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[2025] QCA 193
respondent. Leave to appeal against sentence refused.
The Court of Appeal refused the applicant permission to challenge his sentence. It found no apparent error in the sentencing judge’s treatment of the guilty plea, mitigation, adjournment request or domestic violence context. The Court also held that the cited cases did not make the six-year sentence or parole eligibility date plainly unjust. The decision stresses that sentencing comparisons are guides, not fixed limits, and that an appeal requires more than showing that another sentence might have been preferable.
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2,144 words · generated 07/10/2026
The judgment concerns an application for leave to appeal against sentence, not a full appeal allowed on its merits. On 8 April 2025, R pleaded guilty to one count of rape. The indictment alleged that the offence was a domestic violence offence. The District Court sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment and set parole eligibility for 6 October 2027. The Court of Appeal described the practical effect as requiring him to serve two years and six months in custody before becoming eligible for parole ([1]).
4 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The offending occurred after 11.30 pm on 14 April 2022. R was 24 and the complainant, his then partner’s younger sister, was 16. She was asleep when he raped her. She awoke with her underwear and tracksuit pants pulled down, her wrists held above her head, and the rape in progress ([4]). The agreed facts also placed the offence in a domestic setting: R had been in a relationship with the complainant’s older sister for three years, had lived with her for one year, and had mostly lived in the complainant’s family home or a caravan in its backyard ([23]).
The impact evidence described significant continuing effects on the complainant and her family. The complainant and her sister left the home where the offence occurred. At sentencing, the complainant continued to struggle with the trauma and had threatened suicide on many occasions. Her mother and stepfather described serious impacts on their own wellbeing and ability to trust others ([5]).
R’s proposed appeal argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive, with particular emphasis on the parole eligibility date. He contended that a more appropriate eligibility date would have been after serving one-third of the six-year sentence ([2]). He also relied on alleged errors about the timing of his plea, mitigation, a sentencing adjournment and the domestic violence characterisation ([6]–[25]). The Court refused leave ([43]).
The Court began with the threshold for appellate intervention. A sentence cannot be set aside simply because the appeal court might have selected a more appropriate sentence. The applicant had to show an arguable case that the sentence as a whole was inappropriate, including because of a misapplication of principle, unreasonableness or plain injustice ([3]). Although the stated focus was parole eligibility, the Court said the challenge had to be assessed against the sentence as a whole.
On the guilty plea, the Court considered the chronology rather than treating the plea date in isolation. R pleaded guilty on the morning of the first day of a scheduled three-to-four-day trial ([7]). The complainant had already given evidence at a preliminary hearing, where the defence challenged important parts of her account, including whether R had pulled down her clothing and penetrated her ([10]). DNA reports had been delivered before the preliminary hearing, with further reports provided on 16 July 2024 ([11]). The Court rejected the claim that R pleaded at the first reasonable opportunity after his culpability had been fully determined. It reasoned that he would not have suffered forensic prejudice had he pleaded shortly after the additional reports were provided ([12]). It also accepted that a guilty plea had practical benefits, including avoiding trial time, expense and the inconvenience and distress of witnesses ([13]–[14]).
The Court found no apparent failure to consider mitigation. The sentencing judge had noted the guilty plea, R’s age and personal circumstances, his lack of criminal history, work history and rehabilitation potential ([16]). The applicant did not contend that a particular relevant matter had been ignored or an irrelevant matter considered ([15]). On that record, the Court saw no apparent error ([17]).
The adjournment argument also failed on the hearing record. After the plea, counsel said a work reference might be useful but was not critical and indicated readiness to proceed that afternoon. The judge adjourned until 2.30 pm, offered to address any difficulty at that time, and the sentencing hearing began at 2.37 pm. No further adjournment was sought ([19]–[20]). The Court therefore rejected the allegation that the judge erred by not allowing an overnight adjournment ([18], [21]).
On the domestic violence issue, the Court relied on the agreed relationship and household facts. It concluded that the relationship between R and the complainant’s older sister was a de facto and spousal relationship, and that they were connected by marriage for the relevant statutory purposes. It followed, in the Court’s analysis, that a family relationship and relevant relationship existed between R and the complainant, and that the rape was domestic violence ([23]–[25]).
