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[2025] QCA 96
respondent. Appeal dismissed. Henry J delivered the reasons, with Bradley JA and North J agreeing.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The Court of Appeal held that fraud under s 408C(1)(b) does not require the person from whom property is obtained to be its owner. Here, the company owned the money, but Mr Gore received the appellant's request and made the transfer. The appeal was dismissed.
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1,900 words · generated 07/10/2026
Matthew Wallace appealed his jury conviction for fraud under s 408C(1)(b) of the Criminal Code (Qld). The charge alleged that he dishonestly obtained property from Ricky Edward Gore. The central difficulty was that the $15,000 payment came from the bank account of a company controlled by Mr Gore, rather than from an account held in Mr Gore's own name.
The background was a restoration arrangement for a 1972 Ford Falcon XA Coupe. In 2020, Mr Gore engaged Wallace to restore the vehicle and paid him $10,000 when Wallace took possession of it. Further payment was to be made as work progressed, and Mr Gore transferred more money in November 2020.
On 25 January 2021, Wallace asked Mr Gore for another $15,000. The message represented that work on the engine, gearbox, clutch and interior had been completed, although much of it remained to be done. Wallace then supplied his bank account details. Four days later, Mr Gore transferred the requested amount from the company's account to Wallace's nominated account.
The appeal challenged both the refusal of a no-case submission and whether the Crown had proved that the $15,000 was Mr Gore's property. Henry J identified the underlying question as whether the statutory word “from” requires the person from whom property is obtained to own it. Bradley JA and North J agreed with Henry J. The Court dismissed the appeal.
The judgment was delivered ex tempore and the supplied text has no numbered paragraphs. Accordingly, this analysis refers to the relevant statutory provisions and passages without paragraph citations.
The Court focused on the language of s 408C(1)(b): a person commits fraud if they dishonestly “obtain[] property from any person”. Henry J said the section focuses on the defendant's dishonest obtaining of property from a person, “not that person’s legal status vis-à-vis the property”. The Court did not read the provision as requiring the Crown to prove that the person identified as the source was the owner.
Two further statutory features supported that reading. First, s 408C(3)(e) defines “obtain” to include “to get, gain, receive or acquire in any way”. Henry J treated that as a broad definition, inconsistent with implying a narrow ownership condition. Secondly, s 408C(3)(f) provides that, if a person obtains property from another, it is immaterial whether the owner passes or intends to pass ownership in the property. The judgment used these provisions to show that the statutory concept of obtaining is not confined to a conventional transfer of title by the person from whom the property is obtained.
The Court also examined how s 408C uses different language in different subsections. Section 408C(1)(a)(i) refers to property “belonging to another”. By contrast, s 408C(1)(b) refers to obtaining property “from any person”. The difference mattered: where the legislature used ownership language in one part of the section, the Court did not import it into the distinct wording of s 408C(1)(b).
Applied to the facts, the money could be described in more than one way. It was obtained from the company in the sense that the company owned the bank account. But it could also be described as obtained from Mr Gore: Wallace made the request to him, and Mr Gore physically effected the transfer. The judgment treated those descriptions as compatible, not mutually exclusive.
The Court rejected the argument that Mr Gore's actions had to be characterised exclusively as actions of the company because he acted as its agent. His position in the company explained how he could transfer the funds, but did not displace the factual point that he made the transfer in response to Wallace's request. Whether Mr Gore acted lawfully in using company funds, or might have owed the company an account, did not alter the source analysis under the charged provision. Henry J noted that the transfer had been falsely described in the company's records, but treated any duty to account as immaterial to whether Wallace obtained the money from Mr Gore.
The judgment records competing readings of s 408C(1)(b), rather than a prior appellate rule that the source person must own the property. Wallace's argument was that, because the company owned the money, it could not have been obtained “from” Mr Gore. The Court rejected that proposed implication from the statutory text.
The legal clarification is specific. Under s 408C(1)(b), ownership by the person from whom property is obtained is not a necessary feature of the source relationship. A person can be the source because of their actions in transferring property, even where an entity owns it. This does not mean that ownership is irrelevant to every offence under s 408C. The Court expressly contrasted s 408C(1)(b) with s 408C(1)(a)(i), which uses the phrase “belonging to another”.
