(3)(c) informs that "under section 112, a police protection notice is taken to be an application for a protection order".

[25] Part 4, division 2 (ss 101 to 114) deals with the power of a police offer to issue a "police protection notice". In essence, a police officer may do this if they reasonably believe the respondent has committed domestic violence, that a police protection notice is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence, but it is not necessary for the respondent to be immediately taken into custody (s 101). The officer needs to obtain the approval of a supervising police officer (s 102(1)).

[26] The form of a police protection notice is dealt with in s 105. Among other things, the notice is required to inform the respondent that, under s 112, the notice is taken to be an application for a protection order made by a police officer (s 105(1)(i)) and state the date and time for the hearing of the application for the protection order at the local Magistrates Court for the respondent (s 105(1)(j)). The police protection notice served on Mr R included this information.[17]

(1) If a police officer issues a police protection notice, a copy of the notice must be filed in the local Magistrates Court for the respondent.

(2) Subsection (3) applies if the police protection notice does not state-

(a) the nature of the protection order sought by the application for a protection order; and

(b) the grounds on which the order is sought.

(3) A statement about the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) and (b) must be filed in the local Magistrates Court for the respondent before the earlier of the following -

(a) the date and time stated in the police protection notice for the hearing of the application for the protection order;

(b) the day that is 14 days after the day the notice was issued.

Section 153 provides that a police officer may file a document in a proceeding under this Act by electronic or computer-based means.

(a) made and signed by the police officer who issued the police protection notice; and

(b) served on the respondent -

(i) if the police protection notice has been personally served on the respondent and an address for service for the respondent is known - in any way; or

(ii) otherwise - personally by a police officer.

(a) the way in which the court may be informed, or inform itself, about the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) and (b); or

(b) the documents or evidence a party may file or give in the proceeding.

(6) If the local Magistrates Court for the respondent will not be sitting within 28 days after the day the notice is issued, the clerk of the local Magistrates Court for the respondent must make arrangements with the clerk of another Magistrates Court that will be sitting within 28 days after the day the notice is issued for -

(a) the matter of the application for the protection order to be listed for mention in the other Magistrates Court at the earliest opportunity; and

(b) the respondent, and the police officer or service legal officer responsible for the matter, to be notified of the date, time and place of the mention.

(7) The reference in subsection (2)(a) to the application for a protection order is a reference to the application for a protection order the police protection notice is taken to be under section 112.

(8) To remove any doubt, it is declared that subsection (1) applies whether or not the police protection notice has been served on the respondent."[18]

"112 Police protection notice taken to be application for protection order

(1) A police protection notice is taken to be an application for a protection order made by a police officer.

(a) the police protection notice was issued against the respondent under section 101A when the respondent was released from custody; and

(b) a police officer prepared an application for a protection order against the respondent while the respondent was in custody as required under section 118."[19]

[29] It is also relevant to refer to s 113, which deals with the duration of police protection notices:

(a) the notice is served on the respondent personally or in a way stated in a substituted service order; or

(b) a police officer tells the respondent about the existence of the notice and the conditions of the notice.

(2) For subsection (1)(b), the respondent may be told by a police officer about the existence of the police protection notice in any way, including, for example, by telephone, email, SMS message, a social networking site or other electronic means.

(3) A police protection notice continues in force until -

(a) if, on an application for a temporary protection order made under section 129(2), a magistrate decides to make a temporary protection order - the temporary protection order is served on the respondent or otherwise becomes enforceable under section 177; or

(b) if, upon the hearing of the application for a protection order, the court decides to make a domestic violence order - the domestic violence order is served on the respondent or otherwise becomes enforceable under section 177; or

(c) if the court adjourns the application for a protection order and does not make a domestic violence order - the proceeding is adjourned; or

(d) if the court dismisses the application for a protection order - the application is dismissed.

(4) In this section, a reference to the application for a protection order is a reference to -

(a) the application for a protection order a police protection notice is taken to be under section 112; or

(b) if a police protection notice was issued against the respondent under section 101A when the respondent was released from custody - the application for a protection order against the respondent prepared while the respondent was in custody as required under section 118."[20]

[30] Part 4, division 3, contains provisions dealing with the power of police to take a person into custody (where another person is in danger of personal injury, or property is in danger of being damaged). Division 4 contains provisions which enable the police to apply for a temporary protection order (ss 129-133).

[31] Part 5 of the Act is headed "Court proceedings". Of the provisions in this part, Mr R emphasises s 136(1)(a), which provides that "a court has jurisdiction ... to hear and decide any application made to the court under this Act".

[32] The words of s 112(1) are clear and unambiguous: a police protection notice is taken to be an application for a protection order made by a police officer.

