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[2025] QCA 201
respondent. Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The Court of Appeal accepted that MEV's sentence was towards the high end, but held that the selected comparison cases did not establish a fixed usual range. The sentencing judge had considered the guilty pleas, health and personal circumstances, extensive criminal history, and concerns about future drug use. The judge used immediate parole release to allow longer supervision. The appeal court was not persuaded that the sentence was plainly unjust or showed a misapplication of sentencing principle, so it granted leave but dismissed the appeal.
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2,398 words · generated 07/10/2026
In R v MEV [2025] QCA 201, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered an application for leave to appeal against sentence. MEV's sole ground was that his sentence was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances (paras 3–5, 24). The Court, constituted by Bond and Bradley JJA and Crowley J, granted leave but dismissed the appeal (paras 1–3, 50–51).
MEV had pleaded guilty to three aggravated counts concerning supply of dangerous drugs to a minor aged 16 years or more. The recipient was a 17-year-old girl known to him, and the aggravating circumstance was that MEV was an adult and she was a minor (para 4). The events were spread over several weeks. On 16 August 2023, the girl asked MEV for a “p” on credit, meaning 0.1 grams of methylamphetamine. He supplied slightly less than that amount and later confirmed the quantity by text (para 7). On 18 August, he asked whether she wanted “another p” when she was paid, offered to arrange a lift to an ATM, and told her to tell the driver she was 18. He then supplied 0.1 grams of methylamphetamine (para 8). On 10 September, he asked whether she wanted to have cannabis “cones” with him. She did not respond, and the count concerned an offer rather than an actual supply (para 9).
MEV was 44 at the time of offending and 45 at sentence. He had spent 266 days on remand and had a lengthy criminal history, including drug, property, dishonesty and domestic-violence offences (para 10). His history included a 2018 sentence for supplying a small amount of methamphetamine and possessing methamphetamine and cannabis (para 11). In 2019, he was sentenced for incest and other offences involving a 15-year-old whom he had known since her early childhood, alongside violence, domestic-violence-order contraventions and an attempt to pervert the course of justice (para 12).
The sentencing judge imposed 2 years and 6 months' imprisonment for Count 2, taking the criminality of all three offences into account, and convicted but imposed no further punishment on Counts 1 and 3 (para 22). The judge declared the 266 days of pre-sentence custody and ordered immediate parole release. The sentence was thus not a direction that MEV serve the whole term in custody: the judge considered a longer period of supervision could help monitor his drug use (paras 22–23).
Crowley J began with the appellate test. A manifest-excess ground does not require the applicant to identify a particular error in the sentencing process: the alleged error may be inferred from a result that is “unreasonable or plainly unjust” (para 25). The question was whether the sentence, viewed against the offending, the offender and applicable sentencing considerations, was so unreasonable or plainly unjust that error could be inferred (para 26).
The Court applied the formulation in R v Pham: intervention is not warranted unless the appellate court, after considering all relevant factors, including differences from sentences in comparable cases, is “driven to conclude that there must have been some misapplication of principle” (para 27). That approach is important because it does not treat appeal as a fresh choice between two sentences that an appellate court might itself have preferred. The task is to decide whether the result crosses the demanding threshold for appellate intervention.
The applicant's comparison argument did not establish that threshold. Crowley J explained that other appellate decisions can be useful “yardsticks”, but they do not bind sentencing courts or define the upper and lower limits of discretion (paras 30–33). The first-instance cases surveyed displayed a spread of sentences, but differed across such matters as the offender's and minor's ages, number of supplies, the minor's prior drug use, type of drug, whether supply was actual or constructive, commercial purpose, ulterior motive, plea and antecedents (para 34). The cases did not reveal a discernible sentencing pattern or establish a usual range (para 35).
The appellate authorities were also materially different. Alizadeh involved seven aggravated supply offences, but the appeal concerned a technical question about the aggravating circumstance; the Court there had not considered whether the sentences were manifestly excessive (para 37). Hoskin concerned a single supply to a 16-year-old, with a distinct factual and psychiatric context. The offender's psychosis and mental-health circumstances affected the assessment of deterrence and actual custody, and the Court found the original sentence manifestly excessive for reasons not present in MEV's case (paras 38–41). The judgment contrasted that case with MEV's three offences and the sentencing judge's decision to provide a longer period of parole monitoring.
