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[2025] QCA 120
respondent. The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
4 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The applicant received an effective four-and-a-half-year prison sentence for repeated indecent treatment of three foster children in his care. He argued that the judge had not properly explained why one sentence was made cumulative and that the overall sentence was too high. The Court of Appeal accepted that the sentencing reasons were brief, but found that the sentencing judge had considered proportional punishment and relevant protective and deterrent purposes, against the background of submissions about accumulation. It also considered the repeated offending, the children’s vulnerability, the breach of trust, and the mitigating matters. The Court described the sentence as high but not manifestly excessive, and refused leave to appeal.
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2,135 words · generated 07/10/2026
In [2025] QCA 120, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered an application for leave to appeal against sentence. The applicant had pleaded guilty to seven counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16. The offences were charged under s 210 of the (Qld), and each count included further circumstances of aggravation described in the judgment: the applicant was a guardian of the child, and the offence was a domestic violence offence ([3]–[4]).
The complainants were three foster children cared for by the applicant and his wife. Their ages during the offending ranged from about 6 to 13. The judgment records offending against the children over periods spanning several years, and describes six distinct occasions over a four-year period ([5]–[6], [14]). The conduct included requiring a child to touch the applicant’s exposed penis, touching a child’s genital area, and pinching a child’s penis. The Court characterised the conduct as repeated and as involving a serious betrayal of the trust inherent in the foster-parent relationship ([7], [17]).
The sentencing judge imposed individual prison terms: 12 months on count 1, three years on counts 2 and 3, 18 months on counts 4 and 5, two years on count 6, and 12 months on count 7 ([6]). The sentences were concurrent except that the sentence on count 5 was ordered to be cumulative on count 3. The effective sentence was four and a half years. The judge set parole eligibility at 16 months after sentence, less than one third of the effective term ([7]).
The applicant advanced two grounds. First, he said the sentencing judge erred by failing to give reasons for imposing a cumulative sentence. Second, he argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive ([3]). The Court of Appeal, comprising Mullins P, Bradley JA and North J, refused leave to appeal ([1]–[3], [18]).
On the first ground, the Court accepted the general importance of transparent sentencing reasons. It referred to the High Court’s statement in Markarian v The Queen that accessible reasoning matters to victims, parties, appeal courts and the public, and to R v Hyatt, which said that reasons for structuring a sentence should ordinarily appear in the sentencing remarks ([9]). The concern is practical: without reasons, an appellate court may not be able to identify why the judge chose accumulation rather than another available structure, or what circumstances informed that choice ([11]).
But the Court did not treat the brevity of the sentencing remarks as decisive. The prosecutor had expressly submitted that cumulative sentences were appropriate to reflect the overall criminality, while counsel for the applicant opposed accumulation and characterised the offending as a course of conduct without features justifying it ([8]). Thus, the sentencing structure was a live issue before the sentencing judge.
The Court also considered the available sentencing options. It referred to R v Nagy, which discusses the use of a higher sentence for one offence to reflect overall criminality and circumstances in which cumulative sentences may instead be appropriate ([10]). The reasons explain that the prosecutor had raised the difficulty of reaching the proposed overall sentence by using the “Nagy approach” alone ([10]). The Court’s point was that the sentencing judge was working within a constrained choice of structures, rather than selecting accumulation without the issue having been addressed.
The Court distinguished R v WBQ. There, according to North J, a short sentence accumulated in the context of a suspended sentence affected the offender’s parole release date, and the reasons for that result had not been explained. In PBR, by contrast, the judge referred to proportionate punishment and to the protective and deterrent purposes of sentencing. In the context of the arguments and the remarks as a whole, the Court found the reasons adequate ([13]). The decision therefore does not say that reasons for accumulation are unnecessary. It holds that these particular reasons, although short, were sufficient in the circumstances described.
On manifest excess, the Court assessed the criminal conduct as a whole. It noted the number of occasions, the period involved, the three complainants, their youth and vulnerability, and the abuse of the applicant’s position as foster father ([14], [17]). It also recorded mitigating matters: the pleas spared the children cross-examination, the applicant had no criminal history and a good employment history, and the sentence would affect his ability to support his family ([7], [14]). The Court said the facts did not suggest remorse, while also acknowledging the utilitarian value of the guilty pleas ([17]).
