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[2009] VSC 326
plaintiff. Reid was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for manslaughter and one month’s imprisonment for recklessly causing injury, to run concurrently. The total effective sentence was five years, with a...
A jury found Reid guilty of manslaughter by criminal negligence and recklessly causing injury after he struck Nola Ritter with a mug and later failed to respond to her serious bleeding. The judge stressed that the manslaughter was the failure to help or obtain assistance, not the initial blow. Although the judge assessed the offending as at the lower end of negligent manslaughter, the failure to care for Ritter led to her death and remained serious. Reid's health, remorse, delay and personal circumstances were considered, along with the purposes of sentencing. He received a total effective sentence of five years' imprisonment, with a three-year non-parole period.
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2,398 words · generated 28/09/2026
In R v Reid [2009] VSC 326, Whelan J sentenced David John Reid after a jury found him guilty of manslaughter and recklessly causing injury. The deceased, Nola Ritter, was Reid's de facto wife. The judgment concerns the sentence imposed after the verdict, not a trial determination of guilt by the sentencing judge. Reid was sentenced on 10 August 2009, after a plea in mitigation on 15 July 2009 ([1]–[3]).
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The events began on the evening of 20 May 2006. Reid and Ritter had been drinking cask wine from ceramic coffee mugs. They argued over who would drink the last cup. Reid swung his mug at Ritter, causing a cut on the back of her head measuring 40 by 12 millimetres and penetrating through the skin to the muscle. Whelan J accepted the forensic pathologist's evidence that significant force was needed to cause the wound, and said the jury's verdict on recklessly causing injury meant it must have been satisfied Reid knew his act would probably injure Ritter ([5]). Reid also caused a cut to Ritter's lip with what he described in interview as a “backhander” ([6]).
The next morning, Reid woke to find the pillows and sheets soaked with blood. He saw blood on the kitchen and bathroom floors and made some attempts to clean it. He did not bandage Ritter's wound or try to staunch the bleeding ([7]–[8]). Reid said in police interviews that he offered to take Ritter to a doctor or call an ambulance, and that she rejected those offers. Whelan J accepted that offers were made, but assessed them in the context of the blood loss, Reid's descriptions of the conversations, and his subsequent conduct ([13]–[16]).
At about 9 or 10 am, Reid left Ritter at home and drove to his brother's house. He spent the day watching football and drinking beer. He did not tell his brother or his brother's partner about Ritter's condition. When he returned home at about 5.30 or 6 pm, he found Ritter dead. The pathology evidence was that death resulted from the interaction of the haemorrhage and pre-existing conditions, including an enlarged heart and alcohol-related liver disease. The pathologist also said medical intervention would have increased Ritter's chances of survival ([9]–[10]).
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts on 17 June 2009. The maximum penalties identified in the judgment were 20 years' imprisonment for manslaughter and five years for recklessly causing injury ([1], [3]). Whelan J imposed five years' imprisonment for manslaughter and one month's imprisonment for recklessly causing injury. The terms were concurrent, giving a total effective sentence of five years, and the non-parole period was three years. The judge also declared 55 days already served in custody ([41]–[42]).
A central feature of the sentencing analysis was the distinction between the injury-producing blow and the later failure to respond. Whelan J stated that “the conduct which constitutes the manslaughter is not the coffee cup blow itself; rather it is your lack of response to the position in which Ms Ritter was placed by that blow” ([12]). The judgment explained that, in light of the verdict, the jury must have been satisfied that Reid failed to staunch the blood flow or obtain medical or other intervention, and that the omission involved a sufficiently serious falling short of reasonable care and risk of death or really serious injury to warrant criminal punishment ([11]).
That framing matters to the sentencing decision. The initial blow was separately reflected in the recklessly causing injury count. The manslaughter analysis focused on the risk that continued after the injury and on Reid's failure to act in response to it. The judgment does not say the initial blow was irrelevant to sentence: it forms part of the circumstances, and the wound explains the danger confronting Ritter. But the judge expressly identified the omission as the conduct constituting manslaughter ([5], [11]–[12]).
