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[2026] QCA 14
respondent. Appeal dismissed. Mullins P and Bradley JA agreed with Brown JA that the conviction appeal should be dismissed: [1], [66]-[68].
The Court of Appeal did not decide the case by asking whether each piece of evidence independently proved Negrine's involvement. It looked at the evidence together. It held that the jury could infer from the communications, timing, search for Godschling, material found during police searches and Negrine's flight that he was part of the agreement to import cocaine. The Court therefore dismissed his appeal.
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2,520 words · generated 08/10/2026
Daniel Nunes Negrine appealed his jury conviction for conspiracy to import a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug. The particulars alleged an agreement between Negrine, Ramesh Godschling, Beaumont Blake and Michel Capovilla to import cocaine by air from New Zealand. The Crown alleged Negrine joined the agreement at least by 25 February 2012 and remained a party until 6 March 2012. The particulars also listed acts said to have been done in furtherance of it, including communications about Godschling's expected arrival, a visit to Godschling's residence, and Negrine's possession of cash ([5]).
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The underlying importation evidence was substantially admitted. Blake travelled to New Zealand, Godschling followed, and Blake delivered suitcases containing cocaine to Godschling. Godschling was arrested in Auckland before boarding a flight to Australia, with 1.388 kilograms of cocaine in his luggage ([7]). Negrine conceded on appeal that there was evidence of an attempted importation, but disputed that the evidence proved he agreed to participate in it ([31]-[34]).
The Crown case against Negrine was circumstantial. It relied on text messages and intercepted conversations, evidence that a person alleged to be Negrine went with Capovilla to Godschling's former residence, phones and other items found in searches, cash found in a car and residence, and Negrine's failure to appear on bail followed by his being at large for about ten years ([24]-[28]). Some material did not directly involve Negrine. The appellate issue was whether the evidence, taken as a whole, nevertheless permitted a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of his participation.
Brown JA delivered the principal reasons. Mullins P independently assessed the evidence and agreed with the result, as did Bradley JA ([1], [67]-[68]). The Court dismissed the appeal ([66]).
The Court applied the established unreasonable-verdict approach. It was required to assess the whole evidence independently and ask whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appellate court had to allow for the jury's advantages, including seeing and hearing the evidence as it unfolded, but still undertake its own assessment of the sufficiency and quality of the evidence ([36]-[39]). In a circumstantial case, it had to weigh all circumstances and consider whether an inference consistent with innocence was reasonably open ([40]-[42]).
A central feature of Brown JA's reasoning was that the appeal could not be resolved by examining each evidential strand in isolation. The appellant identified weaknesses in individual items, including uncertainty about phone users, the lack of identification by the Ocean Shores occupier, and the absence of DNA evidence connecting Negrine to some items. The Court considered those points but assessed their cumulative force against the rest of the evidence ([43], [45]-[47], [60]-[64]).
The Court first considered phone 419. It was not registered in Negrine's name, but it was found on the dining table with his Brazilian identity card, and Negrine used it to contact his solicitors during the search. The registered name could not be located in the police database or electoral roll, and no other phone was found registered to Negrine. Brown JA considered that the reasonable inference was that Negrine used phone 419 ([19]-[21], [45]).
The messages exchanged between Blake and phone 419 on 25 February were important because they occurred before Godschling's attempted departure from New Zealand. The exchange referred to money, “them guys”, and “g”. The Court considered that, in context, the jury could infer “g” meant Godschling and that Negrine knew what was occurring in New Zealand and was giving Blake directions or assistance, including offering to transfer more money ([50]-[52]). The fact that cocaine had already been delivered to Godschling did not, in the Court's view, mean the importation operation had ended. Godschling was still in New Zealand and the alleged operation was ongoing ([50], [55]).
Phone 739 required a separate evidential assessment. The evidence linking it to Negrine was weaker than for phone 419, and the officer could not recall whether searches had confirmed the registered name's identity. The judgment also recognised that it was not formally an admitted fact that phone 739 had been found during the searches, although the parties and trial judge had treated it as admitted at trial. Brown JA concluded that the officer's familiarity with the number and the evidence about the search were sufficient to support an inference that the phone was among the phones found, although its exact location was unknown ([22]-[23], [46]). The timing and content of its 26 February exchange with Capovilla, together with the other events, permitted an inference that it concerned Godschling's travel ([46], [52]-[54]).
The visit to Godschling's residence was another connecting circumstance. The evidence included surveillance of a Holden Commodore registered to Negrine, video at a service station, and evidence that Capovilla was picked up and driven to the Ocean Shores address. The occupier did not identify Negrine from a photo board, but Brown JA concluded the jury could nevertheless accept the Crown's identification based on the video, vehicle registration and surrounding communications ([9]-[13], [60]). The visit occurred after Godschling had failed to arrive, and the Court considered that this supported the inference that Negrine and Capovilla were looking for him in connection with the importation ([54], [57]-[60]).
The search evidence also reinforced that inference. Police found cash in Negrine's residence and in a Ford Festiva accessed with a key found inside the residence. They also found phones, Negrine's identity card, and a note with Godschling's name and bank details. Brown JA considered that these items, read with the messages about money and the communications concerning the operation, supported an inference that Negrine had a financial role and that at least some of the cash was connected with the importation ([15]-[20], [61]). The judgment did not treat the cash or note as independently conclusive; their significance arose from their connection to the other circumstances.
The Court also considered the proposed alternatives: that Negrine was merely associated with Blake and Capovilla, was a prospective purchaser, or was involved only in a domestic transaction. It held that those explanations did not account for the communications before Godschling's attempted return, the later search for him, and the other evidence when considered together ([56], [61]-[62]). The Court treated Negrine's flight while on bail as further circumstantial evidence. It rejected the submission that the jury first had to be satisfied of guilt before considering flight, explaining that the conduct was to be assessed as part of the circumstantial case ([63]).
The judgment presents the governing principles as settled, rather than announcing a new legal test. Brown JA described the applicable principles as “generally uncontroversial” and drew on High Court and Queensland appellate authorities ([36]). The judgment's main contribution is its application of those principles to the particular evidence, including the treatment of communications attributed to the appellant and the cumulative assessment of several uncertain or indirect evidential strands.
