R v White [2025] NSWSC 243 | Case summary

R v White [2025] NSWSC 243 | Case summary | Zoe

I am satisfied of the following facts beyond reasonable doubt.
Clare Nowland was a resident at the Yallambee Lodge aged care facility in Cooma. At the date of her death she was 95 years of age and suffering from symptoms consistent with some form of cognitive impairment such as dementia. No formal diagnosis of such a condition had been made at the date of her death. Mrs Nowland had mobility issues that were consistent with her age: she required the use of a walking frame to get about.
On 17 May 2023, Mrs Nowland was observed to be awake and roaming around the care facility. Most of her movements are recorded on CCTV footage from various locations in the facility. At one stage, Mrs Nowland entered the kitchen in a common area and retrieved two small kitchen knives and a jar of prunes. She went on to enter the rooms of a number of other residents while carrying these knives. Attempts by members of staff to take the knives from Mrs Nowland were all unsuccessful and associated attempts to settle her also failed. Shortly after 4am, the Registered Nurse on duty called 000 and requested the assistance of an ambulance. As a result of the fact that Mrs Nowland was in possession of the knives, the 000 operator was required automatically to notify the police as well. No-one at Yallambee Lodge called the police directly.
As a result of the 000 notification, Acting Sgt Pank and Const White, along with the paramedics, attended the facility and searched for Mrs Nowland. They arrived just before 5am. After a short while, they were notified by staff that Mrs Nowland had been located in the nurses’ office in the administration building. They proceeded to the administration building.
From 5.07.21am, the entire interaction with Mrs Nowland in the nurses’ office is recorded by the body worn cameras on each of the police officers. It is also recorded on CCTV. Initially, Sgt Pank and Anna Hofner, one of the paramedics, encouraged Mrs Nowland to put down the single knife which by then remained in her hand. Mrs Nowland did not do so. Indeed, Mrs Nowland did not respond either verbally or otherwise to anything said to her throughout her interaction with those present. Instead, Mrs Nowland stood up from a position sitting on her walker and started to push it towards the door leading to the hallway. Sergeant Pank attempted unsuccessfully to disarm her by stepping towards the room, but stopped when Mrs Nowland raised her hand holding the knife. This was at 5.08.47am. Sergeant Pank put her hand out towards Mrs Nowland but again stopped at the doorway when Mrs Nowland raised her hand holding the knife for a second time 10 seconds later. Constable White drew his taser at 5.08.59am. Mrs Nowland continued shuffling slowly towards the door with her walker.
At 5.09.22am, Mrs Nowland once again raised her hand holding the knife. Constable White then activated the warning arc on his taser at 5.09.31am. A few seconds after that, at 5.09.54am, Mrs Nowland became stationary in the doorway but once again raised her hand holding the knife. Constable White said “Nah, bugger it” and deployed the taser at 5.09.59am, striking Mrs Nowland in the chest and lower abdomen. Mrs Nowland lurched forward before she fell backwards, striking her head heavily on the floor.
Mrs Nowland was then transported by ambulance to Cooma Base Hospital. Her injuries were later deemed non-survivable. She received palliative care until she died seven days later on 24 May 2023.
All of the events just described were electronically before the jury in full in the form of video recordings taken from the body worn cameras.

