R v Palamara

Decision date: 12 December 2025

Jurisdiction: Criminal

Before: Haesler SC DCJ

Decision: Aggregate sentence of imprisonment of 5 years 2 months with a non‑parole period of 3 years

Catchwords: CRIME — Violent offences — Recklessly cause grievous bodily harm
CRIME — Public order offences — Affray
SENTENCING — Aggravating factors — Breach of conditional liberty — Record of previous convictions
SENTENCING — Penalties — Imprisonment
SENTENCING — Relevant factors on sentence — Deterrence — General deterrence — Specific deterrence — Moral culpability — Objective seriousness
SENTENCING — Sentencing procedure — Instinctive synthesis
SENTENCING — Subjective considerations on sentence — Drug and alcohol addiction — Mental disorders — Disadvantage and trauma in childhood — Risk of violent reoffending

Legislation Cited: Bail Act 2013 (NSW)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act (NSW)

Cases Cited: Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; (2013) 249 CLR 571
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357
Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59
Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38; (2013) 249 CLR 600
Owen v R [2022] NSWCCA 214
Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 37; (1998) 194 CLR 610
R v AEM [2002] NSWCCA 58
R v Loveridge [2014] NSWCCA 120
R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2
R v Simpson [2001] NSWCCA 534; 53 NSWLR 704
Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465
Way v R (2004) 60 NSWLR 168; [2004] NSWCCA 131

Category: Sentence

Parties: Ian Neil Palamara (the offender)

Representation: Counsel:
R Baldeo (for the offender)
Solicitors:
Morrisons Law (for the offender)
R Taylor for the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)

File Number(s): 2023/344671

JUDGMENT – ex tempore revised

Introduction

1. On 4 August 2025 a jury found Ian Palamara guilty of two serious offences, recklessly causing grievous bodily harm and affray: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 35(2), 93C(1). After the verdict Palamara entered custody, the inevitability of a custodial sentence having been accepted by him: Bail Act 2013 (NSW), s 22B. He appears for sentence today.

2. The critical issue at trial was not whether an affray had taken place or whether the victim was assaulted and suffered really serious injury, but the identity of the person responsible. By its verdicts the jury obviously accept the identification of Ian Palamara as the offender. He must be sentenced on that basis.

Facts for sentence

3. The facts found for the purposes of sentencing must be consistent with the jury’s verdicts. Any facts adverse to an offender should be established beyond reasonable doubt, but there is no general requirement an offender be sentenced on a view of the facts consistent with the verdict which is the most favourable to the offender. It is ultimately a matter for the judge.

4. In September 2023 two family groups had gathered independently in a park and children’s playground in southern Wollongong. Their children interacted at the playground. One child was particularly annoying. The offender’s sister who was heavily pregnant spoke to the child.

5. The child’s father had words with her. He is quite a large man. He called to his wife who was sitting nearby. She is thin and slight. She ran over to join the argument. Palamara who was some metres away with his group of friends and family then ran over toward the child’s mother. He struck her with his fist to her face knocking her unconscious. She was caught unawares and was unable to take any action to defend herself.

6. The offence occurred in a public park in the presence of many children.

7. After the blow, the victim’s husband and Palamara engaged in a wrestle. Other men from both groups intervened and what was described as a “melee” took place. Words were exchanged. There was a lot of pushing and shoving. Some punches were thrown. This melee went on for some minutes before Palamara and his family left the park.

8. His victim was taken by ambulance to Wollongong Hospital. She was treated for pain, swelling, a laceration and bruising to her left eye and cheek. She was transferred to the Sydney Eye Hospital. Her left eye was found to have a ruptured globe requiring surgical management which repaired with sutures. Her visual prognosis remains very guarded. She will require further surgical intervention. The injury is likely to have a long term impact on the vision in her eye: Trial Exhibit M and Sentence Agreed Facts.

Maximum penalties and standard non-parole periods

9. The offence of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. There is a standard non-parole period of 4 years.

10. The affray has a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Were it not connected with the other matter and were it not for the element being the unlawful act towards the female victim that was in common with Count 1, this matter would have been dealt with summarily where a maximum penalty of 2 years could have been imposed.

11. That said, both the maximum penalties and the applicable standard non-parole periods convey Parliament’s view of the relative seriousness of the offence. Content should be given to the standard non-parole period.

