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[2025] QCA 77
respondent. The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
Millar argued that requiring her to serve 12 weeks in custody was too severe given her four young children, her care of her terminally ill mother and the prospects of rehabilitation. The Court of Appeal accepted that substantial mitigation could have supported a sentence without actual custody, but said that this alone did not make the sentence manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge had considered those matters and significantly reduced the custodial period, while also treating the repeated supply-related offending as serious. The Court found no sentencing error meeting the applicable threshold and refused leave to appeal.
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2,282 words · generated 07/10/2026
In R v Millar [2025] QCA 77, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered an application for leave to appeal against sentence. The applicant, Sheridan Paige Millar, had pleaded guilty to eight counts of supplying a dangerous drug, two counts of possessing a dangerous drug and one count of possessing something used in the commission of supplying a dangerous drug. She was sentenced in the District Court at Rockhampton on 19 March 2025. The Court of Appeal refused leave on 20 May 2025. Boddice JA gave the substantive reasons, with Bond JA and Bradley JA joining them ([1]–[5], [30]).
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The offending occurred over three and a half weeks when Millar was 31. Five supply counts involved her contacting her then de-facto partner and confirming sales for him. She was sentenced on the basis that she facilitated supplies to unknown people through him. Three other counts involved customers contacting Millar, after which she offered to supply drugs. Those counts were treated as arrangements to supply, not completed supplies ([6], [8]–[9]).
The other charges arose from a police search at Millar’s home. Police seized .486 grams of a substance analysed as methylamphetamine, one gram of cannabis, pipes and a mobile phone. Millar admitted owning the items, and her possession of the drugs was treated as being for personal use. The judgment records that she cooperated with police, including providing her PIN code when required under the warrant ([10]).
The sentencing judge imposed concurrent imprisonment terms. Millar received 18 months’ imprisonment on each of six supply counts, with lesser terms on other counts. She was convicted but not further punished on the remaining supply and possession counts. A parole release date of 19 June 2025 was set ([3]). The sole proposed appeal ground was that the 12-week custodial component was manifestly excessive ([4]).
The sentencing judge acknowledged significant personal circumstances. Millar had entered an early guilty plea, was the sole parent of four young children, was no longer with her de-facto partner and assisted in caring for her terminally ill mother. The judge also accepted that she had started using illicit drugs nine or ten years earlier, was said to be free of illicit drug use, and was remorseful. Her limited criminal history, lack of reoffending while on bail and family circumstances were relevant to whether she should serve actual custody ([13]–[14]).
The judge nevertheless concluded that a prison sentence without actual custody would inadequately reflect all relevant circumstances. Millar had committed the offences while caring for four young children, and the offending was serious. The judge found that the mitigating factors warranted a considerable reduction in the custodial term, significantly reducing the time actually to be served ([14]–[15]).
The Court’s central point was that the availability of a more lenient sentence does not itself establish that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. Boddice JA accepted that Millar’s mitigating circumstances could have supported a sentence without actual custody. But the question on appeal was not whether another sentencing option was open. It was whether the sentence imposed met the threshold for appellate interference ([18]).
The judgment stated that the applicant had to show that the sentence was “so different to that which would be imposed in comparable circumstances” as to indicate a misapplication of sentencing principles, or that it was “plainly unreasonable or unjust” ([19]). Applying that test, the Court found no misapplication of principle ([20]).
Three features of the sentencing decision were particularly important. First, the sentencing judge had treated the offending as serious. Millar had involved herself in methylamphetamine supply over several weeks, and deterrence and denunciation properly carried weight ([11], [21]). Second, the sentencing judge had considered the substantial mitigation and significantly reduced the actual custodial period ([22]). Third, the judge had expressly considered whether custody was warranted in light of Millar’s children and her care of her terminally ill mother. The conclusion that seriousness still called for actual custody was within the proper exercise of sentencing discretion ([23]).
The Court also rejected the argument that Millar’s family responsibilities, by themselves, made actual custody plainly unreasonable or unjust. It did not treat those responsibilities as irrelevant. Rather, it noted that they had been expressly reflected in the substantial reduction of the period to be served. On the Court’s analysis, those circumstances did not make a custodial sentence unavailable ([24]–[25]).
