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[2026] QCA 28
respondent. Appeal dismissed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Nguyen’s appeal. He admitted trafficking but argued that the evidence did not establish the required criminal organisation and that the jury should have been expressly told that every participant had to be associated with every other participant. The Court held that the evidence could support a finding of a group involving Nguyen, Tran and Lo, including because they worked together under Nguyen’s direction. The relevant circumstance needed to exist at some time after 9 December 2016, not throughout the whole trafficking period. The jury directions were adequate in context, and any possible defect would not have been material.
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2,387 words · generated 08/10/2026
Adon Minh Nguyen appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal against his conviction for trafficking in a dangerous drug with a serious organised crime circumstance of aggravation. The jury trial proceeded after Nguyen admitted trafficking but disputed the aggravating circumstance. Doyle JA described the sole trial issue as whether that circumstance was proved: [14]. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 27 February 2026.
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The admitted trafficking period ran from 1 January 2014 to 2 March 2018. Nguyen admitted regularly supplying methylamphetamine to Sean Cutler, usually in amounts of one or two kilograms, at an agreed price of between $150,000 and $180,000 per kilogram: [23]. The charge overlapped the commencement of Part 9D of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), which took effect on 9 December 2016. Section 251 meant the aggravating circumstance applied to an offence committed partly before and partly after that date only if the specified circumstance existed at a time after commencement: [15], [18].
The Crown particularised Nguyen, Steven Tran, Adrian Lo and Daniel Milos as alleged members of the criminal organisation: [16]. The key evidence concerned Nguyen, Tran and Lo. Tran described Nguyen as the organiser or head, said Nguyen gave him instructions about deliveries, and said he passed instructions to Lo. Lo described making deliveries and working with Tran. The evidence also covered drug storage, encrypted communications, vehicle purchase and modification, and the division of tasks: [45]-[46], [52].
The Crown also relied on Milos, but Doyle JA concluded that the totality of the evidence did not support finding that Milos was involved in a criminal organisation with Nguyen. The group question therefore turned on the evidence concerning Nguyen, Tran and Lo: [47]-[48].
The appeal had two grounds. First, Nguyen argued that the guilty verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory. Second, he argued that the jury needed a direction that the association had to be proved between each participant and every other participant: [19]-[22]. The Court rejected both grounds.
The Court first identified the statutory elements that mattered. Section 161O defined a criminal organisation as a group of at least three people who engage in, or have as a purpose engaging in, serious criminal activity and who, by their association, represent an unacceptable risk to the community: [17], [27]. Doyle JA explained that the statutory idea of a group involves an arrangement, formal or informal, and an association forming a collective unity: [28]-[30].
That requirement prevents the definition from being satisfied merely because three people separately commit similar crimes. As Doyle JA put it, “The definition should not be inverted”: [29]. The group itself must engage in the activity, rather than the evidence showing only that its members individually did so. Nor does a drug buyer and seller relationship, even with an intermediary, necessarily create a group: [31]. The necessary question is whether the evidence establishes an association among the people that forms the statutory group.
On the unreasonable-verdict ground, s 668E(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld) required the Court to assess the sufficiency and quality of the whole evidence independently. But the assessment had to respect that the jury had primary responsibility for deciding guilt and had seen and heard the witnesses: [39]-[41]. The Court did not simply substitute its view of witness credibility for the jury’s.
The evidence was capable of supporting the jury’s finding. Tran described Nguyen as the person giving directions, including about where and when to deliver drugs. Tran also described passing instructions to Lo, occasions when Nguyen communicated directly with Lo, and deliveries undertaken by Tran and Lo together: [45]. Lo gave evidence of deliveries, communications and involvement in the trafficking activity, including trips with Tran: [46]. The evidence of Nguyen’s direction, shared work and arrangements went beyond separate dealings with a common principal: [52]-[53].
The Court also considered whether the group had three members at a relevant time. The Crown did not need to prove that the aggravating circumstance persisted throughout the entire trafficking period. It was enough for it to apply at a relevant time after 9 December 2016: [57]. Even if Lo’s involvement ended in May or early June 2017, the evidence permitted the jury to find that the group existed before then, while trafficking continued: [58]. There was also evidence supporting a finding that Lo had not ceased his involvement, including Tran’s evidence that Lo wanted time off and that drugs were stored at his home: [59]. The evidence had inconsistencies, but assessing them was for the jury: [60].
On the direction ground, the trial judge told the jury it had to be satisfied that at least three individuals were a group, had an association, and formed a collective unity. The directions also warned against treating a mere conduit or ordinary loose grouping as sufficient: [61]. Doyle JA considered that these directions invited the kind of reasoning the appellant said was necessary, namely, that the jury had to find association among at least three of the individuals: [69].
Mullins P added that the issue had been apparent from the start of trial and that both parties’ addresses treated the question as whether Tran’s evidence proved the association beyond reasonable doubt: [5]-[8], [11]. In that context, no redirection had been sought. Doyle JA concluded that the directions were not deficient. Alternatively, any possible error would not have been material because the evidence the jury must have accepted established the group and the required associations: [70]-[71].
The judgment describes Part 9D of the Penalties and Sentences Act as having been introduced by the Serious and Organised Crime Legislation Amendment Act 2016, with effect from 9 December 2016: [15]. The relevant provisions set out statutory requirements for a criminal organisation, participation in one, and a serious organised crime circumstance of aggravation: [17].
The judgment does not describe a wholesale change in the meaning of “group” before and after that amendment. Rather, it applies the statutory language to the particular offence and addresses the temporal transition through s 251. That section allowed the circumstance to apply to an offence committed partly before commencement, provided the relevant participation and knowledge requirements were satisfied at a time after commencement: [15], [18], [57].
For the group concept, Doyle JA relied on the reasoning in R v Hill (No 2), including the proposition that statutory “group” connotes an association forming “a collective unity”: [30]. He explained that shared characteristics or separate involvement in criminal conduct are insufficient by themselves. There must be an arrangement or association that makes the people a group in the statutory sense: [28]-[33].
The Court also considered how relationships between participants may matter. In R v Stasiak; R v Turkyilmaz, the cited reasoning concerned a lack of evidence that two agents of the same principal were associated with one another: [35]. Doyle JA distinguished the present evidence from that situation. Tran and Lo were not shown merely as separate agents unaware of each other; the evidence was that they worked together, knew of each other and were engaged by Nguyen in the same operation: [53].
