R v Talwar [2026] ACTSC 70

(1) The Crown be permitted to adduce tendency evidence in the trial of the accused pursuant to s 97 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) as notified in the notice of intention to adduce tendency evidence dated 14 July 2025, as amended by the removal of paragraph (2)(b)(iii).

(2) The Crown be permitted to adduce coincidence evidence in the trial of the accused pursuant to s 98 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) as notified in the notice of intention to adduce coincidence evidence dated 14 July 2025.

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - Pre-trial application - application by the Crown to adduce tendency and coincidence evidence - whether the evidence has significant probative value - whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect - significant probative value established - evidence admitted

Criminal Code (Cth), ss 400.3(1A), 400.4, 400.5, 400.12

Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), ss 98(1), 101(2), 97(1)

Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), s 74

Chen v DPP (Cth) [2011] NSWCCA 205; 83 NSWLR 224

DPP v Mastalerz [2024] ACTSC 30

DPP v Roder [2024] HCA 15; 281 CLR 18

Hughes v the Queen [2017] HCA 20; 263 CLR 338

Milne v The Queen [2014] HCA 4; 252 CLR 149

R v Bauer [2018] HCA 40; 266 CLR 56

R v Gale; R v Duckworth [2012] NSWCCA 174; 217 A Crim R 487

R v Mason [2019] ACTSC 161

Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)

1. The Crown has applied for pre-trial rulings that certain tendency and coincidence evidence, set out in notices dated 14 July 2025, be admissible at the trial of the accused.
2. The Crown seeks to adduce evidence of the accused acting in the capacity of a non-financier, carrying on an unregistered business that gave effect to remittance arrangements, accepting instructions from a transferor, being Samuel Harris, for the transfer of money under designated remittance arrangements and receiving quantities of cash between 13 August 2020 and 18 October 2021. The Crown seeks to adduce evidence of these events to prove that, because of the improbability of the events occurring coincidentally:

(i) the accused received instructions from Samuel Harris for the transfer of money by international money transfers;

(ii) in furtherance of the instructions he received from Samuel Harris, the accused provided instructions to Kristian Hietala regarding international money transfers; and

(iii) the accused received quantities of cash from Samuel Harris either:

• (A) as advance payments for the accused to use in his unregistered remittance business intending that the cash payments would become an instrument of crime, namely, to be used to facilitate the accused's provision of unregistered remittance services; or
• (B) as reimbursements/money owed to the accused for transfers of money previously arranged and facilitated by the accused in carrying on his unregistered remittance business, knowing the cash payments were proceeds of crime.

1. The accused does not object to the coincidence notice but raises an issue of law in relation to whether the principles of temporal separation discussed in Milne v The Queen [2014] HCA 4; 252 CLR 149 are satisfied.
2. With respect to the tendency evidence, the Crown seeks to adduce evidence of purchases made by the accused either wholly or substantially in cash, such cash allegedly being the proceeds of crime, at certain luxury goods stores in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra between 16 July 2020 and 23 July 2022. The Crown seeks to adduce this evidence to prove that the accused had tendencies to:

(a) act in a particular way, being to purchase luxury goods wholly or substantially using cash, which cash was the proceeds of crime; and

(b) have a particular state of mind, namely:

(i) to believe the cash used to purchase the luxury goods was proceeds of crime;

(ii) to have an interest in disguising and concealing cash that was the proceeds of crime; and

(iii) to be reckless as to the fact that the nature, value or source of the cash was concealed or disguised because he was in possession of those luxury goods.

1. The accused objects to the tendency notice as it is currently framed on the basis that the tendency notice states the cash payments were the proceeds of crime without identifying a seminal crime, as required in Chen v DPP (Cth) [2011] NSWCCA 205; 83 NSWLR 224.
2. On 5 December 2025 I allowed the applications made by the Crown and made orders accordingly. I said then that I would publish my reasons. These are those reasons.

1. The accused is charged with offences under the following sections of the Criminal Code (Cth).
2. Count 1:

400.5 Proceeds of crime etc. - money or property worth $50,000 or more

(a) the person deals with money or other property; and

(i) the money or property is, and the person believes it to be, proceeds of indictable crime; or

(ii) the person intends that the money or property will become an instrument of crime; and

(c) at the time of the dealing, the value of the money and other property is $50,000 or more.

