R v Robert Karl Huber

Catchwords: CRIME — sentencing — manslaughter — assault occasioning actual bodily harm — breach of ADVO — trespass — common assault —

Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 24, 59, 61
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), s 14
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), s 25C(1)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 21A, 25D(2)(c)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 166
Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW), s 4

Cases Cited: Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37
DPP (C’th) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25
R v Robert Karl Huber [2025] NSWSC 714
Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14

Category: Sentence

Parties: Rex (Crown)
Robert Karl Huber (Accused)

Representation: Counsel:
Ms S Oliver (Crown)
Mr J Watts (Accused)
Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Legal Aid New South Wales (Accused)

File Number(s): 2023/00003477

Publication restriction: N/A

REMARKS ON SENTENCE

1. HIS HONOUR: The Court is required to sentence Robert Karl Huber (hereinafter “the offender”). The offender was charged, on 23 September 2024, with three offences: an assault on the deceased, being an assault occasioning actual bodily harm on 26 December 2022; the murder of the deceased; and, in the alternative to the charge of murder, manslaughter of the deceased.

2. The first offence, the assault occasioning actual bodily harm, was the subject of a plea of guilty. The second and third charges were the subject of a trial by judge alone.

3. On 7 July 2025, the Court as presently constituted, found the offender not guilty of murder and guilty of manslaughter, in that, on 3 January 2023, at Ballina in the State of New South Wales, the offender unlawfully killed Lindy Lucena. The facts giving rise to the finding of guilt are set out in the judgment which delivered the verdict (referred to as “the verdict judgment”). [1]

4. Issues at trial were substantially confined to two: whether the conduct of the offender caused the death of the deceased; and whether at the time that the conduct occurred, if he caused the death of the deceased, the offender intended to cause grievous bodily harm, which would be sufficient to prove guilt of murder, if the Court were otherwise satisfied of the elements the Crown needed to prove.

5. Essentially, the reasons for judgment for the verdict determined that the offender inflicted injury on the deceased by beating her. He punched her in various places causing serious injury to her face, her head, the front of her neck and various bruises on the trunk, arms and legs. Some of the arm and hand bruises may have been caused by being grabbed, physically held or restrained and some may have been defensive wounds.

6. The internal examination conducted on autopsy showed extensive bruising across the entire face, particularly the right side in the region of the cheek bone and focal bruising on the front surface of the right side of the thyroid cartilage. The overall pattern of injuries on the face and head was indicative of a sustained assault with an unknown number of inflicted blows causing bruises, abrasions and lacerations.

7. While there was no evidence of any skull fracture, a subsequent neuropathological examination showed minor areas of acute traumatic subarachnoid haemorrhage on the surface of the brain in three separate areas. There was no evidence of brain swelling or of herniation.

8. Further, there were rib fractures that were caused after death, probably from moving the deceased or rolling her over.

9. The toxicology report showed methadone detected at 0.08 milligrams per litre. Further, the deceased had calcified coronary arteries and an old spontaneously closed ventricular septal defect just beneath the aortic valve. The coronary arteries were over 50% calcified but were patent. Over and above the foregoing, the deceased had previously suffered a stroke, but there was no evidence to suggest that any similar event occurred relating to the time of death.

10. Ultimately, the Court determined that the cause of death was a combination of the beating, the coronary heart disease and, possibly, the effect of the small amount of methadone. The infliction of the wounds to the face and other injuries precipitated the stress necessary to cause the heart to stop, given the narrowing of the coronary arteries and the possible effect of methadone was irregular heartbeat or cardiac arrhythmia.

11. The Court was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender intended, at the time of inflicting the injuries on the deceased, to cause really serious physical injury or grievous bodily harm. Consequently, the Court held that the death of the deceased, having been caused by the offender, the beating being an operative and substantial cause of death, such assault was an unlawful and dangerous act which a reasonable person in the position of the offender would have realised exposed the deceased to an appreciable risk of serious injury.