12. A judge however does not start at the non-parole period and then oscillate about it by reference to aggravating and mitigating factors: Way v R (2004) 60 NSWLR 168; [2004] NSWCCA 131 at [131]. Care should also be taken to ensure that the standard non-parole period does not dominate the remainder of the exercise and thereby fettering other important sentencing discretions. A point also made in the seminal case of Markarian by McHugh J: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [54].

13. Palamara, as is his right, maintained his not guilty plea today. He exercised that right at trial. He is not to be punished for doing so. But he cannot get any of the benefits often given for accepting responsibility or showing remorse. Any comments to his psychologist which purport to demonstrate insight cannot be given any significant weight, other than general statements that one would expect from any sober thinking person.

Objective seriousness

14. The sentence must be proportionate to what was done. An assessment of the objective seriousness of an offence is essential in setting the parameters of an appropriate sentencing outcome.

15. A defence submission was made that this matter fell below the middle of the range of objective seriousness taking into account only objective factors. The Crown said that another finding should be made.

16. For myself, as I have said in many judgments, I am not at all helped by trying to fix a matter on some notional range of objective seriousness. But others differ, and where a standard non-parole period is fixed those who might come to review this judgment say that they may be assisted by a finding. And, where there is dispute between the parties, I am directed to resolve that dispute: Owen v R [2022] NSWCCA 214.

17. For those reasons, and for the reasons I will outline shortly, I find that this matter falls within the middle of the range of objective seriousness.

18. Given the identity of the assailant has now been determined by the jury it is clear that Palamara saw his pregnant sister engaged in a verbal confrontation with a large man. He must have also seen the female victim rushing towards them. His mother may also have been nearby. He then covered the distance between them very quickly. The first his victim knew of his presence was when she saw a fist coming towards her.

19. At the time Palamara was a truck driver. He is obviously a strong, fit man in his early 30s. His victim was of slighter build. He hit her with some force. She had no opportunity to protect herself. She suffered a very serious injury which will have lifelong consequences.

20. Palamara may have been spurred to action by a protective instinct, but what he did, was not in defence of his sister, it exacerbated a verbal confrontation. It was unnecessary violence. I accept the Crown’s submission that it was spontaneous but entirely unjustified both in its nature and its ferocity, particularly where there was no counter threat to the offender or others. Both the level of violence and the degree of harm were at a high level.

21. It was for those reasons it is a serious example of its type, noting as I do, that many more serious injuries fall within that rubric of the section, and more serious activity leading to the assault falls within the rubric of the section.

22. The material now before me indicates that Palamara had been, as he admitted to his psychologist, using illicit drugs and drinking this day. That fact cannot mitigate or excuse what occurred. At best it can help explain why he did what he did, even though he still denies his activity.

23. What Palamara did to his victim was the act of unlawful violence that began, or precipitated, the affray that took place. This affray and the conduct following the precipitating event involved a number of people, it went on for some minutes and would have been disturbing to anyone who had the misfortune to be there. It took place in a public playground where families had gathered to have fun and enjoy the day. It was serious, so serious a custodial penalty is warranted.

24. But had it not been for the more serious offence it would have been the sort of matter dealt with in the Local Court, and courts have to be particularly careful about double counting elements or factors of an offence that are in common and there should be no double counting. There must be as a consequence, considerable concurrence when, after indicating an appropriate sentence, I fix an aggregate sentence for this matter: Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610 at [40].

Other matters

25. The trial was conducted expeditiously. All the medical evidence was by Agreed Facts. Palamara facilitated the administration of justice requiring some reduction in sentence: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act (NSW), s 22A.

26. Palamara has a criminal history. He was born in 1991. He has been before the court for other offences, including an affray in 2010. In 2017 he went to gaol for assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

27. On 30 May 2023 he received a 14 month sentence for an offence of violence. It was to be served subject to intensive correction in the community. He made a promise to the court, himself and others to be of good behaviour and not commit a criminal offence. He broke that promise. That fact is an aggravating circumstance on sentence. He had served only three and a half months of the Intensive Correction Order (‘ICO’) before this offending.

28. He was arrested on 30 October 2023. He was granted bail the next day and he should have credit for those two days by the backdating this sentence. However, after receiving bail in this matter his ICO was reassessed by the State Parole Authority. His ICO was revoked. The reasons given were that this latest offence amplified the risk he poses to the community, “given his history of violent offences, and his alleged breach appears to relate directly to his criminogenic risk factors of violence and aggression”. Community Corrections noted they were “unable to mitigate the risk”.