Nor did the fact that the reduced period was short establish error. The Court acknowledged the utility of short sentences as a sentencing consideration, referring to R v Rogan [2021] QCA 269 at [18]. But it reasoned that the short period in Millar’s case resulted from the judge’s significant reduction for mitigation. In that context, the shortness of the actual custody did not demonstrate misapplication of principle or make the sentence plainly unreasonable or unjust ([27]).
Finally, the Court identified differences from Rogan: Millar had a prior history for drug offending, the present offending represented an escalation from personal use to supplying, and there was no evidence of meaningful efforts at rehabilitation ([28]). These points supported the Court’s conclusion that Rogan did not require the proposed ground to succeed in Millar’s case.
The judgment does not purport to change the legal test for manifest excess. It applies the test stated at [19]: an applicant must show a sufficiently marked difference from sentences in comparable circumstances to indicate a misapplication of sentencing principles, or show that the sentence was plainly unreasonable or unjust. The reasons do not set out a comprehensive account of the doctrine’s historical development or identify a new rule.
The decision’s practical contribution is its application of that test to a short custodial period produced by substantial mitigation. The Court distinguished between two propositions: a non-custodial outcome might have been available, and the custodial outcome actually imposed was therefore manifestly excessive. The first proposition did not establish the second ([18]–[20]).
The judgment also illustrates how family and caregiving circumstances may feature in the review of sentence without automatically determining whether actual custody is appropriate. The sentencing judge considered the children and Millar’s care for her mother, and the Court treated the significant reduction in custody as reflecting those circumstances. The reasons do not say that family responsibilities are subordinate in every case, or prescribe a particular reduction for comparable circumstances. They address the specific sentence and the appeal ground before the Court ([14]–[15], [23]–[25]).
The decision’s treatment of short sentences is similarly confined. It recognises the utility of short sentences as a factor for consideration, citing Rogan, but says that a short period is not by itself evidence of error when it results from a substantial mitigation-based reduction ([27]). It does not establish that every short custodial sentence is useful, nor that a brief period of actual custody will always be appropriate.
Accordingly, the “after” position visible in this judgment is one of application and clarification within the case’s facts, not an announced alteration of the governing threshold. The judgment cites the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 only in reporting Millar’s submission concerning s 9(2)(a)(ii) ([16]). It does not independently analyse that provision’s text or give a general interpretation of it.
At [18], Boddice JA wrote: “the fact that such a sentence may have been open, is not sufficient to support a ground of appeal that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.” In plain English, the appeal court was not deciding whether a non-custodial sentence could have been chosen. It was deciding whether the sentence actually imposed was so wrong by the relevant appellate standard that it should be disturbed. The existence of a more lenient lawful option did not answer that question.
At [19], the Court stated the required threshold: the sentence must be so different from what would be imposed in comparable circumstances as to show misapplication of principle, or be “plainly unreasonable or unjust.” This frames the appellate inquiry. Disagreement about the weight given to mitigation is not, without more, enough under the test expressed in the judgment.
At [23], the Court noted that the sentencing judge expressly considered the applicant’s circumstances, including caring for four children and a terminally ill mother, and concluded that the seriousness of the offending warranted actual custody. The Court held that conclusion fell within a proper exercise of sentencing discretion. The passage shows that consideration of personal circumstances does not necessarily require a particular sentencing result.
At [25], the Court emphasised that the family responsibilities were “expressly reflected in the reduction” of actual custody. The plain-English point is that the Court regarded mitigation as having been taken into account through a shorter custodial period, rather than treating the existence of those responsibilities as a complete answer to the case for custody.
At [27], the Court explained why the short period did not demonstrate error: it resulted from a significant reduction from what otherwise would have been served, having regard to mitigation. The judgment therefore treats the source of the short period as important. It was not, in the Court’s reasoning, an unexplained or arbitrary short sentence.