The Court described the effective sentence as high and expressly recognised that a lesser sentence might have been imposed. It nevertheless concluded that the cumulative sentence was commensurate with the gravity of the whole criminal conduct and was not manifestly excessive ([17]). In other words, the appeal question was not whether the Court itself might have selected a different sentence, but whether the sentence crossed the threshold for appellate intervention. The Court held it did not.
This judgment is a case-specific application of principles about sentencing reasons, sentence structure and appellate review. It does not purport to introduce a new general rule. Its account of the pre-existing position draws on Markarian, Hyatt, Nagy and WBQ.
On reasons, the judgment repeats that sentencing remarks should ordinarily explain why a particular structure was chosen. The requirement serves transparency and permits appellate scrutiny ([9], [11]). At the same time, PBR demonstrates that adequacy is contextual. A short explanation may suffice where the issue has been directly argued and the judge’s remarks disclose relevant considerations. The Court’s conclusion was expressly confined to the circumstances of this case ([13]).
On sentence structure, the judgment describes options identified in Nagy: a sentence for one offence may sometimes reflect overall criminality, while cumulative sentences may be appropriate where that approach would create difficulties such as double punishment for one act, collateral consequences, or artificial disparity between co-offenders ([10]). North J noted that the list in the quoted Nagy passage was not necessarily exhaustive. The decision did not provide a comprehensive account of every permissible sentencing structure or replace the Nagy approach.
On consistency, the Court endorsed the principle stated in R v O'Sullivan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld); R v Lee; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld): consistency requires consistent application of principles, not adherence to previously established penalty ranges without regard to the applicable law ([15]). Earlier decisions may be less useful where legislation has changed. The Court noted a sequence of legislative amendments concerning offences against children and domestic settings, including Acts passed in 2020, 2023 and 2024 ([15]–[16]). The judgment does not analyse each amendment’s operation in detail, so it should not be read as setting out a full account of those statutory changes.
The “after” position established by this decision is therefore narrow. For these facts, brief reasons were adequate because the sentencing judge had addressed proportionate punishment and relevant protective and deterrent considerations, and the cumulative structure had been the subject of submissions. The four-and-a-half-year effective term, although high, was not manifestly excessive. The judgment does not establish that similar sentences will necessarily be upheld in other cases.
At [9], the judgment says, “The law strongly favours transparency,” and explains that accessible reasoning matters to victims, parties, appeal courts and the public. In plain English, sentencing reasons should make the judge’s thinking understandable to people affected by the decision and permit the appellate court to check how the sentence was reached. The passage is drawn from Markarian, which North J cites.
At [11], North J explains the problem with failing to give reasons for accumulation: it may be impossible to know why the judge chose that structure instead of another option, or what circumstances the judge relied on. Put simply, reasons help show that the choice was deliberate and based on relevant sentencing considerations.
At [13], North J says the sentencing judge’s reasons “were adequate in the circumstances.” This is the Court’s answer to the first ground. It does not deny that fuller explanations are desirable. Rather, it concludes that the reasons, the submissions and the sentencing context together enabled the Court to understand the structure chosen.
At [17], North J states that the effective sentence was “high and a lesser sentence might have been imposed” but was commensurate with the gravity of the whole criminal conduct. In plain English, the possibility of a lower sentence does not itself show that the imposed sentence was legally excessive. The Court’s conclusion depended on the overall offending and the circumstances it identified.
PBR is most directly relevant where an appeal challenges a cumulative sentence on the basis that the sentencing judge did not explain the choice of sentence structure. Particularly relevant features include whether accumulation was argued at the original sentencing hearing, whether the sentencing remarks refer to proportionality or other sentencing purposes, and whether the reasons as a whole reveal the judge’s consideration of the competing structures. In PBR, accumulation was argued by both parties, and the Court relied on the sentencing judge’s reference to proportionate punishment and protective and deterrent purposes ([8], [13]).