M v The Queen supplies the central question for an appeal of this kind: whether, on the whole evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt ([36]-[37]). R v ZT is cited for the need to make allowance for the jury's advantages while independently assessing the sufficiency and quality of the evidence ([38]). R v Miller is cited for the proposition that an appellant must do more than identify weaknesses: the appellant must show that those weaknesses reduce the evidence's probative value so that there is a significant possibility an innocent person was convicted, even after full allowance for the jury's advantages ([39]).
For circumstantial cases, Coughlan v The Queen requires the appellate court to weigh all circumstances and consider whether an inference consistent with innocence was reasonably open ([40]). R v Baden-Clay cautions against piecemeal analysis and distinguishes reasonable inference from conjecture, requiring objective facts to support an inference ([41]-[42]). Brown JA applied these principles when rejecting the approach of treating each phone, message, cash item or identification issue as an isolated question ([43]-[64]).
Nothing in the supplied judgment says that R v Negrine altered or displaced those authorities. The decision is best read as applying the existing tests to a fact-specific circumstantial case. It does not establish that possession of cash, association with alleged co-conspirators, use of a particular phone, or flight alone proves conspiracy. The reasoning depended on the interaction of the evidence identified in the judgment.
At [36], the judgment quotes the M v The Queen question: whether “upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt” of guilt. In plain English, the appeal court asks whether the jury had a proper evidential basis to convict, not whether the appeal judges would themselves have reached the same verdict as jurors in the first instance.
At [38], the judgment explains that the appellate court independently examines the evidence but makes allowance for the jury's advantages in seeing and hearing it. The process is not simply a fresh trial on paper, and the appeal court does not merely repeat the parties' trial cases.
At [40], the Coughlan passage says all the circumstances must be weighed in deciding whether the ultimate inference of guilt was open. For this case, the relevant question was not whether every message or item of cash proved the conspiracy by itself, but whether the combined circumstances permitted the jury's conclusion.
At [41], the quoted Baden-Clay passage says evidence should not be examined “in a piecemeal fashion”. In plain English, an alternative explanation for one item does not necessarily undermine the case if other evidence, considered with it, supports the prosecution inference. Conversely, a collection of suspicious facts still has to support an inference through proved facts rather than speculation.
At [46], Brown JA addressed phone 739 and acknowledged limits in the evidence, including uncertainty about the phone's precise location and the investigating officer's inability to recall whether searches had been made into its registered user. The Court nonetheless considered that the evidence could support the inference that it was found during the searches and used by Negrine. This is a fact-specific assessment, not a general rule that uncertain phone attribution is sufficient.
At [64], Brown JA summarised the result: the circumstances “in combination” allowed the jury to conclude that the only rational inference was that Negrine was party to the agreement. In plain English, the conviction was upheld because the Court considered the combined evidence capable of excluding the reasonable innocent explanations advanced on appeal.
The decision is relevant to appeals against conviction where the ground is that the verdict was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence, particularly when the prosecution case is circumstantial. It illustrates the appellate method where the appellant identifies gaps or ambiguities in individual strands, but the prosecution relies on their combined effect ([36]-[43]).
The judgment's factual setting involved an alleged conspiracy, communications attributed to the appellant, conduct before and after an attempted importation, a visit to locate an absent participant, physical items found in searches, and flight while on bail. Its analysis may be relevant when a court has to consider whether separate strands reinforce each other or whether a reasonable innocent inference remains open. The decision does not say that these particular kinds of evidence are automatically sufficient in other cases.
The specific factual connections mattered. Phone 419 was linked to Negrine through its location with his identity card and his use of it to contact solicitors. Phone 739 had weaker attribution evidence, but the Court assessed it with its timing, the officer's evidence and the later events. The visit to Godschling's residence was assessed alongside communications and the alleged failure of Godschling to arrive. The cash was assessed alongside the messages about money and the bank details in Godschling's name ([45]-[61]).
The decision also highlights that the relevant alternative must be reasonably open on the evidence, rather than merely imaginable. The Court considered the suggested explanations of association, intended purchase and a domestic transaction, then assessed whether they remained reasonable when all the evidence was considered ([51]-[56], [61]-[64]).
The supplied judgment contains no decisions subsequent to R v Negrine and gives no account of later judicial treatment. It was delivered on 10 February 2026, so the material provided does not establish whether any later court has followed, distinguished, criticised or otherwise considered it.
The judgment itself identifies the authorities it considered: M v The Queen, Coughlan v The Queen, R v Baden-Clay, R v Miller and R v ZT ([36]-[42]). It applies their stated principles to the appeal rather than claiming to change them. The judgment also cites Hayes v The Queen in describing the risk of allowing a guilty verdict to stand, and Edwards v The Queen in connection with the treatment of flight as part of the circumstantial case ([37], [63]).
A source-limited account therefore cannot responsibly characterise R v Negrine as having established a broader precedent beyond its stated application. The supplied text supports describing it as an application of existing appellate and circumstantial-evidence principles to the evidence in Negrine's trial. Any account of later treatment would require later judgments not included in the material provided.
The judgment resolves the appeal on the evidence before it, but several evidential features remain specific to this record. The text notes that there was no DNA evidence linking Negrine to items in the Ford Festiva or Holden Commodore ([17]-[18]). It also records that Kleeman did not identify Negrine from a photo board, and that phone 739's exact location and registered user were not conclusively established by the investigating officer's recollection ([13], [22], [46]). Brown JA held that these matters did not prevent the jury's inference on the whole evidence; the judgment does not state that they are immaterial in other cases.
The Court also noted that the precise mechanics of payment and collection were not proved, and that Godschling's precise travel time was not in evidence. It considered that the admissions could be read together and that the missing details did not prevent the relevant inferences ([49], [55]). The decision does not specify how such gaps would affect a different circumstantial case without the same surrounding evidence.
The status of the phone 739 evidence is another record-specific point. The trial participants and trial judge treated the phone's discovery as admitted, but Brown JA stated that it was not formally admitted; she relied instead on the investigating officer's familiarity with the number and evidence about the searches ([22], [46]). The judgment does not set out a general rule about when such evidence is sufficient to establish that a phone was found in a search.