The judgment does not state that every case must show the same kind or degree of interaction between all participants. It expressly leaves open whether one principal acting through two or more subordinates, without some other association between those subordinates, could satisfy s 161O: [53]. Its narrower holding is that the evidence here went beyond that unresolved hypothetical.
At [29], Doyle JA stated: “The definition should not be inverted.” In plain English, the statute does not treat any three people who each commit serious crimes as a criminal organisation. The prosecution must establish a group that itself engages in, or has a purpose of engaging in, the relevant activity.
At [30], the judgment refers to “a collective unity”. This describes a group held together by an association or arrangement, rather than people placed in the same category only because they share a trait or criminal activity. The judgment uses the phrase to explain what distinguishes a statutory group from a loose collection.
At [31], the Court explains that a buyer and seller do not become a group merely because each depends commercially on the other, even if an agent is involved. The point is not that commercial or agency relationships can never be relevant. It is that those relationships, without further evidence of the statutory association, do not automatically establish a criminal organisation.
At [53], Doyle JA says that Tran and Lo were each fairly described as Nguyen’s agents or subordinates, but that the evidence went further: “They worked together, knowing of each other and of the engagement of them by the appellant.” In plain English, their mutual work and awareness provided evidence beyond two separate relationships with Nguyen.
At [57], the Court explains the temporal requirement under s 251. The aggravating circumstance did not have to continue through every day of the charged trafficking period. The relevant statutory conditions had to be met at a time after commencement. That mattered because Lo’s evidence suggested he might have ceased involvement during 2017.
At [71], Doyle JA states that a direction error must be material, meaning it could realistically, not fancifully or improbably, have affected the jury’s reasoning. The Court concluded that the evidence the jury must have accepted established the group and its associations, so a different direction would not have changed the analysis of the verdict on the circumstances presented.
The judgment is relevant to cases where an aggravating circumstance depends on proving that a group of at least three people collectively engages in serious criminal activity. It is especially pertinent where the alleged group has an informal structure, members have different roles, or one person directs others.
The decision indicates that different roles do not prevent a group from being established. Section 161O expressly contemplates differences in roles and interests: [17], [34]. But the prosecution still needs evidence of an arrangement or association that makes the participants a group. Evidence that several people separately commit similar offences is not enough by itself: [29]-[33].
The decision is also relevant where one alleged participant acts as a principal and others as subordinates. Evidence of instructions, joint work, awareness of each other’s roles and coordinated activity supported the finding here: [52]-[53]. The Court did not decide whether a principal-subordinate structure alone is sufficient if the subordinates have no other association: [53]. That remains an important limit on how broadly the decision can be applied.
The temporal reasoning matters for offences spanning a statutory commencement date. Where legislation applies only if an aggravating circumstance exists after commencement, the Court’s reading of s 251 means it may be enough that the required conditions existed at a relevant post-commencement time, even if the charged conduct began earlier: [15], [57]-[58].
Finally, the judgment is relevant to appeals alleging inadequate directions about association. It demonstrates that the directions are considered in the context of the trial as a whole, including the written directions, oral summing-up and counsel’s addresses: [61]-[70]. It also applies a materiality requirement to an alleged direction error: the error must realistically have affected the jury’s reasoning: [71].
The supplied judgment was delivered on 27 February 2026 and contains no discussion of later courts applying or distinguishing R v Nguyen. No post-judgment treatment can be identified from the material provided.
The judgment itself applies and discusses earlier authorities. It applies M v The Queen and R v ZT for the approach to unreasonable-verdict review, including the need to respect the jury’s role and its advantage in seeing and hearing witnesses: [40]-[41]. It applies R v Hill (No 2) to the meaning of “group” and collective unity: [30]-[31].
It discusses R v Stasiak; R v Turkyilmaz as an example where two agents of one principal lacked evidence of association with each other: [35]-[36]. It distinguishes the present evidence because Tran and Lo worked together and knew of each other’s engagement by Nguyen: [53]. It cites R v Hilton alongside Hill and Stasiak as reaching similar conclusions about insufficient association in the circumstances considered there: [31].
For direction error, the judgment cites R v CDI and GBF v The Queen concerning the significance of a failure to seek redirection: [70]. It relies on Brawn v The King and MDP v The King for the requirement that an alleged error be material to constitute a miscarriage of justice: [71]. These are authorities applied or cited by this Court, not later treatment of R v Nguyen.
The most explicit open question is whether s 161O can cover a principal acting through at least two subordinates without proof of some additional association between the subordinates. Doyle JA said it was unnecessary to decide that question because the evidence showed more than a coincidence of subordinate relationships: [53].
The judgment also does not prescribe a universal formula for how closely members must be connected, how much communication is necessary, or whether particular forms of coordination are essential. Its conclusion is fact-specific: joint work, mutual awareness and activity under Nguyen’s direction were evidence of the necessary association in this case: [52]-[53].
The decision does not determine how a jury must be directed in every case involving the association requirement. Doyle JA held the directions adequate in this trial and noted that they invited consideration of association among at least three people: [69]-[70]. Mullins P considered that an express statement about association between each participant and every other participant could have emphasised the issue, but that it was already understood in context: [11]. The judgment therefore leaves room for the precise wording to depend on the issues and evidence at trial.
Nor does the judgment resolve every possible issue about when a participant ceases to be part of an organisation. It assessed Lo’s evidence about a possible cessation against the evidence of a request for temporary time off, ongoing storage and the circumstances of the intercepted delivery: [59]-[60]. The outcome rests on what the jury could find from that evidence.
