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[2025] NSWDC 541
General information, not legal advice.
District Court of NSW
2025-12-18
Newlinds SC DCJ
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Thomson [2025] NSWDC 541
Hearing dates: 16 December 2025
Date of orders: 18 December 2025
Decision date: 18 December 2025
Jurisdiction: Criminal
Before: Newlinds SC DCJ
Decision: (1) The Offender is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 4 years to commence 16 December 2025 and expire on 15 December 2029.
(2) The minimum period the Offender must serve before becoming eligible for parole is 2 years and 6 months to date from 16 December 2025, meaning that the first date the Offender will be eligible for parole will be 15 June 2028.
Catchwords: CRIME — Commonwealth offences — Aid, abet, counsel or procure other persons to furnish documents containing false or misleading statements or information to a person exercising powers under the Migration Act in connection with visa applications — Obtain financial advantage by deception of the Commonwealth by submitting fraudulent claims for JobKeeper grants during COVID pandemic
SENTENCING — Offender former union official and member of Parliament with prior convictions for dishonesty — Relevant factors on sentence — Objective seriousness of offending — Prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffending — Significant inconsistencies between Offenders tendered material and Sentencing Assessment Report as to insight, remorse, and contrition — Delay — Effect of term of imprisonment on family members — General and specific deterrence — Consideration of the concept of breach of trust in the context of sentencing
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Part IB
Criminal Code (Cth) s 134.2(1)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 11.2(1), s 234(1)(c)
Cases Cited: Giourtalis v R [2013] NSWCCA 216
McGregor v R [2024] NSWCCA 200
R v Kelu; R v Millner [2023] NSWSC 1537
R v Martin [2005] NSWCCA 190
R v Onley [2023] NSWSC 1008
Ridley v R [2008] NSWCCA 324
Scook v The Queen (2008) 185 A Crim R 164
Suleman v R [2009] NSWCCA 70
YZ v R [2025] NSWCCA 165
Category: Sentence
Parties: Rex (Crown)
Craig Robert Thomson (Offender)
Representation: Counsel:
G Craddock SC / P Boyle (Crown)
M Fernando (Offender)
Solicitors:
CDPP (Crown)
O’Brien Solicitors (Offender)
File Number(s): 2021/327130
Publication restriction: Redaction and non-Publication relating to paragraphs [117]-[120] of these reasons.
Craig Thomson (“the Offender”) is 61. He had a stable upbringing in a loving family into which he was adopted, was a good student at both school and university and established a successful career rising to high office in the union movement. His career peaked in 2007, when he was elected to Parliament. He was, from then until September 2013, the member for Dobell in the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia.
He has a criminal record involving, amongst other things, dishonesty and is again before a court to be sentenced for crimes of dishonesty. The circumstances of the crimes for sentence can be simply stated.
After losing his seat in the September 2013 Federal Election, he was without a job. In the months that followed, he sought to establish different businesses, including one for provision of recruitment and migration consultancy services. It was operated through a company controlled by the Offender called The Wickerman Group Pty Ltd.
The Offender was not a registered migration agent and, in the course of his business, took money from people seeking to obtain long-term Australian visas in exchange for assisting them as a middleman between potential applicants and registered migration agents. Between 2017 and 2020, in contravention of s 234 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), he deliberately created and completed false documents knowing that they would be put before Commonwealth officials as part of applications for visas. It is not clear if any migration agent colluded with him, but either knowingly or unknowingly various migration agents then submitted those documents to the Commonwealth in support of visa applications. There was a degree of sophistication to the offending in the manipulation of and production of supporting documents, however, it was, on the whole, relatively unsophisticated.
Separately and independently during 2020 and 2021, the Offender defrauded the Commonwealth JobKeeper scheme during the COVID pandemic in an amount exceeding $60,000. He did this by making fraudulent claims. This was in breach of s 134.2(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth).
The Offender has pleaded guilty to and is to be sentenced for the following Commonwealth offences arising from that conduct.