Finally, the supplied materials do not show how later courts have interpreted this decision or how its reasoning might apply to materially different evidential combinations. Those questions cannot be resolved from this judgment alone.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Negrine [2026] QCA 14
PARTIES: R / v / NEGRINE, Daniel Nunes / (appellant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 232 of 2024 / SC No 56 of 2024
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 15 October 2024 (Treston J)
DELIVERED ON: 10 February 2026
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 22 July 2025
JUDGES: Mullins P, Brown JA, Bradley JA
ORDER: Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – where the appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug – where the appellant contended that the evidence only suggested that the appellant had an association with his alleged co-conspirators, and did not prove an agreement to import a border controlled drug – whether it was open for the jury to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt having regard to the evidence as a whole / Coughlan v The Queen (2020) 267 CLR 654; [2020] HCA 15, considered / M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63, considered / R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35, considered / R v Miller (2021) 8 QR 221; [2021] QCA 126, considered / R v ZT (2024) 281 CLR 137; [2025] HCA 9, considered
COUNSEL: S E Harburg for the appellant / S J Hedge for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth) for the respondent
MULLINS P: I have undertaken my own independent assessment of the evidence and concluded that it was not unreasonable for the jury to find the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. I otherwise agree with the reasons of Brown JA that the appeal must be dismissed.
BROWN JA: The appellant seeks to appeal the jury’s verdict of guilty on the charge of conspiracy to import a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence.
The appellant was found guilty after a five day trial and was convicted and sentenced in respect of the charge the following day.
The Court is required to carry out an independent assessment of all of the evidence in order to consider whether upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty.1
The charge
"1. Between 1 August 2011 and 6 March 2012, Daniel Nunes Negrine, Ramesh Godschling, Beaumont Basil Blake, and Michel Henrique Capovilla were parties to an agreement with each other.
The agreement was to import a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug into Australia by transporting it by air from New Zealand.
Each party to the agreement intended that the offence of importing a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug would be committed pursuant to the agreement.
Mr Negrine was a party to the agreement at least by 25 February 2012, and remained a party until 6 March 2012.
The border controlled drug that the parties intended to import was cocaine.
The total quantity of cocaine that the parties intended to import was at least 2.0g.
After Mr Negrine became a party to the agreement, one or more of the following acts were done in furtherance of it:
a.On 26 February 2012, Mr Godschling brought a marketable quantity of cocaine to the Auckland International Airport within his luggage bags;
b.On 26 February 2012, Mr Godschling checked-in the cocaine-laden luggage bags onto a flight destined for Australia;
c.On 26 February 2012, Mr Negrine communicated with Mr Godschling or others in relation to Mr Godschling's expected arrival into Australia.
d.On 26 February 2012, Mr Negrine updated Mr Capovilla in relation to Mr Godschling's expected arrival.
e.On 28 February 2012, Mr Negrine and Mr Capovilla travelled to Mr Godschling's residence at Ocean Shores intending to recover the cocaine they thought he had brought into Australia;
f.On 6 March 2012, Mr Negrine possessed cash in the following amounts:
i.$23,000 located at 4/50 Rutledge Street Coolangatta;
ii.$351,600 located in a Ford Festiva bearing Queensland registration 332RXE.”
The evidence
The evidence relied upon by the Crown included the following.
A number of admissions were made in the proceeding. Those admissions included:that Beaumont Blake travelled to New Zealand on 16 February 2012;on 21 February 2012, Ramesh Godschling travelled from Australia to New Zealand;on 22 February 2012, Blake delivered suitcases containing a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug, namely cocaine, to Godschling at the Skyway Lodge, Auckland, New Zealand;on 26 February 2012, Godschling departed the Skyway Lodge in possession of the suitcases that he had collected on 22 February 2012;Godschling was subsequently arrested prior to boarding a flight in Auckland bound for the Gold Coast, Australia;Godschling had checked in luggage containing a marketable quantity of a controlled drug, cocaine, which was found to have been secreted inside his luggage bags; andthe quantity of cocaine found was 1.388 kilograms. It is admitted that was a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug.
A number of other admissions were made related to text exchanges via mobile phones and some phone conversations intercepted through surveillance.3 A number of messages were in Portuguese translated into English. The translations were uncontentious.
In addition to phone and text conversations, the Crown relied upon video evidence taken at a service station of a Holden Commodore and of a man said to be the appellant. It also relied on the fact that the Holden Commodore was registered to the appellant to establish that it was the appellant who was driving and who subsequently picked up Capovilla on 28 February 2012.
Officer Crompton gave evidence of surveillance of the Commodore wagon which was seen to enter a BP service station, out of which an unidentified male exited. The police had been keeping surveillance on Mr Capovilla, who was picked up by the unidentified male in the Holden Commodore which was registered to the appellant. There was video footage taken from the BP service station. That vehicle was then used to drive to the Ocean Shores address where Mr Godschling had resided.
At the Ocean Shores address, at least two men, who the Crown alleged were the appellant and Capovilla, subsequently went inside the premises and spoke to the occupier of the premises, Mr Kleeman, about Godschling’s whereabouts.
Officer Winchester also gave evidence of a statement taken from Mr Kleeman, who resided at the Ocean Shores address. That statement was subsequently tendered as an exhibit. Mr Kleeman referred to the fact that he had known Mr Godschling for about eight years and Mr Godschling had moved in with him in February 2012 for a short time. He recalled Mr Godschling saying he was going to be travelling to New Zealand in March 2012 to meet a businessman after going to Sydney. He recalled about four or five days after Mr Godschling left his house, two or three gentlemen came to his house. He described them as Latin American in appearance and aged between their late 20s and early 30s. One of the persons spoke to him and asked if Mr Godschling was there. He told them he was not and said he may have flown from New Zealand directly to Bali. The person said he wanted to see Mr Godschling as he had a business meeting about his project. He said the person then left. He said the encounter with these people “would have lasted no more than one minute”.
[13.8] …Blake began communicating with a person using the mobile phone number 0423 311 419 (and Nieves Mendonca) by text. This communication was as follows:
Author Date, Time Content
Blake to 0423 311 419 25/2/12, 17:24:49 Bro do i give that money to them guys ?
0423 311 419 to Blake 25/12/12, 17:26:09 The old mate gave you anything?
Blake to 0423 311419 25/2/12, 17:26:30 Ten do i give to them guys
0423 311 419 to Blake 25/2/12, 17:26:30 There's someone there now?
Blake to 0423 311 419 25/2/12, 17:29:52 The same guy wants me to meet them. Maybe another guy arrived?
0423 311 419 to Blake 25/2/12, 17:31:32 Yes! I just got a txt from g! There a guy there!