The judge considered Reid's account that he offered assistance but did not treat the offers as resolving the seriousness of the omission. Whelan J described the scene as involving blood-soaked bedclothes and pools of blood around the house, and considered passive acceptance of Ritter's rejection of assistance an “extraordinary reaction” in that setting ([13]–[15]). The judge also referred to Reid's words about the mess, his decision to leave, and his failure to check on Ritter or inform his brother and his brother's partner ([15]–[16]). At the same time, the judge accepted that Reid was genuinely distraught when he later found Ritter dead ([17]).
Culpability was assessed with some mitigation. Whelan J accepted the submission that the offending was at the lower end of the negligent-manslaughter spectrum. The reasons given were that the culpable conduct was an omission and did not involve the callousness and deliberate cover-up present in some other criminal-negligence cases ([25]). The judge also said there is no inflexible sentencing rule for different categories of manslaughter, but that manslaughter by negligence generally involves less culpability than other forms of manslaughter ([26]). This assessment was not a finding that the offence was minor. The judge immediately emphasised that manslaughter was serious because Reid's criminal neglect caused a death and he had abandoned Ritter in her moment of need ([27]).
Personal circumstances also affected the sentence. The judgment records Reid's long history of alcoholism, impaired executive skills and verbal memory, and severe depression, based on the reports tendered at the plea ([19], [30]–[33]). Whelan J accepted that imprisonment would be a greater burden because of Reid's health. The judge also moderated the weight of specific and general deterrence because of his ill health at the time of the offending, particularly depression and impaired executive skills. But denunciation, just punishment and protection of the community remained relevant ([34]–[36]).
Other considerations included delay between the offending and the charge, the absence of further offending, remorse, cooperation with police, and the risk of reoffending in connection with alcohol abuse ([37]–[39]). The victim impact statements were considered to the extent permitted by the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ([28]–[29]). The judge balanced these matters against the gravity of the death and Reid's conduct, and imposed the concurrent terms set out at [42].
This is a sentencing decision applying principles it describes and cites; it is not presented as changing the law or announcing a new test. The judgment's account of the sentencing fact-finding approach appears in footnote 1. Whelan J said the offender must be sentenced on a factual basis consistent with the jury's verdict. For matters adverse to the offender, the judge stated that the court must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt; matters in the offender's favour may be taken into account if established on the balance of probabilities. The footnote cites R v Storey, R v Olbrich, R v Cheung and R v Ramage for that proposition.
On the relative culpability of negligent manslaughter, the judgment refers to the Court of Appeal's recent discussion in R v Jagroop [2009] VSCA 46, particularly paragraphs 58 and 64 of that decision, and compares Reid's case with R v Jagroop and R v Vandergulik [2009] VSC 3 ([25]–[26] and footnotes 2–3). Whelan J's stated position is qualified: negligent manslaughter “generally” involves less culpability than other forms of manslaughter, but no inflexible sentencing rule governs the categories ([26]). The judgment therefore describes a comparative sentencing assessment, not a fixed sentencing scale.
For health and mental impairment, the judgment cites R v Tsiaras and R v Verdins in connection with the moderation of deterrence and the burden of imprisonment ([34]–[35] and footnote 4). The source provided here does not set out the detailed tests from those authorities. The grounded point from Reid is narrower: the judge accepted that the offender's health increased the burden of imprisonment and moderated deterrence, while preserving the relevance of denunciation, just punishment and community protection ([34]–[36]).
The supplied judgment establishes what Whelan J applied in 2009. It does not itself provide a subsequent account of how the law changed after the decision, and no later judgments are included in the source material. Accordingly, a before-and-after claim beyond these stated propositions, or any claim about Reid's later precedential treatment, cannot be drawn from the supplied text.