Before I proceed further, it is important to note the following things. It is usual and perfectly understandable that many people will have an interest in the result of any sentencing proceedings and not merely the offender awaiting sentence. People other than those who are directly involved in the events that give rise to the relevant offence, such as an accused, often have and forcefully express a desire to follow what happens in court. These include, as in this case, relatives and friends of the deceased, whose position as victims is expressly recognised by statute. Further, and more generally, complete strangers to the proceedings, such as members of the general population and the local community, and often in large numbers, although only affected indirectly, nevertheless remain vicariously invested in the due administration of the criminal justice system. These individuals are entitled to a clear explanation of what happens to an accused person, or what sentence is imposed and why. These different roles are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Sentencing is a complex and complicated task. It is not designed to be so. It is not intended to vex the uninitiated. But unlike theatrical or cinematic representations of this aspect of the criminal law, sentences in this country are not handed down without giving due consideration to a very large number of important and often contradictory themes. I have watched for many years how at least some of those assembled in court to hear counsels’ submissions on sentence will feel the need audibly to express frustration and dismay that the court’s decision is not instantaneous. That is understandable. This case proved to be no exception.
The things to which I will now direct attention are essential matters to be considered and dealt with in these proceedings, as in any similar case. It may appear to some to be overly technical, tedious and pedantic. However, we are in this country the beneficiaries of a remarkable system of criminal justice. My task in sentencing Mr White constitutes a significant example of the operation of that system. But while it is acceptable and understandable that opinions about judicial decisions will inevitably differ, it would be a fundamental error for any particular individual or group of individuals to conclude that the worth of our system of criminal justice is coextensive with, or is only to be judged by, that individual or group’s level of agreement or satisfaction with the sentencing outcome in any particular case.