Blake to 0423 311419 25/2/12, 17:33:03 Nice. i got no room. Tell him hurry up. Ha ha
Blake to Nieves Mendonca 25/2/12, 17:35:47 Im here bro
Nieves Mendonca to Blake 25/2/12, 17:28:32 Were ? I'm here same pla ce
Blake to 0423 311 419 25/2/12, 18:13:58 Bro you need talk to these lads.
0423 311 419 to Blake 25/2/12, 18:24:43 Dont do anything w them! They dont know how to work say they have to wait for g! Sorry about that!
0423 311419 to Blake 25/2/12, 18:29:58 Bro they will give your things! So do you want to me put some more money in your bank 4 you? I can do that Monday morning 4 you!
Blake to 0423 311419 25/2/12, 18:31:39 Bro they will give your things! So do you want to me put some more money in your bank 4 you? I can do that Monday morning 4 you!
Blake to 0423 311 419 25/2/12, 18:32:39 I take everything and tell them we fix up soon as i here and we working. We can send to them if they left. No prob
Blake to 0423 311 419 25/2/12, 18:40:52 Send a over if he keen or m
The Crown also relied on a message from a mobile phone ending in 739 as being from the appellant to Capovilla. The evidence linking the appellant to that mobile phone was not as strong as the evidence linking him to mobile phone 419. There was no evidence as to where the mobile phone ending in 739 was located, other than it was found during the searches on 6 March 2012. Officer Winchester, the principal investigating officer who was involved in attending the address at Rutledge Street on 6 March 2012, was asked whether there was a second mobile phone number ending in 739 as well as the mobile phone with a number ending in 419. He confirmed that to be the case.6 He confirmed that phone was found to be registered to a woman, Lauren Tamie, and she was not located anywhere, either on a police data base or the electoral roll.7 However, the police officer indicated he wasn’t a hundred per cent sure of that.8 In closing addresses however, the Crown, defence, and subsequently the trial judge treated the fact that the mobile phone ending in 739 was found on 6 March as an admitted fact.9 It was not however an admitted fact.
The message involving the number ending in 739 was the subject of an admission in 13.9 in the following terms:
[13.9] On 26 February 2012 at about 1.20pm, Capovilla and a person using the mobile phone number 0402 882 739 shared the following messages with each other:
Author Date, Time Content
Capovilla 26/2/12, 1.20pm So, do I pass the battery?
0402 882 739 26/2/12, 1.21pm I don't know, I am waiting for the result
Capovilla 26/2/12, 1.22pm He said he was going for a run at 8:10 AM!
0402 882 739 26/2/12, 1.24pm But he said he was going to call me when he arrived at the hotel, he was going to have a rest and call me.
Capovilla 26/2/12, 1.24pm Voice
0402 882 739 26/2/12, 1.25pm Cool, I need to talk to him later. Thanks
Capovilla 26/2/12, 1.26pm Cool, let us know if he calls you earlier
0402 882 739 26/2/12, 2.26pm Thanks
The Crown also relied on the appellant’s flight after failing to appear while on bail and being at large for some ten years, as evidence of his consciousness of guilt. Officer Winchester gave evidence that the appellant was not an Australian citizen but was lawfully in Australia at the time of his arrest.
Evidence was given by the police officers involved in the police investigation revealing the outcome of their various investigations including physical and technological surveillance and supporting the continuity of the evidence in respect of the items found in the searches.
The case at trial
The Crown’s case against the appellant was a circumstantial one.
The Crown particularly relied upon the circumstances that: the appellant communicated with Godschling about his intended arrival into Australia;the appellant communicated with Capovilla in relation to Godschling’s arrival in Australia; the appellant communicated with Blake on a phone ending 419, while he was in New Zealand on 25 February 2012, and communicated with Capovilla on 26 February 2012 with a phone ending 739;the appellant went with Capovilla to Godschling’s address on 28 February after there was evidence that Capovilla could not locate him;a number of items were found in a police search on 6 March which linked the appellant to the mobile phone communications with Capovilla and Blake and to Godschling.
The Crown case involved proof of the following key matters:10
Date Events
14-15 February 2012 Blake and Capovilla have phone conversations about “my mate [who is] over there already” and needing bank details for “the kids tickets”.
16 February 2012 Blake travelled to New Zealand.
21 February 2012 Godschling travelled to New Zealand
22 February 2012 Blake and Godschling have conversations to arrange to meet for Blake to give Godschling the “paddle boards”. / Blake gave Godschling a marketable quantity of cocaine in suitcases at the Skyway Lodge, New Zealand.
25 February 2012 Blake spoke to Nieves Mendoca about meeting at the SkyTower. / Immediately afterwards, Blake exchanged text messages with Nieves Mendoca and the number 0423 311 419 (on the prosecution case, the appellant) including:
26 February 2012 Godschling attempted to travel to Australia with the suitcases containing the cocaine but was stopped by New Zealand authorities. / At about 1.20pm, Capovilla exchanged text messages with 0402 882 739 (on the prosecution case, the appellant) where: / At about 9.46pm Capovilla had a phone conversation with an unknown male in which he said he had no news yet, and spoke about another flight.
28 February 2012 Capovilla was picked up by another man (on the prosecution case, the appellant) driving a Holden Commodore registered to the appellant and driven to Godschling’s address at 132 Balemo Drive, Ocean Shores. / Two men (on the prosecution case, Capovilla and the appellant) went inside and spoke to the occupier of the premises, Mr Kleeman, about Godschling’s whereabouts.
29 February 2012 Capovilla had a conversation with an unknown male person after picking him up from the Gold Coast Airport including reference to “Snow White” and prices per gram. / Capovilla said amongst other things that “things are getting harder. The police is closing in. It is fucked. I sent a guy to New Zealand to pick up “stuff and he had not come back”.11
6 March 2012 Police searched the appellant’s unit at 4/50 Rutledge Street. Police found: / In a Ford Festiva connected to the appellant’s workplace, in which police found around $350,000 cash in the boot. The Ford Festiva was accessed by a key that was inside the Rutledge Street unit on the dining room table. / In a Holden Commodore registered to the appellant, police found a number of mobile phones. / The appellant used a mobile phone ending in 419 to phone a lawyer. / The appellant was arrested and charged with the offence of engaging in a conspiracy to import a markable quantity of border controlled drugs.