| Count | Offence | Description | Max. Penalty | | The Migration Act Offences | | 1 | Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 11.2(1) and 234(1)(c) | Between about 25 July 2017 and 8 September 2017 Aid, abet, counsel or procure other persons to furnish or cause to be furnished documents containing false or misleading statements or information to a person exercising powers under the Migration Act in connection with visa applications for three (3) non-citizens to remain in Australia. | 10 years’ imprisonment | | 2 | Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 11.2(1) and 234(1)(c) | Between about 1 August 2017 and 20 May 2020 Aid, abet, counsel or procure other persons to furnish or cause to be furnished documents containing false or misleading statements or information to a person exercising powers under the Migration Act in connection with visa applications for six (6) non-citizens to remain in Australia. | 10 years’ imprisonment | | The JobKeeper Offence | | 1 | Criminal Code (Cth), s 134.2(1) | Between about 1 June 2020 and 8 April 2021 Obtain financial advantage by deception from the Commonwealth | 10 years’ imprisonment |
| Item | Offence | Description | Max. Penalty | | Item 1 on 16BA Schedule | Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 11.2(1) and 234(1)(a) | Between about 27 March 2019 and 2 April 2019 Aid, abet, counsel or procure another person to present or cause to be presented a document that was forged or false to a person exercising powers under the Migration Act in connection with the visa application for a noncitizen to remain in Australia. | 10 years’ imprisonment |
The fundamental principle established by Part IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (“Crimes Act”) is that the Court must impose a sentence “that is of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence”. In doing so, the Court is to take into account the matters listed in s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act to the extent relevant and known to the Court. The statutory list of factors is not exhaustive, and key common law principles such as proportionality and totality also apply when sentencing a Commonwealth offender.
The Court can only sentence a Commonwealth offender to a term of imprisonment if satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
The policy behind a provision such as s 234 is obvious. It is aimed at the protection of the integrity of the system for processing applications by non-citizens to enter and remain in Australia. The honesty and candour of applicants and those representing them are of fundamental importance to the effectiveness of that system. The system itself is obviously critical to the important question of who can come into and work in Australia. This is why only registered migration agents, lawyers, and members of Parliament can lodge the paperwork.
The Crown has submitted that considerations similar to those described in cases involving fraud on the Commonwealth, see for example R v Onley [2023] NSWSC 1008 at [151] and R v Kelu; R v Millner [2023] NSWSC 1537 at [105], are applicable to this sort of offending because, as only migration agents, lawyers, and members of Parliament are permitted to submit applications on behalf of visa applicants, there is a large element of self-reporting and trust involved.
What was going on in relation to the Migration Act offences, including the s 16BA matter, is that the Offender was taking money from visa applicants as payment for services rendered, representing to them that his assistance was valuable, when in fact they could have gone straight to a registered migration agent or other qualified person to obtain the same services, but of course without the fraud. None of the applicants for visas knew that they were dealing with a fraudster or that the application they were making to the Australian Government was fraudulent. The only inference is that they thought they were dealing with a skilled and trusted professional. They lost their money. The Offender is not being sentenced for obtaining money from those applicants by deception although the money lost is directly connected to his criminal conduct. Migration agents are in a position of trust, vis. The Commonwealth, when submitting applications for visas. The offending conduct took advantage of that position of trust and aided its breach in circumstances where the Offender was not in a direct position of trust himself. In other words, he took advantage of a system that involved self-reporting and trust. To that extent, the cases relied on have some relevance.
Between July 2017 and May 2020, the Offender represented to a business, known then as “Peppermint Grove,” which was in need of unskilled employees that he could assist that firm successfully “sponsoring" immigrants to Australia for the purpose of working in Peppermint Grove’s factory as factory workers. He said he would pay Peppermint Grove what was described as a "training fee” for each worker the subject of sponsorship, upon their employment in an unskilled role as a factory worker.
Only certain categories of jobs qualify for the program of sponsoring skilled workers. Factory workers do not qualify. Peppermint Grove did not know this.
Thereafter, the Offender was given close to unfettered access to business records of Peppermint Grove, such as contracts of employment, financial statements, tax returns, business activity statements, organisational charts, and the like, which the Offender understood were the necessary core documents to be included in an Application for Sponsorship under the Commonwealth Migration Scheme. The Offender also obtained samples of the signature of the principal of the business, Mr Staples because his signature was on many of those documents.
The Offender, who had a relationship with a registered Migration Agent, then acted so as to “assist" that Migration Agent make Applications on behalf of prospective migrants to Australia. In doing so, he, without the knowledge or approval of Mr Staples, created a number of entirely fraudulent documents and forged Mr Staples’ signature.
Between April and September 2017, the Offender corresponded with the Migration Agent about the titles and conditions that would need to appear on employment contracts of three potential candidates, such that they would appear to be employed in positions that were eligible for the Scheme.
Thereafter, the Offender fraudulently created documents purportedly signed by Mr Staples that falsely represented that the candidates had been offered employment in roles that qualified for the scheme. Fraudulent signatures were fixed by the Offender on the documents. The Offender also fabricated organisational charts and position descriptions of Peppermint Grove that represented that the business had vacancies in roles that were eligible, but which roles he knew did not actually exist. All this occurred when, in fact, Peppermint Grove was only looking for factory workers, which role did not qualify for the scheme.
The letters of job offer, organisational charts, and other fraudulent documents were provided by the Offender to a licenced Migration Agent. When he did this, he knew they were fabricated, fraudulent, and misleading. He also knew that they would be used in support of an Application for an Australian visa.
