R v Wilkinson

Category: Sentence

Parties: Rex;
Bradley Wayne Wilkinson

Representation: Counsel:
Crown: B Page
Defence: A J Karim
Solicitors:
Crown: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)
Defence: J Faiz

File Number(s): 2024/229584

JUDGMENT

1. On the morning of 20 June 2024, 27-year-old Rhyce Harding was on his way driving to work when he became the victim of a road rage incident which resulted in his violent and tragic death caused by the offender Bradley Wilkinson.

2. The offender was ultimately charged with manslaughter and a further charge of failing to stop and assist after impact causing death. He has since pleaded guilty to each of those charges and now appears for sentence.

3. The offence of manslaughter is contrary to s 18(1)(b) of the Crimes Act and carries a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment. The offence of failing to stop and assist is contrary to s 52AB(1) of the Crimes Act and carries a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment.

4. The Crown bundle of documents, Exhibit A, contains a statement of agreed facts and a detailed summary is as follows:

5. At about 8am on 20 June 2024 the offender left his home at South Windsor in his white Toyota Hilux with his 16-year-old son in the front passenger seat. He was running late for work at Arndell Park which was scheduled to begin at 8am.

6. At about 8:40am Rhyce Harding’s red Ford Ranger was captured on CCTV driving south on Copeland Street at Emerton. About ten seconds later the offender’s white Toyota Hilux was captured driving in the same direction. Less than a minute later Rhyce Harding turned left onto Jersey Road at Blackett. The offender made the same turn a short time later.

7. At about 8:41am Rhyce Harding’s red Ford Ranger and the offender’s white Hilux were both captured on CCTV travelling east towards the roundabout at the intersection of Jersey Road and Popondetta Road at Blackett. Mr Harding was in lane 2 of two while the offender approached the intersection in lane 1 (i.e. the lane closest to the kerb).

8. The offender was travelling at a higher speed than other cars in the footage and can be seen overtaking three cars as he approached the roundabout. Mr Harding’s vehicle entered the roundabout first. However, at this point the offender was only a short distance behind him and can be seen partially entering lane 2. The photographic stills from the CCTV footage are included in the statement of facts document.

9. Both Mr Harding and the offender continued straight through the roundabout to stay on Jersey Road. However, shortly after exiting the roundabout the offender’s Hilux travelled past the red Ford Ranger on its inside and then cut in front of Mr Harding in lane 2. After the offender pulled in front of the red Ford Ranger Mr Harding moved left into lane 1 quickly driving up on the inside of the offender.

10. Up ahead was a parked car causing Mr Harding to put on his indicator to move back into lane 2. However, as he neared the parked car the offender prevented Mr Harding from merging back into lane 2. As they reached the parked car the offender did not continue on in lane 2 but brought his Hilux to a complete stop, thereby blocking Mr Harding from merging. Mr Harding then stopped his Ute between lanes 1 and 2 and just behind the offender’s Ute who was still stationary in lane 2: (see figure 4 of Exhibit A).

11. The agreed facts indicate that whilst Mr Harding had been driving on Jersey Road, he had been speaking on the phone to a friend, Stacy Disbray. After a few minutes on the phone she recalled Mr Harding saying, “Someone’s riding my arse.” A short time later she heard Mr Harding pull up the handbrake and say, “What the fuck”? She then heard him get out of the car. When Mr Harding got out of his Ute, he walked around to the driver’s door of the Hilux to confront the offender: (see figure 5 CCTV, Exhibit A).

12. The offender extended his arm outside the car window grabbing hold of Mr Harding’s orange/blue high visibility jumper pulling him towards the vehicle and then accelerating away. While being held by his jumper and trying to fend off the offender, Mr Harding attempted to maintain his footing by running next to the offender’s Ute. However, he was unable to keep up and started to stumble: (see figure 6 CCTV, Exhibit A).

13. The offender continued to drag Mr Harding for a few more seconds before letting him go. Mr Harding fell to the roadway rolling under the rear offside wheel/tyre of the Hilux. The offender’s Ute bounced moving up and over Mr Harding’s body. Bystanders heard a loud bang and that can also be heard on the CCTV footage, which is Exhibit G.