10 April 2012 – 16 August 2022 The appellant failed to appear on 10 April 2012 in accordance with his bail undertaking and was at large.
16 August 2022 The appellant was found and arrested by police near Perth. / The appellant produced a fake identity card.
The defence contended that the evidence did not establish that the appellant was a party to a conspiracy to import cocaine and did not prove that the appellant had an agreement with the other people alleged to be involved or knowledge of the details of what that agreement was, or that any of the appellant’s conduct was done in furtherance of the agreement.
A no case application made to the court was dismissed.
Contentions on appeal
The appellant properly concedes that there was evidence of an attempted importation of 1.3 kilograms of cocaine into Australia.
The appellant contends however that it was not open for the jury to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt of the offence beyond reasonable doubt having regard to the evidence as a whole. The appellant submits that at its highest the evidence suggested the appellant had an association with Blake and Capovilla, but it was not sufficient to prove an agreement with the others particularised to import a border controlled drug, namely cocaine which was possessed by Mr Godschling.
The appellant particularly contends that:The text messages said to involve the appellant, which were the subject of paragraphs 13.8 and 13.9 of the admissions were exchanged after the cocaine had been delivered to Mr Godschling and involved a Nieves Mendonca who was not a person alleged to be part of the conspiracy. A message exchange involving Capovilla on 26 February discussing flights, which was the subject of admitted message 13.10, did not involve the appellant;there was no evidence as to who was the user of mobile phone ending 739 at the relevant time and thus the messages on that phone could not be linked to the appellant;even if the number ending 739 could be linked to the appellant, the exchange in admission 13.9 could be reasonably construed as relating to separate travel arrangements from any trip and not linked to the subject of the conspiracy;the evidence of who accompanied Capovilla to Ocean Shores was based on the car used and the surveillance video of the person at the petrol station, but the identity of the appellant was not confirmed by Mr Kleeman. In any event, even if the appellant accompanied Capovilla to Godschling’s residence, it was not capable of proving his entry into the agreement to import cocaine;as to the items found in the police search, the cash that was found in the Ford Festiva could not be connected with the agreement. There was a significant gap in time between the alleged date of import of cocaine and the date of the search, disconnecting the items found from any agreement to import cocaine. There was no rational inference that it could be connected to the importation of cocaine that Mr Godschling was bringing into Australia, as he had already been given the cocaine in New Zealand. Further, notwithstanding Mr Godschling’s name and his bank details found on the note at the Rutledge apartment, there was no evidence that it was the appellant’s note or that any money was paid to Mr Godschling by the appellant; andthe evidence of post-offence conduct demonstrating a consciousness of guilt could not be used to ground an inference of guilt unless the jury was satisfied that the appellant’s flight was due to him knowing he was guilty of the offence. Other hypotheses consistent with innocence could not be excluded.
The appellant also contends that the evidence raised an alternative hypothesis that the appellant was an intended purchaser of the cocaine, rather than a party to the conspiracy. The appellant submits this also provides an explanation for the large amount of cash and his accompanying Capovilla to Ocean Shores and could not be excluded. If it could not be excluded as a reasonable possibility, he was entitled to be found innocent of the charge of conspiracy to import. The items found in the Rutledge Street apartment were not found until well after Godschling had been intercepted on 26 February 2012, and could be explained by his association with other people such as Blake and Capovilla.
Legal principles
“Where, notwithstanding that as a matter of law there is evidence to sustain a verdict, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the question which the court must ask itself is whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty.” (footnotes omitted).
The Court must determine whether, notwithstanding the existence of evidence upon which a jury might convict, “none the less it would be dangerous in all the circumstances to allow the verdict of guilty to stand”.13
The majority of the High Court in R v ZT14 recently confirmed the principles as to whether a verdict is unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence as having been authoritatively stated in M v The Queen. In relation to the allowance that must be made in making such an assessment, the majority observed that was “not confined to witness testimony but may extend to all of the evidence adduced at trial. The advantages spoken of are the advantages the jury had, including by the application of the jurors’ collective wisdom and experience of ordinary affairs, from seeing and hearing the evidence as it unfolds when evaluating factual matters, especially witness credibility”15 (footnotes omitted). As to the appellate court’s independent assessment of the sufficiency and quality of the “whole of the evidence” the majority observed that:16
“… that assessment is undertaken in a context in which an appeal is as much of an adversarial process as the criminal trial from which the appeal is brought and in which it is for the parties to identify the evidence that the appellate court must review and assess and the features of that evidence that support their respective cases on appeal. The appellate court does not determine the grounds of appeal by simply reconsidering the parties’ respective cases at the trial.”
“[a]n appellant who contends that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable or that it was unsupported by the evidence must identify the weaknesses in the evidence and must then also demonstrate that these weaknesses reduced the probative value of the evidence in such a way that the appellate court ought to conclude that even making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted. The mere identification of weaknesses in the prosecution case is not enough to sustain the ground …
…
The burden upon an appellant who relies upon this ground is heavy and an appellant, by merely asserting the ground, does not force the Crown to prove its case for a second time.”
“An assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of guilt in a circumstantial case such as this one requires the appellate court to weigh all the circumstances in deciding whether it was open to the jury to draw the ultimate inference that guilt has been proved to the criminal standard. That inference will not be open if the prosecution has failed to exclude an inference consistent with innocence that was reasonably open.” (footnotes omitted)
“For an inference to be reasonable, it ‘must rest upon something more than mere conjecture. The bare possibility of innocence should not prevent a jury from finding the prisoner guilty, if the inference of guilt is the only inference open to reasonable men upon a consideration of all the facts in evidence’… Further, ‘in considering a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighed in deciding whether there is an inference consistent with innocence reasonably open on the evidence’... The evidence is not to be looked at in a piecemeal fashion, at trial or on appeal.
Further, a criminal trial is accusatorial but also adversarial. Subject to well-defined exceptions, ‘parties are bound by the conduct of their counsel, who exercise a wide discretion in deciding what issues to contest, what witnesses to call, what evidence to lead or to seek to have excluded, and what lines of argument to pursue’.” (footnotes omitted)
“Inference must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation. There can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts which it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical certainty as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inference does not go beyond reasonable probability. But if there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture.”