Three applications were successful. The consequence was that the Offender paid to Peppermint Grove $9,000, representing three “training fees” and the Offender received from the successful applicants a total of $45,000 in exchange for his services.
In February 2019, Mr Staples told the Offender that Peppermint Grove was no longer interested in advancing its local operations and did not need any more employees.
Yet, the Offender continued to represent to non-citizens seeking visas that he could obtain employment for them at Peppermint Grove, through which they could be sponsored for permanent residency.
Between August 2017 and May 2020, the Offender provided documents to various migration agents, some of which were legitimate, having been obtained from Peppermint Grove, but others were fraudulently created by him. He again forged Mr Staples’ signature. He did all this without the knowledge or consent of Mr Staples, knowing that such documents would be used in support of fraudulent applications for visas on behalf of seven people.
Again, the documents falsely represented that the candidates had been offered employment at Peppermint Grove..
These applications were all refused, yet some of the applicants for visas paid money to the Offender. The total amount received by him was $35,000. He has since refunded $2,000 to one of those applicants.
Whilst one of the visa applicant’s application was being processed, the applicant had a baby. To add the child to the application, the Department required the applicant to provide a letter from Peppermint Grove to show that the business had agreed to meet the additional burden of sponsoring a child.
The Offender then created and emailed a letter to the relevant migration agent, purportedly on the letterhead of Peppermint Grove and purportedly bearing the signature of Mr Staples. It falsely represented that Peppermint Grove had agreed to add the child to the applicant's visa application. The letter was a fabrication and the signature on it a forgery. It was created by the Offender and sent without the knowledge or consent of Mr Staples or anyone else at Peppermint Grove. The Offender knew when he sent the letter to the migration agent that it would be on forwarded to the relevant Department dealing with the application.
Between May 2020 and April 2021, the Offender, having legitimately obtained access to the business portal of a café on the mid north coast of New South Wales, trading as “North Grounds Café” whilst that business was trading, without the knowledge or consent of anyone, lodged via that business portal thirteen online forms with the Australian Taxation Office, in which he falsely represented the cafe was entitled to payments of a subsidy available during the COVID era, known as “JobKeeper.”
The Offender did so knowing that the café and its owners had no knowledge of this and that the café was no longer operating.
Notwithstanding that knowledge, the Offender dishonestly made the claims for JobKeeper purportedly on behalf of the café until the conclusion of the JobKeeper scheme in April 2021.
As a result of those false applications, the Offender received eleven payments of “JobKeeper,” totalling $61,800. Each of those payments was directed to a business bank account controlled by the Offender, which he had caused his wife to open in the name of the café but had nothing to do with the café.
The Crown contends that these offences are a serious example of offences of this kind and fall above the mid-range for the following reasons:
The very lengthy period of time over which the offending was carried out, being just under three years across both Counts;
The deliberate choice to continue to offend for the period covered by Count 2, on a greater scale than Count 1, notwithstanding Mr Staples telling the Offender he needed no more workers, providing the Offender a clear opportunity to reflect and desist;
The deliberateness of the deceptive conduct, including that it involved the creation of numerous fraudulent documents by the Offender, and the systemic use of augmented versions of legitimate documents that the Offender had been provided by Peppermint Grove;
The breach of trust placed in the Offender by Mr Staples to provide legitimate services, including the provision by Mr Staples of his business records and his signature, followed by use of Mr Staples’ signature on multiple documents without consent or permission;
The Offender’s motivation, which was for personal gain – his actions having no other reasonably conceivable purpose; and
The amount of money fraudulently obtained as a result of the offending across all Counts, including the JobKeeper offence, (approximately $117,000 in total).
On behalf of the Offender, it is accepted that each Count involves a significant, albeit not substantial, sum. It is also accepted that each offence involves a significant degree of dishonesty. Whilst the overall seriousness is increased by the repetition of offending, that repetition is minimal for Count 1, but more significant for Count 2, (and is at its highest for the JobKeeper offence). The Offender accepts the circumstances of the Count 2 offending are more serious when compared to Count 1. The Offender points out that “rolled up” charges are common for offences of fraud and, overall, submits that the objective seriousness falls within the mid-range.
The distinction between “above the mid-range” and “well within the mid-range” is probably illusory. It does, however, demonstrate that the parties are not very far apart.
For my part, I prefer to simply identify what it is that the Offender did, which I do consider to be a substantially serious and continual course of criminal conduct involving high degrees of dishonesty, a significant level of planning, and some sophistication to hide his involvement. The offending involved not just misleading a Commonwealth official, but also a breach of the trust Mr Staples had put in him, not to mention the trust and money given to him by the applicants for visas themselves.
The Offender takes issue with the Crown's submission as to a breach of trust vis-à-vis the Offender and Peppermint Grove.