Finally, the Court compared the sentence with the decisions raised by counsel. It stressed that other sentences do not set limits because sentencing is inherently more complex than a comparison of outcomes ([26], referring to Pham). The cases could illustrate what sentences had been imposed, but differences in the offending and the offenders mattered.
The judgment applies established appellate principles: a sentence is not appealably wrong just because another sentence could have been imposed, and comparison with earlier sentences does not create a tariff or fixed limit ([3], [26]). The Court used Pham for the warning that sentencing is too complex for earlier outcomes to set definitive boundaries. Its task was to assess whether this sentence fell outside a sound exercise of sentencing discretion, not to identify a preferred sentence.
The judgment also discusses the statutory treatment of the domestic violence context. The Court concluded that the admitted facts made the offence domestic violence under the provisions it cited, including the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) ([24] nn 7–13). It said this was a relevant aggravating feature in distinguishing the case from Conway ([39]).
There is an important timing qualification in footnote 18. The judgment states that the specific obligation to treat an adult offender’s commission of a domestic violence offence against a child as an aggravating factor commenced on 26 May 2025, about seven weeks after R’s sentence. It identifies that obligation as having been inserted by the Criminal Law (Coercive Control and Affirmative Consent) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (Qld), and refers to s 9(10C) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). The judgment says that if the sentence were set aside on appeal, the obligation would apply to any new sentence under s 259 ([39] n 18). Leave was refused, so no new sentence was imposed in this proceeding.
Accordingly, the decision does not establish a new numerical sentencing range for rape in a domestic violence context. It applies the appeal threshold to this sentence and explains why the particular comparisons did not establish manifest excess. Nor does the judgment describe later appellate treatment of its own reasoning.
The Court said: “The Court may not set aside a sentence on the basis that there is ‘a more appropriate’ sentence” ([3]). In plain English, an appeal is not a chance to substitute the appeal court’s preferred sentence. The applicant must identify a recognised basis for intervention.
The Court added that, although the challenge was directed at parole eligibility, the applicant had to show that “the sentence as a whole was inappropriate” ([3]). This means that the parole period could not be considered as a free-standing outcome, detached from the head sentence and the offence’s circumstances.
On the plea, the Court said R “would not have suffered any forensic prejudice” if he had pleaded guilty shortly after the additional DNA reports were supplied ([12]). That reasoning linked the plea’s timing to the procedural history. The Court did not accept that the later reports made the first day of trial the first reasonable opportunity to plead.
On comparable decisions, the Court explained that they “may illustrate the sentences available in circumstances similar or different” but do not fix limits ([26]). The plain-English point is that a similar-sounding case is not automatically a sentencing benchmark. Differences in age, circumstances, plea timing, offence features and mitigation can affect how useful a comparison is.
The Court’s conclusion was that the comparisons did not “give rise to an inference that his Honour’s exercise of discretion miscarried” and instead showed the sentence to be within a sound exercise of discretion ([42]). That was the application of the appellate threshold to the cases and facts before it, not a statement that every similar sentence would be appropriate.
The decision is most directly relevant to applications challenging a sentence as manifestly excessive where the applicant focuses on parole eligibility but the sentence must be examined as a whole. It underlines that saying a different parole date would be more suitable does not itself establish an appealable error ([2]–[3]).
It is also relevant where the applicant argues that a guilty plea was not late because important evidence was disclosed close to trial. The Court’s analysis considered what evidence had been available, the procedural steps already taken, whether the complainant had been cross-examined, the timing of the plea, and whether an earlier plea would have caused forensic prejudice ([7]–[14]). Those features show the kinds of chronology the Court examined; they do not create a universal rule that a plea at a particular stage must be treated as late.
The mitigation discussion is relevant where a sentencing appeal alleges inadequate consideration without identifying a specific omitted relevant matter or irrelevant consideration. Here, the Court checked whether the judge had noted the matters relied on, including the plea, age, criminal history, employment and rehabilitation potential ([15]–[17]).
The domestic violence analysis may be relevant where the alleged offender’s relationship with a complainant arises through the complainant’s family member and the parties share a household. The Court relied on the admitted relationship and residence facts to find a relevant relationship ([23]–[25]). The statutory question remains tied to the wording and application of the provisions identified in the judgment.
The supplied judgment does not identify any later court decisions that have applied, followed, distinguished or otherwise treated R v MEU. It would therefore be unsupported to claim that the case has been adopted as a general sentencing benchmark or that later courts have interpreted its reasoning in a particular way.
The judgment does, however, describe how the Court of Appeal treated the earlier decisions cited by counsel. It considered Breckenridge, Miller and Enright as examples where more lenient sentences were not found manifestly excessive, but said those outcomes did not advance the argument that R’s less lenient sentence was manifestly excessive ([37]). It distinguished Conway and Rodriguez by reference to differences in the offending and the relevant circumstances ([38]–[42]). It also explained that Teece did not assist the applicant’s main contention about the head sentence, while noting that R’s guilty plea distinguished his case from the conviction after trial in Teece ([40]).
For Conway, the Court considered R’s offending more serious and emphasised the domestic violence feature and the changes in community attitudes reflected in sentencing for serious sexual offences in that context ([38]–[39]). For Rodriguez, it identified differences including the applicant’s older age, the complainant’s age, the circumstances of the sexual assault, and the absence of evidence of mental health issues or risk of reoffending in R’s case ([41]). These are the Court’s reasons for distinguishing those authorities in this application, not a statement that they have no relevance in other cases.
The judgment does not determine what parole eligibility date would have been appropriate if the sentence had been set aside. The Court’s task was to decide whether the applicant had an arguable case for leave, and it concluded that he had not shown manifest excess or a miscarriage of discretion ([42]–[43]).
It also does not establish how a sentencing court should quantify the effect of each individual feature, such as the domestic violence context, the complainant’s age, the plea or the impact evidence. The Court explained why those features mattered to its comparison, but expressly cautioned that sentencing decisions do not fix limits ([26]).
The judgment identifies a statutory change that would apply to a new sentence if a sentence were set aside, but it did not have to apply that provision in a resentencing exercise because leave was refused ([39] n 18). The judgment also does not report how courts have treated that later statutory obligation in subsequent cases.
Finally, the decision’s application depends on the specific agreed facts and procedural history recorded in it. The Court relied on the relationship and residence facts being admitted ([23]) and on the plea and evidence chronology ([7]–[12]). The judgment therefore supplies a reasoning example, rather than a fixed result for other cases with superficially similar facts.
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v MEU [2025] QCA 193
PARTIES: R / v / MEU / (applicant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 101 of 2025 / DC No 1 of 2024
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Bundaberg – Date of Sentence: 8 April 2025 (Allen KC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON: 17 October 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 10 October 2025
JUDGES: Bradley JA and Hall AJA and Hindman J
ORDER: Leave to appeal against sentence refused.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of rape – where the count on the indictment alleged the rape was a domestic violence offence – where the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for six years, with an order that he be eligible for parole on 6 October 2027 – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal against the sentence on the ground that it is manifestly excessive – where the applicant alleges the sentencing judge made errors – where the applicant relies on those errors in support of his application – whether the primary judge erroneously exercised the sentencing discretion – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive / Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 32DA / Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld), s 8, s 13, s 15, s 19 / Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 21AK, s 132C / Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 9, s 13, s 259 / Bailey v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 62 ALJR 319; (1988) 34 A Crim R 154; [1988] HCA 19, cited / House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, cited / R v Breckenridge [1998] QCA 136, considered / R v Conway (2012) 223 A Crim R 244; [2012] QCA 142, distinguished / R v Enright [2023] QCA 89, considered / R v Miller [2012] QCA 168, considered / R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550; [2015] HCA 39, cited / R v Rodriguez [2025] QCA 34, distinguished / R v Teece [2019] QCA 246, distinguished
COUNSEL: D L Crews for the applicant / J D Finch for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Michael Mason Lawyers for the applicant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
THE COURT: On 8 April 2025, the applicant pleaded guilty to a single count on an indictment, alleging the rape of a complainant as a domestic violence offence. Later that day, the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for six years, with an order that he be eligible for parole on 6 October 2027. The applicant had been held in pre-sentence custody for one day, which was declared to be time already served under the sentence. The effect of these orders is that the applicant is required to serve two years and six months in custody before he will be eligible for parole.
The applicant seeks leave to appeal against the sentence on the ground that it is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances. For the applicant, it was contended that “a more appropriate parole eligibility date would have been at one third of the 6-year period of imprisonment.”
The Court may not set aside a sentence on the basis that there is “a more appropriate” sentence. To succeed in his proposed appeal, the applicant must establish that the sentence is so different to comparable cases as to show there has been a misapplication of principle, or that it is unreasonable or plainly unjust.1 To obtain leave to appeal, he seeks to show a sufficiently arguable case that the sentence imposed was inappropriate.2 Although the applicant’s challenge is expressed to be directed at the parole eligibility date, he must show a case that the sentence as a whole was inappropriate.
The offending and its impact
The facts of the applicant’s offending were set out in an agreed statement tendered at the sentencing hearing. On 14 April 2022, after around 11.30 pm, the applicant raped the younger sister of his then partner. The complainant was asleep. She awoke to find her underwear and tracksuit pants had been pulled down to her ankles, the applicant with his arms around her wrists positioned above her head, and the rape in progress with the applicant’s penis in her vagina. The applicant was then 24 years of age. The complainant was aged 16.
Victim impact statements tendered by the Crown revealed that the complainant and her older sister left their home because they could not bear to live in the place where the applicant committed the offence. At the time of sentencing, the complainant was still having a very difficult time coping with the trauma, would regularly break down, and had threatened to take her own life on many occasions. The lives of the complainant’s family were changed forever. Her mother had to be medicated after multiple acts of self-harm, sleepless nights and living in fear and anger. She was unable to trust anyone, even those she had known for years. The complainant’s step-father has sought out counselling. He could not forgive himself for not being able to protect his step-daughter. He could not trust anyone, even those close to him, and constantly had his guard up, affecting his everyday life and professional relationships.
Alleged errors
The late guilty plea
The applicant pleaded guilty to a single count on the indictment on the morning of the first day of the scheduled three-to-four-day trial. The sentencing judge characterised it as a late plea. The applicant says this was an error.
The complainant was distressed on the evening of the offending, 14 April 2022, and made an early complaint. The police attended the house. The applicant was charged and spent 36 hours in custody on 15 and 16 April 2022.
On 21 August 2023, he was committed for trial, after two witnesses were cross-examined. The indictment was presented on 18 January 2024.
On 5 April 2024, the complainant and her younger brother, also a child, gave evidence at a preliminary hearing, with the proceeding recorded to be presented to the court at the applicant’s trial.4 As the sentencing judge noted, the applicant’s counsel challenged the complainant’s evidence, putting to her that the applicant did not do each of the specific things she had told the court, including putting to her that the applicant had not pulled down her pants and underpants, that he never had sexual intercourse with her at all, and that he never put his penis inside her vagina. The instructions for that cross-examination were plainly inconsistent with the applicant’s written submissions in this Court that the applicant had “no independent recollection of the events” and “put the Crown to proof.” So was the applicant’s counsel’s submission to the sentencing judge that:
“His recollection of what occurred that day is less than accurate by virtue of the amount of alcohol he’d consumed.”
Reports on DNA testing were delivered to the applicant’s defence team before the committal hearing, and just before the preliminary hearing, with additional reports provided on 16 July 2024. The earlier reports indicated a likelihood that the complainant was a contributor to DNA in samples taken by a swab of the applicant’s penis. The later reports indicated a likelihood that the applicant was a contributor to DNA present in samples taken by a high vaginal swab of the complainant. The prosecution provided statements of persons present or involved in the taking of swabs, and perhaps the analysis of the samples, after the preliminary hearing. The applicant’s counsel described this as “compelling DNA evidence” which “solidified the Crown case”.
The sentencing judge noted the cross-examination at the preliminary hearing and “considered carefully” the written submissions and oral submissions about “the history of the matter, and the progressive disclosure of statements regarding DNA by the prosecution”. Taking those matters into account, his Honour concluded it was a late plea. With respect, his Honour’s conclusion was correct. The applicant would not have suffered any forensic prejudice if he had pleaded guilty to the single count shortly after 16 July 2024. We reject the applicant’s submission that his guilty plea “was entered at the first reasonable opportunity after the extent of [his] culpability had been fully determined, based on the disclosure of the DNA evidence.”
In the exercise of sentencing discretion, his Honour reduced the period the applicant would have to spend in prison before being eligible for parole due to his guilty plea and other relevant factors, noting of his plea:
“It is a late plea. It does have the practical advantage to the community of saving the time and expense of a trial, and the inconvenience to witnesses who would have been called in the trial, and the consideration by jury of what would no doubt be upsetting material.”
Matters in mitigation
For the applicant it was submitted that the sentencing judge failed “to consider adequately the matters in mitigation” and that “the mitigating factors were not adequately reflected in the parole eligibility date being set after 2 years 6 months.” It is not submitted that his Honour failed to consider any relevant matter or considered any irrelevant matter.
His Honour noted each of the factors that the applicant characterised as mitigating:the applicant’s guilty plea;the applicant’s personal circumstances, his age at the time he committed the offence and at sentence;as “a significant factor”, the absence of a criminal history;the applicant’s “good work history”, that he had worked on his parents’ property and done some part time concreting work after his release on bail with an ankle bracelet; andhis Honour observed, “Obviously, you are someone who has the potential for rehabilitation.”
There is no apparent error in the sentencing judge’s consideration of the relevant mitigating factors.
Adjournment for sentencing hearing
We reject the applicant’s submission that his Honour failed “to allow an adjournment overnight” to obtain “favourable references” about “the applicant’s otherwise good character and the high regard in which he was held within his local community and his remorse.”
The applicant made his guilty plea at about 10.19 am on the first day of trial. After the allocutus was administered, his Honour asked the applicant’s counsel about proceeding to sentence that same day. Counsel replied, “Well, that’s an option. We could probably do it this afternoon.” His Honour asked counsel what material counsel was seeking for the sentencing hearing. Counsel replied “Perhaps a work reference. … But that’s not critical.” His Honour then asked counsel what time he would be ready for a sentence hearing. Counsel replied, “Two-thirty.”
His Honour adjourned the court until 2.30 pm, advising counsel “If there’s any difficulties at 2.30 pm, we can address the matter again.” The sentencing hearing commenced at 2.37 pm. No further adjournment was sought.
There was no error as alleged.
Domestic violence offence
The applicant’s written outline contended that the count on the indictment erroneously alleged the rape was a domestic violence offence. This “error” was not pursued at the hearing of the application.
The applicant was sentenced on the agreed basis that the complainant’s older sister had been in a relationship with the applicant for three years and the two had lived together for one year before he committed this offence, mostly in the house with the complainant, her siblings, her mother and her step-father or in a caravan in the backyard. As these facts were admitted, the sentencing judge could act on them.6
Given the nature and extent of their common residence, the length of their relationship, and the reputation and public aspects of their relationship, the applicant and the complainant’s older sister were in a de facto relationship,7 in a spousal relationship,8 and considered to be connected by marriage.9 The applicant would be a relative of the complainant, as a person ordinarily understood to have been connected to the complainant by marriage,10 and a family relationship existed between them.11 This was a relevant relationship.12 It follows that the applicant’s sexually abusive behaviour towards the complainant was domestic violence.13
There was no error on that account.
“Comparable” cases
Breckenridge
Conway
Miller
Teece
In R v Teece [2019] QCA 246, the Court refused leave to appeal against a sentence of seven years’ imprisonment, with no parole eligibility date fixed, imposed for conviction after a trial. The offender had raped the sleeping complainant in her bed, after a celebration for the complainant’s husband’s birthday, one of the offender’s closest friends. He penetrated the sleeping complainant. When she awoke and screamed, he covered her mouth to prevent further screaming. He did not desist until the complainant’s husband arrived at the bedroom door. The adverse impact on the complainant was “significant and long lasting.”
The offender was 29 when he committed the rape, and 31 when sentenced. He had a minor irrelevant criminal history, suffered from chronic pain from an earlier motorcycle injury, and had symptoms consistent with adjustment disorder, mixed anxiety, depressed mood and major severe depression. The head sentence was not excessive. The offender did not contend otherwise. The Court found the sentence to be within the sound exercise of sentencing discretion. His challenge was limited to the period before parole eligibility.
Enright
Rodriguez
In R v Rodriguez [2025] QCA 34, the Court allowed an appeal, did not disturb the sentence of five years’ imprisonment, but substituted an order that the sentence be suspended after serving 12 months, rather than the 20 months ordered at first instance.
The Court considered the offender, aged 18, to be “extremely youthful”. The complainant was a friend aged 19. After having consensual intercourse with the offender in his bedroom, the complainant awoke to the offender penetrating her vagina with his penis. He forcefully pushed her shoulder back down and said, “Go back to sleep.” The complainant cried while the offender continued until he ejaculated. He did not wear a condom. Immediately upon arrival back to her home after the offence, the complainant wrote a suicide note and attempted suicide.
In Rodriguez, the offender had no prior criminal history. He expressed remorse immediately and repeated it in later conversations with the complainant. He pleaded guilty in the week the matter was listed for trial.
The Court rejected the submission that the five-year head sentence was manifestly excessive, finding it “fell within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion”. The Court found a suspension after serving 20 months (one-third) was warranted by his plea of guilty, the absence of any criminal history, his substantial rehabilitation, and his low risk of sexual re-offending attested to by a psychologist. However, the Court found the suspension of the sentence after serving one-third was plainly unjust because it did not reflect two additional significant mitigating factors: the offender’s extreme youth; and a previously undiagnosed Bipolar Spectrum Disorder, which meant “the impact of incarceration was likely to be significantly greater” for him than for other offenders in general. The Court resentenced the offender to five years’ imprisonment, suspended after serving 12 months, with an operational period of five years.
Conclusion on comparable cases
The decisions in Breckenridge, Miller, and Enright indicate only that the somewhat more lenient sentences in each of those cases were not manifestly excessive in the circumstances of that offending. This does not advance the applicant’s proposed ground of appeal that his somewhat less lenient sentence was manifestly excessive.
The applicant’s offending was more serious than that before the Court in Conway. The observations of Henry J in that decision indicate comparable yardsticks sentences of up to nine years’ imprisonment.
Unlike the offender in Conway, the applicant was convicted of rape with the aggravating factor that it was a domestic violence offence, which the sentencing judge was obliged to consider in determining the appropriate sentence.18 This reflects changes in community attitudes to sentences imposed for serious sexual offences that are domestic violence offences, since the decision in Conway.
The applicant’s guilty plea distinguishes him from the offender in Teece. Otherwise, the head sentence of seven years in that case does not assist the applicant’s main contention that his sentence is manifestly excessive.
The applicant’s offending was objectively more serious than that in Rodriguez. The applicant was six years older than the offender in Rodriguez. He was not extremely youthful. The complainant was not about his age. She was eight years younger. The applicant was not in bed with the complainant, having had consensual intercourse with her earlier in the evening. The applicant had entered the complainant’s bedroom without consent, when she was asleep and her younger sibling, who also slept in the room, was absent in the shower. The applicant had no mental health issues. There was no evidence of his risk of sexual re-offending.
The applicant’s sentence requires him to serve six months longer in custody, before he is eligible for parole, than the offender in Conway, who was sentenced 13 years ago. He must serve 16 months longer in custody than the offender in Rodriguez, and then be eligible to serve the balance of his sentence on parole. The differences between the nature and circumstances of the applicant’s offending and the offending in Conway and Rodriguez, in particular the aggravating factor, explain the differences in the sentences. They do not indicate the applicant’s sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust. They do not give rise to an inference that his Honour’s exercise of discretion miscarried. On the contrary, they show his sentence to be within the sound exercise of sentencing discretion.
Final disposition
Leave to appeal against sentence refused.
R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550, [28] (French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ). ↩
Bailey v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 34 A Crim R 154, 154-155 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ). ↩
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ). ↩
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 21AK. ↩
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (PSA), s 13(1)-(3). ↩
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 132C(2). ↩
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 32DA. ↩
Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA), s 15(1). ↩
DFVPA, s 19(3). ↩
DFVPA, s 19(2). ↩
DFVPA, s 19(1). ↩
DFVPA, s 13(b). ↩
DFVPA, s 8(1)(a).
R
MEU [2025] QCA 193
(2015) 256 CLR 550
(1936) 55 CLR 499
(1988) 62 ALJR 319
Leave to appeal against sentence refused.
R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550 [26]-[27] (French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ). ↩
The offender would be eligible to apply for parole after serving half the sentence (30 months). ↩
Pincus JA and Dowsett J agreed. ↩
With whom McMurdo P and Muir JA agreed. ↩
PSA, s 9(10A). The specific obligation to treat the fact that an adult offender committed a domestic violence offence against a child as an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate sentence for the offender commenced on 26 May 2025, about seven weeks after the applicant was sentenced: PSA, s 9(10C), inserted by the Criminal Law (Coercive Control and Affirmative Consent) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (Qld), s 86. If the applicant’s sentence were to be set aside on appeal, the obligation would apply to any new sentence: PSA, s 259. ↩