The omission as the manslaughter conduct. Whelan J said: “the conduct which constitutes the manslaughter is not the coffee cup blow itself; rather it is your lack of response to the position in which Ms Ritter was placed by that blow” ([12]). In plain English, the judge treated the failure to respond to the serious bleeding as the conduct for which Reid was sentenced for manslaughter. The blow was the event that created the danger, while the later omission was identified as the manslaughter conduct.
The jury's findings and the sentencing basis. The judge said that, by finding Reid guilty of criminal-negligence manslaughter, the jury must have been satisfied that he neglected to staunch the bleeding or obtain intervention, and that the omission involved a grave departure from reasonable care and a high risk of death or really serious injury ([11]). In plain English, the sentencing judge did not retry guilt, but used the findings necessarily reflected in the jury's verdict to identify the conduct and its seriousness.
Culpability and the seriousness of the offence. Whelan J accepted that the offending was at the lower end of negligent manslaughter because it involved an omission and did not involve the callousness and deliberate cover-up seen in some other cases ([25]). But the next paragraphs explain the limit of that mitigation: negligent manslaughter may generally involve less culpability than other forms of manslaughter, yet Reid had caused a death through criminal neglect and abandoned Ritter in her moment of need ([26]–[27]). In plain English, “lower end” described relative culpability, not an absence of serious harm or responsibility.
Health and sentencing purposes. The judge accepted that imprisonment would be a greater burden because of Reid's health and that deterrence ought to be moderated, especially given depression and impaired executive skills ([34]–[35]). The judge then said denunciation, just punishment and community protection remained relevant ([36]). In plain English, the health evidence affected the balance, but did not displace all other sentencing purposes.
The result. The operative order was five years for manslaughter and one month for recklessly causing injury, concurrently, with a three-year non-parole period ([42]). In plain English, the one-month term did not add to the five-year total effective sentence.
The decision is most directly relevant to sentencing where the jury's verdict establishes that an offender caused an injury and then failed to take reasonable steps in response to a serious danger created by that injury. Its distinctive feature is the judge's express separation of the initial blow from the omission that constituted manslaughter ([11]–[12]).
The judgment's fact pattern involved several linked circumstances: a substantial head wound caused with a mug; visible and extensive blood loss; no attempt to bandage or staunch the wound; leaving the injured person alone for many hours; and not alerting other people to the situation ([5], [7]–[9], [14]–[16]). The accepted medical evidence was that intervention would have increased the victim's chances of survival ([10]). The court also considered the offender's conduct in context, including his claimed offers to obtain help and the victim's alleged rejection of those offers ([13]–[15]).
The decision also illustrates that the offender's personal circumstances may be considered alongside the gravity of the offence. The judge assessed culpability by reference to the omission, the absence of a deliberate cover-up, and the impact of the death, then considered health, alcoholism, remorse, delay and prospects of reoffending ([25]–[27], [30]–[39]). It should not be treated as establishing that every failure to obtain help after an injury amounts to manslaughter. The judgment sentences Reid following a jury verdict and describes the verdict's factual implications; it does not lay out a universal test for other cases.
The supplied material does not include any later judgments citing or applying R v Reid. It therefore does not establish whether later courts followed, distinguished, explained, approved or otherwise treated this decision. The judgment itself cites earlier authority, including R v Storey, R v Olbrich, R v Cheung and R v Ramage for the sentencing fact-finding approach; R v Jagroop and R v Vandergulik for comparison and the relative culpability of negligent manslaughter; and R v Tsiaras and R v Verdins in relation to health and sentencing ([25]–[26], [34]–[35], footnotes 1–4).
Within Reid, the relationship to Jagroop is particularly apparent: the judge says the general proposition about negligent manslaughter was recognised recently by the Court of Appeal in Jagroop, and describes the present offending as lower in culpability than circumstances in Jagroop and Vandergulik ([25]–[26], footnotes 2–3). That is the judgment's own comparative reasoning. It does not supply evidence about how subsequent courts treated Reid itself.
The judgment leaves several matters outside its scope. First, it is a sentencing judgment after a jury verdict. It does not provide a full account of the evidence at trial or decide independently whether the elements of criminal-negligence manslaughter were proved. Its explanation at [11] is expressly framed as what the jury must have been satisfied of.