Penalty: Imprisonment for 15 years, or 900 penalty units, or both.

400.12 Combining several contraventions in a single charge

(1) A single charge of an offence against a provision of this Division (other than a proceeds of general crime offence provision) may be about 2 or more instances of the defendant engaging in conduct (at the same time or different times) that constitutes an offence against a provision of this Division (other than a proceeds of general crime offence provision).

(a) a single charge is about 2 or more such instances; and

(b) the value of the money and other property dealt with is an element of the offence in question;

that value is taken to be the sum of the values of the money and other property dealt with in respect of each of those instances.

400.3 Proceeds of crime etc. - money or property worth $1,000,000 or more

(a) the person engages in conduct in relation to money or other property; and

(b) the money or property is, and the person believes it to be, proceeds of general crime; and

(c) the conduct concealed or disguised any or all of the following:

(i) the nature of the money or property;

(ii) the value of the money or property;

(iii) the source of the money or property;

(iv) the location of the money or property;

(v) any disposition of the money or property;

(vi) any movement of the money or property;

(vii) any rights in respect of the money or property;

(viii) the identity of any person who has rights in respect of the money or property;

(ix) the identity of any person who has effective control of the money or property; and

(d) when the conduct occurs, the value of the money and other property is $1,000,000 or more.

Penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years, or 1500 penalty units, or both.

400.4 Proceeds of crime etc. - money or property worth $100,000 or more

(a) the person deals with money or other property; and

(b) either:

(i) the money or property is, and the person believes it to be, proceeds of indictable crime; or

(ii the person intends that the money or property will become an instrument of crime; and

(c) at the time of the dealing, the value of the money and other property is $100,000 or more.

Penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years, or 1200 penalty units, or both.

400.12 Combining several contraventions in a single charge

(1) A single charge of an offence against a provision of this Division (other than a proceeds of general crime offence provision) may be about 2 or more instances of the defendant engaging in conduct (at the same time or different times) that constitutes an offence against a provision of this Division (other than a proceeds of general crime offence provision).

(a) a single charge is about 2 or more such instances; and

(b) the value of the money and other property dealt with is an element of the offence in question;

that value is taken to be the sum of the values of the money and other property dealt with in respect of each of those instances.

400.4 Proceeds of crime etc. - money or property worth $100,000 or more

(a) on 2 or more occasions, the person engages in conduct in relation to money or other property; and

(b) for each occasion, the money or property is, and the person believes it to be, proceeds of general crime; and

(c) for each occasion, the conduct concealed or disguised any or all of the following:

(vii) any rights in respect of the money or property;

(viii) the identity of any person who has rights in respect of the money or property;

(ix) the identity of any person who has effective control of the money or property; and

(d) the sum of the values of the money and other property (where each value is worked out as at the time when the relevant conduct occurred) is $100,000 or more.

Penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years, or 1200 penalty units, or both.

1. Section 98(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) provides:

(1) Evidence that 2 or more events happened is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they happened, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they happened, it is improbable that the events happened coincidentally unless -

(a) the party seeking to present the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party's intention to present the evidence; and

(b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence presented or to be presented by the party seeking to present the evidence, have significant probative value.

Note One of the events referred to in s (1) may be an event the happening of which is a fact in issue in the proceeding.

1. The notice requirement in s 98(1)(a) is satisfied. The issue for my decision is whether the evidence will have significant probative value.
2. Further, s 101(2) of the Evidence Act provides:

(2) Tendency evidence about a defendant, or coincidence evidence about a defendant, that is presented by the prosecution cannot be used against the defendant unless the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.

1. Section 97(1) of the Evidence Act provides:

(1) Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had, is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person's character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind unless -

(a) the party seeking to present the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party's intention to present the evidence; and

(b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence presented or to be presented by the party seeking to present the evidence, have significant probative value.