The other cited cases did not supply a persuasive measure either. Russell and Callaghan concerned cannabis, not Schedule 1 methylamphetamine; the minor recipients initiated contact and the offenders thought they were 16. The Court considered the different drug and maximum penalty important (paras 42–43). Gesler involved a supply of cannabis that was only one part of a case dominated by burglary and sexual assault, and the supply sentence had not received real separate consideration (paras 44–45).
The Court also rejected the suggestion that an inaccurate statement in the Crown's submissions about the prior incest offending had affected sentence. Although the submission was inaccurately expressed, the sentencing judge had the earlier sentencing remarks and did not misstate the facts in his own remarks. The Court saw no reason to think he had been misled (para 29).
Finally, the Court considered the sentence in light of the sentencing judge's treatment of MEV's personal circumstances. The judge acknowledged his guilty pleas, childhood sexual abuse, mental-health conditions, physical disability, chronic pain and drug problems (paras 21, 47). The report described by the judge as a “mixed bag” included Professor Coyle's pessimistic view about MEV's prospects of remaining abstinent after release (paras 14, 21). The appellate court held that the weight given to these considerations was for the sentencing judge as part of the instinctive synthesis (para 47). It regarded the sentence as high within the appropriate range, but not unreasonable or plainly unjust, particularly given the offending and criminal history (para 48).
The judgment does not announce a new sentencing tariff or change the statutory framework. It applies established appellate principles to an individual sentence. Its central explanation of the existing approach comes from House v The King and R v Pham: an appellate court must be satisfied that the result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that a misapplication of principle can be inferred (paras 25–27).
The decision also explains the limited function of comparison cases. Before this judgment, as described in its reasons, appellate sentencing decisions already served as yardsticks that could guide analysis. They did not operate as binding precedents fixing a “usual range”. Pham was cited for the proposition that a range discerned from comparable cases is not necessarily correct or determinative of the limits of discretion (paras 31–32). The decision applies that distinction to the applicant's argument that a sentence outside a supposed usual range must be manifestly excessive.
After MEV, on the reasoning in this judgment, a party relying on comparisons cannot establish manifest excess simply by showing that other offenders received shorter sentences. The comparison must assist in assessing the relevant sentencing principles, and the factual differences matter. The judgment lists factors that may affect the usefulness of comparisons, including the drug, number and nature of supplies, the minor's prior drug use, any commercial or ulterior purpose, the plea and the offender's antecedents (para 34). It does not say that this list is exhaustive or that any single factor determines sentence.
The judgment also addresses parole as part of the case-specific sentencing response. The sentencing judge considered that immediate parole release, following declaration of pre-sentence custody, would permit a longer period of monitoring and drug testing (paras 22–23, 49). The appellate court considered that approach reasonable in the circumstances. The decision does not establish a general rule about parole or supervision; it explains why the judge's approach did not make this sentence manifestly excessive.
At paragraph 25, Crowley J observed that a manifest-excess ground alleges an error evident in the outcome because the result is “unreasonable or plainly unjust”. In plain English, the applicant need not always identify exactly what went wrong in the sentencing process. The appeal court may infer error from the sentence itself, but only if the result meets the demanding standard.
At paragraph 27, the Court adopted Pham's statement that intervention requires the appellate court to be “driven to conclude” that there must have been a misapplication of principle. This means that the appeal court does not intervene merely because another sentence could also have been imposed, or because a sentence appears high. The court must reach the specified conclusion after considering relevant factors.
At paragraph 31, the Court quoted Pham to explain that a range revealed by comparable cases is not necessarily “the correct range” and does not determine the “upper and lower limits” of discretion. In plain English, past sentences can help orient the analysis, but they do not create a fixed scale that a sentencing judge must follow.
At paragraph 35, Crowley J said the cases relied on did not show a discernible sentencing pattern and provided only limited guidance as yardsticks. The applicant's selection therefore did not establish the alleged usual range.
At paragraph 48, the Court accepted that the sentence could be considered “at the higher end of the appropriate range”, but did not consider it unreasonable or plainly unjust. The passage captures the distinction between a severe sentence and one that is legally manifestly excessive.