29. He was not readmitted to the ICO. He served the entire balance of that sentence in custody. I note that had he received a full time sentence initially, rather than an ICO, a non-parole period would have been fixed requiring his release.

30. His record of violence is a concern. He cannot get the benefits often afforded first offenders. While prior criminal history cannot result in a sentence which is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence here, a more severe penalty is warranted with additional focus on retribution, deterrence and the protection of the community: Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465 at [477].

31. He must get the benefit of his two days on remand. I accept Mr Baldeo’s submissions today that the ICO was breached in substantial part because of the actions that led to today’s sentence, but the Parole Authority also concluded his criminogenic risk factors could not be managed in the community. He must receive some benefit for that custodial period to avoid any hint of double penalty. I also have an obligation to increase the sentence because of the aggravating circumstances noted. Both those matters should not be double counted.

32. He went into custody following the jury verdict on 4 August 2025. I propose to date this sentence from 2 May 2025.

Victim impact

33. The victim of provided a Victim Impact Statement. She is present in Court, but she did not wish it read to Court. I will not read it all aloud. There are some matters in it that reflect her understandable personal view of the penalty that should be imposed. I cannot take them into account, but the aspects of the Victim Impact Statement that must critically be taken into account on sentence are the impacts of the offence on her and her family.

34. She details some matters to which I have already referred. She goes on the say, “On this day I can still unfortunately remember the moment I looked into your eyes before”, as she calls it a “coward’s punch to the left side of my face”. She says, “I still have flashbacks, fear and overwhelming emotions”, particularly about being separated from her children. She says her “self-esteem has been shattered” and her “sense of worth gone”. She notes:

“The physical pain you cased me that day still two years later at times is unbearable. It’s unlike anything else I have ever experienced and even now writing this to find the words to describe my suffering seems impossible.

…

Although I have just had another major eye surgery to aesthetically make my eye look normal due to the severe trauma caused by you means that I will forever need monthly visits to the Sydney Eye Hospital. The [are] ongoing medications, eyedrops, ophthalmologists all of the out of pocket expenses incurred due to this act of violence … out of my control. [It] has had a major impact on me.”

35. She speaks of the impact of the surgery on her both short term and long term. She notes she still may have to undergo more surgeries and invasive treatments. She then makes the obvious point that all of those matters will have an impact on the mother of four children, two of whom have high needs, and the impact of having to travel regularly to Sydney is a particular economic, emotional and physical burden that she has to carry. She says her day to day life has been “changed forever by the choices you made that day”. She speaks about the needs of her children and concludes:

“You were a stranger to me, yet unfortunately I will forever know your name. You have taken the quality of my life my family’s and my children’s lives forever and I hope you are held accountable … No matter what your sentence is it will never change what has happened, it will not fix my left eye, it will not take the trauma away. My kids witnessed it. It will never be the same.”

36. She does not wish what occurred to her on anybody.

37. The statement attests to the personal harm suffered by her as a direct result of the offending and also the psychological and economic loss. It serves the very practical purpose of drawing to the offender’s, the Court’s and the community’s attention the harm caused by this crime.

38. The sentence I impose has a number of parameters. Of course, I take into account the maximum penalty of 10 years. I take into account all the matters that have been put before me. The penalty actually imposed can only be one indicator of the seriousness of which the Court views the crime. There should never be any direct correlation between the victim’s perception of the harm done to her and the time to be served. The victim of crime should never equate or measure her injury with the punishment actually inflicted.

Sentence backdate

39. I pause these sentencing remarks to deal with an interruption by Mr Baldeo in relation to the commencement date of the sentence and whether there was a period of custody which Palamara was entitled to have taken into account because he was bail refused but later acquitted. [Discussion with Counsel].

40. SHORT ADJOURNMENT

41. There was a brief interruption where quite properly Mr Baldeo raised a matter so far as the custodial record is concerned. Courts appreciate the lived experience of gaol, but where someone is serving time on remand and then gets an acquittal that fact does not fall within s 24 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.

Case for the offender

42. No oral evidence was presented in Court but the offender’s mother in her affidavit confirmed matters relating to Palamara’s personal history. She was not required for cross-examination. She concluded her affidavit:

“He now knows that he must work harder [and] to be the person he needs to be for his kids.