12. The offender was found guilty of manslaughter and not guilty of murder. It is unnecessary to describe in further detail the nature of the injuries sustained or the circumstances that led the Court to determine that the offender was guilty of manslaughter. Nevertheless, a brief description is necessary in order to understand the conduct of the offender, which is an important and essential aspect of the exercise of the discretion in sentencing.

The process of sentencing

13. The process of sentencing, or some aspects of it, may be difficult to understand to those unfamiliar with the requirements in the exercise of the sentencing discretion. Each of the offences for which the Court is required to sentence involves an application of the same fundamental principles, even though the manslaughter charge is, as a result of the effect of the infliction of the injuries, a much more serious offence.

14. The Court is required to assess the objective seriousness of the particular offence for which the sentence is being imposed, within the range of conduct covered by such an offence. It is necessary to assess the conduct of the offender to determine where, objectively, in the range of seriousness that may occur for the offence of manslaughter to be found and for the range of seriousness that may occur for the assault occasioning to be found and where this offence fits in those ranges.

15. In that respect, the maximum sentence is a guidepost, but the maximum sentence is reserved for those cases which warrant the maximum sentence being imposed. Such a category is often referred to as the “worst category of offences”, but such a term is misleading and has been deprecated, because human imagination can always imagine a worse case than that which is before the Court.

16. Nevertheless, even when the maximum sentence is not warranted, the maximum sentence for any offence is a guidepost in the setting of an appropriate sentence. So too is the standard non-parole period, if there be one. There is no standard non-parole period for manslaughter because manslaughter has such a range of conduct that may give rise to the offence that it was thought inappropriate by the legislature to prescribe a standard non-parole period.

17. An assault occasioning actual bodily harm, to which the offender pleaded guilty, is an offence under s 59 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. Again, there is no standard non-parole period prescribed in relation to an assault occasioning.

18. Over and above the two offences on the indictment for which sentencing is required, there are three other offences which have been committed to the Court pursuant to s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), which require disposition, either by the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment or otherwise. Those offences are: a breach of the provisional apprehended domestic violence order, which occurred on 3 January 2023, which led to the assault of the deceased that caused her death; a trespass at Reflections Caravan Park Ballina on 29 December 2022; and an assault on Tim Jones at Reflections Caravan Park, Ballina on 29 December 2022. Those offences are respectively offences under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), s 14, the I**nclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW) s 4, and s 61 of the Crimes Act.

19. The other facts that the Court should note in relation to the sentencing aspects and unrelated to the subjective circumstances applicable to the offender are that, as noted in the judgment on verdict, the offender and the deceased were in a relationship from around 2017 until January 2023 and lived at various places in the Northern Rivers region of New South Wales. The Court described the relationship as volatile and often violent.

20. From the evidence of the deceased’s daughter and her sister and friend, the offender was extremely controlling in that relationship. The offender discouraged contact between the deceased and her daughter and often interfered in contact between the offender and others.

21. As earlier stated, the deceased suffered a stroke in or about April 2021. The deceased had some cognitive and physical impairments, including a limp. However, the Court, having viewed CCTV footage of the deceased on 3 January and slightly earlier, did not notice a significant instability. Nevertheless, the offender was aware that the deceased was reliant upon him for certain everyday care and assistance with mobility.

22. Because of the floods that affected Lismore, the deceased and the offender were accommodated in a motorhome at Reflections Caravan Park, Ballina. The offender was described as someone who was probably an alcoholic.

23. The deceased, having had a flight to her daughter’s wedding provided to her, missed the flight either because of injuries sustained from an assault by the offender or because of his controlling conduct. Further, towards the end of 2022, the offender would be yelling at the deceased every couple of days.

24. On 8 December 2022 and again on 22 December 2022, the offender made comments relating to the relationship having ended and, on 8 December 2022, instructed the deceased’s daughter to come to Lismore to collect her mother. Notwithstanding those comments, the relationship continued.

25. As noted, and admitted by the offender, he punched the deceased on 26 December 2022, being a punch to the left cheek in their home at the Caravan Park. He started to punch her again but was stopped by a security guard. The deceased sustained bruising to her left eye and cheek.