At paragraph 49, the Court explained the sentencing judge's reasoning for immediate parole release: the judge wanted a longer period of supervision in light of MEV's drug-related history and the pessimistic assessment of his ability to remain abstinent. The appellate court treated this as a reasonable feature of the sentence, not as a separate general rule.
The decision is most directly relevant where a sentence appeal alleges manifest excess and relies on selected comparator cases to claim that the sentence is outside a “usual range”. Its reasoning is particularly useful where the comparisons differ in material ways from the appealed case. The judgment shows that an appellate court may test the comparators against the details of the offending, the offender's circumstances and the issues actually decided in the earlier appeals (paras 33–46).
For cases involving supply of drugs to minors, the reasons identify factual matters that may be important to comparing cases: ages, number of supplies, who initiated the contact, whether the minor had previously used drugs, whether the offender introduced or encouraged use, drug type, actual versus constructive supply, commerciality, ulterior purpose, plea timing and antecedents (para 34). These are factors identified in this judgment's survey, not a statutory checklist or a conclusive sentencing formula.
The case may also be relevant where the offender relies on mental or physical health, trauma, addiction, a guilty plea or a difficult background. The judgment records that these matters were considered, but emphasises that their weight formed part of the sentencing judge's overall synthesis (paras 21, 47). MEV does not hold that such circumstances are unimportant; it shows that their presence does not, without more, establish manifest excess.
Its comparison with Hoskin is especially fact-specific. There, the Court had found that a psychotic disorder and the offender's circumstances affected deterrence and actual custody. In MEV, the court distinguished that analysis, noting the multiple offences and the different sentencing considerations (paras 38–41). A future case would require attention to the particular evidence and sentencing reasoning, rather than treating Hoskin or MEV as a result applicable solely because mental health is raised.
The supplied judgment contains no references to later judicial treatment of R v MEV [2025] QCA 201. It was delivered on 24 October 2025, and the text provided does not identify any subsequent cases applying, distinguishing or criticising it. No claim about later treatment can therefore be made from this source alone.
The judgment itself discusses earlier authorities and records how it uses them. It applies House v The King and R v Pham to the manifest-excess test and the role of comparable sentences (paras 25–27, 30–33). It distinguishes Alizadeh, Hoskin, Russell and Callaghan and Gesler as limited or poor comparisons for the sentence under appeal (paras 37–45). It cites Goodger when explaining the principles engaged in Hoskin, and cites Coutts and MEO in connection with the sentencing judge's instinctive synthesis (paras 40–41, 47).
Those references establish the authorities' treatment in MEV, not how later courts have treated MEV. The judgment's own contribution is its application of settled principles to the particular facts and its explanation that comparator sentences do not define a mandatory range.
The judgment does not set out a quantitative range for aggravated supply of Schedule 1 drugs to minors. It expressly rejects the argument that the cited cases established a usual range (paras 35, 46). The decision leaves open what a broader, carefully matched set of appellate decisions might show in another case.
It also does not determine how any one listed factor should be weighted in future sentencing cases. The factors in paragraph 34 are drawn from the cases reviewed, while the ultimate sentence remains dependent on the full circumstances and instinctive synthesis. The judgment does not say, for example, that the number of supplies or the type of drug will always outweigh a particular mitigating circumstance.
The decision does not formulate a general rule for the relationship between mental illness and sentence. It distinguishes Hoskin and notes that its psychiatric circumstances engaged principles discussed in Goodger (paras 39–41). It does not decide how those principles would apply to other diagnoses, different evidence of impairment, or a different relationship between a condition and the offending.
Nor does the judgment establish when immediate parole release will be appropriate as a means of increasing supervision. It approves the sentencing judge's reasoning in the circumstances of MEV's case, including his history and the concern about continued drug use (paras 23, 49). It does not prescribe a general approach for other offenders.