14. After running over Mr Harding, the offender did not stop to render assistance. Instead, he sped off in an easterly direction along Jersey Road. Mr Harding was left lying face down on the road, about 55 metres from where he had stopped his Ute. Several bystanders came to his aid and triple-0 calls were made.

15. As witnesses approached Mr Harding, they could hear him moaning and gasping for air. He was seen vomiting several times. A tyre mark was also observed on the back of his high visibility jumper. One of the bystanders made the decision to turn Mr Harding onto his side given there was vomit pooling around his mouth. At this point Mr Harding was still breathing and had a pulse.

16. At about 8:48am police arrived at the scene. At that time Mr Harding appeared unresponsive and they commenced CPR. At about 8:54am paramedics arrived. Police continued to perform CPR while paramedics examined Mr Harding. However, at 9:02am paramedics advised the police to stop CPR and Mr Harding was pronounced deceased.

17. At this point I will merely add that a subsequent postmortem examination was undertaken and the postmortem certificate, which is Exhibit E, details the various injuries suffered, stating that the direct cause of death was blunt force injury to the trunk.

18. Moving forward to 9:05am the offender arrived outside of his workplace at Arndell Park. He walked inside and remained there until the afternoon. At 4:31pm he returned to where his Hilux was parked, and he drove away.

19. At about 5:40pm he parked that Hilux outside 97 Mileham Street, South Windsor, this location being about 200 metres from the offender’s home. He got out of his vehicle and left the area on foot.

20. During the initial investigation police obtained CCTV footage from various locations around the crime scene. Consequently, they were able to ascertain the registration of the white Hilux. Subsequent checks revealed that it was registered to the offender at an address of 229C Macquarie Street, South Windsor.

21. Later that day police attended the offender’s residence, but he was not there. During that day police had released a statement to the media, and a press conference was conducted. During the evening all major television networks ran a story about the incident that included CCTV footage of the offender’s Hilux. Police made an appeal for the driver to come forward.

22. At about 6:15am on the following day being 21 June 2024 the offender attended the Mount Druitt police station to hand himself in. He was taken to an interview room, and the conversation was recorded on body worn video. He was asked to disclose who was driving his car at the time of the offences. He said, “I’m the owner of the vehicle and I was the driver at the time.”

23. He was then cautioned, and he was placed under arrest. He was asked where his vehicle was located, and he told police it was parked near Windsor RSL on Mileham Street. Police later located the Hilux and towed it to a holding yard.

24. At 8:55am he declined an offer to participate in a recorded interview. At about 10am the offender consented to a forensic procedure which was the taking of a buccal swab. Following that procedure he provided a brief version recorded on body worn video. He said:

25. The deceased had pushed his side mirror, then stood at his window and called him “a fucking cunt”.

26. The deceased grabbed hold of him, so he pushed out with his right hand. The second time the deceased grabbed him through the window he drove off in first gear.

27. He was scared for his son, so he had to flee. It went wrong and he’s truly sorry.

28. He went to work after the incident and thought that if something bad had happened, police would come to his work address. When they didn’t, he assumed everything was fine.

29. When he went home, he saw there were police cars around his address so he called a lawyer who told him what had happened. At this point he decided to turn himself in.

30. The statement of agreed facts also sets out what is, in effect, the prosecution position, namely that the offender is liable for the offence of manslaughter on the basis that he caused the death of the deceased by an intentional act that was both unlawful and dangerous. That is the offender unlawfully assaulted and/or detained the deceased by grabbing and holding onto the deceased’s jumper while he drove his Toyota Hilux Ute away from a standing start.

31. Also the offender is liable for the offence of failing to stop and assist after a vehicle impact causing death on the basis that the offender failed to stop after he was involved in the impact that caused the deceased’s death in circumstances where he must have known or ought reasonably to have known that the impact had, at least, caused really serious injury to the deceased.