The Crown case at trial was that the jury could be satisfied of Mr White’s guilt on the two bases referred to at [2] and [3] above. While both paths are viable routes for the jury to have found Mr White guilty, the Crown submitted on sentence that I would be satisfied Mr White’s liability amounted to manslaughter by criminal negligence representing what the Crown described as a slightly higher degree of criminal culpability in the circumstances of this case than manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act.
The Crown reasoned that I would be satisfied that the deployment of the taser by Mr White occurred at a time when he owed Mrs Nowland a duty of care to exercise any lawful power he had reasonably and proportionately in response to any threat or danger Mrs Nowland may have posed. The Crown submitted that the breach of that duty of care involved such a great falling short of the standard which a reasonable person would have exercised that the doing of the act merits criminal punishment. The act of deploying the taser in the circumstances involved an obvious risk that death or grievous bodily harm might follow, especially given Mrs Nowland’s age and apparent physical and mental frailty.
The Crown also submitted that the duty of care owed to any member of the public by a police officer is fundamental. The community places great store in the fact that an officer will only use force in the course of his or her lawful duty that is both reasonably necessary and proportionate in the circumstances. It was the Crown case that Mr White’s use of the taser against Mrs Nowland was “utterly unnecessary and … so obviously excessive a use of force that no reasonable police officer would have done it in the circumstances” faced by him.
Alternatively, the Crown submitted that the offence of manslaughter on the basis of an unlawful and dangerous act nevertheless constituted a very serious breach of the criminal law. While the unlawfulness turned upon a conclusion that the act amounted to the use of unreasonable force in the circumstances, the dangerousness was said to be the obvious risk that Mrs Nowland might fall, having regard to her age, frailty and restricted mobility and balance.
The Crown contended that on either basis, Mr White’s actions were a precipitous and wholly unjustified use of force by a police officer that resulted in the death of an elderly and vulnerable woman and that it warranted appropriate punishment.
In contrast, Mr White submitted that I would positively determine that his guilt was based on satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act. Mr White contended that element 6 of manslaughter by criminal negligence, that his actions merited criminal punishment because what he did fell so far short of the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the circumstances and involved such a high risk that death or really serious bodily harm would follow as a result, had not been made out.
In support of that submission, Mr White emphasised the following matters:
There was expert evidence in the trial that the use of a taser is generally an appropriate response to the threat of a knife and that physically disarming an assailant by force is not recommended.
Mr White attempted to convince Mrs Nowland to surrender the knife and suggested physically disarming her.
Others present at the scene considered the threat was high.
Mr White had little training in dealing with an armed elderly person, and little training in the “exceptional circumstances” test required by the Standard Operating Procedures before deploying a taser on such a person.
Police training encourages containment and negotiation as the principal operating strategy for high risk incidents, with retaining subjects within a perimeter a prime objective.
Mr White submitted that the basis of his criminal liability should in effect draw its content from a finding of the following facts:
Mrs Nowland was armed with a sharp bladed knife.
Mrs Nowland had threatened other residents and staff in the nursing home prior to police and paramedic attendance and Mr White knew this.
Mr White directly witnessed Mrs Nowland threaten Sgt Pank with the knife, by raising it towards her several times.
Mr White was motivated to disarm Mrs Nowland with the minimal amount of force to ensure everyone’s safety.
Mr White’s decision to discharge the taser was neither premeditated nor planned and occurred only after Mrs Nowland had raised the knife towards Sgt Pank several times and had advanced beyond the curtilage of the doorway.
The decision to discharge the taser occurred after numerous attempts by Sgt Pank (in direct collaboration with Mr White) to disarm Mrs Nowland which all failed.
The risk to Sgt Pank, the paramedics and Mr White increased as Mrs Nowland attempted to leave the nurse’s room and enter the hallway.
Mr White believed the risk to himself and others posed by Mrs Nowland was “increasing significantly”, such that he perceived a serious threat to himself and others.
Mr White held a subjective belief that Mrs Nowland at the time was definitely willing to use the knife if anyone got near her.
Taking account of these competing contentions, I do not consider that it is possible on any principled basis legitimately or confidently to conclude that either basis for Mr White’s liability for manslaughter was any more likely to have been the foundation for the jury’s verdict than the other. This is not a case in which there is any fact or collection of facts that the jury might obviously have rejected in favour of some other or others. The objectively observable facts touching what happened at Yallambee Lodge on the morning in question could not seriously be in dispute. In my opinion, it was entirely open to the jury to be satisfied both that Mr White was criminally liable for his breach of duty as well as by reason of the commission of an unlawful and dangerous act. This is not a case in which the jury must have reasoned differently by reference to competing versions of the facts.
In terms of unlawful and dangerous act, the Crown submitted to the jury that tasering Mrs Nowland was unlawful because it was not and could not have been reasonably necessary to use such force and that the use of such force was dangerous because it exposed Mrs Nowland to the risk of serious injury. By way of contrast, the jury were specifically instructed by me that criminal negligence giving rise to manslaughter is often described as gross or even wicked: it is negligence of such a serious kind that it far exceeds simple carelessness or negligence that occurs frequently in our society.
Therein lies in my view the only possible basis of distinction between the two kinds of liability for manslaughter in this case. I am unable to conclude that Mr White’s negligence was either gross or wicked. The simple but tragic fact would seem to me to be that Mr White completely, and on one available view inexplicably, misread and misunderstood the dynamics of the situation that he faced and patently overestimated both the existence and the level of the threat created by Mrs Nowland in the circumstances. I am cautious with the benefit of hindsight to conclude that Mr White was not faced with a difficult situation for the safe resolution of which he was significantly responsible: a courtroom 18 months later is a comparatively leisurely environment from which to theorise about how the situation might better have been handled. But try as I might, I am unable to conclude that it could not and should not have been handled differently, by the calm and patient application of a common sense understanding that a frail and confused 95 year old woman in fact posed nothing that could reasonably be described as a threat of any substance. One might have expected that Mr White’s training as a policeman and his experience in life ought better to have alerted him to these obvious realities. Sadly, they did not.
In my opinion, tasering Mrs Nowland was unlawful because it was not and could not have been reasonably necessary to use such force and that the use of such force was dangerous because it exposed Mrs Nowland to the risk of serious injury. As the Crown has now quite properly conceded, the distinction in terms of comparative criminal culpability is only slight. However, in my opinion, the jury would have inferred that a reasonable person in the position of Mr White would not have resorted to the use of a taser in the circumstances that confronted him. An available line of jury reasoning supported the choice by Mr White of a forbearing and expectant approach, which in all likelihood would have entirely avoided the need for the use of any force at all. Mr White’s failure to do so means that his actions were both unlawful and dangerous.