The case may also be relevant to manifest-excess arguments involving multiple offences, repeated conduct, vulnerable children and abuse of a relationship of trust. The Court evaluated the cumulative effect of the conduct, not each count in isolation ([14], [17]). It considered the complainants’ vulnerability, the repetition and duration of offending, the applicant’s role as foster father, the guilty pleas and personal mitigating matters.
The judgment is not a numerical tariff or a direct comparator for every case involving child victims or cumulative sentences. The Court expressly said that the cited cases were not truly comparable, with some involving significantly less serious offending and others more serious offending ([15]). It also noted that neither party could identify a truly comparable case ([16]). Application to another matter would therefore require attention to the particular offending, statutory provisions, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, sentencing remarks and any relevant legislative changes.
The judgment text supplied for analysis contains no later decisions applying, distinguishing, following or criticising R v PBR. Its delivery date is 1 July 2025, and the text records only the authorities considered by the Court in reaching its decision ([1]–[18]). On the material available here, the later treatment of PBR cannot be determined.
The authorities discussed within PBR should not be mistaken for later treatment of PBR itself. Markarian, Hyatt, Nagy, WBQ, O'Sullivan and Lee, and Mill are authorities the Court cites when explaining the principles applied in this appeal ([9]–[17]). In particular, WBQ is distinguished, not a later case considering PBR: it pre-dates this decision and is used to explain why the circumstances differed ([13]).
A research update would need to check subsequent Queensland appellate decisions and any relevant higher-court decisions for treatment of PBR. The present judgment alone does not support a claim about how later courts have used it.
The judgment leaves the precise minimum content of reasons for a cumulative sentence open. It says reasons should ordinarily be apparent and that the reasons here were adequate in context, but it does not define a universal formula or specify how much explanation will be required in materially different circumstances ([9], [13]).
It also does not determine how the same reasoning would apply where the parties did not address accumulation, the sentencing remarks gave no indication that the judge had considered the structure, or the structure produced a distinct consequence not otherwise explained. The Court’s comparison with WBQ indicates that the consequences of the sentence structure may matter, but PBR does not comprehensively define the boundary between adequate and inadequate reasons ([13]).
The judgment’s discussion of legislative change is deliberately general. It identifies several amending Acts and refers to the approach in O'Sullivan and Lee, but it does not set out the detailed effect of each amendment on the maximum penalty, relevant aggravating factors or sentencing ranges ([15]–[16]). Those questions would need to be addressed by reference to the applicable statutory provisions and their commencement and application rules.
Finally, the Court’s conclusion about manifest excess is tied to the particular facts, sentence structure and parole eligibility date. The judgment does not say that four and a half years is a standard or presumptive sentence for comparable offending. Nor does it decide what sentence would be appropriate on different facts. Its stated conclusion is that this sentence was high but not manifestly excessive when assessed against all the facts and circumstances before the Court ([17]).
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v PBR [2025] QCA 120
PARTIES: R / v / PBR / (applicant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 260 of 2024 / DC No 672 of 2024
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Cairns – Date of Sentence: 18 November 2024 (Clare SC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON: 1 July 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 2 June 2025
JUDGES: Mullins P, Bradley JA and North J
ORDER: The application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to seven counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16 years and in each of the counts there were further circumstances of aggravation – where the learned sentencing judge ordered that count 5 be cumulative on another count – where the applicant was sentenced to an effective 4 and a half years of imprisonment with eligibility for parole set at 16 months post sentencing – where the applicant contends that the learned sentencing judge erred in failing to give reasons for the imposition of a cumulative period of imprisonment – where the applicant contends the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive / Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25, cited / Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59; [1988] HCA 70, cited / R v Hyatt [2011] QCA 55, cited / R v Nagy [2004] 1 Qd R 63; [2003] QCA 175, cited / R v O'Sullivan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld); R v Lee Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2019) 3 QR 196; [2019] QCA 300, cited / R v WBQ [2022] QCA 48, cited
COUNSEL: C J Grant for the applicant / M A Sheppard for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Whitla Criminal Lawyers for the applicant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
MULLINS P: I agree with North J.