32. During the sentence proceedings the offender gave evidence. He was taken to paragraph 32 of the agreed facts where he had informed police that the deceased had pushed his side mirror. He clarified by stating that that was not true. He maintained that Mr Harding had called him “a fucking cunt,” however, he disavowed the suggestion initially made to the police that Mr Harding had grabbed him through the window (see transcript 14, line 47). He confirmed that it was he who grabbed Mr Harding and drove off.

OBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS

28. In Stephenson v R [2008] NSWCCA 266 the Court was dealing with a manslaughter sentence appeal. In the course of the judgment Bell JA stated at [29]:

In R v Forbes [2005] NSWCCA 377 Spigelman CJ discussed sentencing for manslaughter offences at [133] and [134]. He commented that the offence is almost unique in its protean character as an offence and went on to refer to the observations of Gleeson CJ in R v Blacklidge (Unreported CCA 12 December 1995) :

“It has long been recognised that the circumstances which may give rise to a conviction for manslaughter are so various and the range of degrees of culpability is so wide, that it is not possible to point to any established sentencing tariff which can be applied to such cases. Of all crime,s manslaughter throws up the grades of variety of circumstances and culpability.”

29. In R v Bryce (No 5) [2014] NSWSC at 1184 Beech-Jones J stated at [74]:

“…Even within the categories of manslaughter, such as unlawful and dangerous act or excessive self-defence, the range of circumstances is ‘notoriously wide’ and an offence in one category is not necessarily better or worse than one or another... Further, attempts to categorise sentences by reference to a “single common component relating to the mechanism of death” or the use of a particular form of weapon such as a knife face the difficulty that there is no range of sentences for such offences (R v Loveridge [2014] NSWCCA 120 at [126])”.

30. Mr Karim, Counsel for the offender, has acknowledged in his written submissions which are Exhibit 1, that the offence of manslaughter occupies the highest rung in the hierarchy of vehicular offences causing death above even aggravated dangerous driving causing death (which carries a maximum penalty of 14 years) with this particular maximum being one of 25 years imprisonment.

31. As the Crown submitted, every case of manslaughter involves the felonious taking of human life. That is the starting point for a consideration of the appropriate penalty and a key element in the assessment of the gravity of objective circumstances of the case: (see Woodbridge v R [2010] NSWCCA 185 [22]).

32. When sentencing for manslaughter a court must always have regard to the full context in which the death was caused. The surrounding circumstances may bear upon the objective gravity of the offence and the moral culpability of the offender: (see R v Loveridge [2014] NSWCCA 120 [229]). A court should also identify the basis upon which the person is to be sentenced.

33. In the Crown’s written submissions reference was made to Lee v R [2019] NSWCCA 65, where the Court held that it was open to the sentencing judge to find that the objective seriousness of the manslaughter offence was “of a very high order” and that the dangerousness of the unlawful act was “extreme” in circumstances where the applicant conceded in that case that she had intentionally driven her car into the deceased (her husband).

34. It was further held that such an intention was close to the intention for murder, (that is an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm). Moreover, the Court said that if her actions had not been spontaneous the offence would have been likely one of murder rather than manslaughter: (see [65] of that judgment).

35. The facts revealed that the offender was running late for work. He had his 16-year-old son in the front passenger seat. The CCTV compilation shows the offender’s vehicle travelling at a higher speed and undertaking three cars as he approached the roundabout at the intersection of Jersey Road and Popondetta Road. As already indicated, as he enters that roundabout he partially enters lane 2, closely behind Mr Harding’s vehicle, before passing Mr Harding on the inside and cutting in front of him as he was attempting to move across into lane 2. That manoeuvre is clearly seen on the CCTV footage. I am satisfied that it was Mr Harding who then sounded his horn and then moved into the kerbside lane. With a parked car up ahead the offender sped up, preventing Mr Harding from merging back into lane 2. The offender then slowed his vehicle before bringing it to a total stop, thus blocking Mr Harding’s vehicle and causing him to stop, slightly to the left and at the rear of the offender’s vehicle.