It is well-settled that manslaughter is a “protean” offence. The circumstances of its commission are many and varied and a sentencing court must have regard to the full context in which the particular death occurred. The often unique surrounding circumstances bearing upon the objective gravity of the offence and the moral culpability of the offender must be individually considered: R v Hoerler (2004) 147 A Crim R 520; [2004] NSWCCA 184 at 531 [44]; R v Forbes (2005) 160 A Crim R 1; [2005] NSWCCA 377 at [133]-[134]; see also R v Loveridge (2014) 243 A Crim R 31; [2014] NSWCCA 120 at [229] and Davidson v R (2022) 300 A Crim R 214; [2022] NSWCCA 153 at [140].
The variety of circumstances affecting culpability in manslaughter offences, and the absence of any standard non-parole period, means that placing any particular offence on a hypothetical range “is not only not obligatory, it is unlikely to be of much utility”: Paterson v R [2021] NSWCCA 273 at [33] (per Beech-Jones CJ at CL).
There is accordingly no “category” of manslaughter that is more or less serious than others, although it remains relevant to the sentencing exercise to identify the nature of the criminal liability on which the offender is to be sentenced: Davidson v R (2022) 300 A Crim R 214; [2022] NSWCCA 153 at [12] (per Brereton JA), [204] (per N Adams J); R v Dally (2000) 115 A Crim R 582; [2000] NSWCCA 162 at [64].
The Crown emphasised the following features as relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence:
Mr White was a serving police officer who at the time of the death of Mrs Nowland had twelve years’ experience in the force.
The assault occurred within 3 minutes of Mr White first sighting Mrs Nowland, who was initially seated behind a desk in the office and had moved about 1 metre to the doorway in that time.
Mrs Nowland was extremely vulnerable because of her age, physical frailty, limited mobility and mental impairment.
Mrs Nowland only held up the knife when she was stationary and did not do so as she moved towards the door.
There was a significant disparity between Mr White and Mrs Nowland in terms of height, weight, age, strength and mobility so that Mrs Nowland could not have posed immediate or imminent threat to Mr White or anyone else.
The Crown submitted that the present case was not one that could be said to fall “at the very lowest end of objective seriousness”. Mr White contended that the objective seriousness of his offending was to be considered as a function of the degree of departure from conduct that would otherwise be considered as a reasonable execution of his duty as a policeman.
Because death is a necessary element of every manslaughter, it is a neutral consideration in assessing seriousness. The motivation of an offender in committing the act that caused the death, however, may be a relevant consideration.
In the present case, there seems to be no dispute that Mr White held an honest belief that what he did was necessary to meet the threat that he considered was posed by Mrs Nowland. The jury’s verdict proceeded upon the basis that any such belief was unreasonable. Whatever other descriptor one may wish to attach to Mr White’s decision to fire the taser when he did, it was an error of judgment. In Mr White’s submission, it was an error of judgment made in the performance of his duty as a police officer that was motivated by an honest but mistaken and unreasonable belief about the existence and nature of the threat that was posed. Mr White submitted that it was therefore at “the very lowest end” of objective seriousness.
As with so many issues in this case, it is in my view important at this juncture to pause and observe that any discussion about the seriousness, or the objective seriousness, of the offence of which Mr White has been convicted is not, and should not be confused with, a discussion about the seriousness of the death of Mrs Nowland. That would be a mistake. It is beyond controversy that the death of any person is serious. The death of Mrs Nowland is no different. The notion of objective seriousness does not call that fact into question and instead deals with an entirely different concept, being a comparison, if that is possible, between Mr White’s offence and other similar offences. It is in that sense, and only in that sense, that the Crown maintains that Mr White’s offence is not at the lowest end of seriousness and that Mr White contends that it is.
It may be accepted that Mr White’s offence was committed against a vulnerable and elderly woman. I accept that there is a community expectation that violence will not be occasioned to people in that category. This expectation gathers importance as the number of aged and vulnerable people in the community increases: R v Wood (2014) 244 A Crim R 501; [2014] NSWCCA 184. So much is tacitly recognised by the terms of s 21A(2)(l) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999*.*
In my opinion, Mr White’s crime falls at the lower end of objective seriousness for crimes of its type. I have reached that view for the following reasons.
First, Mr White was called to the Yallambee Lodge to perform duties in the course of his work as a serving police officer. Mr White and Mrs Nowland were strangers. The incident that caused her death was neither premeditated nor planned, and did not arise in the context of a prior relationship between them, where the possible indices of any such relationship might have had the potential to influence his actions. Mr White had no choice but to attend Yallambee Lodge when so instructed. He did not seek out contact with Mrs Nowland for a nefarious or improper purpose or to secure some advantage for himself. He was in all respects a disinterested contributor to what happened.
Secondly, Mr White was tasked with a lawful duty to reduce risk and disarm Mrs Nowland whilst ensuring the safety of others who were present. They were brought together in a lawful context pursuant to Mr White’s duty to do so. Once there, Mr White had a duty to resolve the situation that confronted him. He did not have the luxury of being able to exercise a choice about whether or not to remain involved before Mrs Nowland had been disarmed. He was required to resolve the situation to which he had been called and could not have chosen to do nothing.
Thirdly, the fact that Mr White may have overestimated or misunderstood the nature and extent of the risk posed by Mrs Nowland does not increase the seriousness of the offence. It serves merely to explain its commission. The fact that Mr White’s mistake might be characterised as egregious informs his criminal liability, rather than his moral culpability or its comparative seriousness.