26. The apprehended domestic violence order was served on the offender on 28 December 2022. As a result of the assault occasioning actual bodily harm that occurred on 26 December 2022, the offender and deceased lost their accommodation at the Caravan Park. On the evening of 2 January 2023, the couple were homeless and spent the night in the side passage next to and/or belonging to the Salvation Army.

27. There are a number of events that occurred on 3 January 2023, which have been described in the verdict judgment. At about 6.30pm on that day, the offender went to the Australian Hotel, seemingly to meet up with Chris Daley to whom he had sent a message, “[i]f I called U would I ever waste ur time? [sic]”.

28. At 7.03pm, the offender was observed by Mr Daley “bashing the hell” out of the deceased. The deceased had called on him to stop once or twice or, perhaps, three times.

29. At 7.20pm, a passerby saw the deceased motionless on the ground and called out to the offender who was seemingly distressed but refused assistance from the passerby. At 9.30pm the offender was aggressive, yelling and threatening and discouraged the manager of the Salvation Army from approaching the side passage.

30. Close to midnight the offender walked to Ballina Police Station, arriving just after midnight, and he reported her death. The offender admitted to police that he and the deceased had been involved in an argument but denied assaulting her.

31. As already stated, the pattern of injuries indicated a sustained assault, with each of the pathologists remarking that they were unable to determine the number of blows inflicted but there was a minimum of five and, most probably, significantly more than that number. The amount of force in the blows was described as moderate, possibly severe.

32. In determining the sentence to be imposed, the Court considers both the objective circumstances outlined above and otherwise described in the verdict judgment, and the subjective aspects relating to the offender. None of the offences with which the offender has been charged and of which he has been found guilty are in the category where the imposition of the maximum sentence is warranted. I reiterate that the category of such offences is not determined by imagining conduct that could be worse. In my assessment, the manslaughter is at or just above mid-range in objective seriousness.

33. The purposes of sentencing are prescribed by s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), which in turn reflects common law principles. Those objectives include the protection of society, the deterrence of the offender, the deterrence of others who might be tempted to offend, retribution and reform. Those objectives overlap.

34. Often, if not always, those objectives point in different directions. None of those objectives or purposes can be considered in isolation and each is a guidepost to the appropriate sentence to be imposed, as is the maximum sentence, as already stated.

35. Sentencing is not a mathematical exercise. Nor is it performed in a staged manner. It has been described as “instinctive” or “intuitive” synthesis. Arriving at an appropriate sentence requires the assessment and weighing of each of the objective and subjective circumstances in order to achieve the overall objectives undertaken in the sentencing process. [2]

36. The determination of an appropriate sentence is also informed by the prescribed factors in s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. While many, if not all, of those factors would be taken into account regardless of the provision, the section clarifies that each of them is a factor, when relevant, either aggravating or mitigating, in the determination of an appropriate sentence.

37. Over and above the previously mentioned principles and factors, the Court is required to take into account the totality of the sentence to be imposed, which must be such as to reflect the total criminality involved. Thus, where two offences are charged, one of which is completely overtaken by the criminality involved in the other, such a factor is important in determining a sentence that does not overstate the criminality.

38. This is the reason that, in many cases, sentences imposed, where there are multiple offences, involve a significant degree of concurrency. In the present case, the circumstance that the offender breached an apprehended domestic violence order when inflicting the injuries on the deceased involves consideration that the circumstances of that breach are largely the circumstances involved in the manslaughter itself.

39. In dealing with the objective factors of the offending, apart from describing the conduct itself, which has already been done, it is necessary to note that it is impermissible for the Court to take into account as an aggravating feature the actual use of violence, given that the nature of the offence of manslaughter is itself the infliction of violence. Similarly, the cruelty associated with the offence is itself a factor in the commission of the offence of manslaughter (and an assault occasioning), but the cruelty in question is not appropriately described as gratuitous. I do take into account that the deceased had a disability of which the offender was aware and was for that reason even more vulnerable than is the ordinary or usual victim of domestic violence.