The Crown has urged upon me that the only explanation available on the evidence for why the Offender did what he did, was for personal gain. In oral submissions, it was squarely put that he was motivated by greed.
On behalf of the Offender, there was tendered a Report of a psychologist, Dr Mamta Sidhu, together with a letter of apology from the Offender.
Dr Sidhu’s Report sets out in some detail the Offender's life story, which I have already summarised. It is noted that the Offender has had protracted difficulties with depression throughout his life, which got worse while he was in Parliament and that he has taken antidepressant medication for many decades.
However, Dr Sidhu does not in any way connect the Offender’s difficulties with depression to his offending.
In relation to the JobKeeper offence, Dr Sidhu says the following:
“These false claims totalled $61,800, again, the driver for these offences appears to have been related to the financial strain the Offender was experiencing at the time, worsened in the context of the COVID pandemic. In this state of stress and financial strain he made poor decisions that lacked the consequential thinking skills he usually has available to him”
“In his life post Parliament, he struggled to find work that was meaningful enough and often relied on establishing his own businesses. In the context of experiencing financial strain and corresponding business downturn, the Offender again relied on maladaptive coping and poor decision-making. He provided fraudulent immigration documentation and was paid a significant sum for this, his motivation for the offending in this manner appears to be financially driven and it is in this context that the offending occurred.”
“The Offender’s offending has occurred in the context of poor decision-making and unnecessary risk-taking, in relation to experiencing life stressors and choosing antisocial and poor coping strategies, that is engaging in the offence.”
“Therefore, these are the areas of his life that would benefit from intervention to reduce further risk-taking.”
So, it can be seen that, whilst the Offender has had a long history dealing with depression, there is nothing to suggest that the depression is the reason he offended. The medical opinion is that it was a consequence of poor decision-making. So much may be accepted, but it does not engage with the important question of motivation.
In his letter to the Court, the Offender says:
“I've made real changes to how I manage stress, emotions, and decision-making. I've been seeing a psychologist regularly over the last three years…”
However, there is no Report from that psychologist.
I am left with the only rational explanation for the Offender’s motivation was the financial stress he found himself in after he lost his seat in Parliament, perhaps exacerbated by the COVID pandemic.
No doubt his liabilities were mounting up, and he needed money to pay his debts. The poor decisions he made were to engage in fraud to get money to pay those debts and maintain his lifestyle.
That is an explanation and perhaps the characterisation by the Crown as “greed" is an oversimplification. The simple fact remains, however, that the Offender did what he did in order for him to get money. He probably used that money to pay other debts. However, to describe that as a satisfactory explanation, let alone one that might be seen to be a mitigating factor, is a bridge too far. Most people suffer financial stress from time to time during their life and they do not resort to criminal conduct in order to deal with that situation.
As is well understood, the timing and fact of the plea of guilty and the extent to which the plea resulted in any benefit to the community, or any victim or witness, is relevant, albeit the statutory discounts provided for under New South Wales legislation are not applicable.
Under the New South Wales legislation, the Offender would be entitled to a 10% discount, and I do not see any reason why he should not be afforded that discount here.
The plea, even when late, can also be relevant to the question of contrition and remorse.
The Offender has expressed significant remorse and contrition for his conduct in a letter to the Court and to a Mr Gardiner and Mr Heenan. In that letter, he says he takes full responsibility for his actions. When speaking about the offending with Dr Sidhu, he apparently took accountability for his behaviour, offered no excuse for it, and recognised the alternatives that were available to him. He expressed shame and recognised that he “justified it to himself."
There is a real tension which I find impossible to reconcile between the expressions of remorse and contrition contained in the Offender’s letter of apology and the other material, and what he said to the author of the Sentencing Assessment Report within a week of writing that apology.
I feel it is necessary to set out below a number of extracts from the Sentencing Assessment Report, recording statements of the Offender and identify that I see as significant issues with those statements.
First, the Report records:
“[The Offender] acknowledged that he was aware certain applicants were involved in improper dealings with their migration agent and that he participated in facilitating the submission of falsified documentation”
That statement is not true. There is no suggestion that any of the applicants for visas were themselves involved in improper dealings with their migration agent. The only improper dealing that can be identified is the fraudulent and dishonest activities of the Offender.
Second, the Report records:
“[The Offender] identified at the time his primary concern was receiving payment, not verifying the legitimacy of the employment arrangements.”
That statement is completely false. The problem was not created by the Offender not verifying the legitimacy of the employment arrangements. He knew the employment arrangements were illegitimate because he had fictitiously and fraudulently created documents recording those non-existent arrangements.
Third, the Report records:
“[The Offender’s] acceptance of responsibility was tempered by self-interest and justification, as he sought to attribute fault to the migration agent, asserting that he believed they would have verified his paperwork prior to submission to Immigration.”