36. Mr Harding then got out of his car, walked to the offside of the offender’s vehicle. The offender remained stationary, waiting for Mr Harding to appear directly beside the offender’s car door window. The CCTV footage shows that almost immediately the offender, whilst still in the driver’s seat, reaches out, grabbing hold of Mr Harding and pulling him against the car. He then accelerates away, still holding onto Mr Harding, and dragging him along the roadway for approximately 55 metres. All while Mr Harding was attempting to maintain some contact with the ground. Ultimately the offender let go. Mr Harding then falls to the roadway, and under the rear offside wheel, causing the vehicle to bounce up and over Mr Harding’s body. He does not stop; he flees the scene.

37. I will deal shortly with the offence of failing to stop, but this factor is a matter that I take into account on the issue of the offender’s moral culpability in respect of the manslaughter offence.

38. There was simply no reason for the offender to have brought his vehicle to a stop in the manner described. The only inference that can be drawn from this fact is that he was inviting the confrontation with Mr Harding. There was simply nothing preventing him from driving off after Mr Harding had stopped his vehicle. As Mr Harding was held against the offender’s vehicle, he was defenceless. I am satisfied the offender used his vehicle as a weapon against Mr Harding bringing about his death.

39. At this point, on the question of the objective gravity of the offending conduct, the Crown did make a submission in the sentence proceedings, that the Court would view the presence of the offender’s 16-year-old son in the passenger seat as an aggravating factor under s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. In the evidence in the sentence proceedings, the offender said that his son was asleep at the time. There is no other evidence which would satisfy the Court that his son was aware of the offence or impacted by it at the time. Accordingly, I have determined not to take this factor into account as an aggravating factor.

40. My ultimate view is that the offence of manslaughter was of a very high order, and the dangerousness of the unlawful act was extreme.

41. I now turn to the offence of failing to stop and give assistance to Mr Harding, knowing that he was seriously injured or deceased. Now, this offence was introduced by virtue of the Crimes Amendment (Road Accident’s) Bill. The purpose and intention behind the introduction of this Bill was clearly identified in the second reading speech in the NSW Legislative Assembly on 21 September 2005, when it stated:

“Under this Bill a new offence of failing to stop with much heavier penalties is introduced into the Crimes Act in recognition of the society’s abhorrence of those who injure their fellow citizens and then abandon them to die. When a driver leaves the scene of accident, leaving in his or her wake a dead or badly injured person without attempting to render assistance the fundamental code of a civilised society is breached.

Every driver needs to be aware that with the privilege of driving on our roads comes a fundamental responsibility to fellow drivers. The focus of the new offences is to ensure assistance for victims of serious vehicle impacts. Assistance may save a life, minimise injury, improve the prospect of recovery, alleviate suffering and preserve the dignity of the injured or deceased. Failure to stop and assist in serious accidents should invite significant punishment.”

42. In the second reading speech it said:

“The requirement is to stop and give assistance necessary, that is in driver’s power to give...what is required is the for the person to stop and take steps to assist directly or obtain expert help by contacting police or emergency services, to ensure that professional expert assistance is obtained at the earliest opportunity...”

43. It is not to the point that other citizens may come to Mr Harding’s or may have come to Mr Harding’s assistance. Without repeating the facts again, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from a combination of the facts and circumstances is that the offender actually knew that once Mr Harding had fallen to the road and under the rear wheel of his vehicle, that Mr Harding was likely to have suffered a really serious injury or death. And I am satisfied of that beyond reasonable doubt, knowing that he did not stop and render assistance, he simply continued on this way to his place of employment, not saying a word to anyone.

44. My assessment of the objective gravity of this conduct is that it falls above mid-range. Indeed, towards the higher end of the range for offences of its type.

45. In the course of the sentence proceedings the Crown played Exhibit G, which is the CCTV compilation, which is what has been referred to as the slow motion version of the compilation disc, which was Exhibit B. That footage starkly portrayed the extreme gravity of the offending conduct in respect of each of the offences. The motion of the vehicle and the sound it made as it contacted Mr Harding’s body, bouncing up and over it, provides a replay of what actually occurred. And that is not something that is always available to the Court. It was simply not possible to come to any assessment less than that to which I have already referred in respect of each offence.

VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS

46. Pursuant to s 30E(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act I have received, and I considered the Victim Impact Statements, and there were seven in total.

47. Mary and John Harding, parents of Rhyce, read their statements to the Court, as did Stephanie Grech, sister, and Emma Grimsey, a cousin. Statements of Charles and Mary Pisani an aunt and uncle, Elizabeth Piscapo, an aunt, and Rebecca Hill, a cousin, were read to the Court by a designated representative of the family.

48. Each of them has articulated the emotional and psychological harm suffered as a result of the loss of their loved one. His passing was in tragic circumstances, and accordingly their grief is deep and will be long-lasting. There is nothing that I can say in the course of this judgment to alleviate the pain they will continue to endure.

49. The Crown has made application, pursuant to s 30E(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, for the impact statements to also be taken into account by the Court in the connection with the determination of the appropriate punishment on the basis that the harmful impact of Rhyce Harding’s death on the family victims is an aspect of harm done to the community. I have determined that that is appropriate to do so in this case.

SUBJECTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES

50. The offender is now 40 years of age. His criminal record is not one that would entitle him to any leniency.

51. The defence bundle of documents, Exhibit 1, contains a report dated 30 September 2025 of Dr Gerald Chew, forensic psychiatrist. On 16 September 2025 Dr Chew conducted a psychiatric assessment of the offender via AVL at the MRRC Silverwater. During that consultation, the offender provided the following background information:

52. He was born and raised in Western Sydney. His parents separated when he was about three years of age. He has one brother and two sisters. Whilst being raised by his mother this was disrupted by periods in boys’ homes and foster care. He was diagnosed with ADHD in childhood and was treated with stimulant medication from around five to 12 years of age. He left school in year 10, stating that he was an average student and that school was difficult owing to his ADHD. He then trained and became a refrigeration and air conditioning mechanic, which he apparently has been involved in for the majority of his working life.

53. He has three children, a 21-year-old daughter, a 17-year-old son, who was the passenger in the vehicle at the time of the offending, and also a 14-year-old son. He said he was with the mother of those children for about 13 years. Thereafter he was involved in another relationship for about six years, ending about three years ago. He is currently not in a relationship.

54. The offender informed the psychiatrist that when he was around four or five years of age, at a boys’ home halfway house in Randwick, he was sexually assaulted over the course of a week by an older male. He said he was not sure if that person was a staff member or another resident. He also reported that between the ages of five and seven, while staying every second weekend with his father, he was sexually assaulted by his father’s girlfriend’s brother. As a result, he said he had lifelong flashbacks and nightmares. He has had long periods of depression and said he has been suicidal on and off since about the age of ten. He claimed that he had tried to kill himself a number of times, the last when he was 19 or 20 years of age, at his sister’s birthday; stating that he was drunk and he attempted to run in front of an oncoming car.

55. He reported seeing various mental health practitioners, including psychologists and psychiatrists, on and off since childhood. He admitted to cannabis use since the age of 14, generally 2 grams a day. He had used many drugs recreationally from his early twenties to his mid-thirties, where he would party most weekends and use at least monthly. He had used ketamine, acid, mushrooms, cocaine and MDMA.

56. In a period leading up to the index offence he said he had been feeling quite depressed for a few months. He also said that the flashbacks and nightmares for past abuse had increased.

57. At the time of the consultation the psychiatrist stated that he had no abnormal psychometer activity and described no delusions or hallucinations. The psychiatrist was of the view that there was no formal thought disorder. However, the offender reported a depressed mood and his affect was dysphoric.

58. On the basis of the information presented, the primary diagnosis was:

(a) complex post-traumatic stress disorder in the context of childhood trauma; and (b) major depressive disorder with severe depressive symptoms and suicidality.