1. The notice requirement in s 97(1)(a) is satisfied. Again, the issue for my decision is whether the evidence will have significant probative value.
2. Further, s 101(2) of the Evidence Act provides that tendency evidence presented by the Crown cannot be used against a defendant unless the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
3. I will first address the submissions of the accused on the application of the decisions of the High Court in Milne and the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales in Chen. It is not necessary for me to discuss these cases in any detail nor the basis upon which the courts arrived at their decisions. In his outline of submissions, the accused complains that there have been repeated requests for particulars in connection with the application of these decisions and the statutory requirement to identify a seminal crime for s 400.3 of the Criminal Code. Inferentially, the accused complains that there has been no response to these requests for particulars. The contents of these requests is not before the court.
4. The accused has not filed an application seeking orders for the striking out of the action on the basis that, for example, assets in the form of cash or negotiable instruments could not have been intended to become an instrument of crime because they were not intended to be used in the commission of or to facilitate the commission of an indictable offence. The respondent contends only that there was no temporal separation between the dealing and the crime. In the absence of any application to strike out the Crown case on the narrower technical grounds of there being no such offence known to the law or, alternatively, on the broader basis of abuse of process, it behoves the court to hear and determine the application.
5. In support of the applications, the Crown reads the affidavit of Christopher Moore, affirmed on 14 July 2025, to prove the coincidence and tendencies identified. There was no objection to the reading of that affidavit. The application in relation to the coincidence notice involves counts 1-6 of the indictment of 17 July 2025.

1. The Crown alleges that the accused carried on a registrable designated remittance service that was not registered in breach of s 74 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act). The Crown alleges that the accused's dealings with money or other property were intended to be used as an instrument for the unregistered remittance network service or were the proceeds of that unregistered remittance network service. The Crown also contends that the evidence on counts 1-6 of the indictment, together with the evidence connected with other uncharged acts, is cross-admissible as coincidence evidence in respect of each count.
2. As the name suggests, coincidence evidence is a form of circumstantial evidence enabling a trier of fact to engage in probabilistic reasoning that two or more events could not have occurred coincidentally. The probative value of the evidence is that it suggests there is an objective improbability of a particular event occurring accidentally. Therefore, the probabilistic reasoning is connected with the establishment of a particular fact or state of mind.
3. There is a six-stage process of reasoning involved in making this decision (drawn from R v Gale; R v Duckworth [2012] NSWCCA 174; 217 A Crim R 487 at [31] and adapted to reflect the subsequent amendment to s 101(2) of the Evidence Act), namely:

(i) identify the particular act of a person or the particular state of mind of a person the party tendering the evidence seeks to prove;

(ii) identify the two or more events from the occurrence of which the party tendering the evidence seeks to prove the person in question did the particular act or had the particular state of mind;

(iii) identify the similarities in the events and/or the similarities in the circumstances in which the events occurred by reason of which the party tendering the evidence asserts the improbability of coincidental occurrence of the events;

(iv) determine whether reasonable notice has been given of the intention to adduce the evidence;

(v) make an evaluation whether the evidence will, either by itself or in conjunction with other evidence already given or anticipated, have significant probative value;

(vi) in a criminal proceeding, determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant.