40. Over and above the foregoing aspects, I take into account the plea of guilty to the assault occasioning and the other offences referred for disposition pursuant to s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Otherwise, the factors are necessarily circumstances that are taken into account in the offending itself.

Subjective circumstances

41. The offender has a lengthy criminal history, which makes specific deterrence a significant factor. The offender is now 69 years of age and has been in custody since 4 January 2023.

42. The offender relies upon a psychologist’s report dated 2 September 2025, which was conducted by audio visual link when the offender was imprisoned. The author of the report, Dr Thomas Dornan, reported on the family background provided to him by the offender, his presentation on interview, his developmental history and provided a psychological assessment. Other matters were dealt with in the report including the relationship between his psychological functioning and the offences in question.

43. On the basis of the history given by the offender, Dr Dornan considered that the offender had extensive childhood trauma history, which involved maternal abuse, paternal abandonment and foster care placement and, as a consequence, suffered Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder which was, at the time of the offending, undiagnosed. Complex PTSD is differentiated from PTSD by a characterisation of additional disturbances in self-organisation, including affect dysregulation, negative self-concept and interpersonal difficulties that align closely with the offender’s presentation.

44. It is necessary to deal with some of the history provided by the offender to Dr Dornan. The offender was the only child of the union of his biological parents. He was born in Germany. The relationship between his parents ended with the death of his father.

45. The offender described his relationship with his parents as involving a father who was “kind and loving” and who had just about survived the Second World War but was required to work extremely hard to keep his family financially stable. The offender did not believe his father was happy and attributed that to the relationship between his father and mother.

46. His father’s work took him away from the family for weeks at a time and, during that time, his mother was involved in a relationship with a man who would live with the family when his father was absent. The offender believed his father was aware of this relationship but did not complain about it and appeared just to accept it. His mother’s partner treated the offender well and the offender too accepted the “arrangement”.

47. His father tried to give him everything and, when he was not away for work, would spend significant time with the offender, and engaged in a variety of activities. He maintained a positive relationship with his father.

48. His mother, according to the offender, was the complete opposite. He considered his mother hated him and “just couldn’t stand” him.

49. Were it not for the circumstance of his birth, his view was that his mother would have left. The offender considered that his mother also was unhappy in her relationship and that his presence was a constant issue. His mother, according to the offender, was “just horrible” towards him and “was never loving, caring or very supportive”.

50. His mother was regularly abusive and bashed him “all the time”. Her intention seemed to be to control him, but according to the offender, this had the reverse effect and made the offender “aggressive and uncontrollable”.

51. He ran away from home often, travelling to his father’s work site but was returned into his mother’s care. This resulted in more physical abuse.

52. The offender stated that he perceived that his mother had mental health difficulties and described to Dr Dornan symptoms that are normally associated with a personality disorder. Eventually his mother, having “had enough of” the offender, placed him into foster care for a number of years. The offender absconded from foster care as well.

53. The psychologist’s report noted that the offender presented at interview with what seemed to be “a disorganised attachment pattern characterised by the coexistence of conflicting internal working models regarding his parental relationships”. The report compared the offender’s perception and idealisation of his father with the negative perception and devaluation of his mother.

54. After his immigration from Germany, the offender was employed on a full-time basis in construction work, and he was always employed. He purchased land, with his wife in Mullumbimby, where he continued working. He worked in Byron Bay and became self-employed and was doing “pretty well”.

55. The offender worked in Byron Bay for approximately four years and then, after an offer to work, moved to Port Douglas and worked there full-time managing up to 80 people on construction. His life was described as “relatively stable” and he and his partner had another child which was when “everything started going to pieces”.

56. The offender’s wife moved back to Germany, having had enough of living in Australia. Initially, his wife informed him that she was visiting Germany for a holiday but, after her arrival there, she informed him that she was never going to return. The offender advised that he was “powerless” to prevent her from staying there and his wife refused to return.