At [28], the Court identified the differences from Rogan: Millar had prior drug offending, the current offending escalated from personal use to supply, and there was no evidence of meaningful rehabilitation efforts. This passage signals that comparison with a precedent depends on the relevant factual similarities and differences, not simply on the presence of a short sentence.
The decision is most directly relevant to sentence appeals where an applicant argues that actual custody was manifestly excessive because a non-custodial outcome was available. It is particularly pertinent where the sentencing judge considered personal mitigation, including caregiving responsibilities, but concluded that the seriousness of the offending still warranted actual custody.
It also addresses arguments that a short period of actual custody is inherently unreasonable, or that the public interest in maintaining a family unit necessarily makes imprisonment unjust. The Court’s answer was fact-specific: the judge had expressly considered those matters and reduced the custodial period significantly. The judgment does not establish that the same result follows whenever a person has dependent children or provides care to an ill relative ([23]–[27]).
The case involved repeated drug supply-related conduct over several weeks, including facilitation of sales and arrangements to supply, against a background of earlier drug offending. The Court considered the seriousness of the conduct, the need for deterrence and denunciation, and the absence of evidence of meaningful rehabilitation efforts ([8]–[11], [21], [28]). Those features informed its assessment; the judgment does not state that they are necessary conditions for refusing a similar appeal.
For practitioners assessing whether the reasoning is relevant to another sentencing matter, the facts that the Court itself contrasted or emphasised include: the nature and duration of offending; whether the conduct involved supply or possession for personal use; relevant criminal history; evidence of rehabilitation; the extent and treatment of mitigation; and whether the sentencing judge expressly considered actual custody. The decision does not supply a sentencing tariff or a formula for calculating a custodial reduction.
The supplied judgment contains no discussion of decisions issued after R v Millar [2025] QCA 77, which was published on 23 May 2025. On the text available here, it is not possible to state how later courts have treated the decision. No subsequent application, distinction, approval or criticism is identified in the judgment itself.
The precedent relationship that can be established from this judgment concerns R v Rogan [2021] QCA 269. At [27], Boddice JA referred to Sofronoff P’s observation about the utility of short sentences and applied that consideration to Millar’s circumstances. At [28], the Court distinguished Rogan by identifying differences in Millar’s prior drug history, escalation to supply and rehabilitation evidence. The case’s own account therefore shows both use of the principle cited from Rogan and a factual distinction from that decision.
Any account of treatment by later courts would require sources beyond the judgment supplied here. This analysis does not infer later judicial treatment from the decision’s publication date or from its citation of Rogan.
The reasons resolve the proposed ground on the circumstances before the Court but leave questions that would depend on other cases and facts. They do not specify how much weight family responsibilities should receive across different types of offending, or how a sentencing judge should quantify the reduction attributable to caregiving responsibilities. The judgment records that the reduction here was significant but gives no numerical method for assessing it ([15], [22], [25]).
The Court also does not define what evidence would amount to “meaningful efforts at rehabilitation.” It notes the absence of such evidence in distinguishing Rogan, but does not set out categories of evidence or explain how that factor should be weighed in other cases ([28]).
Although Millar’s submission invoked s 9(2)(a)(ii) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, the Court’s reasons do not analyse the provision’s wording or decide a separate interpretive issue about it ([16]). The decision should therefore not be read as supplying a full statutory construction of that section.
Finally, the judgment does not provide a detailed comparative-sentence analysis or identify a group of comparator cases. It states the governing appellate test and applies it to the sentencing reasons and facts in Millar’s matter ([19]–[29]). Whether another sentence is sufficiently different from sentences in comparable circumstances remains a question dependent on the relevant legal sources and case-specific record.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Millar [2025] QCA 77
PARTIES: R / v / MILLAR, Sheridan Paige / (applicant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 80 of 2025 / DC No 31 of 2025
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Rockhampton – Date of Sentence: 19 March 2025 (Farr SC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON: Date of Order: 20 May 2025 / Date of Publication of Reasons: 23 May 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 20 May 2025
JUDGES: Bond, Boddice and Bradley JJA
ORDER: Date of Order: 20 May 2025 / The application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to eight counts of supplying a dangerous drug, two counts of possessing a dangerous drug and one count of possessing anything used in the commission of supplying a dangerous drug – where the applicant was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment on each of six counts of supplying a dangerous drug and lesser periods of imprisonment on the other counts – where the applicant’s parole release date was set at 19 June 2025 – whether the 12 week custodial component of the sentence was manifestly excessive / R v Rogan [2021] QCA 269, applied
COUNSEL: D M Caruana for the applicant / S L Dennis for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Phillips Crawford Lawyers for the applicant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
BOND JA: For the reasons given by Boddice JA, I joined in the making of the Court’s orders on 20 May 2025.
