R v Saran [2019] ACTSC 37

Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 54, 60

Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 6, 7,10, 33

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501CA

Cheung v The Queen [2001] HCA 67; 209 CLR 1

Gillard v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 50

Guden v The Queen [2010] VSCA 196; 28 VR 259

HAT v The Queen [2011] VSCA 427; 35 VR 109

Hili v the Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520

Islam v The Queen [2006] ACTCA 21

Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357

Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59

R v Agresti [2016] ACTSC 9

R v Alabbasi [2017] ACTSC 231

R v Alabbasi [2017] ACTSC 239

R v Aroub [2017] ACTSC 187

R v Chi Sun Tsui (1985) 1 NSWLR 308

R v Cranfield [2017] ACTSC 171

R v Hoyle (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 175

R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374

R v M.A.K; R v M.S.K [2006] NSWCCA 381

R v Meyboom [2012] ACTCA 48

R v Naqvi [2016] ACTSC 345

R v NC [2017] ACTSC 206

R v NO (No 2) [2018] ACTSC 37

R v Norris; Ex Parte Attorney-General (QLD) [2018] QCA 27

R v Palmer [2017] ACTSC 357

R v PM (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 358

R v Stanley [2015] ACTSC 322

R v Stevens (No 3) [2017] ACTSC 297

R v SV [2016] ACTSC 211

R v Tamawiwy (No 4) [2015] ACTSC 371

R v UE [2016] QCA 58

R v US [2016] ACTSC 130

R v Verdins; R v Buckley; R v Vo [2007] VSCA 102; 169 A Crim R 581

R v Wyper (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 103

Singh v R [2015] ACTCA 65

Singh v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 17

The Queen v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383

Zdravkovic v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 53

1. On 26 September 2018, Jasminder Singh Saran (the offender) was found guilty by a jury of the following offences contained on an indictment dated 17 November 2017:

(Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 60(1))

(Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 60(1))

(Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 60(1))

(Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 60(1))

Sexual Intercourse without consent (Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 54(1))

(Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 54(1))

Sexual intercourse without consent (Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 54(1))

2. The High Court in Cheung v The Queen [2001] HCA 67; 209 CLR 1 (Cheung) endorsed the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal's approach in R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 (Isaacs) in relation to the Court's role in sentencing and interpreting a jury's verdict of guilty following a trial. The Court in Cheung at [14] quoted the summarised principles from Isaacs (at pages 377-378) as follows:

1. Where, following a trial by jury, a person has been convicted of a criminal offence, the power and responsibility of determining the punishment to be inflicted upon the offender rest with the judge, and not with the jury ...
2. Subject to certain constraints, it is the duty of the judge to determine the facts relevant to sentencing. Some of these facts will have emerged in evidence at the trial; others may only emerge in the course of the sentencing proceedings. ...
3. The primary constraint upon the power and duty of decision-making referred to above is that the view of the facts adopted by the judge for purposes of sentencing must be consistent with the verdict of the jury.
4. A second constraint is that findings of fact made against an offender by a sentencing judge must be arrived at beyond reasonable doubt.
5. There is no general requirement that a sentencing judge must sentence an offender upon the basis of the view of the facts, consistent with the verdict, which is most favourable to the offender. ... However, the practical effect of 4 above, in a given case, may be that, because the judge is required to resolve any reasonable doubt in favour of the accused, then the judge will be obliged, for that reason, to sentence upon a view of the facts which is most favourable to the offender. ...

3. Taking into account these principles, I make the following factual findings.

4. The victim and the offender were employed as cleaners at a hotel in Canberra. The victim was from China, and the offender is from India.

5. On 2 January 2017, the victim and the accused were "teamed" up to work together cleaning hotel rooms.

6. On the same day, while cleaning hotel rooms, the offender pinched the victim on the face, smacked and touched her on the bottom, and asked her to be his girlfriend. These acts make up Count 1.

7. On 8 January 2017, the victim and the offender were again teamed up to work together cleaning hotel rooms. The victim gave evidence that when cleaning hotel rooms, the doors of each room were meant to be open. However, when working with the offender, the offender would close the doors.

8. In the morning of that day, the offender kissed the victim on the face, hugged her and touched her on the bottom. These acts make up Count 3.