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Nguyen [2026] QCA 28
PARTIES: R / v / NGUYEN, Adon Minh / (appellant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 124 of 2024 / SC No 1138 of 2022
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 15 May 2024 (Muir J)
DELIVERED ON: 27 February 2026
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 22 September 2025
JUDGES: Mullins P, Bond JA, Doyle JA
ORDER: Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant was convicted by a jury of trafficking in a dangerous drug with a serious organised crime circumstance of aggravation – where the appellant made admissions as to the trafficking but not the circumstance of aggravation – where the Crown particularised the appellant, Mr Tran, Mr Lo and Mr Milos as members of a criminal organisation who have an association to form a collective unity – where Tran and Lo gave evidence at the trial – where the central issue at the trial was whether the appellant, between 9 December 2016 and 1 August 2017, was a participant in a criminal organisation – where there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that Tran and Lo were subordinates of the appellant following his instructions and in cooperation with each other – where there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that Lo had not ceased involvement in May or early June 2017 – whether the association between at least the appellant, Tran and Lo required a different association – whether that group continued throughout the charged period – whether the verdict of guilty was unsafe and unsatisfactory in all the circumstances / CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES NOT AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE – MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION – where the primary judge gave the jury a ‘jury question trail’ – where the primary judge directed the jury that they must be satisfied that at least three of the individuals are a group and that those individuals have an association between them in trafficking in dangerous drugs – where the appellant contends that a direction was required as to the need for proof of an association between each and every one of the participants with each and every other participant – whether a miscarriage of justice was occasioned by a lack of such direction / Criminal Code (Qld), s 668E(1) / Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 161O, s 161P, s 161Q, s 251 / Brawn v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 872; [2025] HCA 20, applied / M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63, applied / MDP v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 969; [2025] HCA 24, applied / R v CDI [2024] QCA 232, cited / R v Hill (No 2) (2020) 6 QR 1; [2020] QSC 309, applied / R v Hilton (2020) 3 QR 260; [2020] QSCPR 2, cited / R v Stasiak; R v Turkyilmaz (2019) 2 QR 533; [2019] QSC 260, considered / R v ZT (2025) 281 CLR 137; [2025] HCA 9, applied
COUNSEL: A J Edwards KC for the appellant / J D Finch for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Jacobson Mahony Lawyers for the appellant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
MULLINS P: As Doyle JA explains, the focus of the appellant’s trial was on whether the appellant between 9 December 2016 and 1 August 2017 was a participant in a criminal organisation and knew or ought to have known a matter set out in s 161Q(1)(b) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). The prosecution had relevantly particularised that the criminal organisation was a group made up of three or more persons who have an association to form a collective unity, being the appellant, Mr Tran, Mr Lo and Mr Milos, the organisation had a purpose of engaging in trafficking in dangerous drugs and there was an association between those persons. Two of those persons gave evidence, Mr Tran and Mr Lo. The prosecution had also particularised that the appellant was the head/organiser of the organisation which was his drug trafficking business and that he knew from being the head/organiser that the offence was being committed in association with participants in a criminal organisation.
The trial judge provided the jury with an initial written direction (MFI “C”) that the jury retained throughout the trial. It was extensive in relation to directions on the circumstance of aggravation and included terms defined in s 161O and s 161P of the Act and some further explanation of the expressions used in those definitions that have developed from the authorities that have considered these provisions, which are referred to in the reasons of Doyle JA.
For the purpose of this appeal, it is relevant that the term “group” which is used in the definition of “criminal organisation” was amplified with the explanation that “in the context of the statutory section means that the prosecution must prove that at least three members of the group have an association to form a collective unity”. The term “by their association” referred to in s 161O(1)(b) was also amplified:
“‘by their association’ requires that there exists association between the persons who are alleged, for the purpose of the circumstance of aggravation, to be a part of a criminal organisation.”
When the prosecutor opened the prosecution case for the jury, he drew to the jury’s attention that one of the aspects of the circumstance of aggravation that they would be concerned with was “that there was associations between those persons”, namely, the four persons who were particularised for the purpose of the circumstance of aggravation. He also identified that he expected one of the issues that would be the focus of the trial in respect of the circumstance of aggravation was that three or more of the persons formed part of a collective unity and consideration of “that issue of association in relation to them”.
When the appellant’s trial counsel (who is not the same counsel who appears for the appellant on this appeal) made some comments at the commencement of the trial to highlight the anticipated issues from the appellant’s perspective, he made it clear that the point would be whether the prosecution “can prove there was, in fact, this necessary collective unity existing between these four people” and that one aspect of that was “whether there, in fact, existed the necessary association between [the appellant] and each of the people alleged to be in this criminal organisation and, indeed, between each of those people was there the necessary existing association”.
The appellant’s trial counsel’s address to the jury at the conclusion of the evidence expanded on this aspect of the association between the participants which had been anticipated for the jury. His address included the following explanation of the association that had to exist between the participants:
“Again, in my suggestion to you, whether you can find such a collective unity necessarily requires a consideration of what the interests of each of those people were, where their interests may have diverged, and whether each of those people in that group then had the necessary association with each other.
That’s – it’s got to be all of them. The association has to be with number 1, has to associate with 2, 3 and 4. Number 2 has to have the association with 1, 3 and 4, and so on. And in my suggestion to you, if the state of the evidence leaves you in a position where you’re simply unable to determine what extent of the interests of these alleged participants were, then you can’t conclude that there was this necessary underlying unity, and you would have to find my client not guilty.”
“And when it comes, then, to looking at the group of three, [the appellant], Mr Tran and Mr Lo, again – and you’re looking to see whether there is this collective unity between them such that they’re really just the one organisation, the only way – the only way – you could find that unity and association exists is if you accept Tran: that you can accept his evidence about he said about that as truthful and reliable beyond reasonable doubt. Because it’s Mr Tran who gives the prosecution the evidence of the association, the necessary association, between Mr Lo and [the appellant].”
In relation to the association of each of the likely three participants in the criminal organisation, namely, the appellant, Mr Tran and Mr Lo, the addresses of counsel concentrated on whether Mr Tran’s evidence satisfied the jury beyond reasonable doubt of the association between each participant with each other. It was implicit in the submissions made on the appellant’s behalf to the jury that the requisite association was proved beyond reasonable doubt, if Mr Tran’s evidence was accepted as truthful and reliable on the roles and activities of the three participants.
For the purpose of ground 1, I have undertaken an independent assessment of the evidence and have reached the same conclusion as Doyle JA that, as a question of fact, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the circumstance of aggravation, having regard to the benefit enjoyed by the jury of seeing and hearing the witnesses.
In respect of ground 2, Doyle JA has highlighted those parts of the summing up where the trial judge referred to the need for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the association between three or more members of the group and that they had an association to form a collective unity. The trial judge also in summarising the parties’ respective cases referred to the prosecutor’s submission that the jury “would accept Mr Tran’s evidence because he was a straightshooter and you would find him an honest and reliable witness” and that other evidence supported Mr Tran’s evidence that the appellant was the head or organiser and Mr Tran and Mr Lo couriered drugs, whereas the appellant remained at arm’s length. The trial judge also repeated the appellant’s counsel’s submission to the jury that they would have concerns about accepting Mr Tran’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt, because “it defies commonsense, it was internally inconsistent and was contradicted in many ways by the evidence of Mr Lo and Mr Watt”.