This analysis is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on, relying on, or using this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v MEV [2025] QCA 201
PARTIES: R / v / MEV / (applicant)
FILE NO: CA No 246 of 2024 / SC No 7 of 2024
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Bundaberg – Date of Sentence: 16 October 2024 (Crow J)
DELIVERED ON: 24 October 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 16 September 2025
JUDGES: Bond and Bradley JJA and Crowley J
ORDERS: Leave to appeal be granted. The appeal be dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of supplying a dangerous drug to a minor aged 16 years or more – where the applicant was sentenced to 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with immediate parole release after declaring almost 9 months in pre-sentence custody – where the applicant has a lengthy criminal history containing drug, property and dishonesty offences and offences of domestic violence – where the applicant has several mental health conditions outlined in a psychological report, and a degenerative condition of the spine which causes him chronic pain – where at sentence, the Crown contended for at least 2 years’ imprisonment and the applicant contended for 12 months’ imprisonment – where the applicant contends that having regard to yardstick cases, the sentence was outside the usual range of sentences imposed for like offending – whether the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances / House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, applied / R v Alizadeh [2017] QCA 269, distinguished / R v Gesler [2016] QCA 311, distinguished / R v Goodger [2009] QCA 377, cited / R v Hoskin [2020] QCA 10, distinguished / R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550; [2015] HCA 39, applied / R v Russell and Callaghan [1995] QCA 454, distinguished
COUNSEL: A L Smith for the applicant / R J Marks for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
BOND JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Crowley J and with the orders proposed by his Honour.
BRADLEY JA: I agree with Crowley J.
CROWLEY J: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against a sentence of 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment imposed upon him for three counts of supplying a dangerous drug, with a circumstance of aggravation, to which he pleaded guilty.
The offences concerned the applicant’s supply of methylamphetamine and cannabis to a 17-year-old female minor who was known to him. The aggravating circumstance in each case is that the applicant was an adult and the person to whom he supplied the drugs was a minor who was aged 16 years or more.
The applicant’s sole ground of appeal is that the sentence is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
The offending
The circumstances of the offending were set out in an agreed statement of facts tendered by the Crown at the sentence hearing.
On 16 August 2023, the minor asked the applicant to supply her with a “p” on credit, a “p” being 0.1 grams of methylamphetamine. The applicant supplied her with slightly less than 0.1 grams, and later that day sent a text message to her confirming the quantity that he had supplied to her (Count 1).
On 18 August 2023, the applicant asked the girl whether she wanted “another p when ur pay goes in”. She indicated that she did, and the applicant offered to arrange a lift for her to an ATM. The applicant told her to tell the driver that she was 18, indicating that he knew she was a minor. The applicant later supplied 0.1 grams of methylamphetamine to her (Count 2).
On 10 September 2023, the applicant offered to supply the girl with a small amount of cannabis by sending her a text message and asking whether she wanted to have “cones” with him. She did not respond to the text message (Count 3).
The applicant
The applicant was aged 44 years when he committed the offences and was 45 at sentence. He had spent 266 days on remand in declarable pre-sentence custody. He had a very lengthy criminal history littered with drug, property and dishonesty offences and offences of domestic violence.
In 2018 he was sentenced by Judge Clare SC to 9 months’ imprisonment for an offence of supplying a dangerous drug and a concurrent term of 3 months’ imprisonment for possession of a dangerous drug. His offending on that occasion involved supplying of a small amount of methamphetamine and possessing 0.1g of methamphetamine and 3.5g of cannabis.
In 2019 he was sentenced by Judge Rosengren to 2 years and 9 months’ imprisonment for an offence of incest, being a domestic violence offence, and to lesser concurrent terms of imprisonment for various violent offences, contraventions of domestic violence orders, and an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice. The incest offence involved the applicant forming a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old girl who had lived with his mother from about the age of 2 years. She considered the applicant to be her older brother. She allowed the applicant to have sexual intercourse with her as he let her have access to drugs. He subsequently committed the offences of violence against her, contravened a domestic violence order in which she was named as the aggrieved, and attempted to pervert the course of justice by writing a letter to her while he was in custody, to be delivered to her by another inmate upon his release from jail, in which he urged her to go to the police and tell them that she had made up things about him.