9. In one of the rooms, before lunch, the offender pushed the victim on to a bed, pulled up the victim's t-shit and bra to expose her breasts, and pulled out the waist band of her trousers and looked at her vagina. The victim gave evidence that she tried to push him away, and said "no please don't". These acts make up Count 4.

10. After lunch, while cleaning a room, the offender again pulled up the victim's t-shirt and bra. He pulled her pants down to her knees then removed his erect penis from his pants and masturbated in front of the victim. He had one hand on the victim's breast while he did this. These acts make up Count 5.

11. Later, in a different room, the offender pulled up the victim's t-shirt, kissed her breasts, bit her nipple, pushed her legs apart and inserted his penis in to her vagina. The offender removed his penis and ejaculated onto the victim's vulva. These acts make up Count 6.

12. Later again, the offender kissed the victim on the breasts and he put his penis in her vagina from behind. The victim begged the offender "don't". These acts make up Count 7.

13. Later, the accused pushed the complainant face down on to a glass top table and engaged in penile vaginal intercourse. The victim said "no" and "please don't". This act makes up Count 8.

14. It is clear from the jury's verdict that the offender's version was rejected and the complainant's version as to the elements was accepted beyond a reasonable doubt. Consistent with the jury's verdicts I find that the offender was reckless as to whether there was consent.

15. Included in the Crown tender bundle is a Victim Impact Statement dated 11 October 2018.

16. The extent of the impact upon the victim was made clear by the Victim Impact Statement. Courts know the extremely serious effects of sexual offences on victims. Nevertheless, it is valuable to hear the words of the victim.

17. The court acknowledges the significant impact of the offences on the victim.

18. The offences took place over two separate days at the victim's workplace during the course of employment, where she was, as was submitted by the prosecution, entitled to "carry out her work free from sexual advances and molestation". This is undoubtedly correct. In this regard, the prosecution submitted the offences where opportunistic, but formed part of a continuing course of conduct.

19. Counsel for the offender submitted that these offences did not involve a breach of authority, and submitted that the victim was not a vulnerable person or working in vulnerable circumstances. Counsel submitted that the offending did not involve humiliating, degrading or dominant conduct, or threats, and that the offences took place "not away from" the public or from help. Ultimately, it was submitted that the offending was opportunistic rather than planned. I find in accordance with the submissions of the prosecution and counsel for the offender that the offences were opportunistic and also part of a continuing course of conduct.

20. In relation to the individual counts, the prosecution and counsel for the offender agreed that Counts 1 and 3 were at the lower range of seriousness. This accords with my view and I find these offences to be at the lower end of seriousness for offences of this nature.

21. The prosecution and counsel for the offender agreed that Counts 4 and 5 should be assessed at the mid to high-range of seriousness. This again accords with my view.

22. The prosecution submitted that Counts 6 to 8 should be assessed at "definitively midrange", but not "low". Counsel for the offender submitted that the offences were of low to mid-range for offences of this type.

23. I find that the offences were broadly of mid-range seriousness.

24. In evidence before me is a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) for the offender, as well as a letter to the Court from the offender and a letter from the offender's wife. The offender also gave evidence before me on 11 December 2018.

25. The offender is a 35 year old man who was born in the state of Punjab, India. He indicated that he had a positive childhood with his family in India, and continues to enjoy good relationships with his parents and brother. However, the offender's father has been unwell, and has been confined to his bed in recent years, and his mother is also elderly.

26. The offender gave evidence that he had been a very good hockey player, and had played for his state at the national level, but was unable to be selected at the international level because he hadn't attended college. At the age of 24, the offender travelled to Italy to live and work for six or seven years. The offender married four years ago, and has a one year old son. The offender's wife had been studying in Australia when they married, while the offender had been working in Italy. In 2015, the offender came to Australia on a spousal visa, and settled with his wife in Canberra. The offender received permanent residency in 2016.

27. The offender lives with his wife in private rental accommodation. The offender gave evidence that he has worked at both a car wash and a hospital as a cleaner over the past 12 months.