It may have emphasised the point if the trial judge had added an express statement to the jury about the need for proof of an association between each and every one of the participants with each and every other participant in terms similar to those used by the appellant’s counsel in his address to the jury. It was, however, made clear in the trial from the outset that was the issue. It was also implicit in the way the trial was conducted by both counsel that the requisite association was proved, if the jury accepted Mr Tran’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The focus of counsel’s addresses on whether the jury could accept Mr Tran’s evidence which would prove the necessary association explains why counsel were not concerned to seek any redirection from the trial judge on making more explicit what was otherwise understood that the association that had to be proved was by each participant with each other. I agree with Doyle JA that there was no error in the primary judge’s directions.
I therefore agree that the order that should be made is: Appeal dismissed.
The Penalties and Sentences Act 1992
“161O Meaning of criminal organisation
A criminal organisation is a group of 3 or more persons, whether arranged formally or informally—
who engage in, or have as their purpose (or 1 of their purposes) engaging in, serious criminal activity; and
who, by their association, represent an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare or order of the community.
For subsection (1), it does not matter whether—
the group of persons—
has a name; or
is capable of being recognised by the public as a group; or
has an ongoing existence as a group beyond the serious criminal activity in which the group engages or has as a purpose; or
has a legal personality; or
the persons comprising the group—
have different roles in relation to the serious criminal activity; or
…
have different interests in, or obtain different benefits from, the serious criminal activity; or
Example—
Of the 3 persons comprising a group that engages in serious criminal activity, 1 person obtains the profit from the activity and pays the other 2 persons an amount for engaging in the activity.
change from time to time…
In this section—
engage, in serious criminal activity, includes each of the following—
organise, plan, facilitate, support, or otherwise conspire to engage in, serious criminal activity;
obtain a material benefit, directly or indirectly, from serious criminal activity.
161P Meaning of participant
A person is a participant, in a criminal organisation, if—
the person has been accepted as a member of the organisation and has not ceased to be a member of the organisation; or
the person is an honorary member of the organisation; or
the person is a prospective member of the organisation; or
the person is an office holder of the organisation; or
the person identifies himself or herself in any way as belonging to the organisation; or
…
the person’s conduct in relation to the organisation would reasonably lead someone else to consider the person to be a participant in the organisation.
Example of conduct for paragraph (f)—
doing any of the following for a criminal organisation involved in the production and sale of cannabis—
tending the cannabis plants
packaging the cannabis for sale
selling the cannabis
laundering the profits from the sale of the cannabis
managing the day-to-day business of the organisation
For subsection (1)(a), a person may be accepted as a member of a criminal organisation—
informally; or
through a process set by the organisation, including, for example, by paying a fee or levy.
161Q Meaning of serious organised crime circumstance of aggravation
It is a circumstance of aggravation (a serious organised crime circumstance of aggravation) for a prescribed offence of which an offender is convicted that, at the time the offence was committed, or at any time during the course of the commission of the offence, the offender—
was a participant in a criminal organisation; and
knew, or ought reasonably to have known, the offence was being committed—
at the direction of a criminal organisation or a participant in a criminal organisation; or
in association with 1 or more persons who were, at the time the offence was committed, or at any time during the course of the commission of the offence, participants in a criminal organisation; or
for the benefit of a criminal organisation.
For subsection (1)(b), an offence is committed for the benefit of a criminal organisation if the organisation obtains a benefit, directly or indirectly, from the commission of the offence.
To remove any doubt, it is declared that a criminal organisation mentioned in subsection (1)(b) need not be the criminal organisation in which the offender was a participant.”
The Grounds of Appeal
The appellant has urged two closely related grounds of appeal.
The first, which was set out in the Notice of Appeal, is that the “verdict of guilty on the criminal organisation circumstance of aggravation is unsafe and unsatisfactory in all of the circumstances.”
Leave was sought to add an additional ground of appeal namely:
“A miscarriage of justice was occasioned by a lack of direction, that to prove an ‘association’ between the members of the alleged criminal organisation, required proof that each participant was associated with each of the other participants.”
Statement of Admissions
“1. That between 1 January 2014 and 2 March 2018 (the trafficking period) Adon Minh Nguyen (the defendant) trafficked in dangerous drugs.
During the trafficking period the defendant regularly supplied the dangerous drug methylamphetamine to Sean Mathew Cutler who resided in Mackay. The agreed price for the supply of methylamphetamine was between $150000 and $180 000 per kilo.
Amounts of methylamphetamine supplied by the defendant to Sean Mathew Cutler during the trafficking period were usually supplied in amounts of 1-2 kilograms.
Initial contact between Sean Mathew Cutler and the defendant was arranged by Daniel Bernard Milos, a person known to Sean Mathew Cutler.
On 1 August 2017 police intercepted a Kluger motor vehicle near the intersection of George St and Gladstone Rd, Rockhampton.
At the time of interception of the Kluger motor vehicle (the vehicle) Steven Thanh Phong Tran was located in the drivers seat and the defendant was located in the front passenger seat.”
The Content of the Statutory Test
Before turning to discuss the grounds of appeal, it is convenient to deal with the proper construction of the provisions of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 which I have extracted above.
A number of features must be established in order for the circumstance of aggravation, relevantly, to be engaged in this case.
There must be a criminal organisation being a “group” comprising at least 3 persons. In the present case the Crown particularised a group of four persons but s 161O(1) will be satisfied if the appellant and any two other of those particularised persons can be identified as members of the group.
The context suggests that there needs to be some arrangement of the membership of the group, whether formal or informal. This would distinguish a mere assembly of individuals (who colloquially might be referred to as a group) from a group for the purposes of the Act.
The group must engage in or have as their purpose engaging in a serious criminal activity. But the definition should not be inverted. A number of individuals each of whom separately engages in serious criminal activity do not thereby meet the statutory description of group. They must be a group which in turn can be said to be one which engages in or had as its purpose engaging in that activity.