The Court also maintained a distinct recipient-side requirement discussed in R v Lenahan [2009] QCA 187. In Lenahan, the question was whether the defendant was the person who obtained the property, where the property was delivered to a company. The Court described Lenahan as addressing who received the property, not whether the person from whom it came owned it. Thus, Wallace does not displace the distinction drawn in Lenahan: the identity of the recipient and the identity or ownership of the source are different questions.
The decision is consequently a focused interpretation of the words “from any person” in s 408C(1)(b). It does not decide questions about other subsections, other offences, or the legal consequences of an agent using company funds. The judgment's reasoning should be read in that statutory and factual setting.
“The section’s focus is on a defendant’s dishonest obtaining of property from a person, not that person’s legal status vis-à-vis the property.”
In plain English, the prosecution did not have to prove that Mr Gore owned the money to establish that Wallace obtained it from him. The provision focuses on the relationship between the dishonest obtaining and the person from whom it occurred.
“All that is required in s 408C(1)(b) is that the defendant ‘dishonestly obtains property from any person’.”
The Court relied on the provision's actual words. It contrasted “from any person” with “belonging to another”, which appears elsewhere in s 408C. The difference in language was part of the reason for rejecting an implied ownership element.
“The concepts are not mutually exclusive.”
The same property can be described as obtained from its owner and also from the person whose physical actions conveyed it. In this case, the company was the account owner, while Mr Gore performed the transfer.
“The defendant thus obtained the money from Mr Gore within the meaning of s 408C(1)(b), notwithstanding that the money was owned by the company.”
This is the direct application to the appeal. The Court held that company ownership did not prevent the transaction from meeting the source aspect alleged in the charge.
The judgment also says that Mr Gore's role as a company agent was “a distraction” to the statutory question. That passage does not determine whether his use of the funds was authorised or what obligations he owed to the company. It explains only why those matters did not change the conclusion about whether Wallace obtained the money from him.
The decision is relevant to a charge under s 408C(1)(b) where the alleged fraud involves a transfer or delivery made by a person who does not personally own the property. Its clearest factual pattern is where the defendant asks a particular person to transfer property, that person physically performs the transfer, and the property belongs to a company or another entity.
The source person's role need not be identical to Mr Gore's for the reasoning to be potentially relevant. The judgment's shop example illustrates the general point: a defendant may obtain goods handed over by a sales attendant, even though the shop owns them. The Court considered that the goods might be obtained from the shop through the attendant's agency and also from the attendant whose actions conveyed them.
The decision does not make every person involved in a transaction a source for s 408C(1)(b). The judgment's application depended on the concrete features that Mr Gore received the request and personally effected the payment. Whether another set of facts has a sufficiently similar source relationship would require consideration of the particular evidence and the statutory context.
Nor does Wallace remove the need to address the other elements of fraud. The appeal concerned the meaning of “from” and the ownership argument. The judgment does not give a comprehensive analysis of all elements of s 408C(1)(b), nor does it decide questions about the sufficiency of proof in other factual settings.
The supplied judgment contains no account of later cases applying, following, distinguishing or otherwise treating R v Wallace [2025] QCA 96. No later-court relationship can therefore be established from the material provided.
The judgment itself discusses two earlier authorities. It distinguishes R v Mirotsos [2022] QCA 76 because that case involved different subsections of s 408C and a question about whether a director's conduct was authorised by the company. Henry J considered that corporate-person distinction did not resolve whether property could be obtained from a non-owner who physically transferred it.
The Court explains R v Lenahan [2009] QCA 187 as dealing with a different end of the transaction. Lenahan concerned who had to obtain the property, particularly where a company rather than the defendant received it. Wallace concerned who property was obtained “from”. The Court used Lenahan's comparison of language across s 408C as an interpretive method, while concluding that Lenahan did not impose an ownership condition on the source person.
The judgment does not settle how the source principle applies where the alleged source person did not personally initiate or execute a transfer, or where several intermediaries were involved. Its reasoning identifies physical action in making the payment as important on these facts, but does not formulate an exhaustive test for every transaction structure.