Second, the reasons do not give a comprehensive account of the legal tests in the cited authorities. For example, Tsiaras and Verdins are cited in connection with health and deterrence, but the judgment does not reproduce their detailed reasoning ([35], footnote 4). Likewise, the footnote gives the cited authorities for the fact-finding rule without discussing each case in detail (footnote 1).
Third, although the judge places Reid's culpability at the lower end of the negligent-manslaughter spectrum, the decision does not establish a numerical sentencing tariff or a fixed sentence for comparable omissions. The judge expressly says there is no inflexible rule for the categories of manslaughter ([26]). The sentence reflects this offender's verdict, conduct, personal circumstances, evidence and sentencing factors.
Finally, the supplied source does not identify any later appellate review or subsequent treatment of Reid. Its continuing precedential status and later judicial interpretation cannot be determined from this judgment alone.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
CRIMINAL LAW - Sentence - Manslaughter by criminal negligence and recklessly causing injury - Victim was domestic partner of offender - Victim was hit on the head with a coffee cup by the offender - Offender omitted to obtain assistance and abandoned victim, who later died - Total effective sentence of five years' imprisonment - Non-parole period of three years.
1 David John Reid, on 17 June 2009 a jury found you guilty of one count of manslaughter and one count of recklessly causing injury, in relation to the death of your de facto wife, Nola Ritter, on 21 May 2006.
2 On 15 July 2009 I heard a plea in mitigation on your behalf.
3 The maximum penalty for manslaughter is 20 years' imprisonment. The maximum penalty for recklessly causing injury is five years' imprisonment.
4 The circumstances of your offending can be summarised as follows.[1]
5 You and Ms Ritter spent much of 20 May 2006 drinking cask wine together from ceramic coffee mugs. At some stage that evening, you argued over who would drink the last cup of wine. You swung your mug at Ms Ritter, causing a cut on the back of her head measuring 40 by 12 millimetres and penetrating the full thickness of the skin through to the muscle. The evidence of the forensic pathologist, Dr Woodford, which I accept, was that significant force would have been necessary to cause this wound. The force of the blow caused the cup handle to break. By finding you guilty of recklessly causing injury, the jury must have been satisfied that you knew your act would probably injure the deceased.
6 At some point that night you also gave Ms Ritter what you referred to in your records of interview as a 'backhander', cutting her lip.
7 You both went to bed shortly after the coffee mug incident. You woke at about 7 am to find the pillows and sheets soaked with blood. Ms Ritter moved out of the bed and went to sleep on the bedroom floor. You got up intending to go back to sleep in the lounge room. You saw blood all over the kitchen and bathroom floor. At some point, you made some attempts to clean up the blood.
8 In your records of interview you maintained that you repeatedly offered to take Ms Ritter to a doctor or to call an ambulance. I will return to that. You did not at any time attempt to bandage the wound or staunch the flow of blood yourself.
9 At about 9 or 10 am you left the deceased and drove to your brother, Ian Davidson's house, which he shared with his partner, Sheryl Dyke. You and Mr Davidson spent the day watching football on the television and drinking beer. At no stage did you mention Ms Ritter's condition. You went home at about 5.30 or 6 pm. You found Ms Ritter lying dead on the floor. You drove back to your brother's house, distraught. Ms Dyke called an ambulance, and the three of you returned to your house.
10 According to Dr Woodford, the cause of Ms Ritter's death was the interaction of the haemorrhage from the head wound and pre-existing conditions from which she suffered, being an enlarged heart and alcohol-related liver disease. Dr Woodford's evidence was that medical intervention would have increased her chances of survival.
11 In finding you guilty of criminal negligence manslaughter, the jury must have been satisfied that, having caused Ms Ritter's initial injury recklessly with the coffee mug, you neglected to take any step to either staunch the blood flow or to obtain medical or other intervention, and that this involved such a great falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable person would have exercised, and involved such a high risk of causing death or really serious injury, that it deserves to be criminally punished.
12 It is important to emphasise that the conduct which constitutes the manslaughter is not the coffee cup blow itself; rather it is your lack of response to the position in which Ms Ritter was placed by that blow.
13 The offers of assistance are important. In your records of interview you stated that you repeatedly offered to obtain medical assistance but that the deceased rejected your offers. I accept that offers were made, but those offers have to be seen in the following context.
14 First, the scene which you observed when you rose on the fateful morning was horrific. The bed clothes were drenched in blood. There were literally pools of blood throughout the house. Passive acceptance of the deceased's rejection of your offers seems to me to have been an extraordinary reaction to that situation.
15 Secondly, the terms in which you yourself described some of your conversations with the deceased do not reflect genuine concern. In this respect I refer to the following passages in your records of interview:
"I think she started bleedin' so she went and got a flannel and patted it dry, and it wouldn't stop bleedin' because - I said, 'You're - you're makin' a mess all over the floor'...And I just said, 'Look, come on, get in the car or I'll ring an ambulance. Take your pick'."
"I got out of bed because it was too - our pillows were soaked. So I said, 'Out of bed. Can't sleep in this mess'."
16 Finally, notwithstanding the extraordinary situation existing in the house that morning, you left her, and spent the whole day drinking beer and watching football at your brother's, without ever checking back on her and without even mentioning to your brother or his partner what had happened.
17 I do accept that when you discovered the tragic conclusion to these events after you arrived home from your brother's, you were genuinely distraught.
19 You are 51 years old, having been born in Melbourne in 1958. You were raised in a loving and caring family, though both of your parents were heavy drinkers. You adopted that habit at an early age. You left school at the age of 15 and subsequently held a succession of manual labour jobs. At one point you worked for Jayco Caravans for a period of eight years. In 1991 you were placed on a disability pension when, as your counsel explained, 'alcohol got the better' of you.
20 You have an adult daughter from a former relationship with whom you are no longer in contact.
21 You originally moved in with Ms Ritter as a boarder, but a romantic relationship developed, and lasted for five years until her death.
22 You have since formed a new relationship with a person named Leanne Sullivan. This relationship has existed since April 2007.
23 You have 22 prior convictions from 8 court appearances between 1976 and 2001. Many of these are dishonesty offences. Two are drink driving offences. Of most relevance to my current task are an unlawful assault in 1976, and offences of possessing an offensive weapon and resisting arrest in 1998. Your counsel told me that the offence in 1976 related to a dispute with a taxi driver, and that the offences in 1998 related to an argument in a caravan park where the offensive weapon was a beer bottle. You have never before been sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Counsel for the prosecution conceded that your prior convictions are, for present purposes, minor.
24 Your counsel tendered a number of character references on your plea. They were written by your new partner, Leanne Sullivan; her father, Keith Wright; her sister, Sharon Oppedisano; your sister, Gail Rosse; and your friends, Gavan Fraser and William Butchers. The references describe you as a caring man who has struggled to overcome alcoholism. It seems that you have reduced your alcohol consumption in recent times. The references describe your distress regarding Ms Ritter's death.
25 Your counsel submitted that your offending only narrowly falls into the gross negligence category. I accept that, in terms of culpability, your offending is at the lower end of the negligent manslaughter spectrum.[2] Most notably, your negligence was by omission and your offending conduct did not involve the callousness and deliberate cover-up present in some other criminal negligence cases.
26 Further, although there is no inflexible rule governing the approach to sentencing for the different categories of manslaughter, manslaughter by negligence generally involves less culpability than other forms of manslaughter.[3] This is the situation in your case.
27 Manslaughter is, however, a serious offence. You have, by your criminal neglect, caused a death. You had a responsibility to care for Ms Ritter, and yet you chose to abandon her in her moment of need.
28 At your plea, counsel for the prosecution tendered victim impact statements by Nola Ritter's daughter, Lindy Ritter (with an attachment by her son Anton); and Lindy Ritter's partner, Anton Gogerly. I have taken these statements into account to the extent allowed by the Sentencing Act 1991.