This is consistent with the observations of Applegarth J in R v Hill (No 2) (2020) 6 QR 1 at [96] where his Honour stated:
“Having regard to available dictionary definitions, the context of and the purpose of s 161O, the word ‘group’ in that section concerns three or more persons who are arranged and who have an ‘association’. The word ‘group’ in that statutory context does not appear to be concerned simply with persons who may be related in some way or who may be classified together on the basis of certain shared characteristics, such as their preparedness to engage in criminal activity. Instead, the word ‘group’ in its statutory context connotes some association of persons to form ‘a collective unity’ (to quote two of the definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary). This interpretation accords with the meaning adopted by Henry J that there ‘must be some unifying combination or relation between persons for them to constitute a group’.” (citations omitted).
It follows that the mere fact that three or more persons may be characterised as having the common feature of being involved in dealing with drugs does not constitute them as a group for the purposes of s 161O. The relationship between a buyer and seller of drugs, whilst each in a commercial sense depends upon and is involved in the activities of the other, cannot thereby be said to constitute a group for these purposes, even if the buyer, for example, engages an agent to transact with the seller or vice versa. In R v Hill it was accepted that the buyer and his agent were associated (between each other) as were the seller and his agent associated with each other and that collectively those two groups were engaged in criminal activity, but there was no group of three or more persons for the purposes of the Act. Similar conclusions were reached in R v Hilton (2020) 3 QR 260 and R v Stasiak; R v Turkyilmaz (2019) 2 QR 533.
In the present case if there is a group, there seems to be little doubt that they have engaged in or have as their purpose engaging in serious criminal activity.
The persons must “by their association” represent an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare or order of the community. So again, the coincidence that a number of individuals, each of whom engages in serious criminal activity, can be said collectively to represent an unacceptable risk to the safety welfare or order of the community does not thereby satisfy this element of being a criminal organisation. It is their association (and pursuit of their purpose) that must give rise to that unacceptable risk. Again, if there is a relevant association in this case, the activity of the supply of methylamphetamine would satisfy this requirement.
The group of three or more persons can constitute a group for the purposes of the section even though it is not capable of being recognised by the public as a group and even if the persons comprising the group have different roles in relation to the serious criminal activity.
There is an aspect of R v Stasiak which should be mentioned. Three people were charged with unlawfully trafficking dangerous drugs being participants in a criminal organisation. Bryan trafficked the drugs. The evidence was that Wieslaw acted as his agent. At some point, they travelled to Poland where Bryan used Gokhan as his agent in much the same way as he had used Wieslaw. Henry J stated, at [30]-[33]:
“There is ample evidence of the association of Bryan and Wieslaw. There is ample evidence of the association of Bryan and Gokhan. The apparently fatal obstacle to the prosecution evidence (as explained in this application and which is, for the purpose of the application, common ground) is that there is no direct evidence of any association as between Wieslaw Stasiak and Gokhan…
…
This provides, undoubtedly, some evidence of each of them fulfilling the role of an agent of Bryan. What it does not do is provide evidence of any association as between Wieslaw Stasiak and Gokhan… Indeed, the way in which Bryan arranged things seems to make it plain that he went out of his way to avoid direct contact between those two gentlemen. Whilst of course that may not be enough to avoid a circumstance of aggravation of the kind we are concerned with here in every case, the difficulty confronting the prosecution case, as explained in this application, is there really is insufficient evidence to sustain the inference that there was any association between Wieslaw Stasiak and Gokhan… Taking the evidence at the best, they appear to each have been agents of Bryan. There is an absence of evidence of association between them, direct or indirect.”
The appellant in the present case relies upon this passage as the foundation for his contention as to the inadequacy of the direction the subject of the second ground of appeal. But it is also relied on to suggest that there was no sufficient association between Tran and Lo, Lo and the appellant, and Tran and the appellant such that it was not a criminal organisation. I shall return to this later.
By s 161Q(1) it must be established that at the relevant time (at any time after the commencement date) the appellant “was a participant in a criminal organisation.” The further requirements of s 161Q(1)(b) do not need to be further considered in this case as they would be satisfied if otherwise the section applied.
Section 161P provides a definition of when a person is a “participant” in a criminal organisation. Neither party made submissions on the impact of this section on the present appeal. Again, if the numerical threshold of a group is established in this case, there would appear to be no dispute that the appellant was a participant in the defined sense. He would at least satisfy s 161P(1)(f), if not other paragraphs of that subsection.
Ground 1
Pursuant to s 668E(1) of the Criminal Code, this Court “… shall allow the appeal if it is of opinion that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable, or can not be supported having regard to the evidence…”
This requires the Court to undertake an independent assessment of the sufficiency and quality of the whole of the evidence to determine, as a question of fact, whether the verdict of the jury is unreasonable.1 However, in this assessment the Court “must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence or the consideration that the jury has had the ‘benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses’.”2
It must be borne in mind that the jury members enjoy advantages which include:“the application of the jurors’ collective wisdom and experience of ordinary affairs, from seeing and hearing the evidence as it unfolds when evaluating factual matters, especially witness credibility;”3 and“matters such as: the tone and manner in which the witness or participants spoke or conducted themselves; their maturity; their emotional state and intelligence; and how they interact with others…”.4
The admitted facts include that the appellant regularly supplied the drugs to Cutler who resided in Mackay.
Oral evidence was given by each of Tran, Lo and Cutler.
Cutler said:He would receive a delivery at varying times “[a] couple of months, or three months, depends” on when he ran out; or “two months, three months.”5He received it in 2 kilogram lots.6Tran would deliver to him7 probably four to six times in the period 2014 to 1 August 2017.8 He believed Tran made a delivery to him in 2017 prior to 1 August 2017.9On one occasion Tran was accompanied by Lo (probably in 2017) and after that Lo would come down himself probably only once on his own. This was probably in 2017 close to the time of the interception on 1 August 2017.He had been expecting a delivery around 1 August 2017 having been contacted (via Wickr message) by the appellant.
Appellant was a Participant After 9 December 2016
“Leaving aside the general evidence of drug trafficking, which was formally admitted, the evidence of a group with the relevant association and collective unity post 9 December 2016 was inconsistent, and lacking in specificity as to timing.”