It also does not decide how the source question interacts with other forms of obtaining covered by the broad definition in s 408C(3)(e), beyond the example and transaction before the Court. Further cases may need to address whether the source relationship is established where the defendant obtains property through an automated system, a delegated payment process, or a transfer in which the person named in the charge has a less direct role.
The decision leaves separate questions about company authority and accountability untouched. Henry J said it did not matter to the source question whether Mr Gore acted lawfully or unlawfully in using company funds. The judgment therefore should not be treated as deciding whether a company controller's conduct was authorised, whether the controller owed a duty to account, or what consequences might follow between the controller and the company.
Finally, Wallace's reasoning is confined to s 408C(1)(b). The judgment's contrast with s 408C(1)(a)(i), and its discussion of Lenahan concerning other subsections, caution against treating the decision as a general rule that ownership never matters in fraud offences. The precise statutory words and the element in issue remain significant.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Wallace [2025] QCA 96
PARTIES: R / v / WALLACE, Matthew James / (appellant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 76 of 2025 / DC No 290 of 2024
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Townsville – Date of Conviction: 1 April 2025 (Clare SC DCJ)
DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON: 3 June 2025
DELIVERED AT: Townsville
HEARING DATE: 3 June 2025
JUDGES: Bradley JA and North and Henry JJ
ORDER: Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – PARTICULAR OFFENCES – PROPERTY OFFENCES – OWNERSHIP OF GOODS – GENERALLY – where the appellant was convicted by a jury of the offence of Fraud under s 408C(1)(b) Criminal Code (Qld) – where the charge alleged the appellant dishonestly obtained a sum of money from the complainant – where the complainant electronically transferred the money to the appellant from the bank account of a company the complainant controlled – where the money was owned by the company and not the complainant – whether s 408C(1)(b) requires proof that the dishonestly obtained property belonged to the person from whom it was obtained / Criminal Code (Qld), s 408C / R v Lenahan [2009] QCA 187, cited / R v Mirotsos [2022] QCA 76, cited
COUNSEL: C J Grant for the appellant / M A Sheppard for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Purcell Taylor for the appellant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
HENRY J: The appellant was convicted of the offence of Fraud. The charge alleged he ‘dishonestly obtained property from Ricky Edward Gore’.
In 2020, Mr Gore engaged the appellant to restore his 1972 Ford Falcon XA Coupe. A cash payment of $10,000 was made by Mr Gore to the appellant when he took possession of the vehicle. It was agreed the appellant would be paid more for his work as it progressed. Mr Gore transferred more money to the appellant when requested in November 2020.
On 25 January 2021, the appellant texted Mr Gore another request for payment, this time of $15,000. The message falsely represented the appellant had completed work on the engine, the gearbox, the clutch and interior. Much of that work was yet to be performed. The message said the appellant needed to ‘grab another 15k off’ Mr Gore. The appellant then messaged his bank account’s BSB and account number to Mr Gore. Four days later, Mr Gore transferred the requested $15,000 to the appellant’s nominated account. The appellant was thereby alleged to have dishonestly obtained property from Mr Gore.
The key fact on which this appeal is founded is that Mr Gore transferred the money to the appellant by executing an electronic funds transfer from the bank account of a company he controlled, not from his own bank account. The appellant thus submits, as he did below, that there was no case to answer because the money was not obtained, as the charge alleges, ‘from Ricky Edward Gore’.
That submission founds both grounds of appeal, which are that:
that the learned trial judge erred in not upholding the no case submission; and
the Crown failed to prove that the $15,000 paid to the appellant was the property of Mr Gore.
The premise of the latter point exposes the issue to be determined: Does proof of the element of obtaining a property ‘from’ a person require proof that person was the owner of the property?
The charged offence provision, s 408C(1)(b) Criminal Code (Qld), requires no such thing. It provides, ‘a person who dishonestly … obtains property from any person … commits the crime of fraud.’ The section’s focus is on a defendant’s dishonest obtaining of property from a person, not that person’s legal status vis-à-vis the property.
The appellant emphasises the legal distinction between a registered company and a natural person, citing R v Mirotsos [2022] QCA 76, which involved convictions under different subsections of s 408C than here. That distinction was relevant in Mirotsos because it was necessary to determine whether the allegedly dishonest conduct of the defendant as a company director was authorised by the company. The distinction is not to the same point here. While the obtained money was owned by Mr Gore’s company, not Mr Gore, that could not logically inform whether the defendant, who had no role in the company, was dishonest in obtaining the money.