28. The offender reported significant financial stress due to his wife's inability to work due to health complications since the birth of their son, his parent's reliance on him for financial support, and loans obtained to pay his legal fees, which the offender gave evidence totalled $90,000.

29. The offender reported that he had an entirely prosocial support network, and had no drug or alcohol issues. The offender did not report any medical or mental health issues.

[The offender] was assessed as low risk of reoffending. He appears to have multiple protective factors including stable accommodation and employment and positive familial, marital and social relationships. Further he does not appear to have substance abuse issues or mental health issues. His primary criminogenic risks appear to be his sexual offending, financial pressures and a lack of organised activities. Despite his denials, it would be beneficial for him to address his offending behaviour. Further, it may be of benefit for [the offender] to engage with a financial counsellor to assist with his financial situation.

Should [the offender] engage in appropriate interventions, his risk of reoffending should decrease further.

31. The offender has no criminal history and is of prior good character.

32. Section 33(1)(o) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (the Sentencing Act) requires consideration of the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on any of the offender's family or dependants.

33. The offender and his wife, in letters to the Court, outlined the significant hardship that incarceration of the offender would have on their families.

34. The offender gave evidence that his wife has been unable to work in the past two years, and has been unwell. His wife has not been sleeping well, has been worrying, has high blood pressure and fluctuating iron levels as well as weight loss since the offender was arrested.

35. The offender's wages are the family's main source of income, supplemented with Centrelink, and the offender is also a source of income for his and his wife's families in India.

36. Further, the offender gave evidence that he believed he would never be able to see his family again if he was ultimately deported from Australia as a result of the sentence. When challenged on this evidence in cross examination by the prosecutor, the offender indicated that his son only has an Australian passport, and that he was not aware if his son would be entitled to live in India.

37. Counsel for the offender submitted that the hardship to the offender's family would be exceptional as a result of the lack of other support the offender's wife has in Australia. Whereas other offenders in a similar situation would have "some other family in the community to assist", counsel for the offender submitted that the offender's family does not have that.

38. The prosecution submitted that the hardship to the offender's family was not exceptional. The prosecution submitted that during the lengthy adjournment between the jury delivering their verdicts and the sentencing hearing, not much had been done by the offender "to mitigate the hardship that was inevitably going to be suffered by his family in the event that he is ultimately sentenced". The prosecution further submitted that the submission that deportation would represent "the end of this family" wasn't borne out of any evidence, given the ability for the family to return to India once the offender is released from prison.

39. Counsel for the offender submitted that hardship to the offender's family was a mitigating factor. The prosecution submitted that in accordance with the authorities, the circumstances must be exceptional to be a mitigating factor. In this case, I am unable to find that the circumstances are exceptional. I will, however, in accordance with the authorities deal with this aspect as part of the subjective matters relevant to sentence.

40. The prosecution submitted that the possibility of deportation could be considered as a relevant sentencing consideration pursuant to ss 33(1)(o) and 33(1)(r) of the Sentencing Act, as a sentence of over 12 months of imprisonment was likely in this case, and therefore s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) would be applicable.

41. The prosecution submitted that it would be "contrary to sentencing principles to impose a shorter and inappropriate sentence only to allow" an offender to "avoid the possible consequences of deportation": see Islam v The Queen [2006] ACTCA 21 at [35].

42. In R v UE [2016] QCA 58 (UE), Philippidies JA, with whom Morrison JA and North J agreed, cited with approval the matter of Guden v The Queen [2010] VSCA 196; 28 VR 259 (Guden), and stated the following at [16]-[17]:

16. It is undoubtedly correct that, in an appropriate case, the prospect of deportation may be a relevant factor, personal to the offender, to be considered in mitigation of sentence. The prospect of deportation may affect the impact of a sentence of imprisonment, because it makes the period of incarceration more burdensome, and also because upon release, the fact of imprisonment will result in the offender being deprived of the opportunity of permanent residence in Australia. While the prospect of deportation may be a relevant mitigatory factor, the sentencing court cannot be asked to speculate about that prospect or as to the impact of deportation on the offender. Proof that deportation will in fact be a hardship for the particular offender will be required.