[33] It is to be noted that s 112 follows immediately upon s 111 which provides, in s 111(1), that the police officer must file a copy of the police protection notice in the local Magistrates Court for the respondent. The two sections operate together: the notice must be filed in the local Court and is taken to be an application for a protection order made by a police officer.

[34] If the police protection notice does not, itself, state the matters in s 111(2), then another statement must be filed in the local Magistrates Court dealing with those things (s 111(3)). The statement which is filed in accordance with s 111(3) is not an "application for a protection order" - only the police protection notice is taken to be such an application (s 112(1)). The statement is a document which accompanies the application, for the purpose of informing the respondent and the court about the nature of the protection order sought, and the grounds on which it is sought.[21] This is the same information which is required to be provided in an application made under s 32.

[35] The purpose of the procedure provided for by ss 101 and 112 is explained in the explanatory notes which accompanied the Bill which became the Act, when enacted in 2012. This was a new power introduced at that time, to address a gap in the range of responses then available to police officers attending a domestic violence incident. Further amendments were made to the provisions in 2016, to address some practical difficulties with the provisions as originally enacted. A detailed analysis of the history of the provisions as enacted in 2012, and amended in 2016, is set out in Ryan J's decision in MAB v Magistrate Hackett [2025] QSC 299 at [52]- [63], leading to her Honour's conclusion that:

"[70] PPNs were introduced to provide a level of short-term immediate protection to a victim of domestic violence which had not previously been available to them.

[71] They were introduced as an addition to the only previously available responses which depended on the outcome of an application decided by a Magistrate. Before the introduction of PPNs, only a Magistrate could provide protection to a victim by way of the making of a domestic violence order. Under the PPN regime, a police officer is empowered to provide similar protection in the short term - on the strength of their reasonable belief, rather than satisfaction, that inter alia the respondent has committed domestic violence and that a PPN is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from the respondent's domestic violence.

[72] The Act does not burden a police officer who has issued a PPN with having to separately apply for a protection order. Efficiency is achieved by section 112 of the Act which gives the PPN its second function as an application."

[36] As Ryan J went on to say, at [73], a police protection notice tracks along two "paths" as a protective measure (MAB at [74]-[83]) and as an application which commences a court proceeding for a protection order (MAB at [85]-[86]). A police protection notice provides protection for an aggrieved, immediately upon the respondent being served with it, or being told about it by a police officer (s 113(1)). This protective effect is reinforced by the criminal consequences for a respondent who breaches the notice (s 178). The protection continues until another form of protection is put in place (a temporary protection order or domestic violence order), or the whole proceeding is dismissed or withdrawn (s 113(3)). It also commences a proceeding in the Magistrates Court (s 112(1), in which the Court can hear from all parties (the police, the aggrieved and the respondent) and decide whether to make a protection order (or a temporary protection order, in the interim).

[37] By the use of the words "is taken to be", s 112(1) is a form of deeming provision.[22] As Windeyer J explains in Hunter Douglas Pty Ltd v Perma Blinds [1970] HCA 63; (1970) 122 CLR 49 at 66-67_,_ sometimes a deeming provision might create a "statutory fiction"; but often it does not. His Honour said (at 65) that:

"... to deem means simply to judge or reach a conclusion about something... The words 'deem' and 'deemed' when used in a statute thus simply state the effect or meaning which some matter or thing has - the way in which it is to be adjudged. This need not import artificiality or fiction. It may be simply the statement of an indisputable conclusion, as if for example one were to say that on attaining the age of twenty-one years a man is deemed to be of full age and no longer an infant..."[23]

[38] There is no legal fiction created by s 112(1). On the contrary, the section is an express legislative statement of the effect of a police protection notice: that it is taken to be an application for a protection order made by a police officer.

[39] Section 32 is one way in which an application for a protection order may be made to a Magistrates Court. The issue of a police protection notice against a person by a police officer is another way in which an application for a protection order may be made. That is the effect of s 112(1). In that context, it does not matter that the "application" (being the police protection notice) does not comply with the approved form for an application under s 32. That is because the police protection notice is "taken to be" such an application made by the police officer.

[40] In any event, the "legal fiction" which Mr R contends is created by s 112(1) is not something recognised by our legal system. Mr R argued that the effect of s 112(1) is merely to create a "court listing", but that there had to be an actual application, under s 32, filed with the Court before the Court has jurisdiction to make a protection order (or temporary protection order). There is no procedure by which a "court listing" can be made, in the absence of an originating application which commences the court proceeding. That is a fiction. A court proceeding can only be commenced by an originating application of some kind. In the context of the Act, where the proceeding is an application for a protection order, that could be an application under s 32 or it could be a police protection notice issued under s 101, which is taken to be an application for a protection order under s 112(1).