59. When giving evidence in the sentence proceedings, the offender confirmed the accuracy of the information provided to Dr Chew. The psychiatrist Dr Chew was also called to give evidence in the sentence proceedings and be cross-examined by the Crown.

60. At transcript 58 line 44 to 50, Dr Chew clarified his view concerning the interaction between the offender’s underlying mental illness and his behaviour at the time in this way:

“For most part people with significant trauma-base disorders unfortunately they are more likely than someone without those trauma-based disorders to respond poorly at times of distress in a negative way such as anger.”

61. Mr Karim, Counsel for the offender, has not submitted that Dr Chew’s evidence suggests any causal connection between the offending conduct and the offender’s impairment and/or disorder so as to enliven the principles in De La Rosa, (DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194) which in appropriate cases might lead to a reduction in moral culpability and lessen the need for general deterrence. I am also of the view that no such causal connection can be established in this case.

62. At tab 17 in the Crown bundle, Exhibit A, there is a statement of facts in respect of the offender’s serious assault in February 2014 on his former partner, the mother of his children. When giving evidence, the offender indicated that following that assault he sought psychological assistance. He began consultation with Creative Therapy Clinic and continued with therapy he believed over the following 12 months to two years (Exhibit 2 provides confirmation of this).

63. Exhibit 3 also confirms that on 23 September 2022, he had a consultation with Dr Olga Vaviluva in respect of continuing mental health concerns.

64. On 12 January 2023, owing to anxiety/depression and panic attacks, he was prescribed various medications including Escitalopram 20 milligrams and Mirtazapine 30 milligrams. There was a further consultation on 7 December 2023 in respect of “major depression.” His medication was reviewed, and he was provided a mental healthcare plan (see Exhibit 3).

65. In a consultation on 14 June 2024, that is about a week prior to his offending, his medication was again reviewed. This additional material (being Exhibits 2 and 3) had not been available to Dr Chew at the time of his consultation with the offender and the subsequent preparation of his report. However, this material was provided to Dr Chew before giving evidence in the sentence proceedings. He indicated that this material served to confirm the opinions expressed in his report.

66. Dr Chew was also provided with Exhibit 4 which is a COPS entry dated 18 October 2020 when the offender attended Castle Hill Police Station to report a historical allegation of sexual assault when he was four or five years of age at the hands of his father’s girlfriends’ brother (said to be 17/18 years of age). At transcript 55 line 19, Dr Chew said:

“I mean that fairly corroborates the history and I guess formulating the diagnosis I had...”

67. At transcript 59, Dr Chew was cross-examined in respect of paragraph 11 of his report where he stated that the offender had expressed remorse on the impact on the victim and his family. Dr Chew explained this way:

“He told me directly that he felt sorry for what had happened that he obviously did not intend to cause this degree of harm to anybody at all, you know, he was living with those sorts of feelings...”

68. In his own evidence, the offender addressed the deceased’s family.

69. He said inter alia:

“No matter what I say or what I do is going to bring Rhyce back or going to change what happened that day. My worst nightmare became your reality. No parent should bury their child...he’s never going to have his 30th, he’s never going to have a kid, you are never going to have a grandchild because of what I did. I don’t know what else to say. I’ve left a scar that will never heal...”

70. Whilst the offender no doubt understands that he will suffer a significant punishment, I am nevertheless satisfied that his expressions of remorse to Mr Harding’s family members was genuine.

71. Exhibit 5 is a letter to the Court from the offender’s partner, Stacey Sams. She said they had been in a committed relationship for 13 years and they have three children. She described him as a “devoted and loving father,” a hard worker, who continued to provide financially and emotionally even after their separation. She made only passing reference to the 2014 incident resulting in the offender receiving a suspended sentence. Following that, she said that she witnessed an incredible transformation in him. She said that:

“In recent years, Brad has found peace and purpose through healthy grounding outlets.”

72. Clearly, that would indicate a rather inaccurate view and understanding of the continuing difficulties that the offender had been experiencing in recent years as evidenced by other material presented to the Court.