The fact that an offender was a person of good character before the commission of the offence for which he or she is to be sentenced achieves specific recognition in s 21A(3)(f) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. Apart from the extent to which it can operate to inform matters like rehabilitation, prospects of re-offending and future dangerousness, judicial references to good character in the context of sentencing remarks or sentencing proceedings have to be carefully understood and sensitively explained. In my experience, the mere mention of an accused person being of good character, having been convicted of a serious and tragic offence, does not often, if ever, sit well with those coping with the consequences of the crime in question. A common and understandable reaction in such circumstances is to blanch at any suggestion that a person should be sentenced more favourably simply because it may be his or her first offence: why should an offender be entitled to leniency for a blameless life if their crime means they are no longer blameless? Such views are completely understandable for as long as the limited context in which so called good character is considered is not properly understood.
Experience has led the courts to understand that a person with no prior criminal history is less likely, although by no means certain, to re-offend and more likely successfully to embrace opportunities for rehabilitation. A person who has committed and been convicted of a dangerous act will in most, but by no means all, cases present a lower risk of committing a further dangerous offence than a person with a history of doing so. These are largely matters of common sense.
In the present case, Mr White asks me to take his past into account in these limited ways when determining what sentence he should receive. Mr White submitted that his lack of criminal history and strong family support militate strongly in favour of a community based order to allow him to continue his road to rehabilitation and meaningfully to contribute to society and the community in which he resides.

It is unnecessary in my opinion in this case to take account of the need for specific deterrence. It can hardly be doubted that Mr White would not and does not need to be reminded of the consequences of his actions in this case. The offending occurred in the strict and limited context of Mr White’s employment where his access to a taser was an incident of his official police function. Moreover, in practical terms, the realistic likelihood that he would ever deploy a taser in similar circumstances is negligible if not fanciful. That risk is also affected by the fact that his employment has been terminated by the Commissioner and his challenge to that decision is yet to be determined. I do not understand the Crown to take issue with that analysis.
By contrast, the Crown maintains that there is a real need generally to deter others who might be likely to commit a similar offence. That submission must necessarily be directed at other members of the NSW Police Service in the unique and fact-specific circumstances of Mr White's offence.
Mr White submitted that general deterrence has a limited role to play in the current sentencing exercise. The offending occurred in the very confined scope of being a police officer. The harm caused to Mrs Nowland resulted from an error of judgment.
The prospect of a police officer in New South Wales intentionally or recklessly causing harm to elderly members of the community in the same or similar circumstances when confronted by an elderly and frail woman in her 90s is so small as to be unlikely to reoccur. If it is accepted that Mr White’s actions and the subject offence resulted from an error of judgment, general deterrence has little or no role to play. Knowledge and awareness of the tragic consequences flowing from the erroneous use of a taser may well deter a reoccurrence of the same behaviour but that is different to the deterrent effect that the sentence to be imposed for such conduct might be expected to create.
General deterrence should in my view play only a minor role in assessing the proper sentence to impose in this case.

