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[2020] NSWDC 287
plaintiff. Moon was convicted and ordered to serve a 12-month Community Correction Order for affray and 1 year 5 months imprisonment by way of an Intensive Correction Order, with 150 hours of community...
The judge sentenced three men for an affray and an assault on a man who had tried to intervene. The assault caused a fracture around the victim's eye. All three were treated as legally responsible for the assault, but the judge did not treat them as equally culpable for sentencing. Moon was considered the most responsible, McCarthy somewhat less responsible, and Clarke the least responsible. The court also considered Moon's substantial provocation, the close connection between the offences, the offenders' backgrounds and prospects, and the guilty pleas. Moon and McCarthy received prison sentences to be served in the community under Intensive Correction Orders for the assault. Clarke received Community Correction Orders for both offences. All three also received Community Correction Orders for affray.
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2,122 words · generated 28/09/2026
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The District Court sentenced Lachlan Moon, Bradley McCarthy and Daniel Clarke after each pleaded guilty to affray and assault occasioning actual bodily harm in company. The offences arose from events in Junee in the early hours of 30 March 2019. The judge records that the offenders had initially pleaded not guilty and changed their pleas after a jury was empanelled ([8], [14]).
The immediate background was an escalating dispute between Moon and Joseph Clemson. Clemson had attended a 21st birthday party after drinking, though he was not invited. The agreed facts described him slapping Moon on the back of the head, standing over him, threatening him and later making calls in which he said he was coming to Moon and would kill him ([29]-[34]). The court also accepted that Clemson had previously insulted Moon because Moon's father was a police officer, including calling him a “copper dog” ([31]-[33]).
Moon, McCarthy, Clarke and another man went to George Street. Clemson confronted Moon outside Andrew Hatch's premises, then retreated inside when he saw other people behind the group. Hatch came to the front gate and tried to address the men. Moon insulted and punched Hatch twice. McCarthy also punched him. Hatch fell and was struck several more times, although the agreed facts did not identify who delivered those blows ([34]-[35]).
Hatch suffered a fracture to the left orbit, was taken to hospital and discharged the next day. The judge regarded the injury as substantial, while observing that it was not at the most serious end of actual bodily harm ([35], [38]). The judge could not determine beyond reasonable doubt who delivered the blow that caused the fracture. Clarke was not proved to have struck a blow, but he admitted the offence as part of the joint criminal enterprise ([36]).
The outcome differentiated between the offenders. Moon received 1 year 5 months imprisonment by way of an Intensive Correction Order for the assault, with 150 hours community service, and a 12-month Community Correction Order for affray. McCarthy received 1 year 2 months imprisonment by way of an Intensive Correction Order for the assault, also with 150 hours community service, and a 15-month Community Correction Order for affray. Clarke received an 18-month Community Correction Order for the assault with 120 hours community service, and a 15-month Community Correction Order for affray ([57]-[65]).
The judge identified several sentencing purposes, including accountability, denunciation, general deterrence and recognition of the harm to Hatch. He considered that protection of the community was not a significant issue because he did not regard the offenders as a threat to the community ([16]-[19]). He treated the assault as the more serious offence, notwithstanding the higher maximum penalty for affray, and described the affray itself as low in objective criminality ([10]-[13], [34]).
A central issue was parity. The judge relied on the principle that equal justice requires treating like cases alike, but also permits different treatment where there are rational grounds for distinguishing the offenders. He referred to Postiglione and to Rothman J's discussion in Jimmy ([23]-[24]). He then made an express comparison of culpability: Moon was most culpable, McCarthy somewhat less culpable, and Clarke less culpable again ([37]). This explains why common liability did not lead to identical orders.
The court treated joint criminal enterprise as establishing each offender's responsibility for the assault, even though the evidence did not establish who caused the fracture or whether Clarke struck Hatch at all ([35]-[37]). At the same time, individual participation remained relevant to sentence. Moon started the assault. McCarthy threw a punch. Clarke's proven role was more limited, and the judge accepted that his objective culpability was lower ([36]-[37], [46]).