73. The offender’s mother, Deborah Wilkinson, in her letter to the Court, which was part of Exhibit 1, referred to her diagnosis with acute myeloid leukaemia and has been undergoing treatment and chemotherapy. She referred to certain hardship that she faces and has faced since the offender’s incarceration. Whilst the Court has some sympathy for her circumstances, it is not a matter that will have any impact on the final determination of this matter.

74. Also within Exhibit 1 is a character reference from his employer, Mark Gauci, who is the managing director of Thermal Mark Transport Refrigeration. He said the offender had been employed in his company for over five years. He stated, “The offender was a reliable, honest and hardworking individual...” He said, “His conduct in the workplace has always been respectful and responsible and he is well regarded by both management and colleagues...”

75. He indicated his preparedness to offer the offender employment upon his eventual release. That reference would indicate that whilst the offender has been dealing with his own mental health concerns, they were not of a severity that impacted his ability to perform satisfactorily in his employment. He appears to have had a significant work history and that, of course, is a positive factor in respect of his prospects of rehabilitation.

76. However, the Crown has pointed to his record involving acting in a violent and threatening manner specifically, the three charges of common assault in 2006, one in 2007 and the 2014 charges of common assault and stalk and intimidate and a 2022 charge of common assault. The effect of the Crown submission is that those matters might give the Court some concern in respect of his likelihood of reoffending.

77. Dr Chew commented that with treatment the offender’s prognosis would be improved and his risk of reoffending lowered. He went on to indicate what a suitable treatment plan would involve.

78. I am ultimately of the view that he does have reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, but much will depend on his commitment to continue treatment with psychological and psychiatric services upon his eventual release.

79. Also tendered in the sentence proceedings was Exhibit D which was a sentencing assessment report and that is dated 16 October 2025. While that report refers to the offender having acknowledged partial responsibility, when he gave evidence, he denied saying that. He simply said when giving evidence, “It was all my fault” (see transcript 30 line 45).

80. His sentencing assessment report stated that the offender understood the seriousness and impact of his offending “that he thinks about his offending every day” and that he also acknowledges that “the witnesses and emergency services who attended will also continue to be impacted by his offending.”

81. He also expressed his willingness to engage with interventions to address aggression, driving and mental health.

82. I have also considered the offender’s two handwritten letters being Exhibits 6 and 7 addressing the impact on his own children and his mother.

PLEA

83. The offender’s guilty pleas were entered at the first available opportunity and accordingly he is entitled to the statutory discount of 25% in respect of each offence: (s25D(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act).

CUSTODIAL HARDSHIP

84. When giving evidence the offender said that when initially going into custody it was Corrective Services officers that suggested he should go into “Special Management and Protection”: (transcript 22 line 6). The suggestion was that this was owing to the publicity surrounding the case and that he was at risk of being attacked.

85. He has remained within that unit for the duration of his custody.

86. He said that depending on location generally he would “be let out about 9 in the morning, then you’re locked in your yard for an hour or two, and at 3 o’clock you’re locked back in your cell.”

87. He said that due to staff shortages he would sometimes be locked in his cell all day and night. He believed this had occurred on about 115 days all up during his custody.

88. Exhibit F includes an email from Peter Russell, the Senior Assistant Superintendent Corrective Services. It indicates that the offender had not been subject to a protection order but has been housed in the Special Management Area Placement referred to as SMAP at his own request due to fears for his safety. The email indicated that the offender could elect to sign off SMAP at any time and that SMAP areas had the same access to centre amenities as normal discipline inmates.

89. There was also a reference to his involvement in three fights in custody. The offender asserted when giving evidence that in respect of the first two he was merely attempting to protect himself and in respect of the third he said he was not defending himself at all.

90. Experienced Judicial officers are well aware of the sometimes volatile nature of detainees. Without specific details of these incidents and for the purposes of the present sentencing exercise I am not prepared to attach any weight to those incidents (i.e. adverse to the offender).