A psychological report prepared by Professor Coyle, dated 2 June 2021, which had been commissioned in relation to a civil claim previously brought by the applicant, was tendered on behalf of the applicant at the sentence hearing. The report detailed the applicant’s personal and family background, noting that his parents separated before he was born; that he had been a witness to, and victim of, domestic violence in the home at the hands of his mother’s subsequent partners; and that he had been subjected to physical, sexual and psychological abuse by a teacher at school. Professor Coyle noted the applicant had an extensive history of recreational drug abuse, which the applicant reported had commenced when he was about 15 years of age in an effort to block out the abuse he had suffered. Professor Coyle considered the criminal behaviour the applicant later engaged in was a consequence of the sexual abuse that had been inflicted upon him.
Professor Coyle’s preliminary opinion was that the applicant had Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and comorbidities of Persistent Depressive Disorder, with anxious distress, Antisocial Personality Disorder and Polysubstance Use Disorder, in remission in a controlled environment. After noting that the applicant’s psychological disorders were well-entrenched, Professor Coyle further stated that he was “deeply pessimistic” about the applicant’s prospects of remaining abstinent from drug use on his release from incarceration.
Sentence submissions
During the sentence hearing, the Crown submitted that the applicant should be sentenced to at least two years’ imprisonment, and that he should serve a third of the sentence in custody before being released on parole. The Crown referred to R v Alizadeh [2017] QCA 269 and R v Hoskin [2020] QCA 10, where the offenders had each received sentences of 18 months’ imprisonment for offences of supplying dangerous drugs to minors, as comparable authorities.
Counsel for the applicant contended for a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment, with the period of pre-sentence custody being declared and the applicant immediately being released on parole. He submitted that the cases of Alizadeh and Hoskin each involved more serious offending and that the applicant’s offending warranted a lesser penalty than that imposed in either of those cases.
Sentencing remarks
The sentencing judge reiterated the circumstances of the offending as set out in the agreed statement of facts. His Honour emphasised that Counts 1 and 2 were the most serious, as they involved the supply of Schedule 1 drugs, while Count 3 involved cannabis and an offer to supply, rather than an actual supply. His Honour considered Count 2 was “perhaps a little more egregious” than Count 1. Regardless, his Honour considered the three supplies to be “most serious offending”, particularly as the applicant had “chased” the child on two occasions to supply the drugs. His Honour accepted that there was no evidence that the applicant had corrupted the child, inferring that she was already a drug user, but nonetheless considered he had encouraged her by providing drugs on credit. His Honour noted that the offending needed to be strongly deterred and denounced.
The sentencing judge detailed the applicant’s prior criminal history and recounted the circumstances of his previous offending for which he had been sentenced by Judge Clare SC and Judge Rosengren. His Honour observed that the applicant’s full criminal history was “quite relevant” and “shocking”.
The sentencing judge summarised the details of the applicant’s personal circumstances and background. His Honour accepted the applicant had a disadvantaged background, having been a victim of sexual assault as a child, and that he experienced multiple conditions which were said by Professor Coyle to have developed as a direct result of the sexual abuse. His Honour accepted the applicant had serious issues with his mental health. The sentencing judge otherwise described Professor Coyle’s report as a “mixed bag” and “double edged sword” for the applicant. In particular, his Honour found Professor Coyle’s pessimism with respect to the applicant’s prospects of remaining abstinent on his release from incarceration to be “deeply troubling”, concluding that it showed the applicant would have difficulty turning his back on drugs and may be seen in the courts again.
The sentencing judge ultimately determined that it was proper to impose a sentence of two and a half years for the Count 2 offence, utilising the Nagy1 approach and taking into account the criminality for all three offences, and to convict but not further punish the applicant for Counts 1 and 3. His Honour further noted that the applicant had been in pre-sentence custody for nearly nine months, which was essentially a third of the sentence to be imposed, and therefore he ought to be immediately released on parole after that period was declared as time already served.
His Honour then further stated:
“I am concerned with your terrible criminal history that I ought to keep you in longer, but I consider, given your mental health, your problems with drugs, that there is some benefit to the community of having you on parole a little longer, that is, having you monitored longer, drug tested longer to see if you can stay away from the drugs that are part and parcel and a cause of much of the misery in your life.”
Is the sentence manifestly excessive?