Provocation was especially important for Moon. The judge accepted that Clemson's conduct had been substantial and had occurred over time, including taunts about Moon's father and threats on the night. That history materially affected Moon's affray sentence. It also provided context for why the confrontation happened, but the judge emphasised that it did not directly explain or excuse the attack on Hatch in the same way ([26]-[28], [38]-[39]). The court therefore did not treat provocation as erasing the seriousness of the assault.
Totality was also addressed. The offences were distinct, but closely connected in time and circumstances. The judge said that, if separate full-time prison terms had been imposed, accumulation would have been slight and concurrency substantial ([20]-[22]). The sentences remained separate, but the court accounted for the relationship between the offences in assessing the overall result.
Personal circumstances also mattered. Moon had a limited prior history, substantial support and good rehabilitation prospects. McCarthy had no criminal convictions, strong employment and family support, and the judge accepted his remorse and acceptance of responsibility. Clarke had a difficult upbringing, stable employment, a partner and young children, and good prospects of rehabilitation ([24], [29]-[45], [51]). The judge also accepted a 5% reduction for the guilty pleas under s 25D(2)(c) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ([15]).
This is a sentencing decision applying existing principles to three offenders. It does not purport to formulate a new test for parity, joint criminal enterprise or totality. The judge drew on authorities concerning totality, including Johnson, Mill, Holder and R v XX, and on parity authorities including Postiglione and Jimmy ([20]-[24]). The judgment's central contribution in this case is its application of those principles to co-offenders with different roles and personal circumstances.
On parity, the judgment adopts the approach expressed in Jimmy: equality does not mean identical sentences in every case. It means treating similar offenders similarly and explaining differences by rational and reasonable grounds ([24]). Here those grounds included the degree of participation, Moon's provocation, and the distinct personal circumstances of each offender ([37], [46], [51]).
For joint criminal enterprise, the judge accepted equal legal responsibility for the assault but did not equate that with equal sentencing culpability. The judgment illustrates that distinction in practice: Clarke could be sentenced for the joint offence without a finding that he personally struck Hatch, while his lesser participation informed the type of order imposed ([36]-[37], [46]).
The judgment also discusses the victim's proximity to his home as a possible aggravating consideration. Referring to R v Lulham, the judge said an offence need not occur inside a dwelling to potentially fall within the relevant aggravating factor, depending on the facts and proximity. But the court was uncertain whether Hatch was on, just outside, or at the boundary of the property, and expressed doubt about whether the facts brought the offence within that factor ([48]-[50]). The judgment does not establish a new rule on that issue.
The decision notes that R v Way had been overturned by Muldrock “for different reasons” in the discussion of objective seriousness and standard non-parole periods ([36]). It does not undertake a detailed account of that appellate history or use it to determine a contested standard non-parole period. The judge said the parties' reference to the middle range was a convenient point of comparison, but described the assault as below the middle range ([36]).
The judgment itself contains no information about how later courts treated it. No claim about its subsequent citation, approval or adoption can be established from the supplied text. It is therefore safest to treat its reasoning as a case-specific sentencing application, not to infer a wider precedential status beyond what the judgment says.
At [24], the judge states that parity means “treating alike alike and those that are unalike to the extent of their unlikeness on rational and reasonable grounds.” In plain English, co-offenders should not automatically receive identical sentences. Differences are appropriate when the court can explain them by relevant differences between the cases.
At [37], the judge identifies Moon as most culpable, McCarthy as slightly less culpable, and Clarke as less culpable again. This is the practical application of parity to their roles. Moon initiated the attack, McCarthy punched Hatch, and Clarke was not proved to have struck him.
At [39], the judge says that Clemson's antipathy towards Moon significantly increased the importance of provocation in Moon's sentencing. The court accepted that the hostility was longstanding and connected to Moon's father's occupation. The passage explains why Moon's affray order was shorter than those of the other offenders, while not removing his responsibility for what happened to Hatch.