That statement is close to absurd in light of the Agreed Facts. He knew the migration agent was not going to, and was not able to, verify his paperwork, because he had fraudulently created it to look legitimate.
Fourth, the Report records:
“[The Offender] stated he believed that because the migration agent held statutory authority, they would identify and correct any discrepancies in the paperwork.”
That statement is completely false. The Offender held no such belief all.
Fifth, the Report records:
“[The Offender] displayed some insight into his offending, stating he feels responsible for some of the victims, stating “I could have been clearer and more honest about the expectations around their employment options.”
To say that statement minimises the criminality of the Offender is an understatement.
Finally, the Report records:
“[The Offender] conveyed regret and remorse for his offending behaviour, characterising his actions as ‘reckless’ due to his failure to familiarise himself with the relevant legislation prior to commencing the business.”
In the light of the Agreed Facts, that statement makes no sense. Nothing the Offender did was reckless, what he did was intentional. The reason he knew what to do was because he was in fact familiar with the relevant legislation and its requirements.
The cases are replete with statements as to the circumspection that ought be given to statements of remorse and contrition contained in letters to the Court or third-party material. In light of the stark, irreconcilable inconsistency between the open and frank apology, and the full acceptance of responsibility contained in the letter of apology and third-party statements, against what was said to the author of the Sentencing Assessment Report, I do not accept the Offender’s expressions of remorse, contrition, and insight.
I accept that the Offender is remorseful as to what he did, in light of the fact that he has been caught and is to be sentenced, but other than that, I am not satisfied that he really understands why it is that what he did was, not just legally wrong, but why it was morally reprehensible.
At the time of the Migration Act offences, The Offender was aged 53 for Count 1 and 53-55 for Count 2. At the time of the JobKeeper offence, he was aged 55-56.
The Offender was adopted. He grew up with the privilege of love, support, stability and education. According to Dr Mamta Sidhu, forensic psychologist, he had “an underlying anxious disposition and attachment style”. At age 18, The Offender and his family experienced a highly traumatising and tragic event when his sister was killed in a car accident while The Offender was driving. Following this his family moved overseas while he stayed in Sydney to attend university. Dr Sidhu opines:
“[His] anxiety related difficulties became more pronounced. He struggled with his confidence, mood and self-worth and coped with alcohol, which only served to perpetuate his difficulties.”
Notwithstanding this tragedy, the Offender completed his HSC with sufficient marks to get into university. He then went to the University of NSW, where he obtained a commerce degree. He later completed a law degree.
The Offender achieved high level tertiary qualifications. He then obtained employment in the industrial relations sector working for a trade union. He achieved high office in the trade union movement. Ultimately, he won a seat as a Member of the Australian Parliament through which he made positive contributions to his local community. However, The Offender had misused funds while working for the union. This conduct accounts for The Offender’s conviction in Victoria in 2014, which resulted in a fine of $25,000 and compensation of $5,650.
In March 2024, he was convicted for two offences of dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception and make false document to obtain financial advantage, for which he received an aggregate sentence of imprisonment of 14 months to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order, including as a condition 250 hours of community service and treatment from a psychologist. The Agreed Statement of Facts for that offending indicate that, in the period from 2020-2022 (a period which overlaps the JobKeeper offence), the Offender fraudulently obtained two separate COVID-19 grants from the New South Wales Government, to which he was not entitled. The amount involved was $25,000 and each payment was obtained after an application was submitted by the Offender using false information, including submitting an application in his ex-wife's name without her authority.
The Offender has other criminal history, which for the purpose of the matters before me, I think I can put to one side. However, it is in the light of the Offender’s two previous convictions and sentences for crimes of dishonesty that the evidence that has been tendered before me as to the Offender’s good character needs to be assessed.
I have before me a number of reasonably glowing references attesting to the character of the Offender, to the effect that he is a good and honest man and is well liked and trusted. That proves that there are people in the community who like and trust him. That may be accepted. In light of his criminal history, I cannot approach this matter on any other basis but that the Offender has a defect in his character related to honesty and that, in circumstances of need, he resorts to criminal conduct to obtain money. I am sorry to say that, in my judgment, the Offender has a character flaw, he is dishonest.
The Migration Act offences were committed in the years The Offender was trying to forge a new career having left politics. The JobKeeper offence was committed in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
As I have said, there is no suggestion that there is a connection between the Offender’s long-standing diagnosis of depression and anxiety, and the offending.
“from an early age I carried a strong need to achieve, to be accepted, and to belong. I learned to perform and to please others, often at the expense of recognising my own limits”.
The discovery of these offences may have been a catalyst to the breakdown of The Offender’s marriage. He has lost his relationship with two of his young daughters. He has managed to maintain a relationship with his 14-year-old daughter, whom he sees once a week. He has been on bail for more than four years. These factors alone are likely to have brought about significant personal deterrence. Against that, his earlier conviction and significant fine in Victoria did not cause him to change his ways. With that history, he offended again, being the March 2024 offences for which he has been sentenced and the offences before me.