Consideration
An independent assessment of the evidence in this case does support the fact that on the evidence as a whole when all circumstances are considered, a verdict of guilty was open. While the appellant’s counsel sought to dissect the evidence to undermine the probative value of the evidence relied upon by the Crown, the case was a circumstantial one and all the circumstances must be considered to determine whether the only rational inference is that the appellant is guilty.
As stated above there were a number of admissions made, particularly in terms of the travel arrangements of Mr Blake and Mr Godschling to New Zealand and Mr Godschling’s arrest while in possession of cocaine as he was to board a flight to Australia. Conversations through text message or recorded through surveillance were also admitted. A number of those conversations did not involve the appellant but involved Mr Blake, Mr Capovilla and/or Mr Godschling. They were not sought to be relied upon as evidence of the truth of their contents but as evidence of the agreement to import cocaine between Mr Capovilla, Mr Blake and Mr Godschling.
As to the contention that there was a reasonable possibility that the mobile phones in respect of numbers ending in 419 or at least 739 were not being used by the appellant, the evidence showed that the reasonable inference was that those mobile phones were being used by the appellant. In the case of the phone ending 419, while not registered in the appellant’s name, it was registered to a name that could not be located either on the electoral roll or national police database searches. No other phone was found registered to the appellant. It was found with other items on the table directly linked to the appellant, namely his Brazilian identity card in the wallet. Moreover, the appellant used that phone to contact his solicitors when the police were carrying out the search warrant.
As to the mobile phone ending in 739, the evidence as to 739 was not as limited as contended by the appellant. Although mistakenly referred to by the appellant as being the subject of an admission, it was uncontentious between the Crown and appellant during the trial that it was found on the day of the police search of the residence and vehicles.23 The police officer concerned with the search was aware of the number and that an analysis had been carried out of the number by the police. He was aware it was registered in the name of Lauren Tamie. Cross-examination focussed on the extent of the searches carried out of the name Lauren Tamie, not on whether the mobile phone was one found at all in the searches carried out. Officer Winchester’s evidence was that he assumed that the same searches of 739 had been carried out as for 419 to check whether Laura Tamie existed in fact, but he could not actually recall if the same searches had been made in relation to whom it was registered as had been done for the number ending 419. Officer Winchester’s assumption is of course not evidence. The fact however that Officer Winchester was familiar with the two mobile phone numbers was sufficient evidence to demonstrate it was one of the phones found on the day of the search, whether inside of the residence or the cars. While there were no personal messages of the appellant, that is unsurprising in the case of messages being exchanged for a drug operation. The messages on the phone with Capovilla on 26 February could be inferred to be referring to Godschling given the evidence, from which it could be inferred the appellant and Capovilla were looking for Godschling some two days later on 28 February and that Godschling had left the Skylodge on 26 February with the drugs in his suitcase which was subsequently searched and confiscated at the Auckland airport. The inference was open that it was a phone used by the appellant to exchange the message with Capovilla.
Order
Appeal dismissed.
BRADLEY JA: I agree with the analysis by Brown JA of the features of the evidence that support the appellant’s case and the Crown’s case on appeal, as advanced in the respective written and oral submissions. Considering the sufficiency and quality of the whole of the evidence, it was not unreasonable for the jury to have decided there was no reasonable doubt as to the proof of the appellant’s guilt. I also agree with her Honour’s conclusion that, on the whole of the evidence, a jury could be satisfied the appellant was guilty of the offence of conspiracy to import a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug.
It follows that I concur with her Honour’s conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed.
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493-494. ↩
MFI C. ↩
Admissions 13.1- 13.11. ↩
AB Vol 2 125/44. ↩
AB Vol 2 126/1-5. ↩
AB Vol 2 134 /40-50. ↩
AB Vol 2 136/1-15. ↩
See also AB Vol 2 138/4-10. ↩
AB Vol 1 24 /18-21, AB Vol 1 33/34-39 and AB Vol 1 56/27-30. ↩
As summarised in the Respondent’s outline. ↩
The correct quote is “I sent a guy to New Zealand and he hasn’t come back until now.” ↩
(1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493. ↩
M at 492-3 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ, quoting from Hayes v The Queen (1973) 47 ALJR 603 at 604. ↩
(2025) 281 CLR 137. ↩
R
Negrine [2026] QCA 14
(2024) 281 CLR 137
(2020) 267 CLR 654
(1994) 181 CLR 487
(2016) 258 CLR 308
Appeal dismissed. Mullins P and Bradley JA agreed with Brown JA that the conviction appeal should be dismissed: [1], [66]-[68].
Mr Kleeman did not however identify the appellant from a photo board shown to him in July 2012.5
On 29 February 2012, there was a phone call recorded after Capovilla picked up an unidentified male from the airport, which was the subject of admission 13.11. In that conversation he was recorded as saying: “I sent a guy to New Zealand and he hasn’t come back until now……Yes, I am so worried.” He stated that he was “worried because he was meant to come back on Sunday”. Capovilla agreed that he had sent him to pick up stuff and had given him money. The appellant was not said to be a party to that phone conversation, but it was relied on as a circumstance from which it could be inferred that Capovilla, in the company of the appellant, attended Ocean Shores to try and locate Godschling in relation to the importing of cocaine from New Zealand.
The Crown also relied on various items that were found when they executed a warrant at the address of the appellant. These items included mobile phones, a wallet containing a Brazilian identity card, keys to a Ford Festiva found parked outside on the street and a handwritten note with bank details and the name of Godschling. All of the items were found on the dining room table. In the house, $23,000 was found in the lining of the back of a couch in the loungeroom and underneath a couch in the bedroom. In the Ford Festiva, police found $350,000 worth of cash in the boot and documents connected to the appellant’s workplace. The Ford Festiva was accessed using a key that was on the dining room table with the other items.
Officer Winchester also confirmed that a document found in the Ford Festiva was of a repair to wiper blades and indicator bulbs and that the company responsible for the repairs employed the appellant. That company also employed Mr Blake.
No DNA evidence was found from inside the Ford Festiva linking the appellant to it or the items found.
The police also found a Holden Commodore registered to the appellant parked outside in which there were a number of mobile phones. There was no DNA evidence linking the appellant to the items found.
A mobile phone with a number 0423 311 419 (mobile phone ending in 419) was found on the dining room table inside the Rutledge Street unit on 6 March 2012. The appellant was observed using that mobile phone to phone a solicitor. Officer Winchester confirmed there were no messages on the phone ending in 419 between Mr Negrine and his partner, when the messages on the phone were analysed.