The applicant contends that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances. He submits that the sentence imposed was outside the usual range for like offending; did not adequately reflect the plea of guilty or the mitigating features of the case; that there was a misstatement of facts by the prosecutor in relation to the applicant’s prior incest offence; and that too much weight was placed on his criminal history and the sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of the offending.
Whilst it is commonplace for arguments in support of a ground asserting that a sentence is manifestly excessive to attempt to identify or explain how or why the sentencing discretion supposedly miscarried, it is to be borne in mind that the very essence of such a ground of appeal is that the cause of error is simply not known. Error is said to be evident in the result, as it is “unreasonable or plainly unjust”.2
Ultimately, the task of this Court is to consider whether the sentence is so unreasonable or plainly unjust, having regard to the relevant circumstances of the offending and the offender, and applicable sentencing principles and considerations, such that error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion may be inferred.
As French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ stated in R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550:3
“Appellate intervention on the ground of manifest excessiveness or inadequacy is not warranted unless, having regard to all of the relevant sentencing factors, including the degree to which the impugned sentence differs from sentences that have been imposed in comparable cases, the appellate court is driven to conclude that there must have been some misapplication of principle.”
Putting aside the applicant’s complaints about the weight given to particular factors, two aspects of the applicant’s submissions can be immediately addressed and discarded.
The first is the point about the supposed misstatement of the facts concerning the past incest offence committed by the applicant. The applicant suggested that the sentencing judge may have somehow been misled by the Crown’s written submissions about the circumstances of the offending, which included the statement, “She had allowed that intercourse to occur after the defendant supplied her with drugs.” The applicant complains that this was wrong as there was no evidence of an actual supply of drugs, simply that the applicant had allowed the complainant to access drugs. Whilst the Crown’s submission was inaccurately expressed, it is of no moment. Quite aside from the fact that there is no complaint of specific error in respect of this point, the sentencing judge had the full sentencing remarks of the District Court judge, which he had obviously read, and he did not misstate anything about the offending in his own sentencing remarks. There is no reason to think that the sentencing judge was somehow misled about the facts of the prior offence.
The second point to dispel is the notion that the sentence is manifestly excessive because it fell outside the “usual range” for like offending. The applicant’s argument seems to suggest that if the applicant’s sentence is shown to be longer than the range of sentences that have been imposed in other supposedly comparable cases then manifest excess is demonstrated. That is not so.
In Pham, the plurality stated, at [26]-[27], that comparable cases:
“… can and should provide guidance as to the identification and application of relevant sentencing principles…the analysis of comparable cases may yield discernible sentencing patterns and possibly a range of sentences against which to examine a proposed or impugned sentence.
It does not mean that the range of sentences so disclosed is necessarily the correct range or otherwise determinative of the upper and lower limits of sentencing discretion … the sentencing task is inherently and inevitably more complex than that.”
Decisions of other courts in sentencing appeals are not binding precedents. However, in the context of determining whether a given sentence is manifestly excessive, unless there is a compelling reason not to do so, an intermediate appellate court must have regard to sentencing decisions of other intermediate appellate courts in comparable cases as “yardsticks” that may serve to illustrate (although not define) the possible range of sentences available.4
The applicant here referred the Court to a selection of supposedly comparable cases in an effort to make good his argument that the sentence imposed upon him was manifestly excessive. Most of the cases cited by the applicant can be put to one side without further analysis as they were simply sentences imposed at first instance by other sentencing judges. It is the comparable cases decided by intermediate appellate courts that will provide the most useful guidance.5
A general survey of the single judge sentences cited by the applicant shows that sentences of between 9 months’ and 2 years’ imprisonment have in the past been imposed on offenders for offences of supplying dangerous drugs to a minor. The circumstances of those cases varied. From my review of the cases, particular factors which were identified as important in the sentencing exercise included the ages of the offender and the minor; the number of supplies; whether the minor sought out the drugs; whether the minor was corrupted by the offender, in the sense that the minor had not previously used drugs; the number of different minors supplied to; the type of drug supplied; whether the supply was an actual supply or a constructive supply; whether there was a commercial purpose; whether the supply was made with the intention of a sexual encounter with the minor or some other ulterior motive; whether the offender pleaded guilty, and the timing of that plea; and the antecedents of the offender.