57. The offender reported that his mental health began to decline, particularly as a result of his separation and the loss of his children. He became involved in another relationship and worked “as an avoidance tool”. The second relationship ended and there was a downturn in work in North Queensland. The offender stated that he was not coping, and he needed a change.

58. The offender returned to Sydney, and he described things as starting to spiral out of control. The offender engaged in drug use, on the offender’s description, by way of managing his mental health. He became involved with the criminal justice system and had no stability in his life.

59. According to the offender, notwithstanding these factors, particularly his drug use and incarceration, he remained employed and worked as a contract painter. The offender described his offending behaviour as reflecting his emotional state.

60. The psychologist reports on the offender’s experience in custody and, in particular, his witnessing of violence. Dr Dornan refers to research that demonstrates that witnessing prison violence frequently leads to post-traumatic stress symptoms, including hypervigilance, anxiety and emotional dysregulation.

61. The opinion of Dr Dornan is that the offender presents significant risk factors for institutionalisation which, if allowed to fester, would impair his successful community reintegration. The psychologist refers to his extensive criminal history spanning over 40 years, with multiple periods of custody including two and a half years in his most recent period of incarceration. I accept that there are serious risks of institutionalisation in the offender, which I take into account in fixing a sentence.

62. The report also refers to the offender’s social functioning as undeveloped and those people with whom he had acquaintance included some who were engaged in an antisocial lifestyle. Further, the offender described his relationships as a situation where he typically struggled to function in interpersonal relationships.

63. The description provided by the psychologist both as to the childhood history and the circumstances of his social and interpersonal relationships suggests that the offender points to others for the responsibility for his misfortune and blames them and the circumstances in which they were forced to live for his “mental health” issues.

64. He is otherwise physically fit but, as is obvious from the verdict judgment and these remarks, engages in the use of illicit substances. He began that involvement in early adulthood and described experimentation with cannabis and hallucinogens in the era of his early adulthood as “normal”. The offender denied any problematic use of either alcohol or drugs.

65. In relation to the manslaughter offence and, to a lesser degree, the assault occasioning, the offender described the period as “intense” and that his partner was evicted so he had nowhere to live. While this discloses the powerless feelings often associated with domestic violence, it is also an example of the offender blaming others for his perceived shortcomings and problems.

66. The offender described to his psychologist the events of 3 January 2023 and before. After being rendered homeless, he was instructed to attend the Caravan Park and remove their belongings, in the absence of which the belongings would be dumped.

67. He was angry with the deceased because she refused to assist, and he was required to do everything himself. He recounted that the deceased turned down an offer of a motel room, which, on his perception, he could have utilised the following day when he was released from gaol. This is an aspect of the telephone call from prison which was in evidence at trial. The offender was angry with her for refusing the offer.

68. They decided to sleep behind the Salvation Army building (a reference to the side passage) and try to obtain accommodation the next day. The offender had been drinking earlier in the day and had consumed something more than a half bottle of gin and a few temazepam tablets. The offender said that he was not coping and considered everything was hopeless.

69. He described to the psychologist that he and the deceased became involved in an argument which became physical. He described the deceased as having struck him, as a consequence of which he “threw two punches” and denied that any more injury was occasioned, notwithstanding what the pathologists or the judge may say.

70. He then described the deceased as having moved away; the offender thinking that she was “okay”; that the deceased did not look unconscious or badly affected; and the offender “lay down and fell asleep”.

71. When the offender awoke, he thought that the deceased was still sleeping and it took a few moments for him to realise that she was dead. He then told the psychologist, “whatever happened, whatever reason she died, I will never forgive myself … it is still my fault, the argument should never have happened, I should never have hit her and that is just absolutely insane she is dead”.

72. He then said that he accepted full responsibility for his actions; that something happened to the deceased; that it was his fault; and that the deceased did not deserve to be punched.