At [46], the judge accepts that Clarke's offending did not cross the imprisonment threshold under s 5 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. In practical terms, the judge considered Clarke's role and circumstances insufficient to warrant imprisonment, and imposed Community Correction Orders instead.
At [55], the judge explains why the sentencing reasons are detailed: careful explanation of the reasoning can support respect for the court's ultimate decision. This is a statement about judicial reasoning and transparency, rather than a rule governing the elements of either offence.
The reasoning is most directly relevant to sentencing situations involving multiple offenders convicted of common offending, where legal responsibility is shared but their participation differs. The judgment shows how a court may recognise joint criminal enterprise responsibility while still assessing the offender's individual culpability ([35]-[37]).
It is also relevant where an offender's conduct is influenced by provocation directed at them, but the eventual victim is a different person. The court distinguished the direct relevance of provocation to Moon's affray from its contextual relevance to the assault on Hatch ([38]-[39]). The case does not say that provocation negates responsibility for harm to a bystander.
The totality discussion may be relevant where multiple offences arise close together in a single sequence of events but remain distinct offences. The court considered whether the offences overlapped and how concurrency or accumulation would affect the overall sentence ([20]-[22], [50]).
The judgment may also be useful where sentencing submissions rely on a victim's proximity to a home as an aggravating circumstance. It highlights the importance of the actual location and surrounding facts, while recording uncertainty about whether Hatch was on his property and whether the statutory factor applied ([48]-[50]).
Finally, the decision illustrates the need to separate objective seriousness from personal circumstances. The court considered injury, planning, participation and context alongside records, remorse, employment, support and rehabilitation prospects ([24], [36]-[46], [51]). It does not establish that these factors will carry the same weight in another case.
The provided judgment contains no later decisions, citations or appellate history concerning R v Moon; R v Clarke; R v McCarthy. It is therefore not possible to say from this source whether later courts followed, applied, distinguished or criticised this decision.
The judgment does identify authorities that informed the sentencing reasoning at the time. It cites Johnson, Mill, Holder and R v XX on totality; Postiglione and Jimmy on parity; and considers R v Lulham on the possible relevance of offending near a victim's home ([20]-[24], [48]). Those are authorities relied on within this judgment, not evidence of how later courts treated this judgment itself.
The citation of R v Way and reference to Muldrock record the judge's observation that Way had been overturned for different reasons ([36]). That discussion should not be mistaken for later treatment of the present decision.
Several questions remain unresolved on the face of the judgment. First, the agreed facts did not identify who delivered the further blows to Hatch after he fell, or which blow caused the orbital fracture. The judge therefore could not attribute the injury-causing blow to a particular offender, while still sentencing all three on their joint criminal enterprise responsibility ([35]-[37]).
Second, the precise location of the assault was unclear. Hatch was described as being “at the gate”, but the judge could not determine whether he was inside the property, at its boundary or outside it. That factual uncertainty limited the court's ability to determine whether the home-related aggravating factor applied ([49]-[50]).
Third, the decision does not explain in detail the later appellate treatment of the statutory guilty-plea provisions. The judge described Pt 3, Div 1A as containing ambiguity and holes, and selected s 25D(2)(c) for the circumstances before the court ([15]). The judgment records the 5% reduction, but does not provide a broader construction of that provision.
Fourth, this source does not establish how the relative sentences were treated on any appeal or in subsequent cases. The sentencing outcome and the judge's reasons are available, but later history cannot be determined from the supplied judgment text.
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Judgment
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 10 June 2020
(1983) 3 NSWLR 245
(2004) 78 ALJR 616
(1988) 166 CLR 59
(1997) 189 CLR 295
Moon was convicted and ordered to serve a 12-month Community Correction Order for affray and 1 year 5 months imprisonment by way of an Intensive Correction Order, with 150 hours of community service, for assault; McCarthy received a 15-month Community Correction Order for affray and 1 year 2 months imprisonment by way of an Intensive Correction Order, with 150 hours of community service, for assault; Clarke received Community Correction Orders of 15 months for affray and 18 months for assault, the latter with 120 hours of community service.