17. As to the prospect of deportation, the following observations in Guden are pertinent:

"If defence counsel on a plea in mitigation can say no more than that a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months will, upon its expiry, enliven the power of the Minister for Immigration either to revoke an existing visa or to decline to renew one, then deportation may properly be viewed ... as 'a completely speculative possibility'."

43. The approach in UE and Guden was cited with approval by Gotterson JA with whom Sofronoff P and Philippides JA agreed in R v Norris; Ex Parte Attorney-General (QLD) [2018] QCA 27 (Norris) at [41]:

As the respondent correctly submits, UE has been consistently followed in this Court in its acceptance of the reasoned principle enunciated in Guden. I agree that that principle is correct and am of the view that it ought to continue to be applied by sentencing courts in Queensland.

44. The Court in Norris additionally stated the following at [42]-[43]:

42. I also consider that the contextual limitation to the observation of Street CJ in Chi, identified in Guden, is significant and need be borne in mind. I note that other decisions of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal to which this Court was referred in oral argument, R v Latumetan & Murwanto and R v Pham, were also concerned with the setting of non-parole periods.

43. In Abdi, the evidence before the sentencing judge would not have justified a finding that deportation would have harmed the offender in either of the two ways identified in Guden. Significantly, this Court held that the sentencing judge had erred by not considering the relevance of the likely deportation to the efficacy of a court ordered parole and the potential consequences of that for the offender. The relevance of that factor was illustrated by events subsequent to sentencing. The offender was in immigration detention following his release on court-ordered parole on 26 October 2016. Because of the detention, he could not comply with parole conditions. An order for suspension of his sentence from that date was substituted.

45. It is worth noting that at the time that the authority of Guden was decided, section 501(3A) of the Migration Act was not yet in force. The relevant parts of section 501 provide as follows:

501 Refusal or cancellation of visa on character grounds

(3A) The Minister must cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if:

(a) the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of:

(i) paragraph (6)(a) (substantial criminal record), on the basis of paragraph (7)(a), (b) or (c); or

(ii) paragraph (6)(e) (sexually based offences involving a child); and

(b) the person is serving a sentence of imprisonment, on a full-time basis in a custodial institution, for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.

(7) For the purposes of the character test, a person has a substantial criminal record if:

(c) the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more; or

46. The effect of s 501(3A) is that the legislation requires the mandatory cancellation of a visa where a person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding 12 months. However, in any instance where the minister cancels a visa pursuant to s 501(3A), s 501CA makes provision for the revocation of such a decision. That provision is explained in Norris at [14]:

I note also that s 501CA of the [Migration Act] makes provision for the revocation of a decision made under s 501(3A) to cancel a visa. Section 501CA(4) sets out the circumstances in which such a cancellation may be revoked. Pursuant to s 501CA(6), any detention of a person during the period that began with the making of a cancellation decision under s 501(3A)and ending with its revocation, is lawful. As this Court observed in R v Schelvis; R v Hildebrand, the legislative intent at the time of the enactment of ss 501(3A) and [21834](https://jade.io/article/501CA included that a person who fails the character test and is released from criminal custody would remain in immigration detention whilst revocation is pursued. The provision in s 501CA(6) accommodates an application of the legislation that accords with that intent.

47. Counsel for the offender submitted that in previous cases, there was "reluctance" to take the possibility of deportation into account, however, given the change in legislation, there was "not really any doubt anymore as to what the authorities will do". Counsel for the offender submitted that the possibility of deportation in this case is an unavoidable consequence of the offending, assuming that the accumulated sentence exceeds 12 months.

48. In particular, counsel for the offender referred to the following statement in HAT v The Queen [2011] VSCA 427; 35 VR 109 (HAT) at [126]:

The burden of imprisonment may be greater for a prisoner who knows that following his release he will be deported. Also, if the effect of receiving a sentence of imprisonment is that an offender will lose the opportunity of settling permanently in Australia, this may be taken into account as a form of additional punishment.

49. Counsel for the offender submitted that deportation in this case would permanently deprive the offender from settling with his family in Australia, which would be a form of extra curial punishment.

50. The prosecution submitted that ultimately, there would be nothing stopping the offender's family returning to India together to live.