BRADLEY JA: I agree with North J.
NORTH J: On 18 November 2024 the applicant pleaded guilty to seven counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16 years (in six of the offences the complainant was an infant under 12) and in each of the counts there were further circumstances of aggravation (in each case the applicant was a guardian of the child and the offence was a Domestic Violence Offence). He was sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. He seeks leave to appeal against the sentences imposed on the grounds:
“1.The learned sentencing judge erred in failing to give reasons for the imposition of a cumulative period of imprisonment.
2.The sentence imposed by the Court was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.”
“
Counts Date Offence Maximum Penalty
1 23/12/2014 – 31/12/2018 Indecent treatment of a child under 16, under 12, as a guardian (Domestic Violence Offence) / Section 210(1)(c), (3), (4) Criminal Code 1899 Complainant 1 20 years imprisonment
2 01/01/2015– 31/12/2017 Indecent treatment of a child under 16, under 12, as a guardian (Domestic Violence Offence) / Section 210(1)(c), (3), (4) Criminal Code 1899 Complainant 1 20 years imprisonment
3 01/01/2015 – 31/12/2017 Indecent treatment of a child under 16, under 12, as a guardian (Domestic Violence Offence) / Section 210(1)(a), (3), (4) Criminal Code 1899 Complainant 1 20 years imprisonment
4 01/01/2015 – 31/12/2018 Indecent treatment of a child under 16, under 12, as a guardian (Domestic Violence Offence) / Section 210(1)(a), (3), (4) Criminal Code 1899 Complainant 2 20 years imprisonment
5 01/01/2015 – 31/03/2019 Indecent treatment of a child under 16, as a guardian (Domestic Violence Offence) / Section 210(1)(a), (3), (4) Criminal Code 1899 Complainant 2 20 years imprisonment
6 01/01/2015 – 31/03/2019 Indecent treatment of a child under 16, under 12, as a guardian (Domestic Violence Offence) / Section 210(1)(c), (3), (4) Criminal Code 1899 Complainant 1 20 years imprisonment
7 01/01/2016 – 31/12/2018 Indecent treatment of a child under 16, under 12, as a guardian (Domestic Violence Offence) / Section 210(1)(a), (3) Criminal Code 1899 Complainant 3 20 years imprisonment
1”
The circumstances of offending and sentences imposed
(a)Complainant 1 6 to 10 years at the time of the offending (DOB: 26.05.2008);
(b)Complainant 2 7 to 11 years at the time of the offending (DOB: 16.05.2007);
(c)Complainant 3 9 to 13 years at the time of the offending (DOB: 03.07.2005).
Count 1
The first complainant was at home in the rumpus room. The applicant told others to leave the room and he then pulled down his pants exposing his penis. He told the first complainant to touch his penis, she complied. The applicant told her to tell her siblings nothing about what had occurred and he then left the room. The first complainant was between 6 and 10 years of age at the time. The sentence imposed was 12 months imprisonment.
Count 2
On a night between 1 January 2015 and 31 December 2017 the first complainant was asleep. The applicant entered the room and woke the first complainant. He pulled down his pants exposing his penis and told the first complainant to touch it. She complied and touched his penis. She was 6 to 9 years at the time but thought she was 7 to 8 years old. The sentence imposed was three years imprisonment.
Count 3
On the same occasion as Count 2 the applicant told the first complainant to pull down her pants and she complied. The applicant touched her on the outside of her vagina with an open hand. He asked her if it felt good and told her she could do it herself. The first complainant was between 6 and 9 years at the time and she thought she was between 7 and 8 years old. The sentence imposed was three years imprisonment.
Count 4
On an occasion when the second complainant was about 8, 9 or 10 years of age he was asleep in his bed at night. The applicant pulled the second complainant’s pants down to his knees. The second complainant awoke to the sensation of the applicant “pinching” his penis. He described it as a “biting” feeling. The feeling caused the second complainant to kick out as a reaction. The “pinching” continued and each time the second complainant reacted to it. The applicant “pinched” the second complainant’s penis again harder. The second complainant could not see what the applicant was doing to cause the feeling to his penis. The sentence imposed was 18 months imprisonment.