The following matters were emphasised in support of Mr White’s submission that I could be satisfied in the particular circumstances of this case, having considered all possible alternatives, that a penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate.
First, Mr White has already suffered extra-curial punishment as a result of his actions. His employment has been terminated. Moreover, as the victim impact statements make perfectly plain, he has become an unwelcome member of the local Cooma community as the result of what he has done. Cooma is the town in which he had made his home with his young family. It will be difficult for him to continue to live there as the negative opinions of him held by Mrs Nowland’s family are unlikely to change.
Secondly, as a former police officer, the imposition of a custodial sentence, and the associated likely conditions for him in gaol, would be unduly onerous. It is inevitable that any sentence of full-time custody could only be served in some form of protective isolation, a fact that I take to be accepted by the Crown having regard to the evidence provided to me for consideration of the Crown’s detention application last year.
Thirdly, Mr White does not represent a risk or a danger to the community. Incarceration is not necessary to ensure the safety of a particular individual or group of individuals with whom he is likely to come into contact.
Fourthly, and in a related sense, Mr White does not pose a risk of re-offending. It is unnecessary as a matter of practical reality that he be retained in custody until Corrective Services NSW has been given an opportunity in a controlled setting to educate Mr White in the eradication of some entrenched or persistent socially inappropriate or dangerous tendencies or proclivities.
Fifthly, although there will be stridently differing views about it, the imposition of onerous and enforceable community service work conditions requiring the performance of community service work for as many as 500 hours is an appropriate and adequate method of meeting the sentencing conditions of punishment and denunciation for the crime he has committed.
Sixthly, the law in New South Wales contemplates the imposition of a Community Correction Order, even for offences of manslaughter.
In a related sense, there is adequate precedent for a sentence other than full-time imprisonment in cases of wrongful death such as the present. I have been referred to several cases in which manslaughter convictions were punished by the imposition of either a suspended sentence or a good behaviour bond. One of these cases is particularly instructive.
In R v Gary Gow [2006] NSWDC 78, the offender was a medical practitioner. He was sentenced following a plea of guilty for causing death as the result of the criminally negligent over-prescription and mis-prescription of morphine tartrate. The deceased was a patient who placed considerable pressure upon Dr Gow, to which pressure the offender succumbed, to prescribe him with a narcotic as well as to provide the means to administer it himself by injection. Dr Gow was also found to have made a series of other serious mistakes which led to his patient being supplied with the potentially fatal doses of morphine tartrate without any written instructions as to the quantity he should use. Despite the egregious nature of his negligence, he was sentenced to an 18-month suspended sentence. Unlike the present case, and as a matter of distinction, Gow involved a series of five errors made over a substantial period of time rather than a single decision made under the pressure of a perceived threat.
See also R v Armstrong (Supreme Court (NSW), 25 August 1995, unrep), R v Hall (1999) 108 A Crim R 209; [1999] NSWSC 738, R v ANG [2001] NSWSC 758 and R v H**A [2008] NSWSC 1368. In all of these cases, as in the present case, the death of the deceased was tragic, avoidable and serious.
In my opinion, this is a suitable case for the imposition of a Community Correction Order, subject to the conditions to which I will later refer. I should note immediately that I have derived significant assistance in arriving at that conclusion from the considered and learned judgments of his Honour Basten JA in Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Burton [2020] NSWCCA 54 at [42] – [43] and his Honour Beech-Jones J (as his Honour then was) in R v Eckersley [2021] NSWSC 562 at [78] – [81] and [86] – [89].
I trust it will be apparent from the foregoing that I have given close and careful consideration to the purposes of sentencing described in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. Some of those purposes are not engaged in this case. Others will no doubt be the subject of considerable conjecture.
It will be recalled that I raised with counsel at Mr White’s sentencing hearing the force, if it be so, of the analogy of a nursing sister on night shift called in unexpectedly at the last minute to replace a colleague in a critical care ward. Part of the sister’s duties included the dispensing of pharmaceuticals to patients, some of which were potentially lethal if administered other than in accordance with strict protocols. I posed the rhetorical question of what penalty the community might expect ought to be imposed upon such a medical professional if his or her impatience, inattention or misjudgment resulted in the egregiously mistaken disregard for such protocols causing the death of a patient and a conviction for manslaughter by reason of criminal negligence or unlawful and dangerous act as a consequence. I was attempting by this analogue to draw attention to the fact that the nurse, like Mr White, caused a tragic and avoidable death as the result of an error of judgment amounting to a mistake that in hindsight is hard to comprehend. Accepting that the acts in each case were criminal does not in my view inevitably inform the nature of the penalty that should be imposed or that no sentence other than full-time custody should result.