1. I am satisfied that the correct approach to the reasoning of probability and improbability is based upon the improbability of coincidence even though, for example, two events may bear similarities. The enquiry is whether or not similarity is explicable by coincidence. It is necessary to identify the nature of the facts in issue in order to determine whether there is significant probative value in the evidence. Part of that enquiry is to determine the significance or importance that the evidence may have in establishing relevant facts.
2. This enquiry ordinarily involves issues of credibility and reliability, usually in the context of viva voce evidence. However, in this case, the evidence is almost completely written and constitutes, in the main, business records which have been identified by the Crown. What inferences might arise from this material is a question for the jury and the Crown would invite the jury to reason that the only possible inference arising from this material is in connection with the guilt of the accused.
3. This evidence must rationally affect the probability of the existence of a fact in issue and so it must have significant probative value. The assessment of probative value must be made having regard to the whole of the evidence to be placed before the court. The nature of the evidence in this case, in large part, obviates any aspect of what might otherwise be called unfair prejudice. Such prejudice must arise from the use of the evidence and when, for example, a jury may give it more weight than it deserves or the evidence may improperly influence the jury. I am satisfied that any such possibility of unfair prejudice may be easily catered for by proper directions to the jury.
4. Turning then to the relevant steps to be considered in the coincidence application, the Crown has thoroughly identified the steps required to determine the admission of coincidence evidence. The Crown has discharged the burden of proof of the facts which are in dispute. These matters are set out in [21]-[58] of the Crown's submissions and it is not necessary that I repeat or attempt to paraphrase those matters. I accept the Crown has identified the particular act or the particular state of mind of the accused (the first step). The Crown is also required to identify two or more events (the second step) and identify the similarities in the events and/or similarities in the circumstances (the third step). Under this third step, the Crown must identify the reasoning process by which the similarities are said to be probative of the actual state of mind to be proved unless it is blindingly obvious (R v Mason [2019] ACTSC 161 at [526] per Penfold J).
5. The Crown accepts that, in relation to counts 1-6, there is no evidence that Harris sent the accused instructions to transfer money. The Crown submits that the similarities across the events give rise to the improbability that those instructions were not given. Similarly, in relation to counts 1-5, where there is no evidence that the accused met with Harris and that the accused received a quantity of cash, it is probable, having regard to all of the circumstances that are known, that the meeting did occur and that the accused received a quantity of cash at that meeting. In relation to count 6, there is no evidence of the accused meeting with Harris at about the time of the international money transfers from Finfil Inc to RMA 1245 Golding Pty Ltd. However, it is contended that it is probable that such a meeting did take place, funds were transferred and that the accused received a quantity of cash by way of reimbursement for facilitating the relevant international monetary transfer.
6. The Crown contends that these similarities are highly consistent over the relevant events. In connection with count 5 where cash handovers were received after the acceptance of instructions for an international monetary transfer, the Crown contends that it is improbable that this pattern of behaviour did not continue throughout count 6 in connection with the disappearing messages in the absence of text-based communications with Harris. I accept the submissions of the Crown. In the course of argument, the Crown handed to the court annexures A-D, coincidence summary tables, which set out in detail the transactions, including in respect of the uncharged acts. It is apparent that the process used by the participants in these activities was consistent over a long period of time and in respect of similar forms of transaction. I am satisfied that, in fulfilment of the test of capability, it is open to a jury to be satisfied that the acts were committed by the same offender. I am also satisfied that any two similarities do not detract from the strength of the inferential reasoning even though, on occasions, there are some gaps in the documentation. I am satisfied that these do not detract from the process of reasoning because the transactions are of largely identical nature and occurred before and after these gaps in communication. I consider that the similarities are so stark and distinct that the inferential reasoning under s 98 of the Evidence Act is available. These similarities are the basis of coincidence reasoning and do not detract from the probative value of the evidence.
7. The fourth step for determining the admission of coincidence evidence, being the provision of a notice to adduce coincidence evidence, has been satisfied by the Crown. The submissions in relation to the fifth step, being that the evidence is of significant probative value, are set out in [39]-[50] of the Crown's submissions. No challenge was made to the Crown's contention that the evidence by itself or in conjunction with other evidence has significant probative value. The evidence is capable of rationally affecting the assessment by the jury of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue to a significant degree. I have made my own estimate of the assessment of the probative value based upon the assumption that the jury would accept the evidence. The material set out in annexures A-D satisfies me that, if accepted, the Crown evidence proves the facts in issue because of its overwhelming weight in favour of the assessment of the probability of the existence of the fact in issue.
8. In this context, I accept the submissions of the Crown that, properly viewed, this is not a complex case and, in large part, it is based upon business records which are admissible under the Evidence Act and the common law. Viewed as a whole, this evidence satisfies me that there is no possibility of an alternative explanation of the innocence of the accused which is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused.
9. For the same reasons, I am satisfied that the evidence has significant probative value and I accept the submissions of the Crown that the similarities in the case are overwhelming such that, viewed in combination, or for that matter separately, the evidence has significant probative value. As annexures A-D disclose, there are distinct similarities in the way in which these transactions occurred. These similarities include the people giving instructions, the actions taken once instructions were received, the people and entities used in the transactions, the confirmations of the transactions later received, the creation and transmission of false invoices to particular addressees but delivered to other recipients and the arranging of cash handovers. I consider that the method of operation employed by the accused and others is both apparent and distinct.
10. The Crown points to other evidence to be adduced which is to be considered in conjunction with the proposed coincidence evidence. This includes discussions by the accused of his involvement in money laundering, his failure to declare cash receipts on his tax records, the very large amounts of money he spent on luxury goods and the very significant amount of cash found in the home of the accused. One feature of the discovery of that cash is its amount and the different places where it was stored in the house.
11. The sixth step for determining the admission of coincidence evidence, being to determine whether the risk of unfair prejudice to the accused is outweighed by the significant probative value of the evidence, is dealt with by the Crown at paragraphs [51]-[58] of the Crown's submissions. Having found that the evidence is admissible for a coincidence purpose, I am also satisfied that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect that it may have. Although no proposition in response has been put by the accused in submissions, I am satisfied that a jury, if properly directed, would not give more weight to this evidence than it deserves, nor will the jury be overwhelmed by the evidence or make unfair use of it. That is my task as a trial judge.
12. It is for these reasons that I have made orders granting leave to the Crown to adduce coincidence evidence.