BODDICE JA: On 19 March 2025, the applicant pleaded guilty to eight counts of supplying a dangerous drug, two counts of possessing a dangerous drug and one count of possessing anything used in the commission of supplying a dangerous drug.
On the same date, the applicant was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment on each of six counts of supplying a dangerous drug and lesser periods of imprisonment for another supplying a dangerous drug count, one count of possessing a dangerous drug and the count of possessing anything used in the commission of supplying a dangerous drug. The applicant was convicted and not further punished in respect of the remaining counts of supplying a dangerous drug and possessing a dangerous drug. The sentences of imprisonment were ordered to be served concurrently. A parole release date was set at 19 June 2025.
The applicant sought leave to appeal those sentences. If leave was granted, the sole ground relied upon was that the 12 week custodial component of the sentence was manifestly excessive.
On 20 May 2025, the application for leave to appeal sentence was dismissed. These are my reasons for joining in that order.
Offences
All of the offences were committed over a period of three and a-half weeks when the applicant was 31 years of age. At the time of their commission, the applicant had a relevant, but limited, prior criminal history concerning possession of utensils in 2016 and possession of drugs and utensils in 2018. On each of the prior occasions, no conviction had been recorded.
The applicant’s offending came to the attention of the authorities as her then de-facto partner was the target of a police operation. The de-facto partner was subsequently charged with trafficking in methylamphetamine at a street level, for a period of a little over three months. All of the applicant’s offending occurred during that period.
Five of the supply counts related to supplying methylamphetamine, in circumstances where the applicant contacted her de-facto partner and confirmed a sale for him. On each of those occasions, the applicant was sentenced on the basis that she had facilitated the supply to an unknown person through her de-facto partner.
The three remaining supply counts concerned circumstances in which the applicant was contacted by a customer and the applicant offered to supply drugs to that person. On each occasion, the applicant was sentenced on the basis of an arrangement to supply, rather than an actual supply.
The remaining counts arose out of drugs and paraphernalia found whilst police executed a search warrant at the applicant’s address. The applicant was compliant during the execution of the search warrant and provided her PIN code in accordance with the warrant. During the search, police located and seized .486 grams of a substance that was analysed to contained methylamphetamine, 1 gram of cannabis, three water pipes, three glass pipes and a mobile phone. The applicant admitted ownership to all items. The applicant was sentenced on the basis that her possession of those drugs was for her own personal use.
Sentencing remarks
The sentencing judge found that the offences were serious. The applicant had, over a three and a-half week period, involved herself in the supply of methylamphetamine. Although the applicant was to be sentenced in respect of five counts on the basis that she facilitated the supply to an unknown person, the sentencing judge observed that illicit drug use created immense problems in society and that there was a need for general and personal deterrence, as well as denunciation.
The sentencing judge further observed that whilst it had been submitted that the applicant had been the subject of some domestic violence in the relationship, little was placed before the court linking her behaviour and the commission of the offences to any issues of domestic violence.
The sentencing judge accepted that the applicant had entered an early plea of guilty; that she was now the sole parent of four young children; that she was no longer in a relationship with her de-facto partner; and that the applicant assisted in the care of her mother who had a significant health issue, by reason of a terminal illness. The sentencing judge also accepted that the applicant had started using illicit drugs nine or 10 years prior to these offences and that it was now said that she was free of illicit drug use. She was also remorseful for her offending conduct.