Dr Sidhu has identified protective factors that provide a basis for a little optimism with respect to rehabilitation prospects. These include his new relationship, his motivation to work and pursue pro-social, positive pastimes. Dr Sidhu opines:
“Importantly, The Offender presents as a psychologically-minded man, who has the ability to reflect. This bodes well for his engagement in psychological treatment if he remains motivated to engage.”
Dr Sidhu has also provided recommendations which if followed, may improve The Offender’s prospects. The Offender also enjoys the ongoing support of Ms Guimenez, Mr Heenan and Mr Gardiner.
The Community Corrections Officer assessed The Offender as having a low risk of reoffending. I do not accept that conclusion. The author of the Sentencing Assessment Report was, I am sorry to say, seriously misled by the Offender in the interview. The stark reality is that the Offender has offended before in similar ways, been caught, convicted, and sentenced and yet, notwithstanding that experience, offended again.
Accepting that the Offender has a complex psychological make up, I have concluded that part of that make up is an inability to understand why it is wrong to deal with people or governments dishonestly for any purpose, let alone the purpose of obtaining money.
I regard the Offender’s risk of reoffending as significant and, for that reason, give substantial weight in this exercise to the sentencing principles of specific deterrence and protection of the community.
I have already discussed this aspect at length.
I am, of course, not resentencing the Offender for those earlier offences. He has already been sentenced and served those sentences. However, that history does disentitle him to the leniency which is often afforded to first-time Offenders. Moreover, for reasons I have explained, I consider that history also is very relevant to my assessment of the prospects of the Offender being rehabilitated, in the sense of changing his ways and what I consider to be his significant risk of reoffending.
The Offender points to significant and unjustified delay by the prosecution.
The Offender was charged with numerous offences in November 2021. This followed the execution of a search warrant at the Offender’s home and the seizure of his laptop computer in July 2021.
After being charged in November 2021 in relation to a number of offences, including what are now the Migration Act offences and the JobKeeper offence, it took a year for a charge certificate to be filed.
The contents of the Offenders laptop computer was not served on the Offender until February 2025.
A comprehensive chronology of the procedural history of the matter has been prepared by the Crown. Things certainly moved slowly. I am sure that, with the benefit of hindsight, the Crown accepts that things could have moved faster.
As has been observed in many cases, in a case of complex fraud it will always be necessary to balance the effect of the delay on the Offender against the difficulty and complexity of proving the offence and the need for greater deterrence. In particular, although an accused person is entitled to rely on rights and protection of the criminal law, in circumstances were such reliance has necessitated a complex and lengthy investigation, the extent that delay can be called upon as a mitigating factor is limited: see for example Giourtalis v R [2013] NSWCCA 216 at [1791] and Scook v The Queen (2008) 185 A Crim R 164 at [57] to [65].
It is true that, when the matter came on before me, packaged up in the context of a very substantial Statement of Agreed Facts with the supporting documents in relation to each charge being tabbed in folders, it looks simple enough.
However, experience teaches one that the real skill of investigators and lawyers presenting material in a forensic context is to present it in such a way. It does not follow that, because at the end of the exercise it all looks simple and clear, that the investigation was itself an easy task.
That all being said, all the relevant information was on the Offender’s computer, although apparently not in an organised way, and there does appear, on the face of it, to have been considerable delay in the Crown accessing that material and then providing that same information to the Offender. Some of the delay is also attributable to the recent difficulties the Court has had following a flood earlier this year.
Against all that, is the fact that the Offender, during all this time, knew what he had done and presumably knew that evidence of his conduct was contained on his computer, which was in the hands of the prosecuting authorities.
I am not satisfied that there is delay that amounts to the case not being prepared and presented with “." On the other hand, I do accept that the charges have been hanging over the Offender’s head for many years, which I accept would have been an extremely stressful state of affairs and I factor that stress and anxiety into my consideration in his favour.
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I propose to make an order that the above paragraphs ([117]-[120]) and the preceding subheading be redacted in any published version of this judgment, and that there be a non-publication order as to anything that might disclose the matters discussed in the redacted paragraphs.
I accept that the Offenders 14-year-old daughter will be devastated if the Offender is to be sent to prison, as will his very elderly mother who is in ill health.
It is an unfortunate aspect of our criminal justice system that the almost inevitable consequence of sending an Offender to gaol is that there is significant emotional and other harm occasioned to innocent people close to the Offender.
That will be the case here. Whilst I feel extremely sorry for both the Offender, his daughter, and his mother, I really do not think I can give it any significant weight on the question of an appropriate sentence. It perhaps may have more significant weight considering how any sentence is to be served, or any non-parole period.