51. In accordance with the authorities I will not impose a shorter and inappropriate sentence to allow the offender to avoid the possible consequences of deportation. I will, however, take this matter into account in the manner outlined above in HAT as to the burden of imprisonment.

52. The offender has spent no relevant time in custody referable to this offence, as he was arrested and released on the same day.

53. There are a number of decisions of this court relating to offenders who committed similar offences. The following cases from this jurisdiction provide a "yardstick" as referred to by the High Court in relation to this sentencing exercise: Hili v the Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 (Hili) at [53]-[54].

54. The prosecution provided me with a table of relevant cases, and specifically referred me to R v Hoyle (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 175 (Hoyle No 2), R v NO (No 2) [2018] ACTSC 37 (NO (No 2)), and R v Stevens (No 3) [2017] ACTSC 297 (Stevens (No 3)) as yardsticks for the offences before me.

55. In Hoyle (No 2), the offender was found guilty by a jury of six counts of an act of indecency, and two counts of sexual intercourse without consent. The offences related to four different victims, who had each been international students at the University of Canberra, and had been students of the offender. The offender was of previous good character, and was a distinguished university lecturer. The sentencing judge considered that some of the principles outlined in R v Verdins; R v Buckley; R v Vo [2007] VSCA 102; 169 A Crim R 581 were applicable due to a medical condition, resulting in a diminished sentence. The total sentence of imprisonment was four years of imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years and six months.

56. In NO (No 2), the offender was found guilty by a jury of one count of sexual assault in the second degree, one count of sexual intercourse without consent, and one count of an act of indecency without consent. The offender and the victim had been in a sexual relationship. On one occasion, when the victim went to the offender's house, the offender was intoxicated, and began to kiss the victim while holding her up against a wall. The victim was then held down by her arms on a bed while the offender had intercourse with her without her consent. The offence left the victim with bruising around her breasts, throat and inner thighs. Some years later, whilst the victim and the offender were sharing a bed, the offender ejaculated on the victim's back without her consent. The offender was also sentenced for a transferred offence of stalking. The offender had some criminal history, and had compelling subjective circumstances related to hardship to family, however, the sentencing judge considered that it was not a case in which "any significant discount to the otherwise appropriate sentence could be made" due to the hardship to family. The offender was sentenced to three years and nine months of imprisonment for the offence of sexual intercourse without consent, and two years of imprisonment for the act of indecency. The total sentence was five years and three months of imprisonment, with a non-parole period of three years.

57. In Stevens (No 3), the offender was found guilty at trial of four counts of engaging in sexual intercourse without consent. The offences related to the same complainant. The offender had been living with the complainant since meeting on an internet dating website. The offender and complainant engaged in consensual vaginal sexual intercourse. In the first count, the offender then forced his penis into the complainant's anus without her consent, having previously explained that it was a "no go area". A week later, the offender forced the victim to perform oral sex on him, despite the victim's attempts to pull away. A few weeks later, the offender came home drunk from a social event, pinned the complainant to the bed, and inserted more than one finger into her vagina and then her anus. The incident happened at the complainant's home while her children were present. The offender was a 37 year old man with a substantial criminal history for motor vehicle offences, but had no history of similar offences. The offender received a total sentence of five years and eight months of imprisonment, with a non-parole period of three years.

58. In addition, the prosecution provided a sentencing table containing the following cases: R v Palmer [2017] ACTSC 357; R v Alabbasi [2017] ACTSC 239; R v Alabbasi [2017] ACTSC 231; R v NC [2017] ACTSC 206; R v Aroub [2017] ACTSC 187 (Aroub); R v Cranfield [2017] ACTSC 171; Singh v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 17; R v Wyper (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 103; R v Naqvi [2016] ACTSC 345; Gillard v R [2016] ACTCA 50; R v Goold (No 2) [2016] ACTSC; R v SV [2016] ACTSC 211; R v US [2016] ACTSC 130; R v Agresti [2016] ACTSC 9; Singh v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 65; R v Tamawiwy (No 4) [2015] ACTSC 371; R v PM (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 358 and R v Stanley [2015] ACTSC 322. Every case is different and must be approached on its own facts. Nevertheless, I have been referred to and considered these comparable cases as yardsticks.