91. The Special Management Area Placement does not equate with a sentence being served on protection. A court can always have regard to custodial conditions amounting to hardship. However, for that to be taken into account the conditions must be substantially worse than those experienced by the general gaol population before a reduction in sentence would be warranted. I am not satisfied that the offender’s present custodial conditions fulfill that criteria.

TOTALITY

92. In Franklin v R [2013] NSWLR 122 Hoeben CJ at CL stated at [44]:

“There is no rule that sentences for offences committed on the same day, or as part of the same criminal enterprise, should be served concurrently. A sentence should not be "concurrent simply because of the similarity of the conduct or because it may be seen as part of the one course of criminal conduct" . . . The question to be asked is whether the criminality of the offence can be encompassed in the criminality of the other offence . . . If not, the sentence should be at least partially cumulative, otherwise there is a risk that the sentence will fail to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. This is so regardless of whether the offences can be regarded as part of a single episode of criminality (see Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1 at [27]).

93. In respect of the present matter, I agree with the Crown submission that the sentence for one cannot comprehend and reflect the criminality of the other. Accordingly, I am of the view that partial accumulation is required.

94. I have taken into account the various purposes of sentencing set out in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. Deterrence both specific and general are significant factors for the Court in this sentencing exercise. I have earlier made reference to the offender’s history of violence; his criminal history and traffic record indicate a continuing disregard for the law.

95. In my view general deterrence is entitled to a greater weight when dealing with an offence of manslaughter involving the use of a motor vehicle because of the large numbers of community members who drive every day of their lives. Hardly a day goes by without news of road rage incidents where other road users are either threatened or injured and there is increasing public concern that every citizen should feel safe when driving in their motor vehicle.

96. The message must be sent loud and clear that the use of motor vehicles as weapons will not be tolerated and significant punishments will follow.

97. In respect of the offence of fail to stop and assist similarly severe punishments are warranted to deter other drivers from fleeing in the event of serious collisions.

98. I have detailed and taken into account the significant subjective circumstances of the offender. However, it is important for the courts to ensure that the subjective circumstances of an individual offender do not divert the Court from imposing a sentence which adequately reflects the part which the law must play in upholding the protection of human life and in punishing those who take it: (see R v Troja unreported, CCA 16 July 1991).

99. With regard to s5 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act*,* obviously given the objective gravity of each of the offences I am satisfied that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate.

100. Accordingly, I have determined it is appropriate to impose an aggregate sentence pursuant to s 53A(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.

101. However, when sentencing an offender for more than one offence the Court must fix appropriate individual sentences (being the indicative sentences) and then consider questions of accumulation and concurrence, as well as totality.

102. In JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297 at [38] the Court stated:

“The imposition of an aggregate sentence is not to be used to minimise the offending conduct, or obscure or obliterate the range of offending conduct or its totality.”

103. The aggregate non-parole period must reflect the minimum period of imprisonment required to be served having regard to the various purposes of sentencing.

104. Mr Karim, Counsel for the offender, asked the Court to consider a finding of special circumstances on the basis of the offender’s first-time custodial experience “in the context of the offender’s mental health fragility and the nature of his incarceration.”

105. However, I am not persuaded there is sufficient reason to make such a finding and vary the statutory ratio. Given the terms of imprisonment that I am about to impose he will have a lengthy period on parole to assist his reintegration into the community and hopefully assist in preventing any further offending.

106. I will now proceed to sentence.

107. Mr Wilkinson, having been convicted of each of these offences:

108. In respect of the charge of manslaughter I specify an indicative term of 13 years six months imprisonment.

109. In respect of the charge of failing to stop and assist the indicative term will be one of four years six months imprisonment.

110. I, therefore, sentence you to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 16 years to date from 21 June 2024 and to expire on 20 June 2040.

111. I fix an aggregate non-parole period of 12 years to date from 21 June 2024 and to expire on 20 June 2036, on which date you will become eligible for release to parole.

112. As earlier mentioned in the proceedings, pursuant to s 206A of the Road Transport Act there will be disqualification of 12 months and, as indicated, that section provides that the disqualification only commences once released to parole.

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