1. The Crown's tendency application is confined to counts 7-8 on the indictment. Those counts are connected with the state of mind of the accused and his tendency to act in a particular way, namely to purchase luxury goods in cash or almost wholly in cash, as well as disguising and concealing this cash as the proceeds of crime. The Crown contends that the accused had a tendency to purchase luxury goods using cash which was the proceeds of crime and that the accused had a particular state of mind namely:

(a) that he believed (he knew) that the cash used to purchase these luxury goods was the proceeds of crime; and

(b) he had an interest in disguising and concealing cash that was the proceeds of crime (generally around his home environment).

1. The accused made substantial purchases of luxury goods from stores in Melbourne, Canberra and Sydney, and a summary of these luxury goods is set out in annexure 8 of the tendency notice. The Crown contends that these occurred as a result of the accused carrying on a registrable designated remittance business that was not registered, in breach of s 74 of the AML/CTF Act. This dealing with money and property was the proceeds of that unregistered remittance network service. Sections 97(1) and 101(2) of the Evidence Act are set out earlier in these reasons. It is no longer necessary under s 101 to prove that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.
2. In DPP v Mastalerz [2024] ACTSC 30, at [31] Baker J held:

Tendency reasoning is a particular form of inferential or deductive reasoning that operates in two stages. Where the tribunal of fact is satisfied that a person acted in a specified way, or had a specified state of mind, on a particular occasion or occasions, the tribunal of fact may first draw an inference that the person has or had a tendency to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind. The tribunal of fact may then use this tendency in its determination of whether the person acted in the particular way, or had the particular state of mind, alleged by the Crown on the occasion in question.

3. In DPP v Roder [2024] HCA 15; 281 CLR 18 at [24] the High Court held:

In Hughes v The Queen, the majority in this Court explained that with tendency evidence, "[t]he trier of fact reasons from satisfaction that a person has a tendency to have a particular state of mind, or to act in a particular way, to [determining] the likelihood that the person had the particular state of mind, or acted in the particular way, on the occasion in issue" (emphasis added). The process of reasoning involved is similar to the manner in which an assessment of the significant probative value of the evidence is undertaken by the trial judge for the purpose of determining its admissibility, namely, by first assessing the strength of the evidence in establishing the tendency and then considering "the extent to which the tendency makes more likely the elements of the offence charged". In the language of Shepherd, the tendency is an "intermediate fact" that the Crown seeks to establish and rely on as circumstantial proof of the elements of the offence. Unless the tendency is an "intermediate fact" which is "indispensable" to proof of guilt, it need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

4. The expression significant probative value requires a probative value which is important or of consequence and must be influential in the context of fact-finding. I must be satisfied that first, the evidence supports the tendency and second, the tendency makes more likely the facts that make up the charged offence. The High Court held in Hughes v the Queen [2017] HCA 20; 263 CLR 338 at [41] that:

There is likely to be a high degree of probative value where (i) the evidence, by itself or together with other evidence, strongly supports proof of a tendency, and (ii) the tendency strongly supports the proof of a fact that makes up the offence charged.