The sentencing judge accepted that the applicant’s lack of significant criminal history, lack of any re-offending whilst on bail and unique family circumstances, were relevant to whether the applicant ought to serve any term of actual custody. However, the applicant had knowingly placed her family unit at risk by the commission of these offences, as they had been committed whilst she had the care of four young children. Further, whilst the applicant’s assistance of her ill mother was also relevant, an overall consideration of the matter supported a conclusion that a term of imprisonment, that did not involve actual custody, would inadequately recognise all of the relevant circumstances.
The sentencing judge found that those factors supported a considerable reduction in the term to be served in custody from what would otherwise have been considered an appropriate sentence, thereby significantly reducing the period of actual imprisonment.
Application for leave
The applicant submitted that the requirement that she serve actual custody, rendered the sentence manifestly excessive. The applicant submitted that a sentence that allowed the applicant to stay in the community was preferable, under s 9(2)(a)(ii) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 and that in those circumstances, a sentence requiring the applicant to serve three months’ actual custody, evidences a misapplication of sentencing principles.
The applicant further submitted that public interest in preserving the family unit, in circumstances where there was strong prospects of rehabilitation, supported a conclusion that there was a “latent error” and a substantial injustice in requiring actual custody to be served by the applicant.
There is no doubt that the applicant had substantial mitigating factors which could have supported the exercise of the sentencing discretion so as not to require the applicant to serve actual custody. However, the fact that such a sentence may have been open, is not sufficient to support a ground of appeal that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
To succeed on such a ground, the applicant must establish that the sentence imposed was so different to that which would be imposed in comparable circumstances, as to warrant a conclusion that there was a misapplication of sentencing principles, or that the sentence imposed was plainly unreasonable or unjust.
A consideration of all of the circumstances supports a conclusion there was no misapplication of principle.
First, the sentencing judge rightly observed that the applicant’s offending involved serious criminal conduct. Deterrence and denunciation properly loomed large.
Second, the sentencing judge had regard to the significant mitigating factors in the applicant’s favour. In doing so, the sentencing judge expressly reduced, by a significant degree, the period to be served in actual custody.
Third, the sentencing judge expressly considered whether actual custody was warranted, having regard to the applicant’s particular circumstances including being the mother of four young children and caring for a terminally ill mother. The sentencing judge concluded that notwithstanding those circumstances, the seriousness of the applicant’s criminal conduct warranted a period of actual custody. Such a conclusion fell within a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion.
There is also no basis to conclude that the sentence imposed was plainly unreasonable or unjust. Whilst the applicant had responsibility for the care of four young children and was actively undertaking the care of her terminally ill mother, those factors of themselves could not be said to render a sentence of actual custody, not open.
Importantly, those factors were expressly reflected in the reduction in the period required to be served in actual custody. The magnitude of that reduction warrants a conclusion that the overall sentence imposed was neither plainly unreasonable, nor unjust.
R v Rogan [2021] QCA 269 at [18]. ↩
R
Millar [2025] QCA 77
The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
There is no merit in the applicant’s contention that the magnitude of that reduction, having resulted in a short period of actual custody, rendered the sentence plainly unreasonable or unjust, as it was contrary to the public interest in keeping together a family unit involving young children.
Whilst the utility of short sentences, as observed by Sofronoff P in Rogan,1 is a factor for consideration on sentence, the shortness of the actual period in custody arose by reason of a significant reduction from what would otherwise have been the period in actual custody, having regard to the mitigating factors. In such circumstances, the imposition of a relatively short period of actual custody does not evidence any misapplication of principle, or warrant a conclusion that the sentence imposed was plainly unreasonable or unjust.
Further, unlike Rogan, the applicant came before the Court with a prior history for drug offending, the present offending represented an escalation from personal use to supplying, and there was no evidence of meaningful efforts at rehabilitation.
As the applicant has not established any misapplication of principle, or that the sentence was plainly unreasonable or unjust, an appeal against sentence on the ground of manifest excess would be unsuccessful.
**BRADLEY JA:**I joined in the orders made on 20 May 2025 for the same reasons expressed by Boddice JA.