The mobile phone ending 419 was found with the wallet containing the Brazilian identity card. The details on the identity card support the fact that the identity card was the appellant’s identity card. The name to which the mobile phone ending 419 was registered was not found on the national police data base or the Australian Electoral Roll.
The message involving the phone ending in 419 was contained in admission 13.8 and was in the following terms:
According to the Crown, the appellant wrongly contends that some individual pieces of evidence do not conclusively prove the appellant’s involvement in the conspiracy or individually leave other explanations open. The Crown contends that is not a proper approach to considering the strength of a circumstantial case, which should be considered by reference to the combination of strands of evidence and the inference available on the whole of the evidence, not individual strands in isolation. While the appellant had accepted that principle in his submissions, his contentions were inconsistent with the principle which applied to circumstantial cases.
As to the messages themselves, it is unsurprising that the appellant was not referred to explicitly in the exchanges, given the covert nature of the operation. However, viewed as a whole it could be inferred it was the appellant who was party to a number of the messages. Further, the messages with third parties created part of the context in terms of the timing of events of the conspiracy, from which inferences could be drawn in respect of the evidence involving the appellant, given the co-incidence in timing and people involved, although they themselves were not admissible against the appellant for the truth of their contents.
It was admitted that Blake had travelled to New Zealand on 16 February in advance of Godschling, made contact with him in text messages and delivered the cocaine to him. Prior to Blake leaving, he had been exchanging messages with Capovilla including to get a bank account for “our friend”. While the cocaine had been given to Godschling on 22 February, Blake and he had arranged to meet up for dinner that night and again on 23 February. There was no evidence that the appellant was party to or knew of those conversations.
The appellant sought to argue that the respondent had not proved Godschling’s travel arrangements, which has some importance in terms of inferences that can be drawn against the appellant. While Godschling’s precise time of travel was not, for some inexplicable reason, in evidence, it can reasonably be inferred that Godschling’s flight to Australia was on 26 February given the admissions that Godschling had left the Skyway Lodge in possession of the suitcases on 26 February and was arrested prior to boarding the plane in Auckland for the Gold Coast. The admissions were plainly to be read together.
The first message between the appellant and one of the alleged parties to the agreement to import cocaine was not until 25 February. That was however prior to Godschling’s purported departure from New Zealand for Australia and involved Blake (who had delivered the cocaine to Godschling). The messages between Blake and the number ending 419 on 25 February support a clear inference that the appellant was a person whom Blake knew, that he had knowledge of what was transpiring in New Zealand involving Blake and Godschling and that he was giving some direction to Blake. For example, Blake asked him whether he should give money to “them guys”. It could reasonably be inferred that the appellant was in control of money in relation to the operation, as he offered to transfer more money into Blake’s bank account. Blake is asked whether someone is there and says that the same guy wants him to meet them. The appellant’s response to Blake stated “[y]es! I just got a txt [sic] from g! There a guy there!”.24 The appellant later states that “…They dont [sic] know how to work say they have to wait for g! Sorry about that!” although five minutes later he sends a message saying they will give Blake things and asking whether he wants more money transferred to his account.25 Given Blake and Godschling were both in New Zealand it could readily be inferred that the reference to “g” was to Godschling. The appellant contends that given the exchange is after the cocaine had been delivered to Godschling prior to the date of that message on 25 February 2012, it could not be inferred that the messages related to its delivery or any part of the arrangements for the import of cocaine from another country. That contention must be rejected. The fact that it involved the importation of cocaine from New Zealand can not only be inferred from the fact that the appellant was engaging with Blake and referred to “g”, but that it was taking place prior to Godschling’s departure from New Zealand. The operation was plainly still ongoing at that stage.
The appellant contends that Nieves Mendonca’s involvement in the message exchange supports the reasonable inference that it is another transaction that is occurring and that the money for the cocaine would have been handed over earlier or Blake wouldn’t have been given the cocaine to supply to Godschling. That is a matter of speculation, but in any event that possibility can be excluded given the reference to “g”, Blake being a party to the messages and that the appellant’s responses demonstrate knowledge of what was transpiring in New Zealand. It was not alleged Nieves Mendonca was part of the conspiracy. However, it was open to infer from the messages that Nieves Mendonca and his men were playing some role in the operation relating to the drug importation, for which they were to be paid or that the payment for the cocaine had been deferred while other matters were put in place. It can reasonably be inferred that the messages between the appellant and Blake show that what Mendonca and his men were doing was linked to what Godschling was doing and the appellant’s knowledge of what Blake and Godschling were doing.
In the circumstances, the inference is open that the user of 419 was aware of and a party to the operation in New Zealand and that “g” referred to Godschling. In the context of Blake and Godschling travelling to New Zealand, the obtaining and delivery of cocaine by Blake to Godschling and the time spent in New Zealand before Godschling’s departure from New Zealand, the possibility that the messages between Blake and the appellant related to another transaction could reasonably be excluded. Similarly, the possibility that the exchange between 739 and Capovilla related to another transaction could be excluded when it occurred on the same day as Godschling was due to fly. Given Capovilla was told to wait for the result before handing over the battery, and given the reference to the person in question calling the appellant when he arrived at the hotel, it could be inferred that this conversation was referring to Godschling while in transit.
Consistent with the fact that Godschling was travelling to Australia as part of the conspiracy, Capovilla had another conversation on 26 February 2012, recorded in admission 13.10, referring to someone leaving on a flight: “ You must be there at 10, at the 10:30 is the check-in flight because the flight leaves at 11.”
The only rational inference was that the appellant’s discussion on the number ending 739 was in relation to Godschling is further supported by the evidence of a visit to Godschling’s residence on 28 February by Capovilla and a person who could be inferred to be the appellant. That was two days after the discussions about travel. The acts of visiting Godschling’s residence and asking about his whereabouts were overt acts in relation to the agreement to import cocaine.
The operation to import cocaine into Australia from New Zealand was ongoing at the time of the exchange of messages with Blake and Godschling in New Zealand at the time and it can reasonably be inferred that messages exchanged between Blake and the appellant, and later between the number 739 (which can be reasonably inferred to have been the appellant) and Capovilla, who were in Australia, related to the importation of cocaine from New Zealand. Further, when regard is had to all of the evidence, it was open to conclude that the only rational inference that could be drawn was that the appellant was a party to the agreement to import cocaine from overseas, notwithstanding that the precise mechanics of the operation in terms of payment and collection of cocaine by Blake were not the subject of evidence.