Mr White made what by any measure was a terrible mistake. For reasons that may never clearly be understood, if understood at all, he deployed his taser in response to what he perceived to be a threat that in my view never called for such a response. As I have attempted to make clear, there were several ways that he might have dealt with the situation quite differently. Strict adherence to protocols mandating containment of a person armed with a knife may well have been something that Mr White had been trained to enforce, but it is difficult to accept that Mrs Nowland could have gone anywhere quickly or that the possible opportunities for disarming her in the corridor of the administration building would not have been significantly greater than when she was confined to the nurses’ office. The complete and utter frustration and despair exhibited by her family in the circumstances is easy to understand when things could so easily have been handled better.
I do not mean to reduce or dilute the significance of what happened to Mrs Nowland by characterising Mr White’s decision to deploy his taser as a mistake. To the extent that his decision as a police officer in the circumstances called for a choice between or among several options of what to do, Mr White clearly made the wrong choice. Moreover, the words spoken by him immediately before firing his taser suggest a loss of patience on his part, a fact that only underscores the awful nature of that mistake. I am confident that Mrs Nowland’s children will more than once have painfully called to mind what the body worn video permits us all to see and to hear in distressing detail. I discern from their statements a real sense of guilt, quite undeserved by any measure, that they were not with their mother at the time to protect her and that the viewing of that video is almost a matter of self-induced punishment to transfer the pain from her to them. This is no more and no less a perfectly natural response.
Death takes many forms. The pain it causes is no more or less severe if it is the result of a human failing or a natural occurrence. There is an understandable tendency, however, to feel that pain more deeply when there is someone to blame for the death. In the present case, as in many others, that is often because the death resulted from a human failing that should never have occurred as it did and which could have been avoided or prevented.
As the Crown uncontroversially accepts, the death of Mrs Nowland is not in the worst category of manslaughter. In my judgment, which I am able dispassionately to form having regard to the objective facts, it is on the contrary at the lower end of seriousness of crimes amounting to wrongful death. It does not call in my judgment for a custodial sentence in order to give effect to the objects of sentencing described earlier in these reasons. Moreover, a custodial sentence would in my view be disproportionate to the objective seriousness of the offence and Mr White’s particular subjective circumstances.

R v White

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment

REMARKS ON SENTENCE

Facts

Comment

Basis of liability

Objective seriousness

Subjective considerations

Criminal antecedents

Remorse

“Good character”

Mental state

Deterrence - general and specific

Victim impact statements

Legislation

Crown submissions

Mr White’s submissions

Community Correction Assessment Report

Discernment

Sentence

Parties

Legislation Cited (2)

Cited By (1)