Trafficking
The Criminal Organisation
There was, in my view, evidence to establish a criminal organisation satisfying the description of the Act. There was evidence from which the jury could conclude that:The appellant was the decision maker and essentially the boss.The supplies were of drugs in significant amounts and for substantial sums. There can be no doubt as to the purpose of their activity being to engage in criminal activity for reward.He gave instructions to Tran and also had Tran pass instructions onto Lo.Lo had initially followed the appellant around but then commenced deliveries with Tran. Some deliveries were made by Tran and Lo together. This included collecting a package from the appellant and driving it to Mackay.It was the appellant who suggested the purchase of and modification to a car and this was carried into effect by Tran and Lo.Communications were made by all three via Blackberry or Wickr.The appellant decided what was done and paid. Drugs were sometimes stored by Lo and collected and packaged by Tran.71 The money was sometimes held by Lo overnight or given to Tran who paid him.72
The facts in this case are substantially different from those considered by Henry J in R v Stasiak, supra. In this case, each of Tran and Lo might fairly be described as the agents or subordinates of the appellant. They followed his instructions as to what to do, and where and when to make deliveries. It is unnecessary to decide in this case whether s 161(O) would capture, as a criminal organisation, one principal acting through two or more subordinates, without there being a need to establish some other association between the subordinates. In this case the evidence goes well beyond the mere coincidence of Tran and Lo being subordinates of the appellant. They worked together, knowing of each other and of the engagement of them by the appellant.
Did It Have Three Members?
The position as to there being at least three people involved in some group at a particular time requires separate consideration.
The appellant puts some reliance on the evidence that Lo had ceased his involvement in early 2017 and so that whatever the group’s constitution was prior to that, it no longer included Lo after early 2017.
There are two aspects of this to consider.
First, s 161Q(1) applies to this offence if at a time after 9 December 2016 the appellant: (i) was a participant in a criminal organisation; and (ii) knew or ought to have reasonably known one of the matters in s 161Q(1)(b). It does not require that this circumstance persist for the whole of the period of the charged conduct; and, in particular, not the whole of that period after the commencement date.
The charge was of trafficking over a period. If (as suggested by Lo’s evidence) the group ceased to meet the minimum size of three people in May or early June 2017 that does not assist the appellant if he was trafficking from 9 December 2016 until May or early June 2017. Cutler’s evidence again would suggest two or more deliveries in that period. Lo’s own evidence was that his last delivery was in early 2017. It is difficult to conclude that even if the appellant’s submission was correct and that Lo’s overall involvement ceased in May or early June 2017, that it would be determinative.
Second, there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Lo had not ceased his involvement in May or early June 2017.He had, according to Tran, asked for time off “work.” This was because of the recent arrival of a child. He said Lo wanted two or three weeks off. The request suggests a temporary leave of absence rather than a cessation of the association.He was still storing drugs for the appellant and, indeed, the drugs in the car when it was intercepted had been collected from his house.
There are some inconsistencies between the evidence given by Tran and Lo, in particular as to Lo having stored drugs at his house in July 2017 and as to whether he was ceasing involvement or merely taking a few weeks off. The jury had to consider this evidence and assess what to act upon. Having reviewed the evidence, I do not conclude that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable. As mentioned above, it is the jury which is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence and has done so with the “benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses.”73
Ground 2 – The Direction
“If you look at my initial written direction to you under the meaning of ‘criminal organisation’, I have identified specifically to this case what it is the Crown must prove. Namely, that three or more individuals, so in this case being the defendant, Steven Tran, Adrian Lo and Daniel Milos, were a group of three or more persons, whether arranged formally or informally, who had engaged in, or had as their purpose, or one of their purposes, engaging in serious criminal activity, namely trafficking in dangerous drugs. Who, by their association, represent an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare or order of the community. Now, as to that there are a number of points to be made. The circumstance of aggravation is identified as a serious organised crime circumstance of aggravation. It is not simply some people who together commit a prescribed offence. You must be satisfied that at least three of the individuals are a group and that those individuals have an association.
Secondly, the notion of the group that you need to be satisfied under the legislation is not a loose notion that you might associate with the ordinary meaning. So three people standing on a corner having a chat might be a group, but they are not what the legislation requires. Why? As you can see from the definition of ‘criminal organisation’ that three of those persons may be arranged informally and the criminal organisation does not need to have a particular name, or be capable of being recognised to establish the three or more persons are a group within the meaning of the legislation. You must be satisfied that three or more persons identified by the Crown as part of a group, have an association to form a collective unity.
…
Evidence of association may be indirect. It can be circumstantial. But you must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt the only reasonable inference is that there was an association between three or more members of the group.
…
So, for example, someone may source drugs for someone else and be a conduit, but that does not mean they do so as a member of a group with the person they source the drugs from. You must find three or more individuals did so as a group and had a collective unit of action or purpose and that there was an association between them in trafficking in dangerous drugs, and you also need to be satisfied that, by association, they represented an unacceptable risk to the community…”.
“The evidence in the present case as to an ‘association’ during the relevant period was questionable at best. After 2016 there was very little evidence of an association between the appellant and anyone other than Mr Tran. Mr Tran provided a link to Mr Lo which was not supported by Mr Lo himself during that period. Similarly the evidence of an association with Mr Milos over that period was poor. Whilst it could not be argued that the evidence was non-existent on that issue, the jury were entitled to accept or reject such parts of the evidence, particularly of Mr Tran, as they saw fit. It is impossible to know what the jury relied upon in proof of the relevant association at the relevant time. The jury may well have relied upon each of the alleged participants having an association with at least one of the others during the relevant period. On the basis that the jury may have rejected Mr Tran’s evidence as to association, it was important that the jury be directed as to the need for proof of an association between each and every one of the participants with each and every other participant.”
There are a number of aspects of that submission which cannot be accepted.
First, it presupposes that evidence of association in the lead up to the end of 2016 cannot be relied upon to establish the criminal organisation. But s 251 of the Act does not require that the organisation be formed after the commencement date. It, in one sense, presupposes that the organisation might exist beforehand and continue thereafter.
There is ample evidence of the criminal organisation between the appellant, Tran and Lo to which I have referred above prior to 9 December 2016.
Second, and in any event, I do not accept: that “after 2016 there was very little evidence of an association between the appellant and anyone other than Mr Tran”; or that while Mr Tran provided a link to Mr Lo, “that was not supported by Mr Lo himself during that period.”
Lo, himself, gave evidence of his last delivery to Mackay being in early 2017. Accepting his evidence at its highest he decided to cease being involved in May or early June 2017. At least implicitly he continued his involvement prior to that time. Cutler continued to get deliveries and both Tran and Lo had played a role in their delivery. The appellant himself with Tran were to make a further delivery when intercepted.