Count 5
On a date approximately a week or a month following the events of Count 4 the second complainant was asleep in his bed at night and woke to the feeling of the applicant’s “pinching” his penis. He was able to see the applicant’s face at the time and he pretended to be asleep. The sentence imposed was 18 months imprisonment.
Count 6
After an occasion when the grandparents visited, the first complainant was asleep in the applicant’s bed one evening. While in the room with the applicant he pulled his pants down exposing his penis. The applicant told the first complainant to touch his penis and she complied by touching his penis. She continued to touch his penis for approximately five to ten minutes. While this was occurring the applicant’s penis became erect. The first complainant stopped and the applicant told her to go to sleep and not to tell anyone. She was aged between 6 to 10 years. The sentence imposed was two years imprisonment.
Count 7
On a date unknown between 27 March 2013 and 31 December 2018 the third complainant was asleep in the applicant’s bed with him. Whilst in the bed with the applicant she awoke to the applicant softly touching her on the vagina. The third complainant was lying on her side facing away from the applicant. She could not say if the applicant was touching her on top or underneath her clothing. She went back to sleep. The offence occurred whilst the third complainant was in primary school and she was between 6 and 13 years of age at the time. The sentence imposed was 12 months imprisonment.
The cumulative sentence
The learned trial judge did not give elaborate reasons for the cumulative sentence. The prospect of a cumulative structure to the sentence was raised in submissions by the prosecutor2 who submitted that in this case it was “appropriate…for sentences to be served cumulatively to each other to reflect the criminality of the overall offending.” The prosecutor submitted that a sentence as high as five years could not be imposed on any one count because no individual count could sustain a sentence as high as five years. The prosecutor went on to refer to cases said to involve comparable offending before submitting for a sentence “overall…somewhere in the vicinity of five years”.3 The prospect of a cumulative sentence structure was resisted by counsel for the applicant.4 She submitted that the offending was “effectively a course of conduct [having] no particular features” justifying accumulation.
In Markarian v The Queen5 the plurality said:
“The law strongly favours transparency. Accessible reasoning is necessary in the interest of victims, of the parties, appeal courts, and the public.”
Relevant to circumstances that apply in this matter it is worthwhile recalling the comment by Margaret Wilson AJA in R v Hyatt:6
“It is desirable that sentencing remarks be succinct, sharply focussed and expressed in a way likely to resonate with the offender, the victim and the public at large. They also have to be able to withstand the scrutiny of appellate courts. The reasons for structuring a sentence in a particular way should ordinarily appear in the sentencing remarks, and a sentencing court may more readily infer error when reasons are not expressed.”
“Where a judge is faced with the task of imposing sentences for a number of distinct, unrelated offences there are a number of options open. One of those options is to fix a sentence for the most serious (or the last in point of time) offence which is higher than that which would have been fixed had it stood alone, the higher sentence taking into account the overall criminality. But that approach should not be adopted where it would effectively mean that the offender was being doubly punished for the one act, or where there would be collateral consequences such as being required to serve a longer period in custody before being eligible for parole, or where the imposition of such a sentence would give rise to an artificial claim of disparity between co-offenders. That list is not necessarily exhaustive. Such considerations may mean that the other option of utilising cumulative sentences should be adopted.”
The vice of the failure to give reasons for a cumulative sentence may be that it is not possible to identify the reasons why a court imposed the sentence9 in preference to other options nor what circumstance the judge took into account in imposing such a structure.
In R v WBQ10 Boddice J (as his Honour then was) said:
“There was an obligation on the sentencing Judge to record reasons for the imposition of a cumulative period of imprisonment, rather than a concurrent period of imprisonment. The sentencing remarks provide no such reasons. The failure to do so constituted an error of law warranting appellate intervention.”