73. The psychologist expresses an opinion that the offender’s behaviour “can be understood through a confluence of developmental attachment disruption, chronic substance-related disinhibition, and acute psychosocial stressors that created conditions conducive to intimate partner violence perpetration. [The offender’s] childhood experiences of maternal abuse, paternal abandonment, and foster care placement created disorganised attachment patterns characterised by conflicting internal working models that confuse violence and love, abuse and intimacy. I note that physical and emotional abuse, emotional and physical neglect are also associated with higher levels of community violence, with a linear increase in violence frequency corresponding to cumulative childhood adversity types”. [3]

74. The report also acknowledges that which is well-known, namely, that the presence of substance use disorders significantly increases the likelihood of intimate partner violence perpetration. The report, at paragraph [87] and following, engages in a psychological assessment and recounts what is said to be his early childhood abandonment, persistent periods of depression which worsened in early adulthood and feelings of melancholy, negative self-talk, reduced self-esteem, amotivation, disturbed sleep, increased appetite and lethargy.

75. The offender also reported that he experienced persistent nightmares and troubling dreams often linked to his past traumas commenting at the death of his partner continuing “to haunt him”. He has no suicidal ideation or thoughts of suicide. The offender also denied ever experiencing any psychotic or manic episodes.

76. Dr Dornan described the offender as meeting the symptoms of PTSD, indeed Complex-PTSD, and also meeting the criteria for Stimulant Use Disorder (moderate) and Alcohol Use Disorder (moderate) both of which are in sustained remission as a result of his controlled environment. Dr Dornan describes, in his report, the offender’s pattern of chronic alcohol and drug use as consistent with “self-medication hypothesis”.

77. As earlier stated, the offender has a long and significant history of criminal offending. The prior offending commences, in Queensland, in early 1988 and includes possession of drugs, break and enter, cultivation of drugs, goods in custody, possession of house breaking implements, armed robbery, robbery in company, shoplifting, the making of false instruments, assault with intent to rob with an offensive weapon, robbery armed with an offensive weapon, malicious wounding, assault and obstruct police, custody of knife in a public place, reckless infliction of grievous bodily harm and assault occasioning, perverting the course of justice, some of them on multiple occasions.

78. The deceased’s daughter provided a Victim Impact Statement. The death of a parent is always tragic. When that death occurs by a violent act, the tragedy is significantly greater.

79. The daughter describes seeing her mother at the funeral parlour and the obvious shock that would have been experienced on seeing the injuries, photos of which were before the Court in the trial. She also described the coercive control and assaults which the deceased suffered during the course of her relationship with the offender and which, in part, she described in her evidence at the trial. The deceased’s daughter recently gave birth, noting her baby daughter will never know her grandmother, and she was unable to go to her mother for advice during her pregnancy.

80. The deceased’s daughter described her mother as “encapsulating joy” and her missing, daily, the sound of her voice, the watching of television and cricket together as a result of her untimely and violent death. Whatever sentence the Court imposes cannot undo that which has been done.

Consideration

81. As already noted, specific deterrence, in my view is a significant factor. The report of the psychologist which I have summarised at length, is taken into account.

82. I have serious doubts about the truthfulness of the history given by the offender to the psychologist. Those doubts are occasioned by the obvious lack of truth associated with the extent of the assault occasioned by the accused on the deceased on 3 January 2023.

83. Each of the pathologists, who examined the deceased’s body, expressed an opinion of the number of blows that had been occasioned in the inflicting of the injuries. Even the pathologist commissioned by the offender, who, like the government pathologist, was unable to provide an opinion as to the full extent of the blows inflicted, made clear the facts which give rise to the notion that there were at least five blows to the head or face of the deceased. The notion that the offender inflicted two punches only is palpably false.

84. The failure to take responsibility for the full extent of the injuries inflicted by the offender casts serious doubt on the truthfulness of the matters to which he referred in dealing with the psychologist. The offender did not give evidence.

85. There are some anomalies in the version reported by the psychologist. First, he reports nightmares. This is a common, if not universal, feature of PTSD. Yet the nightmares are of the death of the deceased. This factor seems to point to the events of 3 January 2023 being the traumatic event.

86. Secondly, the abuse in the offender’s childhood does not seem to be so significant, although I accept there was some abuse. The trauma relied upon by Dr Dornan seems to be a combination of the events of 3 January, the childhood mistreatment and the prison violence witnessed by the offender.