59. In sentencing the offender, the court is required to take into account those matters under s 33 of the Sentencing Act that are known and relevant. I have referred to the relevant matters above.

60. The court sentences in the context of the objects of the Sentencing Act in s 6 and the sentencing purposes in s 7 of the Sentencing Act. The sentencing purposes of punishment, general and specific deterrence, the protection of the community, accountability, denunciation, and recognition of harm to the victim are important sentencing considerations. Rehabilitation is also an important consideration having regard to the offender's lack of prior criminal record.

61. The sentencing process also requires an examination of s 10 of the Sentencing Act and alternatives to prison. In this case, an alternative to full-time custody is not appropriate in my view in light of the seriousness of the offending.

62. In the present case, relevant sentencing purposes include adequate punishment, general and personal deterrence, protection of the community, accountability, denunciation and recognition of harm to the victim. It is important for the Court to send a message that offences of sexual violence against women will not be tolerated.

63. Ordinarily, significant offences of sexual assault will result in sentences of full time imprisonment. The ACT Sentencing Database statistics show that 83 per cent of s 54 offenders receive sentences of full time imprisonment, 12 per cent receive partially suspended sentences and only five per cent receive fully suspended sentences. Sentences are generally in the range of three to five years: Aroub at [42]. As discussed above, bare sentencing statistics provide limited assistance: see R v Pham [2015] HCA 39; 256 CLR 550; Hili.

64. As with every sentencing exercise, careful attention must be paid to the maximum penalty, which provides a yardstick: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357.

65. When sentencing for multiple offences, I must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider questions of accumulation or concurrence, as well as totality: Zdravkovic v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 53 at [64] (Zdravkovic). The real question is whether the total sentence is "just and appropriate" to reflect the total criminality: Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59 (Mill); R v Meyboom [2012] ACTCA 48 at [66]; Zdravkovic at [71].

66. In sentencing for multiple offences, the court needs to be mindful of the principle of totality. That is particularly so where there are several counts representing different aspects of effectively the one incident. However, it must not be applied so as to suggest the offender is receiving a discount for multiple offending: R v M.A.K; R v M.S.K [2006] NSWCCA 381 at [18].

67. It must be recognised by the Court that the offences committed against the victim have had a serious and significant impact upon her. Both the short and long-term consequences of being the victim of these offences must be acknowledged.

68. In coming to a sentence by way of instinctive synthesis, I have taken into account all the matters discussed above, including the objective seriousness of the offences and the subjective matters.

(a) I record convictions in relation to the offences;

(b) In respect of Count 1, act of indecency without consent (XO2017/31257), the offender is sentenced to a term of 1 month of imprisonment, commencing on 22 February 2019 and ending on 21 March 2019;

(c) In respect of Count 3, act of indecency without consent (XO2017/31259), the offender is sentenced to a term of 3 months of imprisonment, commencing on 22 February 2019 and ending on 21 May 2019;

(d) In respect of Count 4, act of indecency without consent (CC2017/1613), the offender is sentenced to a term of 6 months of imprisonment, commencing on 22 February 2019 and ending on 21 August 2019;

(e) In respect of Count 5, act of indecency without consent (CC2017/1614), the offender is sentenced to a term of 12 months of imprisonment, commencing on 22 May 2019 and ending on 21 May 2020;

(f) In respect of Count 6, Sexual intercourse without consent, (CC2017/758), the offender is sentenced to a term of 17 months of imprisonment, commencing on 22 September 2019 and ending on 21 February 2021;

(g) In respect of Count 7, Sexual intercourse without consent (CC2017/759), the offender is sentenced to a term of 18 months of imprisonment, commencing on 22 November 2020 and ending on 21 May 2022;

(h) In respect of Count 8, Sexual intercourse without consent (CC2017/760), the offender is sentenced to a term of 18 months of imprisonment, commencing on 22 August 2021 and ending on 21 February 2023;

(i) Overall there will be a sentence of 4 years of imprisonment.

(j) I set a non-parole period of 2 years, commencing on 22 February 2019 and ending on 21 February 2021.

I certify that the preceding sixty-nine [69] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence her Honour Justice Loukas-Karlsson.