Irrespective, I do not think the cases cited reveal any discernible sentencing pattern and they certainly do not establish the “usual range” of sentence for offences of this kind. Rather, they simply show the range of sentences that have previously been imposed in some other cases involving the supply of dangerous drugs to a minor. As yardsticks, they provide very limited guidance.
The four decisions of this Court referred to by the applicant also provide little assistance. They are not really comparable cases.
In Alizadeh the offender was sentenced to concurrent terms of 18 months’ imprisonment for seven aggravated supply offences. The appeal focused on a technical point concerning the nature of the circumstance of aggravation for the offences for which he had been convicted and sentenced upon pleading guilty. Given the nature of the appeal, the Court only briefly referred to the offender’s antecedents and did not consider whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive. It is therefore of no real utility as an intermediate appellate court decision.
Orders
Leave to appeal be granted.
The appeal be dismissed.
R v Nagy [2004] 1 Qd R 63. ↩
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, at 504–505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ). ↩
At [28(7)]. ↩
Pham [29]. ↩
Pham, [50] (Bell J and Gageler J, as his Honour then was). ↩
Citing the principles reiterated by the Court in R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269, 276, [32]. ↩
R v Coutts [2016] QCA 206, [4] (Fraser JA); R v MEO [2025] QCA 103, [6] (Burns J, Bond JA and Bradley JA agreeing). ↩
R
MEV [2025] QCA 201
(1936) 55 CLR 499
(2015) 256 CLR 550
(2007) 16 VR 269
Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
In addition to his mental health issues, the applicant suffers from Scheuermann’s disease, a degenerative condition of the spine which causes him chronic pain.
The applicant had previously been employed in various low skilled capacities, including as a machine operator, shop assistant and removalist. He was on a disability pension at the time of the offending due to his physical disabilities and mental health issues.
In Hoskin the offender was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, with parole release after serving 8 months, upon pleading guilty to a single offence of supply of a dangerous drug to a 16-year-old minor. The minor was a friend of the offender who regularly attended the offender’s house to smoke cannabis. She had previously taken speed and was encouraged by the offender to take the methylamphetamine but wished to take it by a method other than injection. Honestly, but unreasonably believing that the minor was agreeable to take the drug by injection, the offender injected her with the methylamphetamine. She suffered an immediate adverse reaction, including a seizure, and was subsequently hospitalised. There was no element of corruption of the minor and no ulterior purpose for the offending. The offender was 34 years old at the time of the offence. She had a prior criminal history for offences concerning dangerous drugs and was on probation at the time but had never been sentenced to imprisonment. She had been educated to year 9; suffered from psychosis and satisfied the criteria for paranoid schizophrenia and for mental and behavioural disorder due to multiple drug use and use of other psychoactive substances; and was on a disability support pension at the time of the offence. She had not been taking her antipsychotic medication, was using drugs and was hearing voices at the time of the offending. Since the offending she had been compliant with her medication and engaged with mental health providers.
In concluding that the sentence was manifestly excessive, the Court noted that the offender’s psychiatric condition impacted her ability to respond to efforts to deal with her drug addiction, reduced considerations of general and personal deterrence and made the imposition of actual custody beyond the three months she had already served inappropriate. The Court allowed the appeal and resentenced the offender to 18 months’ imprisonment and ordered her release on parole after the 87 days she had already served under the sentence.
The reasons for the Court’s conclusion that the sentence in Hoskin was manifestly excessive are quite different to the applicant’s case. Hoskin involved a single instance of offending by a woman with long-standing mental health issues and a psychotic disorder. Principles relevant to the sentencing of offenders who experience mental health conditions, discussed in cases such as R v Goodger [2009] QCA 377,6 were engaged and largely dictated the outcome.
In the present case, the applicant committed three offences and the sentencing principles discussed in R v Goodger were not engaged. The sentencing judge here noted that the applicant suffered from various health conditions, had a terrible criminal history and had struggled to turn his back on drugs. It was for this reason that a lengthier parole period was imposed, because the sentencing judge considered that being monitored for a longer period of time would assist the applicant in staying away from drugs.
In R v Russell and Callaghan [1995] QCA 454, Russell was convicted of 6 counts of aggravated supply of dangerous drugs to a minor of 16 years or more, and Callaghan was convicted of 5 counts of that offence. The dangerous drug in each instance was cannabis rather than the Schedule 1 drug methylamphetamine. Russell was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment and Callaghan was sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment. The offenders there had supplied cannabis to three 14-year-old girls, one of whom was “intimate” with both the offenders on one occasion. There was no element of commerciality involved; the girls had initiated contact with the offenders on each occasion; the offenders thought they were 16 years old; and it did not appear that the offenders had introduced them to smoking marijuana. The offenders were aged 29 and 27 years respectively, had quite serious criminal histories but reasonable work histories.
That fact that Russell and Callaghan did not concern the supply of Schedule 1 drugs is an important distinction. Amongst other things, the maximum penalty that would have applied to each of their offences was 20 years’ imprisonment, compared to the maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment that applied for Counts 1 and 2. The Court’s conclusion in that case, that the sentences there were not manifestly excessive, provides very little support for the applicant’s case.
In R v Gesler [2016] QCA 311*,* the offender appealed against sentences imposed upon him after he was found guilty at trial of offences of burglary, sexual assault and supply of a dangerous drug to a minor. The complainant there was a 17-year-old girl known to the offender and with whom he was obsessed. He committed the burglary and sexual assault offences by breaking into her home, entering her bed and putting his hand down the front of her underpants, whilst masturbating himself. The supply offence was the least serious of the offences. It occurred about a week later and involved the offender providing a cigarette to the minor and smoking it with her as he attempted to apologise for his earlier behaviour. He did not tell her, but she subsequently discovered, that the cigarette contained cannabis. The sentencing judge concluded that whilst the supply offence did not involve any attempt to stupefy the complainant, the offender nevertheless intended to make her more receptive to his advances and it had involved deception by him about the contents of the cigarette. He was sentenced to a head sentence of four years’ imprisonment for the burglary offence and concurrent sentences of three years’ imprisonment for the sexual assault and 12 months’ imprisonment for the supply offence. The applicant was 48 years of age at the time of the offence and 51 at the time of sentence; had a limited and dated criminal history for minor offences, which was not relevant; and had a reasonable work record. The Court rejected his complaint that the head sentence was manifestly excessive.
Gesler is a poor case for comparison. It involved no real consideration of the sentence imposed for the supply offence and once more concerned the Schedule 2 dangerous drug cannabis rather than the Schedule 1 drug methylamphetamine. The lesser maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment would also have applied to the supply offence in that case.
In my opinion, the cases relied upon by the applicant do not demonstrate that his sentence falls outside the “usual range” of sentence for this type of offence, nor that it is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
The sentencing judge here took into account the applicant’s guilty pleas and discussed at length his antecedents, including relevant mitigating factors. His Honour acknowledged his guilty pleas; described his multiple medical and mental health conditions; referred to the sexual abuse he had experienced as a child; noted his physical disability and chronic pain; and referred to his problems with drugs, to which he often resorted to assist with coping with the sexual abuse he suffered. The weight to be given to these various factors was a matter for the sentencing judge, as part of the instinctive synthesis of all relevant sentencing considerations.7
Whilst the resultant sentence may be considered to be at the higher end of the appropriate range in the circumstances, I do not consider it to be unreasonable or plainly unjust. The applicant had a shocking criminal history. He was 44 years old at the time and the minor was 17. He committed three serious offences, two of which had involved him “chasing” the child. As the sentencing judge correctly observed, offending of this kind is to be strongly deterred and denounced. The sentencing judge did not find the applicant to be remorseful and was rightly concerned about his prospects of rehabilitation, particularly in light of Professor Coyle’s pessimistic opinion as to the applicant’s ability to remain abstinent from drug use in the future.
Indeed, it was for this latter reason, coupled with the applicant’s prior criminal history of drug related offending, that the sentencing judge determined that the applicant should be given the benefit of an immediate release on parole after the 266 days of pre-sentence custody was declared as time already served under the sentences imposed, thereby allowing for a longer period of supervision on parole. That was an entirely reasonable approach in the circumstances.
In the circumstances, the applicant has not demonstrated that the sentence is manifestly excessive.