Submissions were made on behalf the Offender and there is a paragraph in Dr Sidhu's Report to the effect that, because the Offender is a “high-profile individual" and a former member of Parliament that any time in custody we will be more onerous on him than others.
There is no doubt that the Offender is “high-profile." He is infamous. That reputation is mostly a consequence of the offences he has been convicted of to date and other matters about which he has been subject to allegations.
Whilst I do not profess to be an expert as to what goes on in prison, I am not aware that high-profile people who are criminals and former members of Parliament are in need of protection. There is certainly no evidence to that effect, and I do not take it into account in the sentencing exercise.
The starting point is that the offending here is very serious and involved a person with significant academic qualifications, experience, and reputation as a Parliamentarian effectively abusing the trust and using the skills that such qualifications and experience implicitly create.
The Offender has a prior criminal record from his time as a union official, which involved an abuse of a position of trust and relatively serious criminality involving dishonesty for which he was dealt with by a fine. He has more recent convictions, also for crimes of dishonesty involving defrauding a NSW Government COVID grant scheme, for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment served in the community pursuant to an Intensive Corrections Order. That history, to my mind, disentitles him to leniency, although of course I am not sentencing him for those earlier matters. In light of that history, I must give significant weight to specific deterrence and protection of the community.
The Offender presents with a very limited but unusual subjective case. His psychological make up is difficult to understand but does perhaps offer some explanation for his offending. The Crown’s submission that he was motivated by pure greed is probably an oversimplification. I do not think it is as simple as that, but undoubtedly he did what he did to get money that he was not entitled to. He is a person who will act dishonestly if it suits his circumstances.
In offences of this kind, general deterrence must loom large. A clear message needs to be sent that conduct of this nature is criminal and will, on apprehension, be met with stern punishment.
There has been some delay in the prosecution which is not adequately explained and the consequence of that has been a lengthy period that the Offender has spent on reasonably strict bail conditions, which have limited his liberty. I propose to take into account that period on bail to some extent to lessen the ultimate sentence.
As far as the prospects of rehabilitation and chances of the Offender reoffending, I consider that his prospects of rehabilitation are low but cannot be ruled out and his chances of reoffending are therefore considerable, which is why specific deterrence has an important part to play here. I am not satisfied that the Offender has any real insight as to why what he did is considered wrong by others. This does not mean that, with time, he cannot come to understand.
There is a need for some accumulation to reflect the different applicants and applications between the two Migration Act offences and the s 16BA matter, and the very separate criminality and conduct involving the JobKeeper offence.
However, there is much overlap between the Migration Act offences and, ultimately, the punishment must involve an overall assessment of the Offender’s criminality in its entirety, recognising his subjective case with a view to determining an appropriate punishment for each offence which is not harsh or crushing and is proportionate to the criminality involved.
Whilst there is some doubt at the moment as to the ability of courts to impose aggregate sentences for Commonwealth offences and the matter is presently to be determined by the High Court, see McGregor v R [2024] NSWCCA 200, the fact is the law as it currently stands in this State is that an aggregate sentence can be imposed and that is what I propose to do.
It is common ground that the only appropriate sentence is a term of imprisonment.
The concession to that effect by the Offender is well-made in light of the objective seriousness of the crimes and the Offender’s history. It must be said that his subjective case, such as it exists at all, is weak.
Taking all the matters that I have mentioned into account, I consider the following indicative sentences to be appropriate for each of the matters before me for sentence. after a reduction of 10% to take account of the pleas.
In relation to Migration Act Count 1: 2 years’ imprisonment.
In relation to Migration Act Count 2 (taking into account the s 16BA matter): 3 years’ imprisonment.
In relation to JobKeeper Count 1: 3 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment.
I consider an appropriate aggregate sentence to be 4 years.
As the aggregate sentence of imprisonment exceeds 3 years, the option of an Intensive Corrections Order is not available.
On the assumption that option might be available, the parties spent some considerable time before me debating whether it would be appropriate to order that any aggregate term of imprisonment of less than three years be served in the community pursuant to an Intensive Corrections Order.
As has recently been explained by the Court of Appeal in YZ v R [2025] NSWCCA 165, this would involve a separate and distinct process in the sentencing exercise which involves another “instinctive synthesis" of relevant matters. It may well be that whilst the same matters are factored into that synthesis, different weight may be given to different matters for the purpose of this sentencing exercise as opposed to the primary question of whether a term of imprisonment is appropriate.
A very significant factor to be taken into account on the question of an Intensive Corrections Order is whether to serve a term of imprisonment in the community would promote the prospects of the Offender being rehabilitated and thus provide protection to the community.
Even if I had concluded that an aggregate term of imprisonment of less than 3 years was appropriate, I would not have been persuaded that sentence ought be served in any other way than full-time imprisonment. I consider the offending to be serious and do not consider his prospects of rehabilitation to be significant enough to outweigh that.