The sentence for the offending
Most of the facts and circumstances relevant to the second ground can be found above.11 Ms Sheppard, who appeared for the respondent, identified relevant factors which were mentioned by her Honour below. The applicant offended on six distinct occasions over a four year period, the offending involving the applicant exposing himself, pinching or touching the genitals of the child or having them touch him, there were three separate complainants two of whom were prepubescent at the time of offending and the most serious offending was against the younger complainants. All complainants were vulnerable because they had been removed from their mother’s care and the offending involved betrayal of trust by a foster father. Ms Sheppard acknowledged that there was utilitarian value in the applicant’s pleas of guilty and she described the pleas as timely against a strong prosecution case. She acknowledged that the applicant had a good employment history and no criminal history and that as a result of his conviction and sentence he would not be able to continue to financially support his family.
In support of the submission made concerning ground 2 (manifest excess) both counsel referred to decisions of this Court. The object was to persuade the Court that the sentence was either manifestly excessive or, on the other hand, within a sound discretionary range. For example Mrs Grant, counsel for the applicant, provided us with R v NH [2006] QCA 476 and R v Watson [2017] QCA 82 whilst Ms Sheppard (for the respondent) placed R v AAR [2014] QCA 20 and R v SBM [2009] QCA 115 before us. None of these judgements are truly comparable. The offending in R v NH and R v Watson was significantly less serious than the offending here while the offending in R v SBM and R v AAR was significantly more serious. Further many of the judgments are dated. In R v O'Sullivan and Lee; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld)12 the Court said:
“[93]This sequence of legislative changes since 1997 puts it beyond question that the legislature has made a judgment about the community’s attitude towards violent offences committed against children in domestic settings. The amendments constitute legislative instructions to judges to give greater weight than previously given to the aggravating effect upon a sentence that an offence was one that involved infliction of violence on a child and that the offender committed the offence within the home environment.
[94]The significance of these legislative events has to be taken into account when sentencing. There must be consistency of sentencing but consistency is constituted by the consistent application of principles and not by adherence to a previously established range of penalties in disregard of the applicable law. The sentences imposed in earlier cases are useful only insofar as they can be used to identify the unifying principles that should be applied. When applicable legislation changes, the laws as changed must be applied faithfully and a previous range of sentencing may no longer be useful.” (footnotes omitted)
The tide of legislative amendment and innovation has not abated.13 In argument both counsel acknowledged that neither could find a truly comparable case.
The seriousness of the offending is manifest. It involved a gross breach of trust, and repetition of conduct suggestive of planning rather than impulse. The complainants were young children incapable of protecting themselves. While the applicant’s plea spared the complainants the ordeal of giving evidence under cross examination the facts and circumstances do not suggest remorse on his part. The effect of what her Honour has done is to cumulate a sentence imposed for offending against complainant 2 upon a sentence concerning offending against the youngest child against whom most of the offending was committed. Her Honour moderated the sentence structure by fixing a parole eligibility date at 16 months (less than one third) indicating that she was mindful of totality considerations. The effective sentence of four and a half years is high and a lesser sentence might have been imposed but the cumulative sentence is commensurate with the gravity of the whole of the criminal conduct.14 The sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive when regard is had to all the facts and circumstances.
The application should be refused.
AB p 42. ↩
See AB p 21 l26. ↩
AB p 23 l47. ↩
AB p 36 l5 – p 37 l14. ↩
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [39], Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ. ↩
R v Hyatt [2011] QCA 55 at [11]. ↩
See AB l20. ↩
R v Nagy [2004] 1 Qd R 63 at [39], Jerrard JA and Muir J agreeing. ↩
Such a sentence was discretionarily available, see s 156 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992. It was not mandatory, see s 156A. ↩
R v WBQ [2022] QCA 48 at [20]; Mullins JA (as her Honour then was) and Flanagan J (as his Honour then was) agreeing. ↩
See [3] to [7] above. ↩
R v O'Sullivan and Lee; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2019) 3 QR 196. ↩
See for example Criminal Code (Child Sexual Offences Reform) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2020; ; ; .
R
PBR [2025] QCA 120
(2005) 228 CLR 357
(1988) 166 CLR 59
The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 at [63]. ↩