5. The whole of the evidence sought to be tendered by the Crown will assist in the assessment of whether the evidence has significant probative value. In Mastalerz, Baker J set out a number of factors which may be relevant to the assessment of probative value. However, as in all lists of factors, they are not exhaustive and each case will be informed by its own peculiar facts and so any discretion must be exercised having regard to the facts of a particular matter. The factors referred to by her Honour at [36] are as follows:

(a) the number of incidents establishing the tendency: Hughes at 371 [91]; > > (b) the temporal distance between the tendency incidents and the alleged acts: McPhillamy v The Queen [2018] HCA 52; 92 ALJR 1045 at [30] - [32]; TL v The King [2022] HCA 35; 275 CLR 83 at 98 [37] (see further at [39] below); > > (c) Any similarity in conduct and circumstances between the tendency incidents and the alleged acts, and among the tendency incidents: TL at 95 [29] (see further at [37] below); > > (d) Whether the tendency alleged is unusual: Hughes at 393 [155]; > > (e)The specificity (or generality) of the tendency alleged: TL at 95 [29]; Hughes at 363 [64] (see further at [38] below); > > (f) Whether tendency evidence involves a single complainant, or more than one complainant: The Queen v Dennis Bauer (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 40; 266 CLR 56 at 82 [48], 83 [50] and 88 [60] (see further at [38] below); > > (g) The nature of the tendency alleged (including whether "logic and human experience" suggest that the tendency is such as to be probative of the facts in issue: Hughes at 356 [40]); > > (h) The extent to which the tendency as particularised will assist in determining the fact(s) in issue: TL at 95 [29]; > > (i) The issue that the tendency evidence is sought to establish (for example, whether the tendency is adduced to support a witness' credibility or to establish identity; whether the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party; and/or whether the tendency evidence is adduced to demonstrate a critical fact in the Crown case): Hughes at 355 [39], but see TL at 96 [30] - [31]); and > > (j) The other evidence to be presented: s 97(1)(b) of the Evidence Act.

6. On the question of unfair prejudice, it is trite but any inculpatory evidence led against an accused which makes it more likely that an accused will be convicted is not unfair. It is necessary to show that there is a risk of harm to the accused because a jury may use the evidence improperly or in some unfair way. I am satisfied that there is no risk of this occurring because of the nature of the evidence to be led by the Crown, the high likelihood of there being some agreed facts and the presentation to the jury of business records through which the jury can be taken and which are explanatory of the basis of the charged offences.
7. It is a jury question whether it accepts that all or any part of this money was legitimately earned and that the purchases of the luxury goods were made with lawfully obtained money. That is, a jury issue is whether the Crown is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the cash used for the purchase of the goods were proceeds of crime.
8. The Crown contends and I accept that the evidence strongly supports the tendency. There is a striking degree of similarity in the tendencies involving large amounts of cash to purchase luxury goods. These tendencies became manifest within a short date range and were similar in each case. When a comparison is made of the other sources of income available to the accused, such as bank accounts, there is no significant movement of cash within those accounts. The tax returns of the accused do not reflect a large income to support such purchases, and the accused did not declare receipts of large amounts of money or any basis to fund very large purchases of luxury goods.
9. I am satisfied that these tendencies have significant probative value because they are directly relevant to proving the elements of the offences. In R v Bauer [2018] HCA 40; 266 CLR 56, the High Court considered Hughes and addressed the question of whether evidence that the accused committed an offence against one complainant was significantly probative of the accused having committed an offence against another complainant. The High Court held that, under the logic of probability reasoning, evidence of offending (against one complainant) may be significantly probative of the offending against the other where there is some feature of or about the offending which links the two together. The High Court held in Bauer at [58] that a common feature of the offending "may demonstrate a tendency to act in a particular way proof of which increases the likelihood that the account of the offence under consideration is true."
10. I am satisfied that the tendency evidence has significant probative value. I am also satisfied that, at the appropriate times, it will be necessary to give very clear directions to the jury about the use to which they can make of the evidence, the use to which they may not make of the evidence and so avoid any possibility of unfair prejudice to the accused. I consider that the probative value of the evidence very heavily outweighs its prejudicial effect.

1. The orders of the Court, as made on 5 December 2025, are:

(1) The Crown be permitted to adduce tendency evidence in the trial of the accused pursuant to s 97 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) as notified in the notice of intention to adduce tendency evidence dated 14 July 2025, as amended by the removal of paragraph (2)(b)(iii).

(2) The Crown be permitted to adduce coincidence evidence in the trial of the accused pursuant to s 98 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) as notified in the notice of intention to adduce coincidence evidence dated 14 July 2025.

I certify that the preceding forty-seven [47] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Slattery.