It is heartbreaking despite doing so well recently, he will not be able to be the father he wants to be for his kids.”

43. I received other written material. His partner of ten years wrote how he had fallen in with “the wrong crowd” who encouraged his use of alcohol and drugs such that he forgot his responsibilities as a father and husband. She spoke of the considerable change in his behaviour over the last three years. He had committed himself to his work, limited his drinking and drug use. He has been trying to play a real and positive role in his children’s lives and repair his relationship with her. She noted the huge negative impact his incarceration had on his family. Some of the children have neurodivergent issues, they are dependent on their father. His personal references speak of a generous man who volunteers with his school and helps parents and friends.

44. The evidence illustrates the impact periods in gaol have on families and children in particular. The courts do not ignore these impacts, and while significant weight cannot be given to these factors, unless circumstances are highly exceptional, which is not suggested here, it would be wrong to ignore the hardship to others, particularly family and young children in sentencing. Those impacts will be taken into account.

45. Courts similarly do not ignore the lived experience of gaol. Gaols are nasty, violent places and the evidence before me indicates that the offender has been subject to assaults while in custody.

46. I have the report from Ms Bennett, a respected psychologist. It is not controversial. It seems to be what a ‘warts and all’ account. Palamara, is now 34. Until bail was refused, he worked as a truck driver. He has worked most of his adult life. He is in a long term relationship. There are three children in the relationship. He grew up locally. His early home life was blighted by domestic violence and alcohol abuse. It appears he had problems concentrating at school and Ms Bennett suspects he has ADHD.

47. He began abusing alcohol and other drugs as a teenager and has a significant drug and alcohol problem. In Ms Bennett’s opinion he has a severe Alcohol Use and Polysubstance Use Disorder. She reports that his mental health presentation is complex and difficult to diagnose with certainty due to these longstanding disorders.

48. In summary her report notes that as a child he experienced “a highly dysfunctional and chaotic home environment, characterised by social and economic disadvantage, exposure to domestic violence, and parental alcohol misuse” now thankfully moderated. She notes that he “was exposed to the aftermath of sexual abuse within the family” involving a sibling. She details his regular involvement with “criminal oriented peers”.

49. She concludes, “Mr Palamara has an elevated risk of violent reoffending and a moderate risk of general reoffending, and he requires intensive assistance in order to ameliorate this risk”: par [62]. “He presents with numerous risk factors”, which are detailed at par [49]. But she also notes some protective factors including; vocational qualifications, no prior periods of custody, a stable relationship, stable accommodation and family support.

50. She recommends he receive drug and alcohol treatment both in custody and on release. She recommends; participation in EQUIPS Addiction and EQUIPS Aggression programs, that he engage with the Violent Offender Treatment Program, and on release he participates in a mental health care plan with drug and alcohol community services. She notes he requires long term psychological counselling. A copy of her report will be sent to Corrections.

51. Mr Baldeo, who appears at trial and sentence, submits that Palamara’s underlying mental health problems and personal history warrant a diminution of sentence. He relies on authorities such as Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194 at [177]; R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2 at [69] and Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; (2013) 249 CLR 571.

52. Where an offender’s childhood or adolescence has been affected dysfunction and disadvantage it can, and it would appear here does, have an inhibitory effect on; the development of prosocial values, on the acquisition of a moral compass, on a capacity to make positive behavioural decisions and the person’s consequential thinking.

53. As the High Court made clear in Bugmy such a background can compromise a person’s capacity to mature and learn from experience and that impact does not diminish over time. It is often connected, as here, with the early uptake of drugs and alcohol before a person is old enough to make rational choices. It requires sympathetic consideration and some reduction of sentence because his moral culpability will not be the same as a person who did not have those disadvantages.

54. That said, all the material before me still requires that general deterrence principles be applied given the nature of the offence, an offence of public violence. And, while I will moderate them, I cannot moderate those principles to a significant extent. There is still a considerable need to denounce this crime.

55. There is no evidence that his current custody carries a significantly greater burden because of these underlying conditions.