29 Nola Ritter's death has clearly had a devastating effect on her family. Lindy Ritter describes her as a loving mother and grandmother. She says: "I am not as light hearted as before. This sadness and despair for Mum is always in the background.'
30 At your plea your counsel tendered a report by the clinical neurologist, Dr Ian Stuart, dated 14 April 2009 and a report by the psychologist, Mr Jeffrey Cummins, dated 10 July 2009.
31 According to Dr Stuart, testing revealed a marked impairment in your executive skills (which he says is the ability to sum up a situation and take appropriate action) and severe impairment of memory for verbal information. These deficits are a product of your alcohol abuse.
32 Mr Cummins assessed you as being severely depressed.
33 Both reports note that you have suffered from chronic alcoholism for many years.
34 I accept that imprisonment will be a greater burden on you than on others by reason of your state of health. I take that into account.
35 I also accept that specific and general deterrence, while still relevant to sentencing here, ought be moderated by reason of your ill health at the time of your offending.[4] In this regard, I refer in particular to your depression, and to your marked impairment of executive skills due to your alcoholism.
36 Denunciation, just punishment, and protection of the community remain relevant sentencing factors.
37 Your counsel submitted that I should mitigate your sentence by virtue of the delay between the commission of these offences (in May 2006) and the date you were charged (in September 2007), and the fact that you have committed no further offences. I do take these matters into account in your favour.
38 Your counsel submitted that your not guilty plea should not be taken to indicate a lack of remorse, and that in fact you are very remorseful for your offending. He referred to two suicide attempts and relied upon a suicide letter which you wrote as evidence of remorse. Mr Cummins is of the opinion that you are genuinely remorseful for your behaviour. You were co-operative when interviewed by police and you made frank admissions. I accept that you are genuinely remorseful for what you have done.
39 Your counsel submitted that you are unlikely to re-offend. At least some of your past offending would seem to be linked with your alcoholism. These offences were certainly a product of your alcohol abuse. You have the support of your family and your partner's family. Your future depends upon your capacity to cease alcohol abuse. I cannot be confident that you will succeed in that.
40 At your plea the prosecutor submitted that an appropriate head sentence would be between four and five years, with a non-parole period of between two and three years. Your counsel, on the other hand, submitted that a suspended sentence would be appropriate in this case, perhaps in combination with a community based order.
41 You have been in custody since 17 June 2009, and accordingly I declare that the period of 55 days is to be reckoned as already served.
42 On the count of manslaughter, I sentence you to five years' imprisonment. On the count of recklessly causing injury, I sentence you to one month's imprisonment. The sentences on the two counts are to run concurrently with each other, producing a total effective sentence of five years' imprisonment. I fix a non-parole period of three years.
[1] I am bound to sentence the accused on a factual basis which is consistent with the jury's verdict. Otherwise, in relation to matters adverse to the accused, I must be satisfied of those matters beyond reasonable doubt, but I may take into account matters in his favour which are established on the balance of probabilities: R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 395 at 369; R v Olbrich (1999) 1999 CLR 270; R v Cheung [2001] HCA 67; (2001) 209 CLR 1; and R v Ramage [2004] VSC 508 at [25].
[2] Compared to circumstances such as those in R v Jagroop [2009] VSCA 46 and R v Vandergulik [2009] VSC 3.
[3] As recognised recently by the Court of Appeal in R v Jagroop [2009] VSCA 46 at [58] and [64].
[4] R v Tsiaras [1996] VicRp 26; (1996) 1 VR 398; R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269.
R
Reid [2009] VSC 326
(1999) 1999 CLR 270
(2001) 209 CLR 1
(1996) 1 VR 398
(2007) 16 VR 269
Reid was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for manslaughter and one month’s imprisonment for recklessly causing injury, to run concurrently. The total effective sentence was five years, with a non-parole period of three years; 55 days in custody were declared already served.