Third, Tran’s evidence was not simply of his association with the appellant continuing up to August 2017 but of Lo’s association and involvement continuing. The drugs which were intercepted on 1 August 2017 were, on his evidence, collected from Lo’s house for his (Tran’s) packaging and delivery. There is no evidence to suggest that the appellant being in charge and directing his subordinates had altered after 9 December 2016.
The primary judge’s direction, in particular the passages emphasised in the extract above, invited the course of reasoning that the appellant urges was required: viz some form of direct association between each of the three of the appellant, Tran and Lo. There is no direction that the association may be constituted by the aggregation or convergence of associations between the appellant and Tran, the appellant and Lo and even between Tran and Lo. That was a favourable form of direction and when asked by the primary judge, no redirection was sought.
The fact that no redirection was sought may bolster a determination that there has been no error.74 That is the position here. In my view, the direction was not deficient and that conclusion draws support from the circumstance that counsel at the trial did not view it as calling for any clarification by redirection.
In any case, to give rise to a miscarriage of justice the impugned direction must constitute a error or irregularity, in the sense that they could have realistically (not fancifully or improbably) affected the jury’s reasoning to a verdict of guilty. The evidence which the jury must have accepted, to reach their verdict on the sole issue was whether the serious organised crime circumstance of aggravation was proved, is such as to establish a group and the required associations. The evidence does not throw up a scenario of the kind which the appellant relies on as calling for a need for a different direction. Accordingly in my view an error, if there had been one, is not material.
Conclusion
R v ZT (2025) 281 CLR 137 at [11]-[12]; M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 492-93. ↩
R v ZT (2025) 281 CLR 137 at [7]; M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493. ↩
R v ZT (2025) 281 CLR 137 at [9] (citations omitted). ↩
R v ZT (2025) 281 CLR 137 at [10]. ↩
T1-48 lines 28 to 44. ↩
T1-49 lines 3 to 4. ↩
T1-53 lines 19 to 20. ↩
T1-53 lines 22 to 25. ↩
T1-54 lines 7 to 13. ↩
T1-54 lines 15 to 23. ↩
T1-53 lines 41 to 47. ↩
T1-55 lines 16 to 17. ↩
T1-55 lines 26 to 37. ↩
This is a secure encrypted message means of communication.
R
Nguyen [2026] QCA 28
(2025) 99 ALJR 872
(1994) 181 CLR 487
(2025) 99 ALJR 969
(2025) 281 CLR 137
(2020) 271 CLR 537
Appeal dismissed.
BOND JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Doyle JA and the order proposed by his Honour. I also agree with the additional reasons for judgment of the President.
DOYLE JA: The appellant, after a three day trial, was convicted by a jury of trafficking in a dangerous drug between 1 January 2014 and 2 March 2018, with a serious organised crime circumstance of aggravation. He had, at the commencement of the trial, pleaded guilty to the trafficking charge but that plea was not accepted by the Crown and his trial proceeded. In that trial the appellant admitted the trafficking and the sole issue was whether the serious organised crime circumstance of aggravation was proved.
The Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) was relevantly amended by the introduction of Part 9D “Serious and organised crime” by the Serious and Organised Crime Legislation Amendment Act 2016 with effect from 9 December 2016. It applied to an offence which is committed partly but not wholly after the commencement date. That is the current case. In such a case s 161Q is said to apply in relation to an offence only if, at a time after the commencement of these amendments the offender was a participant in a criminal organisation and knew or ought reasonably to have known a matter mentioned in s 161Q(1)(b): s 251 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992.
The Crown particularised the relevant participants in the criminal organisation as being the appellant, Steven Tran, Adrian Lo and Daniel Milos.
Tran’s evidence included:When asked who the organiser, or head, of the trafficking business was, he identified the appellant.16 He told Tran what to do; he gave Tran “orders to go and give drugs to someone else” including Cutler, in 2016 and up to August 2017.17 The appellant told him when to go, when to collect money and where to go.18He (Tran) made deliveries to Cutler “maybe 16 times or maybe more”, and in the first seven months of 2017 he said “I think I did one or two; only one or two.”19 I read the hesitation in this answer as the witness stating that, in that period, he made a delivery and thinks it was only once or twice, rather than being consistent with his perhaps not having made any such deliveries. He later affirmed that in the period of 2016 to August 2017 he was still engaged in delivering drugs.20He was told to make these deliveries by the appellant.21Lo also made deliveries. That was before the interception.22 The appellant told Tran that there was another driver, Lo.23 Tran recalled the appellant telling him to use Lo because “he looks geeky and no one would pick him.”24 He knew Lo made the deliveries because “sometimes [he] would have to pass a message on… [f]rom” the appellant.25 He was fairly sure it was the same approximately two kilogram size deliveries he had made.26Tran rejected the suggestion that he was the one deciding and telling Lo what to do. He said he received instructions and would pass them on to Lo.27 Sometimes the appellant would bypass Tran and go straight to Lo.28The appellant told Tran to provide Lo with a Blackberry phone “so that we could contact each other through encrypted messaging.”29 He accepted that he could not know if the appellant contacted Lo directly on a Blackberry.30Lo was involved until the interception on 1 August 2017;31 right up to that date.32Tran delivered drugs with Lo to Cutler to show him (Lo) the way.33 This was in late 2016 or early 2017.34 He was told by the appellant what to do and told Lo.35He was told by the appellant to get another car which was purchased in late 2016 or early 2017. He was to be reimbursed by the appellant.36 Tran and Lo went together to buy the car.37 The appellant wanted modifications made to the car and told “us to send it now and leave it with some people down [in Sydney].38 Lo dropped it off.39 Tran told Lo to make two or three deliveries in that car.40Money was stored at his house, that being something decided by the appellant.41Sometimes drugs would be stored at his house but mostly at Lo’s house.42The trip when the interception was to occur was originally to be made by Tran and Lo but Lo “said he wanted two to three weeks off” as he had just had a new born baby, so the appellant opted to go instead.43Tran had collected the drugs from Lo’s house, took them to his own home to package and then he and the appellant set off on the delivery that was intercepted on 1 August 2017.44