56. There is clearly a need here for specific deterrence. To some extent his periods in custody in breach of the ICO and for the other unrelated matter seem to have caused him to think about the obligations he had to his family and resolve to do better, and so much is reflected in his partner’s reference and the other references before me. He must recognise the impact of his drug and alcohol problem and the clear matters raised in the report that he is at risk of violent offending. If he is to moderate that risk, he will need to cooperate with and engage in programs. It is his risk of violent offending that requires the sentencing factor of the protection of the community be considered.

Structure of the sentence

57. The community will be protected while Palamara is in custody, but that is a short term option. He will need to be released, and on release he must be supervised and engage in programs for as long as practicable as the community will be protected if he keeps to the promise he appears to have made to his family that he will do everything he can while in custody to reduce the risk of violent reoffending.

58. He will need help adjusting to normal community life on release. He will need help keeping to his promise that he engages in risk avoidant behaviour. They all provide for a finding of special circumstances. However, in so finding I am mindful of the requirement a minimum period for which he should be imprisoned should properly reflect the seriousness of his offending and the other purposes of sentencing: R v Simpson [2001] NSWCCA 534; 53 NSWLR 704 at [59].

59. I am required to, and will be indicating, an appropriate sentence for each offence. I am then required to structure the sentence such that the overall sentence is just and appropriate to the totality of his crimes: Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59 at [62]-[63]. Here, given elements between the two offences were in common, they must not be double counted: Pearce v The Queen.

60. Here, given the assault was the genesis for the affray there must be almost complete concurrence to avoid that double counting of critical elements. But there cannot be complete concurrence. There must be some independent punishment for the affray offence given that the initial conduct precipitating the assault led to a continuation of activity which would, and surely did, cause distress to the community. While that factor is not required, in proof of the offence it must have happened here.

Submissions

61. I am indebted to Mr Baldeo, counsel for Palamara, and Mr Taylor, solicitor advocate for the Director of Public Prosecutions, for their comprehensive written submissions to which they spoke. I hope this judgment does justice to them. I have not referred explicitly to each of the matters raised, but in discussion, raised matters that I required further submissions to and I sought to address them in this judgment.

Synthesis

62. I am required to identify all the factors relevant to the sentence, discuss their significance and then make a value judgment about the appropriate sentence. The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal has repeatedly emphasised that public acts of violence by men often, as it appears here given the admissions made, under the influence of alcohol and drugs, is too common. The Court has made the point that sentences that carry a significant degree of general deterrence and denunciation are required to protect the public: R v Loveridge [2014] NSWCCA 120; R v AEM [2002] NSWCCA 58 at [92].

63. As the Director pointed out in their submissions, and as I have in a number of judgments, the question about general deterrence preventing matters where someone behaves spontaneously is a “vexed” one. Courts are obliged to take into account those sentencing principles, but there is a countervailing position. It may be argued that general deterrence has little rational claim upon sentencing discretion where crimes are not premeditated and spontaneous. In such cases it may be said that heavy sentences are likely to be of little utility in reducing the general incidence of crimes of violence: Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38; (2013) 249 CLR 600 at [52] to [58].

64. However, the High Court in Munda at par [54] went on to say, “the proper role of the criminal law is not limited to the utilitarian value of general deterrence”. The courts have an obligation to vindicate the dignity of the victim of a crime of violence, particularly one where long term physical and psychological injuries were inflicted. The courts have a significant obligation to express the community’s disapproval of the offending and to attempt to afford such protection as the State can to the vulnerable without repetition of the offending.

65. As I said earlier, removal can only achieve that purpose for a short period. The offender must be released at the expiry of either his non-parole period or his sentence. It is important to note, as the High Court did in Munda, that one of the historical functions of the criminal law has been to properly punish an offender so that victims, their friends and family are discouraged from resorting to self-help with a consequent escalation of violent vendettas between members of the community.

Orders

66. Having considered all those matters I indicate a sentence of 5 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years for the first count. In relation to the affray, I indicate a sentence of 8 months imprisonment.

67. The aggregate term of the sentence is one of 5 years and 2 months. The non-parole period is 3 years reflecting the finding of special circumstances. There is a significant backdate.

68. The sentence will commence on 2 May 2025. Meaning that the offender will be eligible for consideration for parole on 1 May 2028. His release will be subject to an order and discretion of the State Parole Authority.

69. The balance of the term of 2 years and 2 months will commence the following day and the total sentence will expire on 1 July 2030. Eligible for consideration for parole on 1 May 2028, total sentence 5 years and 2 months.

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