[41] Mr R's related argument, that there is no "applicant" unless an application is made under s 32, is also misconceived. Section s 112(1) provides that the police protection notice is taken to be an application for a protection order made by a police officer. This means the applicant is the police officer. That a police offer can be the applicant for a protection order is plain from ss 25(1)(c), 32(2), 33, 34, 35 and 38(3) of the Act. In this context, the other parties to the application (the proceeding) are the aggrieved and the respondent.

[42] The jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court to "hear and decide any application made" to it (s 136) includes jurisdiction to hear and decide an application which is a police protection notice taken to be an application for a protection order under s 112(1).

[43] The proceedings in the Magistrates Court were properly commenced when a police protection notice was issued, which was taken to be an application for a protection order. That is the originating application for the proceeding in the Magistrates Court. The Magistrates Court did have jurisdiction to deal with the application.

[44] Accordingly, Mr R's challenge to the validity of the decision of Magistrate Luxton made on 19 March 2024 fails.

[45] Mr R's challenge to the subsequent decision, made by Magistrate Dalton on 11 June 2025 also fails.

[46] Properly understood, Magistrate Dalton did not "refuse to hear" Mr R's application for costs - his Honour refused the application. That refusal involved no jurisdictional error, such as to enliven this Court's supervisory jurisdiction under part 5 of the Judicial Review Act.

[47] In any event, as the proceeding was discontinued (withdrawn) by the police on 11 June 2025, no basis for the exercise of the discretion under s 157(2) of the Act arose.[24] The discretion arises only where the court hears the application and decides:

(a) to dismiss the application and, in doing so, also decides that the party, in making the application, intentionally engaged in behaviour, or continued a pattern of behaviour, towards the respondent to the application that is domestic violence; or

(b) to dismiss the application on the grounds that it is malicious, deliberately false, frivolous or vexatious.[25]

[48] Mr R argued that the application could not be "withdrawn" in June 2025, because the police protection notice had already ceased to have effect, under s 113(3)(a) (when the temporary protection order was made, in March 2024). This argument overlooks the dual purpose of a police protection notice: first, as a protective measure, and second as an application which commences a proceeding in the Magistrates Court. It is correct to say that, under s 113(3)(a), the police protection notice was no longer in force once the temporary protection order was made in March 2024. But that does not affect the operation of the notice as an "application for a protection order made by a police officer" by which the proceedings in the Court were commenced. It is that proceeding which the police discontinued in June 2025.

[49] As can be seen, I have proceeded to deal with Mr R's argument as to jurisdiction - rather than, as submitted by the third respondent, to proceed first by reference to whether the argument is futile because the proceedings have now been discontinued.

[50] Mr R argued that his application was not futile, because of the legal consequences which he submits flow from the fact that a police protection notice has been issued, leading to the commencement of a proceeding in the Magistrates Court (including that there is a record in the court of the allegations made against him).

[51] Mr R also argued that it was necessary to determine the jurisdiction issue because an order made without jurisdiction is no order at all.[26]

[52] I accept Mr R's submission that it was necessary to deal with his jurisdiction argument. If he had been right about that, it would have been an important issue to address, rather than simply to dismiss his application because the Magistrates Court proceeding is now at an end.

[53] However, Mr R's arguments about legal consequences are misplaced - both because I have found the Magistrates Court did have jurisdiction and, in any event, because such consequences as Mr R identified (including the ability of a police officer, on application to a court, to obtain a copy of the record of a proceeding under this Act for a subsequent investigation - s 160(2)(h)) are simply the product of the operation of the express provisions of the Act. Even if Mr R's argument - as to lack of jurisdiction - had been successful, it would not follow that there would be no record of the proceedings in the Magistrates Court (that is, the file).

[54] For completeness, I note that by his application Mr R sought a range of other "consequential relief" (apart from declarations and orders in relation to the decisions of the Magistrates), including a declaration that the Queensland Police Service had no lawful authority to create or store records relating to the police protection notice and orders requiring the Commissioner of Police "to cause the removal of all records" relating to the Magistrates Court proceeding and the police protection notice. There is no lawful basis on which such orders could be made. In addition, orders of this kind are beyond the scope of a review proceeding under part 5 of the Judicial Review Act, because an order in the nature of certiorari is only concerned with the decision the subject of review, and directed to the court which made the decision.[27]

[55] The application for a statutory order of review is dismissed.[28]

[56] The third respondent seeks an order that Mr R pay its costs, on the standard basis. Subject to s 49 of the Judicial Review Act, the rules of court (the UCPR) in relation to costs apply (s 49(4)). The general rule, under r 681 of the UCPR, is that costs are in the discretion of the Court but follow the event unless the court orders otherwise. I will hear from the parties in relation to costs at the time this decision is delivered.