87. I also note that notwithstanding the offender’s childhood experience, he had stable employment throughout and two stable personal relationships which did not involve domestic violence. This tends to suggest that of the three factors taken into account by Dr Dornan, the offender’s childhood experiences were the least significant.

88. Over and above those aspects, there is the issue of general deterrence. The material before the Court discloses a sustained period of domestic abuse, both physical and psychological. The offender was controlling of the deceased and was physically violent towards her, it seems, on a number of occasions.

89. The incidence of domestic violence in the community discloses a real need for general deterrence. While I accept, as I found, that the Crown has not shown that the offender intended really serious bodily injury, and that most perpetrators of domestic violence, do not intend for death to occur, the community must understand that the occasioning of domestic violence is not only extremely problematic, but also extremely dangerous.

90. Even without an intention to occasion death, it causes death and has caused death on numerous occasions. Offenders who are inflicting violence in a domestic situation need to understand that their conduct is to be punished and will be punished. Further, an AVO issues from the Local Court and deals with risk. A breach of an AVO is a breach of an order of a court; it undermines the administration of justice and our democracy. Such a breach also eliminates the judicial steps taken to ameliorate the risk and places vulnerable persons at great risk. Persons restricted by an AVO need to understand that a breach is taken seriously.

91. Having made the above comment, as submitted by counsel for the offender, I am not sentencing for all domestic violence offences; just this one. And the Complex PTSD diagnosed by Dr Dornan is a minor indirect contribution to the offender’s conduct in the offence; renders the offender less appropriate for general deterrence; also reduces the appropriateness of significant specific deterrence as part of the sentence; and will render the custody more onerous. [4] I take the view that those factors and any Bugmy [5] consideration should be dealt with together and I do so.

Conclusion

92. The offender was arrested on 4 January 2023 and has been in custody to the present day as a consequence of the conduct which gave rise to the manslaughter. I take into account the age of the offender and take that into account to his credit, in the sense that an overly lengthy period of imprisonment, at the offender’s age, may result in the sentence being a “life sentence” and/or the offender being institutionalised.

93. I accept, as I suggested as a possibility in the verdict judgment, that the offender lay down to sleep after the infliction of the injuries and only realised that the deceased had died when he awoke.

94. I take the view that the offender’s failure to take responsibility for the extent of the injuries inflicted is a failure to accept responsibility in a genuine way and a failure to acknowledge the injury that was inflicted. I do not consider that the remorse shown by the offender is genuine.

95. I accept that he regrets the death of the deceased, but I do not consider that he has genuine remorse for his actions. I also consider that the failure to accept responsibility for the extent of the injuries has a significant impact on the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation, although I accept, at the age of the offender, he is less likely to reoffend than a younger person might. I do not consider that the offender has no prospects of rehabilitation, but I cannot accept that his prospects of rehabilitation are sound or good. His conduct in prison since his arrest and the records of his behaviour in prison disclose that there are some prospects which I factor to his credit.

96. I take into account that the offender did not use a weapon; that the conduct was not part of a planned or organised criminal activity; and, in relation to the assault occasioning and the matters referred to the Court under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the pleas of guilty. In relation to the assault occasioning, I allow a reduction of 5% in the sentence that I would otherwise impose, pursuant to the terms of s 25D(2)(c) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).

97. The offence is serious. It clearly involves the taking of human life. While the offender was aware of the disabilities of the deceased, he could not have been aware of her heart condition, which, with the injuries the offender inflicted, caused death.

98. I consider the breach of the provisional apprehended domestic violence order is a serious offence, but because it is based upon the assault to the deceased which caused her death, it is only the breach by presence at the scene after consuming drugs and alcohol which is an additional feature associated with the offence under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, s 14.