The evidence of the appellant’s involvement in the message exchanges prior to the time Godschling was to board the plane to return to Australia and the evidence of the appellant’s involvement after Godschling’s arrest when he did not arrive in Australia, could exclude the reasonable possibility that the appellant’s involvement was as a mere associate of Blake and Capovilla or as a potential purchaser of the cocaine.
Given Godschling was arrested, there was clear evidence of his non-arrival in Australia. A conversation between Capovilla and an unidentified male on 29 February which did not involve the appellant, the day after evidence of a visit to Godschling’s residence by Capovilla and the appellant, where Capovilla expressed his concern about the person’s non-arrival, was consistent with the fact that the visit to Godschling’s residence was in furtherance of the agreement to import cocaine from New Zealand.
In that conversation, Capovilla on 29 February could clearly be inferred to be speaking of Godschling. He referred to being worried because he had sent a guy to New Zealand and he hadn’t come back and he had paid him “a little” money and “handed it over to the guys and the guys did everything for him”, and made reference to Bali which was Mr Godschling’s country of origin and to receiving a message from the person’s wife concerned that she had not heard from him for three days and that he had asked a guy to check whether he boarded the plane or had arrived or whether “shit went wrong when he arrived”. This is strong evidence that Capovilla was referring to Mr Godschling in that conversation and his lack of return. He also said he had given the guy a little money inferring that Godschling was still to be fully paid.
While the appellant was not a party to that conversation, the evidence of the appellant subsequently meeting Capovilla by picking him up in a car registered to the appellant on 28 February and then driving to Godschling’s address in search of him strongly supports the fact that he accompanied Capovilla because he was a party to the agreement to import cocaine and they were searching for Godschling who was responsible for bringing the cocaine into Australia.
As the appellant properly conceded, the jury could have been satisfied from video evidence of the service station that the person driving the Holden Commodore which was registered to the appellant was in fact the appellant. The fact that Kleeman did not identify the appellant did not otherwise undermine the evidence of the video, the car being registered to the appellant and the evidence of communications between Capovilla and the appellant which supported the inference it was the appellant who attended the residence with Capovilla. While the appellant bravely sought to contend that there was a reasonable possibility that the appellant being with Capovilla and attending Godschling’s residence was not associated with the alleged agreement to import cocaine, that possibility can be readily excluded, given the sequence of events that had occurred, evidence of the appellant’s involvement prior to Godschling leaving New Zealand and the coincidence of the search for Godschling some two days after.
The evidence of the appellant’s involvement was strengthened by the evidence revealed by the police search. There was a reasonable inference that the cash found in the Ford Festiva and house on 6 March was connected with the importing of the cocaine. At least in part it could be inferred that the money was for payment of Godschling, given the conversation of 26 February between Capovilla and the mobile 739, which could be reasonably inferred to be the appellant, where after Capovilla asked whether he should pass the battery the appellant said: “I don’t know, I am waiting for the result”. The lapse in time between when the items were found and the proposed importation and Godschling’s non-arrival was not significant and did not disconnect the items found from the agreement to import cocaine. The money found was consistent with the appellant having a source of funds which supported his offer to pay Blake money by way of transfer to a bank account and his possession of Godschling’s bank details. The finding of the mobile phone ending in 419, the appellant’s identity card and Godschling’s bank details and the cash found strongly supported an inference together with the messages from that phone that the appellant knew of the intended importation of cocaine, was a party to that agreement to import it and was responsible for payments to Blake and Godschling. The cash found could at least in part be inferred to have been in furtherance of the agreement. To the extent that the appellant sought to contend that the evidence of the cash and the appellant’s involvement could reasonably be inferred to be as a purchaser or as an associate and not as a party to the conspiracy, that possibility could be excluded. The only rational inference for the appellant being involved in a conversation with Blake while in New Zealand, his conversation with Capovilla about waiting for the result, having Godschling’s bank details and searching for Godschling with Capovilla was that he was party to the agreement to import the cocaine.
The evidence of the appellant attending the address of Mr Godschling on 28 February 2012, together with his possession of Godschling’s bank details and participation in messages on 25 and 26 February with Blake and Capovilla, also support the fact that the jury could be satisfied that the only rational inference was that the appellant was not simply involved in a domestic drug transaction but that he was a party to the agreement to import cocaine and undertook overt acts pursuant to that agreement to further the importation. The notion he was involved only in a domestic transaction was not explicable by the messages in which the appellant was involved prior to Godschling returning to Australia.
The evidence of his flight when on bail of this offence was clearly further evidence capable of demonstrating consciousness of guilt. At the time of his arrest and granting of bail, the appellant, although not an Australian citizen, was lawfully in Australia. There was no evidence of any other offences. The jury could be satisfied that there was no other rational explanation for the appellant’s flight other than his seeking to escape because he was conscious of his guilt of the offence. It was not necessary, as the appellant contends, for the jury to consider the appellant was guilty before using that post-offence conduct as part of the circumstantial case. It was evidence to be assessed as part of the circumstantial case.26
While individual pieces of evidence could not of themselves establish the appellant’s guilt, the circumstances in combination were sufficient, when considered as a whole, for a jury to conclude that the only rational inference was that the appellant was a party to the agreement to import the cocaine possessed by Godschling from New Zealand and had carried out acts in furtherance of that agreement and to exclude any alternative reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence.
A jury could be satisfied on the evidence as a whole that the appellant was guilty of the offence.
ZT at 145 [9]. ↩
ZT at 146 [11]. ↩
(2021) 8 QR 221 at 230 [18]-[19] per Sofronoff P, Morrison JA and Ryan J. ↩
(2020) 267 CLR 654 at 674-5 [55]. ↩
(2016) 258 CLR 308 at 323-4 [47]-[48], citing Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 661, R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618 at 637-8 and Nudd v The Queen (2006) 80 ALJR 614 at 618. ↩
Baden-Clay at 326 [55], citing Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 at 169-70. ↩
[1940] AC 152 at 169-70. ↩
Caswell at 169-70. ↩
Although there was no evidence as to whether it was found in the house or the car outside. ↩
Exhibit 1 at [13.8]. ↩
Exhibit 1 at [13.8]. ↩
Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 210. ↩