Lo also gave evidence. He said:He was involved in trafficking dangerous drugs in 2016 through to 2017.45He approached the appellant for work and that is how it developed (trafficking in dangerous drugs).46He received instructions from Tran to take a package to Milos which he did.47 He assumed it was methylamphetamine and this was in about 2017.48He made deliveries of packages to Cutler in Mackay in the period 2016-2017 about four or five times.49He first followed the appellant around then delivered packages. Then Tran got in touch. He then commenced delivering packages to Mackay pretty early. He was told not to ask any questions. On one occasion he met both the appellant and Tran at the appellant’s house.50 Then, Tran and he set off to Mackay, alternating driving to make a delivery to Cutler.51 He was paid $500 and it was paid to him by Tran.52 The next trip was again with Tran to make a delivery to Cutler.53 Again he was paid by Tran. His instructions essentially came from Tran.54He went with Tran to purchase the car. It was initially registered in his name but then in the name of his wife. There were modifications made to it. He dropped it off in Sydney.55 The modifications were to put some compartments in the back and the front.At this time, he and Tran communicated by Blackberry.56 He accepted however that he did communicate with the appellant on the phone prior to getting the Blackberry to meet up to get instructions.57 His Blackberry communications were ‘mainly’ with Tran. His communications with the appellant would have been via Wickr.58His last trip to Cutler was in early 2017.59 Tran would tell him where to take and leave things and sometimes he would hold onto money overnight.He rejected the suggestion that he was storing drugs at his home in July 2017.60
The Crown had also particularised Milos as a member of the criminal organisation. There is some evidence which might support such a conclusion.Cutler identified his supplier as Milos.61 However, he understood some of it came from the appellant.62The admitted chronology shows that on days when Cutler flew from Mackay to Brisbane, Milos made contact with the appellant. This was on 17 June 2016, to call to see him, and on 24 January 2017 to phone the appellant to tell him he has “a friend here.” There were other coincidences between flights by others and Milos making contact with the appellant but the role of the other identified persons is peripheral and can be put aside.63 Tran said he understood that the appellant and Milos were partners.64 But this was said for the first time during cross examination by counsel for the appellant and had not been included in the statement Tran had earlier given the police.65Tran also gave evidence that the appellant told him to give drugs to a Brad Watt, who he (Tran) believed to be a contact of Milos.66Lo delivered packages to Milos.67Brad Watt (a purchaser of drugs) and some police officers gave evidence where Milos was named, but that took no further the issue of his association with the appellant, Tran or Lo.
The totality of the evidence would not support a conclusion that Milos was involved in any criminal organisation with the appellant. Whether there was a relevant group then turned on the evidence as it related to Lo, Tran and the appellant.
Other evidence was given but it is not necessary to go through it in any detail.
T1-58 lines 12 to 16. ↩
T2-6 lines 30 to 35. ↩
T2-27 line 44 to T2-28 line 12. ↩
T2-30 lines 5 to 13. ↩
T2-9 lines 38 to 48. ↩
T2-27 lines 16 to 17. ↩
T2-10 lines 11 to 14 and T2-11 lines 17 to 22. ↩
T2-11 lines 34 to 42. ↩
T2-13 lines 1 to 11. ↩
T2-35 lines 26 to 30. ↩
T2-11 lines 44 to 48 to T2-12 lines 12 to 17 and T2-13 lines 13 to 18. ↩
T2-12 line 33. ↩
T2-34 lines 20 to 27. ↩
T2-34 lines 36 to 40. ↩
T2-38 lines 22 to 23. ↩
T2-39 line 5. ↩
T2-13 lines 20 to 25. ↩
T2-13 line 36 to 39. ↩
T2-13 lines 41 to 48. ↩
T2-14 lines 31 to 34. ↩
T2-14 lines 36 to 46. ↩
T2-17 lines 24 to 28. ↩
T2-36 lines 10 to 14. ↩
T2-16 lines 21 to 27. ↩
T2-16 line 33. ↩
T2-15 line 44 to T2-16 line 2. ↩
T2-25 lines 9 to 12. ↩
T2-28 lines 14 to 20 and T2-37 lines 12 to 15. ↩
T2-25 lines 42 to 49. ↩
T2-37 lines 23 to 35. ↩
T2-46 lines 45 to 46. ↩
T2-47 lines 18 to 21. ↩
T2-50 lines 44 to 45. ↩
T2-50 lines 15 to 27. ↩
T2-51 lines 35 to 48. ↩
T2-52 lines 8 to 23. ↩
T2-52 lines 34 to 38. ↩
T2-53 lines 26 to 28. ↩
T2-53 lines 30 to 48. ↩
T2-61 lines 22 to 35. ↩
T2-54 lines 20 to 44. ↩
T2-55 line 10 to T2-56 lines 10 to 39 and T2-59 lines 12 to 14. ↩
T2-59 lines 25 to 29. ↩
T2-59 line 39 to T2-60 line 5. ↩
T2-55 lines 32 to 39. ↩
T2-65 lines 6 to 7. ↩
T1-43 lines 21 to 22. ↩
T1-48 lines 4 to 8. ↩
The named persons were Fitzsimmons and Borg each of whom seem to have delivered cash for Cutler at various times. As to Fitzsimmons see T1-55 lines 39 to 43; T1-57 lines 25 to 33; and as to Borg see T1-51 lines 41 to 45; T1-56 lines 43 to 48; T1-57 lines 19 to 23. ↩
T2-31 lines 27 to 37. ↩
T2-31 line 39 to T2-32 line 16. ↩
T2-23 lines 11 to 33. ↩
T2-50 lines 8 to 47; T2-51 lines 9 to 30 and lines 41 to 43. ↩
T2-55 lines 32 to 39. ↩
T2-55 line 30. ↩
T2-65 lines 1 to 2. ↩
T2-19 lines 38 to 39; T2-22 lines 6 to 8; T2-28 lines 14 to 28; T2-37 lines 12 to 27. Cf T2-64 line 33. ↩
T2-21 lines 23 to 49; T2-56 lines 31 to 32. ↩
R v ZT (2025) 281 CLR 137 at [7]; M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487, 493. ↩
R v CDI [2024] QCA 232 at [59] citing GBF v The Queen (2020) 271 CLR 537 at 548. ↩
Brawn v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 872 at [10]; see also MDP v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 969 at [3] (Gageler CJ), [9] (Gordon and Steward JJ), [44] (Edelman J), [98] (Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ). ↩