[57] There are other applications previously made by Mr R in this proceeding, seeking to add Attorneys-General of the states and territories, which have been adjourned until after this determination of Mr R's application (orders 4 and 8 made on 2 December 2025). In light of the conclusion I have reached, in relation to the question of jurisdiction, and dismissal of Mr R's application, there is no basis on which any such joinder applications could proceed, and they should properly be dismissed. The only possible issue is the question of costs of those applications. I will mention these applications at the time of delivering this decision.

[1] Filed on 27 January 2026 (court document 52).

[2] This decision is anonymised, having regard to s 159 of the Act.

[3] In determining this application, I have not proceeded on the basis that Mr R's consent gave the Court jurisdiction (cf Yirrell v Yirrell [1939] HCA 33; (1939) 62 CLR 287 at 295 and Pantorno v The Queen [1989] HCA 18; (1989) 166 CLR 466 at 473, to which Mr R referred in his oral submissions).

[4] See s 44(1)(a) of the Act, which provides that the Court may make a temporary protection order if the court adjourns the hearing of an application for a protection order. In this Court, the applicant notes that the form of the temporary protection order includes reference to ss 44, 48, 131 and 132 of the Act, and sought some support from that for his arguments in this proceeding. The reference to multiple sections simply reflects the fact that there are a number of provisions in the Act which empower a court to make a temporary protection order. The relevant provision in this case is s 44(1)(a).

[5] Mr R had commenced this proceeding earlier, in July 2025, by filing an application for judicial review. On 2 December 2025, Mr R was given leave to file an amended originating application (order 7). I proceed on the basis that the application filed on 27 January 2026 is the amended application (although it is not - contrary to the order made - described in that way).

[6] Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 175-176; Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; (2010) 239 CLR 531 at [56]; Sica v Attorney-General (2021) 9 QR 543 at [13].

[7] Court document 77 is Mr R's response to the third respondent's outline of argument which was filed on 4 March 2026.

[8] See the List of Affidavits Relied upon by the Applicant, filed on 11 March 2026 (court document 81), which lists 9 affidavits. Items 1 and 4-9 on this list are court documents 3, 39, 46, 51, 54, 55 and 74. Items 2 and 3 on this list refer to affidavits of Mr R affirmed on 19 September 2025. There are in fact 11 affidavits on the court file affirmed by Mr R on that date - court documents 8, 10, 16, 18, 19, 28, 27, 30, 32, 34 and 36. The only affidavits actually referred to during the hearing before me were the affidavit of Ms Ong (court document 51) and the affidavit of Mr R (court document 54).

[9] A separate application by Mr R, that Ms Ong's affidavit should be struck out or excluded from evidence (court document 58) was dismissed by me during the course of the hearing.

[10] Indeed, Mr R ultimately acknowledges this, in his submissions filed on 9 March 2026, in response to the third respondent's outline of argument (court document 77) in which he says, at p 7 [7], "the central question raised by the present proceeding is a simple one: what document constituted the originating application that invoked the adjudicative jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court under Part 3 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act".

[11] See s 191 of the Act in relation to approved forms.

[12] Referring to Muller v Dalgety & Co Ltd [1909] HCA 67; (1909) 9 CLR 693 at 696 where Griffith CJ addressed the meaning of the word "deemed" in offence provisions of the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) and Hunter Douglas Australia Pty Ltd v Perma Blinds [1970] HCA 63; (1970) 122 CLR 49 at 65 where Windeyer J also addressed the meaning of the words "deem" or "deemed".

[13] Court document 62, "Block 1 - Submission 11", at p 3 [51]-[57].

[14] Only the third respondent appeared on the hearing of the application. The first and second respondents, initially named as the particular Magistrates who made the decisions sought to be reviewed, but subsequently named as "A Magistrates Court of Queensland", reflecting the decision in EAC v Magistrates Court of Queensland [2025] QSC 240, were appropriately excused from any further appearance.

[15] R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 269 CLR 507.

[17] Exhibit GSR-1 to the affidavit of Mr R filed on 27 January 2026 (court document 54).

[22] See Trevorrow v Council of the City of the Gold Coast [2018] 3 Qd R 407 at [24] and [33].

[24] Even putting to one side the fact that Mr R was self-represented, and so no claim for professional legal costs could arise.

[25] For completeness, I note that Mr R referred in his oral submissions to Thomas v The a2 Milk Company Ltd [2022] VSC319 at [53]. That was a decision about costs in an entirely different context. It has no application in relation to the operation of s 157 of the Act.

[26] Referring to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 at [51].

[27] Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 175-176. See also s 47 of the Judicial Review Act.

[28] To avoid any doubt, this includes the original application by which this proceeding was commenced, filed on 8 July 2025, and the amended application, filed on 27 January 2026.