99. The maximum sentence for an ADVO offence is two years and/or 50 penalty units. A penalty unit is $110. The offence of trespass, which is a contravention of s 4 of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW), carries a maximum sentence of $550 (5 penalty units) and the common assault on Tim Jones at Reflections Caravan Park, which is a contravention of s 61 of the Crimes Act, carries a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. The Court has been provided with agreed facts for the assault, which covers the trespass and I take them into account on each offence. I also have regard to the plea of guilty to all offences, other than the manslaughter. I consider the assault is at a very low level of objective seriousness.

100. I will impose the following sentences:

101. For the trespass at Reflections Caravan Park, Ballina on 29 December 2022 and the common assault on Tim Jones at the same address on the same date, the Court records each conviction and imposes no further penalty.

102. In relation to the breach of the provisional apprehended domestic violence order, committed on 3 January 2023, contrary to s 14 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), the Court records a conviction and sentences the offender, Robert Karl Huber, to a fixed term of 12 months imprisonment, commencing 4 January 2023 and concluding 3 January 2024.

103. For the assault occasioning actual bodily harm, committed on 26 December 2022 against the deceased, being a contravention of s 59 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), carrying a maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment, I record the conviction and impose a sentence of a fixed term, after reducing the sentence by just over 5% for rounding, of 17 months’ imprisonment, commencing 4 April 2023, and concluding 3 September 2024.

104. For the manslaughter of Lindy Lucena on 3 January 2023, the Court will record the conviction and, pursuant to the terms of s 24 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), will sentence the offender, Robert Karl Huber, to 12 years imprisonment commencing 4 October 2023 and concluding 3 October 2035, with a non-parole of 8 years and 9 months, concluding 3 July 2032.

105. On account of the accumulation, the non-parole period fixed for the manslaughter represents slightly less than 75% of the head sentence. The accumulation represents special circumstances, and I do alter the non-parole period by an amount that would be necessary for the non-parole to represent exactly three quarters of the total effective head sentence, albeit rounded slightly. I find no other special circumstances.

Sentence

102. Robert Karl Huber, please stand:

103. The Court records the following offences against your name, being a breach of the provisional apprehended domestic violence order on 3 January 2023, contrary to the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), s 14, trespass on Reflections Caravan Park Ballina on 29 December 2022, contrary to the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW), s 4; common assault against Tim Jones at Reflections Caravan Park Ballina on 29 December 2022, contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); assault occasioning actual bodily harm occasioned against Lindy Lucena on 26 December 2022, contrary to s 59 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); and the unlawful killing, being manslaughter, of Lindy Lucena on 3 January 2023 at Ballina.

104. The Court imposes no further sentence in relation to the trespass and common assault offences.

105. The Court sentences you, Robert Karl Huber, in relation to the breach of the provisional apprehended domestic violence order, committed on 3 January 2023, contrary to s 14 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), to a fixed term of 12 months imprisonment, commencing 4 January 2023 and concluding 3 January 2024.

106. The Court further sentences you, Robert Karl Huber, for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm, committed on 26 December 2022 against the deceased, Lindy Lucena, being a contravention of s 59 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), to a fixed term, after reducing the sentence by just over 5% for rounding, of 17 months’ imprisonment, commencing 4 April 2023, and concluding 3 September 2024.

107. Further again, the Court sentences you, Robert Karl Huber, for the manslaughter of Lindy Lucena on 3 January 2023, pursuant to the terms of s 24 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), to a non-parole period of 8 years and 9 months, commencing 4 October 2023 and concluding 3 July 2032 and a remainder of term of 3 years and 3 months imprisonment, concluding 3 October 2035.

108. You have been sentenced for all of the offences to an overall effective sentence of 12 years and 9 months’ imprisonment with an overall non-parole period of 9 years and 6 months and you will be first eligible for parole on 3 July 2032.

109. Pursuant to the provisions of s 25C(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), you are advised of the existence of that statute and that it may apply to you and to these offences and the offender’s legal team is directed to explain the significance of this fact to the offender.

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Endnotes

R v Robert Karl Huber [2025] NSWSC 714.

Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25.

Report of Dr Thomas Dornan, 2 September 2025, paragraph [83].

DPP (C’th) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194 at [177].

Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37.