The appellant submits the money could only have been transferred by Mr Gore in his capacity as an agent of the company, so that his actions in executing the transfer can only be categorised as actions of the company. However, the means by which Mr Gore came to have the ability to transfer the funds, namely through his position as one of the company’s agents, is a distraction. It would not matter whether Mr Gore was acting lawfully or unlawfully in taking the company’s money to pay the appellant. The fact remains, that is what he did. True, it is, as the learned trial judge observed, Mr Gore’s act of transferring the money, a transfer which he falsely described in the company’s records, may have raised a duty on him to account to the company, but that did not mean the money had not been obtained from him.
The appellant places significant reliance upon R v Lenahan [2009] QCA 187, which did involve s 408C(1)(b). Unlike this appeal, the issue on appeal there was focused on who the recipient of the obtained property was. The complainant had parted with the subject property pursuant to a contract between the complainant and a company of which Lenahan was the sole director. It was thus the company, not Lenahan, which obtained the property. Fraser JA, with whom McMurdo P and Jones J agreed, observed the language of s 408C(1)(b) did not include the ‘delivery of property to someone other than the fraudster’. His Honour reasoned it was a requirement flowing unequivocally from s 408C(1)(b) ‘that the person who obtains the property must be the person who is dishonest’. His Honour contrasted this with s 408C(1)(c) and (d), which allow that the charged defendant does not have to be the recipient of the property or associated benefit.
However, the present issue relates to the source end rather than the recipient end of the obtaining. At that end, the method used by Fraser JA in Lenahan, of comparing other offence provisions in s 408C, is also instructive. Section 408C(1)(b) may be contrasted with s 408C(1)(a)(i), which speaks of the dishonest application of property ‘belonging to another’. All that is required in s 408C(1)(b) is that the defendant ‘dishonestly obtains property from any person’. It does not require that the dishonestly obtained property belongs to the person from whom it is obtained.
The appellant’s argument necessarily requires the implication of such a requirement from the language of the offence provision. In that provision, the connecting work done by the word ‘from’, a preposition usually indicating the starting point or source in time or space of something, must logically be affected by what is meant by the word ‘obtains’.
Section 408C(3)(e) defines ‘obtain’, as including ‘to get, gain, receive or acquire in any way’. Such an expansive definition tells strongly against the implication sought. So too does s 408C(3)(f), which provides, ‘if a person obtains property from any person … it is immaterial … whether the owner passes or intends to pass ownership in the property’.
The broad definition of ‘obtain’ accommodates a broad range of possibilities. One of them is that one can obtain property from another via the actions of that person, without that person necessarily being the owner of the property. For example, a defendant may attend a shop and dishonestly obtain shop goods handed to the offender by the shop’s sales attendant. The goods may be said to have been obtained from the owner of the shop goods, in the sense they were handed over by a sales attendant as the owner’s agent. But they may also be said to have been obtained from the sales attendant whose physical actions conveyed the goods to the defendant. The concepts are not mutually exclusive.
The learned trial judge correctly applied similar reasoning in finding there was a case to answer here. The $15,000 may be said to have been obtained from Mr Gore’s company in that it was the owner of the account from which Mr Gore transferred the money. But it may also be said to have been obtained from Mr Gore, given the dual features that the payment request was made of Mr Gore and it was Mr Gore who met that request by his physical actions in effecting the payment. Those actions have the consequence that the defendant ‘obtained’, that is, ‘acquired in any way’, the money which he had requested Mr Gore to effect payment of. The defendant thus obtained the money from Mr Gore within the meaning of s 408C(1)(b), notwithstanding that the money was owned by the company.
It follows both grounds of appeal must fail. I would order: Appeal dismissed.
BRADLEY JA: I agree.
NORTH J: I agree.
BRADLEY JA: We will adjourn the court briefly to allow the panel to be reconstituted.
R
Wallace [2025] QCA 96
Appeal dismissed. Henry J delivered the reasons, with Bradley JA and North J agreeing.