As this is a Commonwealth offence, there is no requirement to find special circumstances when considering an appropriate non-parole period.
I am concerned as to the impact this sentence will have on the Offender’s daughter and his mother. I am also conscious that it is possible that, because he is a former member of Parliament, he may suffer more in prison than others, I have determined that the period of the sentence that ought be served prior to him being eligible for parole be 2 years and 6 months.
For those reasons, my orders are as follows:
In relation to Migration Act Offences Counts 1 and 2, taking into account the matter on the s 16BA schedule, and the Criminal Code JobKeeper offence Count 1, after deducting 10% for the pleas of guilty, the Offender is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 4 years to commence 16 December 2025 and expire on 15 December 2029.
The minimum period the Offender must serve before becoming eligible for parole is 2 years and 6 months to date from 16 December 2025, meaning that the first date the Offender will be eligible for parole will be 15 June 2028.
Paragraphs [117]-[120], and the preceding subheading, of this written judgment be redacted and that the unredacted version only be used by the parties for proper purposes and are not to be published.
On the basis that the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person and for the proper administration of justice, the publication or disclosure of information that will reveal or is likely to reveal the matters referred to in paragraphs [117]-[120], and the preceding subheading, of these reasons is prohibited. This order remains in force until 18 December 2095. I am satisfied that it is necessary for the order to apply outside of New South Wales to achieve the purpose of protecting the safety of any person and for the proper administration of justice.
Confidential Exhibits D and E, and Submissions marked MFI-2, be returned to the Crown forthwith on an undertaking to maintain them securely.
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Fixed typological error in orders.
R
Thomson [2025] NSWDC 541
The Offender relies on what was said by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Suleman v R [2009] NSWCCA 70 (“Suleman”) at [22]-[25] in the context of a discussion concerning the aggravating factor of “breach of trust" in the State sentencing regime. In that case, the Court identified that something more than a business relationship must be identified so as to amount to a breach of trust relying on what was said in R v Martin [2005] NSWCCA 190 (“Martin”).
I am not at all sure that grafting notions of breach of trust and special relationships from one area of the law – in this case the law of fiduciaries – to another, the statutory construction of criminal sentencing provisions, works perfectly.
The relationship between the Offender and Peppermint Grove/Mr Staples can be seen as a business relationship, albeit one that involved Peppermint Grove giving to the Offender access to its confidential records and paperwork for a particular purpose. In so doing, it reposed trust implicitly on the Offender to only use those documents for their intended purpose.
As between the Offender and the various applicants, there most certainly was a breach of trust. They were in a special relationship of vulnerability to the Offender regardless of the fact that they also were in a business relationship. In my view, nothing said by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Suleman or Martin*,* properly understood, means that, just because a relationship is a business relationship, it cannot also amount to a relationship of trust and confidence. What the Court was saying is that there must be identified something more than a business relationship.
Furthermore, the registered migration agents involved were most certainly in a position of trust vis-à-vis the Commonwealth. The Offender aided and abetted that trust being breached and so it seems to me that, however one looks at the overall criminality of the migration offences, there were significant positions of trust taken advantage of by the Offender. In other areas of the law, to be knowingly involved in a breach of a fiduciary or trust obligation makes the person involved liable for that breach of trust as if they were the trustee. I do not see a reason why the same concept ought not apply to the law of sentencing.
Dealing then with the JobKeeper offence.
There were 11 payments received from the Commonwealth as a result of the fraudulent applications in just under one year. Initially, some payments had been claimed legitimately, however, after the business ceased trading, they were entirely fraudulent. The financial benefit to Mr Thomson for the JobKeeper offence amounted to $61,800 and his financial records demonstrate that the bulk of this money was spent servicing his credit card debt, and mortgage and business loan repayments.
It has been said in many cases that offences involving fraud on the Commonwealth are, firstly, not victimless crimes, secondly, they involve a breach of trust and are a fraud not just on the Commonwealth but on taxpaying members of the community: Ridley v R [2008] NSWCCA 324. Thirdly, they are a species of what are sometimes referred to as “white-collar crimes” and are difficult to detect. To describe what occurred as “white-collar” is to say nothing more than the Offender stole $61,800 of the Government’s money by engaging in fraud.
I consider the JobKeeper offence to be a serious example of this type of offending. It could have been for more money, but it was planned, systematic dishonesty on a Government program designed to help people in a time of national crisis.
The letters from Nilzen Guimenez, David Heenan, and David Gardiner are highly positive. Each provides some insights into The Offender’s character. He is clearly an impressive, charismatic, and intelligent man.
The Offender’s character is no doubt complex. Perhaps one of his more insightful statements appears in his letter to the Court: