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[2025] QCA 191
respondent. Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed. The sentence, including parole eligibility fixed halfway through the 6.5-year head sentence, was not disturbed.
The Court of Appeal accepted that the one-third point is commonly used to recognise a guilty plea, but said it is not a rule that applies in every case. A sentence must be considered as a whole, and a judge does not have to explain a separate discount calculation for the head sentence and the parole eligibility date. Here, the sentencing remarks identified the aggravating and mitigating features and showed they had been considered together. Given the sustained and serious offending, the Court did not find the half-way parole eligibility date made the sentence manifestly excessive. Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal failed.
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2,084 words · generated 07/10/2026
In R v Ullman [2025] QCA 191, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered a challenge to the parole eligibility date in a sentence imposed after John Robert Ullman pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in dangerous drugs and nine counts of supplying a dangerous drug. The conduct covered 1 January 2018 to 22 September 2020 [4].
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Ullman was a registered medical practitioner. The trafficking involved Schedule 2 prescription drugs, primarily benzodiazepines, sold from his Chermside clinic and through an unqualified gym owner. The Court recorded sales on 76 occasions to at least 31 people, including two undercover police officers. The turnover from trafficking exceeded $1.5 million; the turnover associated with the supply counts was likely to exceed $10,000 [11]. Police found $338,760 in cash, as well as drugs, at Ullman’s house and clinic [11].
On 4 April 2025, Treston J sentenced Ullman to six years and six months’ imprisonment on the trafficking count. The nine six-month terms for supplying were concurrent, so the effective head sentence remained six years and six months. Parole eligibility was fixed halfway through that period, with the eligibility date specified as 5 July 2028 [5], [18]–[19]. Ullman did not challenge the length of the head sentence. His challenge was confined to parole eligibility and the sufficiency of the sentencing judge’s reasons for fixing it at that point [6].
The Court granted leave to appeal, including leave to add a ground alleging inadequate reasons, but dismissed the appeal [3], [9]–[10], [38]. Bradley JA and Wilson J agreed with Doyle JA’s reasons [1], [39].
The Court rejected the idea that the sentencing exercise had to begin with a head sentence that already reflected all mitigation, followed by a further and separate application of mitigation to determine parole eligibility. Doyle JA described that approach as fragmenting the sentencing process. The task was to determine an appropriate sentence overall, not to calculate components in isolation and then piece them together [27]–[29].
The Court acknowledged that one-third of a sentence is commonly used as a starting point for parole eligibility in Queensland to recognise a guilty plea. It relied on R v Ungvari and R v DAC for that description of the practice [30]. But it expressly held that one-third is not mandated in every case. The level and form of recognition depend on the relevant circumstances [30]. A guilty plea may be recognised through the parole eligibility period, among other possible approaches, but that is not the only way it can affect sentence [29].
The Court also rejected the contention that mitigation had to be counted twice: first when fixing the head sentence, then again through a separate reduction in the parole eligibility period. The judge retains discretion in setting an appropriate early parole date, and the law does not rigidly require the applicant’s proposed two-stage method [31]. The Court distinguished the significance of R v DAC: although that case found a sentence manifestly excessive where parole eligibility was about 26 per cent of the head sentence, the Court said there had been no direct argument there about avoiding double allowance. It treated that result as an overall assessment rather than authority for a mandatory staged analysis [32]–[33].
On reasons, the Court applied the principle that judicial reasons must identify the legal principles and main factual findings relied on, citing DL v The Queen [20]. It also emphasised that sentencing is not capable of analytical precision and involves instinctive synthesis, referring to R v Dwyer and Wong v The Queen [20]. The sentencing remarks identified aggravating and mitigating features and recorded the concern about double counting. Doyle JA read them as showing that the judge considered those features in determining both the head sentence and parole eligibility [22]–[25]. The reasons therefore did not need to show the precise numerical effect of each factor on each component.
The seriousness of the offending was central to the manifest-excessiveness issue. Ullman abused the trust placed in him as a medical practitioner, engaged in drug trafficking over a sustained period, and used concealment methods including encrypted devices. The sentencing judge had referred to the quantity of drugs supplied as “breathtaking” [12]. The Court also noted that Ullman had discussed on-selling drugs with customers, provided indicative street pricing and directed customers to the black market for drugs he could not supply without attracting suspicion [13], [36].
The Court did not ignore mitigation. It recorded the early guilty pleas, remorse, loss of professional standing and career, family consequences, rehabilitation, the delay before the matter came to court, and the judge’s assessment that reoffending was not a real prospect. It also noted the sentencing judge’s view that the delay reduced the need for punishment and diminished the weight of general deterrence [14]. Against all of those matters, the Court concluded that the overall outcome was not more than appropriate [36]–[37].
The judgment describes an existing Queensland practice, rather than creating a new numerical rule. Before Ullman, the one-third mark was recognised as a usual starting point for parole eligibility when acknowledging a guilty plea. Ullman confirms that description, while making clear that it is not mandatory and does not dictate the result in every case [30].
The decision also locates parole eligibility within the broader sentencing task of instinctive synthesis. Its reasoning is consistent with the cited High Court authorities, including Markarian v The Queen and Barbaro v The Queen, on the overall nature of sentencing [35]. The judgment’s practical clarification is that mitigation need not be allocated in a rigid, separately itemised manner between head sentence and parole eligibility. The concern is whether the overall sentence is appropriate, including whether a factor has inadvertently been allowed for twice [31], [35].
On adequate reasons, the judgment applies the requirement identified in DL v The Queen: reasons must expose the governing principles and main factual findings. It does not treat that obligation as requiring a sentencing judge to provide a mathematical account of how every factor altered each part of the sentence [20]–[25]. The result is a reaffirmation of the importance of intelligible reasons, alongside recognition of the evaluative character of sentencing.
The judgment does not purport to abolish the one-third practice, nor does it establish that a half-way parole eligibility date will generally be appropriate. Its holding is contextual. The Court assessed this particular sentence and offending as a whole and concluded that the appeal grounds were not made out [26]–[37].
At [28], Doyle JA said the sentence must be one the judge considers appropriate, not a collection of components separately considered and then assembled. In plain English, a reviewing court should not assume that the head sentence and parole date can be tested as if they were independent calculations. The question is whether the final sentencing outcome is appropriate as a whole.
At [30], the Court said the one-third mark is an appropriate starting point “as a matter of general practice”, but is not mandated in every case. The practical meaning is that one-third is a relevant benchmark, particularly where a guilty plea is involved, but it does not operate as an automatic entitlement or compulsory formula.
At [31], the Court rejected the claim that a plea or other mitigating feature must be applied separately twice. In plain English, the sentencing judge may consider how mitigation affects the overall sentence without giving a second, additional reduction in parole eligibility simply because mitigation has already influenced the head sentence.
At [24], Doyle JA concluded that there was “no demonstrated failure” to give adequate reasons. That did not mean reasons are optional. Rather, the Court found that these reasons sufficiently showed the factors considered and the overall approach taken. The Court’s explanation at [20]–[25] indicates that a sentencing judge need not provide a detailed factor-by-factor calculation.
At [36]–[37], the Court linked the seriousness of the offending with its conclusion on the overall outcome. It emphasised the abuse of professional trust, the scale and duration of the trafficking, commercial gain, and attempts at concealment, while also noting that mitigation had been advanced and taken into account.
The decision is most directly relevant where a sentencing appeal challenges parole eligibility on the basis that a one-third starting point should have been applied after mitigation had already reduced the head sentence. It is also relevant where an appellant argues that reasons are inadequate because they do not identify precisely which mitigating factors affected the head sentence and which affected parole eligibility.
The central factual setting was serious, sustained drug offending by a medical practitioner who used professional access and trust to facilitate trafficking, with substantial turnover and concealment efforts [11]–[13], [36]. The Court’s conclusion about manifest excessiveness should be read against those features and the particular mitigation recorded at [14]. The judgment does not establish a universal outcome for less serious offending, different kinds of offences, or different forms of mitigation.
A case involving a late plea, limited offending, different statutory parole provisions, or sentencing remarks that do not identify the relevant factors may raise distinct issues. The judgment’s discussion of R v Tran illustrates that the timing and circumstances of a plea can affect whether an additional parole allowance is appropriate: the passage cited from Tran concerned a late plea and a failure to appear [34]. Ullman does not state that double recognition can never be appropriate. It says that a judge should avoid unwitting double allowance and retains discretion to determine the overall sentence [31], [34]–[35].
The supplied judgment records no later decisions that apply, distinguish, approve or criticise Ullman. It was delivered on 14 October 2025, and the material provided is the judgment itself. Accordingly, no conclusion about subsequent treatment can be drawn from this source.
Within Ullman, the Court considered earlier Queensland authorities on the one-third practice and on avoiding double allowance. It applied R v CCR for the proposition that a guilty plea may be recognised through reduction of parole eligibility and that the level of discount depends on a range of factors [29]–[30]. It considered R v DAC, explaining why that decision did not establish a requirement to calculate head sentence and parole eligibility in separate stages [32]–[33]. It also relied on R v Wales for the warning against fragmenting sentence into components [28].
The judgment cited R v Tran as an illustration of a circumstance where a plea had already produced a substantial practical reduction and an additional parole benefit was not justified on the facts there [34]. It cited R v Williams, R v Brown and Trueman v Tasmania for the general caution against double allowance [34]. These are the relationships stated in this judgment; the source does not provide a broader survey of how those authorities have been treated elsewhere.
The judgment does not specify a threshold for when departure from the one-third starting point will make a sentence manifestly excessive. It confirms the practice is not mandatory, but leaves its application to the sentencing judge’s assessment of all the circumstances [30]–[31].
It also does not prescribe how a judge should express the reasoning where the head sentence and parole eligibility date reflect overlapping considerations. The decision holds that a staged factor-by-factor explanation is not required in the circumstances before it, but still requires reasons sufficient to disclose the principles and main factual findings [20]–[25]. The degree of explanation needed may depend on the sentence, the issues raised and the reasons actually given.
Nor does the judgment identify a comprehensive method for deciding when recognition of a guilty plea through both the head sentence and parole eligibility amounts to double counting. It states that double benefit may be appropriate in some circumstances, while emphasising that the sentencing discretion is not rigidly structured [31], [34]. The precise balance remains fact-sensitive.
Finally, Ullman does not decide what result should follow where the sentencing remarks fail to identify the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, or where they do not disclose whether the judge considered the risk of double counting. It found no such deficiency in this case [24]–[25]. Any extension of its reasoning to a materially different record would require consideration of that record and the applicable sentencing provisions.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Ullman [2025] QCA 191
PARTIES: R / v / ULLMAN, John Robert / (applicant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 104 of 2025 / SC No 325 of 2025
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 4 April 2025 (Treston J)
DELIVERED ON: 14 October 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 9 October 2025
JUDGES: Bradley and Doyle JJA and Wilson J
ORDERS: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant was convicted on his own pleas of guilty to one count of trafficking in dangerous drugs and nine counts of supplying a dangerous drug – where the applicant was sentenced to 6.5 years in respect of the trafficking count and a period of 6 months for each of the supplying counts to be served concurrently – where the parole eligibility date was fixed half way through that period – where the applicant contends the non-parole period renders the sentence manifestly excessive – where the applicant asserts that the starting point is a head sentence of 6.5 years leaving the non-parole period to be determined, taking into account all the relevant mitigating circumstances – where the applicant submits that the default position of setting the non-parole period at no more than one-third of the head sentence is a requirement in case of early pleas of guilty – whether setting the parole eligibility date half way through the applicant’s sentence rendered the sentence manifestly excessive / APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – ERROR OF LAW – PARTICULAR CASES INVOLVING ERROR OF LAW – FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS FOR DECISION – ADEQUACY OF REASONS – where the applicant contends that the sentencing judge’s reasons do not reveal how mitigating circumstances had been taken into account in arriving at the parole eligibility date – whether there is any demonstrated failure by the sentencing judge to give adequate reasons / Criminal Code (Qld), s 668D(1)(c) / Bailey v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 62 ALJR 319; (1988) 78 ALR 116; [1988] HCA 19, applied / Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2, cited / DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26, applied / Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25, cited / R v CCR [2021] QCA 119, applied / R v DAC [2023] QCA 53, considered / R v Dwyer [2008] QCA 117, applied / R v Tran; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2018] QCA 22, cited / R v Ungvari [2010] QCA 134, cited / R v Wales [2019] QCA 64, applied / Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584; [2001] HCA 64, applied
COUNSEL: A J Edwards KC for the applicant / J T Aylward for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Gilshenan & Luton Legal Practice for the applicant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
BRADLEY JA: I agree with the reasons of Doyle JA and the orders proposed by his Honour.
DOYLE JA: This is an application for leave to appeal against a sentence imposed upon the applicant.
Leave was sought to add an additional proposed ground of appeal. That was not opposed and that leave has been granted.
The applicant entered pleas of guilty in the Supreme Court on 4 April 2025, to one count of trafficking in dangerous drugs between 1 January 2018 and 22 September 2020, and nine counts of supplying a dangerous drug. The sentencing judge was given and referred to a detailed statement of facts.
Convictions were recorded, and in respect of the trafficking count, the applicant was to be imprisoned for 6 years 6 months (with one day of pre-sentence custody being taken as served), a parole eligibility date fixed of 5 July 2028 and a serious drug offence certificate was issued. In respect of each of the supplying counts, convictions were recorded, and the applicant was to be imprisoned for a period of 6 months with all terms of imprisonment to be concurrent. The effective result was a period of imprisonment of six and a-half years with the parole eligibility date fixed half way through that period.
No issue is taken with respect to the head sentence. On this application the only challenge is to the parole eligibility date. It is contended that the sentence is manifestly excessive. The added ground of proposed appeal is that the sentencing judge erred in failing to give adequate reasons for setting the parole eligibility date at the half way point of the head sentence imposed.
Summary of applicant’s contentions
Requirement for leave
Appeal against the imposed sentence lies to this Court only by leave: s 668D(1)(c) Criminal Code (Qld). That section confers a discretion expressed in unfettered language. It is not possible nor desirable to seek to determine all of the circumstances in which that discretion might be exercised, but ordinarily it would be granted if the applicant for leave makes out a sufficiently arguable case that the sentence imposed was inappropriate: Bailey v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 78 ALR 116, at 116 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ.
I would grant leave. The added ground is sufficiently arguable, and so connected with the first ground, as to warrant the grant of that leave.
However, for the reasons that follow I would dismiss the appeal.
The circumstances of the offending
Sentencing remarks
It is not suggested that the sentencing judge omitted to identify any matters of relevance, either as aggravating features, or as mitigating features. The significant aggravating features were the applicant’s use of his position as a medical practitioner to enable him to betray the trust of his profession and the public, which persisted over a significant period and contributed to societal harm. There was significant criminality attached to his actions, including deceptive conduct in lying to police by alleging that a customer had accidentally taken some drugs from his office, and using encrypted devices to avoid detection. The sentencing judge referred to the quantity of drugs supplied as “breathtaking”.
A matter not specifically mentioned by the sentencing judge, but which appears from the statement of agreed facts is that the applicant “explicitly discussed the” on-supply of drugs with customers, giving indicative street pricing and referred customers to the ‘black market’ for dangerous drugs that he could not order without attracting suspicion’.1
The mitigating factors included: his early guilty pleas; genuine remorse; the loss of his professional standing and career accompanied by an enormous fall from grace; the loss of his relationship with his family; the possibility that he was in over his head being involved with supplying customers who were members of an outlaw motorcycle gang; and that there was no real prospect of the applicant himself re-offending. There had been a delay of some four years since his offending for the matter to come to court, none of which was attributable to the applicant. During that time he was able to show prolonged rehabilitative progress, as well as being left in a state of prolonged stressful uncertainty, reducing the requirement of the sentence to be imposed to punish him and also to diminish the weight to be given to the significance of general deterrence.
The trafficking charge carried a maximum penalty of 25 years. As to that the sentencing judge recorded at the outset that she would “definitely take [the applicant’s] early plea into account and it may have the effect of reducing either [the] penalty or the parole eligibility period”.
The Crown at first instance had suggested that the starting point should be between 10 and 12 years, but that taking into account the applicant’s early plea of guilty and the other factors in mitigation, the head sentence ought to be reduced to 9 years. In doing so the Crown argued that the court would be free to set a parole eligibility period lower than the otherwise mandated 80 per cent of the head sentence. On the other hand, the applicant urged for a head sentence of between 6 and 8 years, with a parole eligibility date fixed at between 18 months and 2 years.
The primary judge recorded a submission made on behalf of the applicant in support of encouraging the sentencing judge to fix a parole eligibility period, that:
“… I must in sentencing avoid, effectively, mitigating your sentence twice – firstly, by giving account to mitigating factors and the plea of guilty when settling upon the head sentence, and then, secondly, giving you a double discount by fixing a parole eligibility period.”
“I am persuaded having taken into account the features to which I have referred that a head sentence of six and a-half years is appropriate in the circumstances, and I will be making that order in respect of count 1. In respect of counts 2 to 10, I will be making an order that concurrently you be sentenced to six months imprisonment in respect of each of those counts, and I will be making an order that the date that you are eligible for parole be fixed at three years and ninety-two days, which represents 50 per cent of the head sentence.”
Ground 2: Failure to Give Adequate Reasons
Judges have a duty arising out of discharge of their judicial function, to provide reasons for their judgments. The content and detail will vary according to the nature of the jurisdiction which the court is exercising and its subject matter. The reasons must, however, be sufficient to identify the principles of law applied and the main factual findings upon which the judge has relied: DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [32]–[33]. It must be recognised, however, that the jurisdiction being exercised, the process of sentencing, is not one which is capable of analytical precision: R v Dwyer [2008] QCA 117 at [37]; Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 at [76]–[77]. It is to some extent an instinctive synthesis process; with the ultimate question the sentencing judge must consider being whether the overall sentence is the appropriate one to impose.
The applicant’s case assumes that in order for the primary judge’s reasons to be adequate they must reveal how or in what magnitude the mitigating circumstances have affected the parole eligibility date that otherwise might have been imposed. With the “starting point” of the head sentence of six and a-half years, the applicant submits there has been a departure from the norm of imposing a parole eligibility date of one-third of that sentence without it being explained why this occurred.
Insofar as it is suggested that the Reasons must reveal that the sentencing judge followed a staged process first of fixing the head sentence, identifying the factors taken into account at that stage, and then of moving to consider the parole eligibility date, identifying the factors taken into account at that stage, with some statement at each stage how the factors influenced the result, it cannot be accepted.
The Reasons of the sentencing judge, in my view, adequately explain the significance that her Honour placed upon the mitigating circumstances, including the early plea of guilty. Her Honour identified the relevant mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Then, in the passage extracted at [17] above, her Honour took all the factors that she had mentioned in setting the head sentence and the parole eligibility date (her Honour having already recorded that she needed to be conscious not to double count the factors). The result was a sentence which overall was, in her Honour’s judgment, appropriate.
Whether or not those Reasons reveal a manifestly excessive outcome is a matter to which I will next return, but in my view, there is no demonstrated failure by the sentencing judge to give adequate reasons for the course her Honour in fact adopted.
In the course of submissions, Senior Counsel for the applicant fairly accepted that reasons which stated, in effect, that the sentencing judge was taking into account in one process all the factors in mitigation and aggravation for determining both the head sentence and the parole eligibility date, while being careful not to reward twice for the same conduct**,** could not be said to be inadequate reasons. I read the sentencing remarks to which I have referred in this case, as being to that effect.
Ground 1: Manifestly Excessive
In my view the applicant cannot establish that the non-parole period set in this case was manifestly excessive.
It is artificial to assess whether the sentence is manifestly excessive by focussing only on one aspect of it. That is especially so in this case where, as I have mentioned, the sentencing judge’s approach was to set out that, having regard to all factors, she would impose a penalty being a custodial sentence of six and a half years and a parole eligibility date half way through that.
It is wrong to view the “starting point” as a head sentence arrived at taking into account all relevant mitigating factors, as effectively a silo and then to ask whether a non-parole period different from one-third of the head sentence should be applied with respect to that reduced head sentence taking into account the mitigating factors in that exercise. This requires an approach which artificially fragments the sentencing process. The sentence imposed must be one which the sentencing judge determines is appropriate, and not one which represents the components derived from separate consideration which are then pieced together: R v Wales [2019] QCA 64 at [6] per Fraser JA (Morrison and McMurdo JJA agreeing).
In that overall assessment of the appropriate plea, it has long been recognised that a plea of guilty is normally a matter to take into account in mitigation. One way (but not the only way) this can be given effect to is in reduction of the non-parole period: R v CCR [2021] QCA 119 at [18].
In this State it has been recognised for some years that “[a]s a matter of general practice… the one-third mark of the sentence of imprisonment is seen as an appropriate starting point to recognise a plea of guilty”: R v Ungvari [2010] QCA 134 at [30]; R v DAC [2023] QCA 53 at [31]-[33]. It is not however one which is mandated to be applied in every case. In each case the level of discount will depend on a range of factors: R v CCR at [18].
It should not be accepted that the plea of guilty (or indeed other mitigating factors) must be taken into account in some analysis separately twice; not only when setting the head sentence but again and additionally as a reduction when fixing the parole eligibility date. The sentencing judge retains the discretion to determine the appropriate early parole date, and that discretion is not so rigidly fettered in the way that the applicant’s case assumes.
Some support for the applicant’s suggested approach might be said to appear from R v DAC, supra, where the head sentence, at [25], was explicitly reduced by taking account of all relevant mitigating factors, but this Court held that the imposed sentence was nonetheless manifestly excessive. This was said to be because a parole eligibility date of about 26 per cent of the head sentence was set which the Court held did not properly take account of all factors in mitigation: [33].
“[40] The consequence of such a reduction was, in practical terms, very significant. Once the sentencing judge had determined to undertake that course, in recognition of the pleas of guilty, there was no legitimate basis upon which to further ameliorate the sentence by fixing a parole eligibility date earlier than would be set pursuant to section 184(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006. To do so was to extend a double benefit to the respondent.
[41] Whilst a double benefit may, in certain circumstances, be an appropriate exercise of the sentencing discretion, there was no proper basis for affording a double benefit in the present case. The respondent’s plea of guilty was late. He subsequently failed to appear at his initial sentence date. He only appeared in court after being arrested pursuant to a warrant issued as a consequence of his failure to appear at his sentence.”
For a sentencing judge to be conscious of the possibility of taking factors into account twice, and seeking to come to an appropriate overall sentence recognising that possibility, is consistent with the instinctive synthesis and overall approach to sentencing recognised by courts in numerous cases: Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [37]; Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58 at [34].
Moreover, the circumstances of these offences indicate their seriousness and accordingly, in my view, that the sentence imposed, including the parole eligibility date which was set, cannot be said to be more than was appropriate.A medical practitioner, in whom the public reposed faith and confidence, abused that to traffic drugs on a sustained scale, over a long period.He did so for obvious and seemingly considerable commercial gain.He provided customers with indicative street pricing for the products.He encouraged customers seeking drugs which he could not supply, without drawing attention to himself, to go to the black market to source them.His activities were carried out in an attempted clandestine form, being paid in some instances in cash, using encrypted communication devices and, as I have mentioned, trying to conceal things from the police.He did not cease his criminal activities of his own volition, but rather only after being detected.
Everything that could sensibly be urged in mitigation was said on the applicant’s behalf and taken into account by the sentencing judge. The result is not in my view manifestly excessive. The outcome in my view, would not be disturbed if this Court was called upon to re-exercise the sentencing power.
Conclusion
In my view, the appropriate order is that leave to appeal be granted but that the appeal be dismissed.
WILSON J: I agree with Doyle JA.
Statement of Facts para 7(iii). ↩
R
Ullman [2025] QCA 191
(1988) 62 ALJR 319
(1988) 78 ALR 116
(2014) 253 CLR 58
(2018) 266 CLR 1
(2005) 228 CLR 357
(2001) 207 CLR 584
Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed. The sentence, including parole eligibility fixed halfway through the 6.5-year head sentence, was not disturbed.
However, there was no direct argument about, or consideration of, the desirability of avoiding making a double allowance for the same factors. The decision is explicable on the basis of the view taken that overall the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Other decisions have endorsed the need to be cautious not to unwittingly make a double allowance in the sentencing process: R v Williams: Ex Parte Attorney General (Qld) [2014] QCA 346 at [71] (McMeekin J Henry J agreeing); R v Brown: Ex Parte Attorney General (Qld) [2016] QCA 156 at [112] (Jackson J, Fraser JA and Bond J agreeing); Trueman v Tasmania [2009] TASSC 29 at [45] (Crawford CJ, Slicer and Tennant JJ). In R v Tran; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2018] QCA 22, Boddice J (with whom Philippides and McMurdo JJA agreed) stated: