R v Medley (No 2) [2025] NSWDC 500 | Case summary | Zoe

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R v Medley (No 2) [2025] NSWDC 500 | Case summary | Zoe

The circumstances of the offending are set out in my judgment regarding the conviction appeal in these proceedings at [21]-[57].
In brief, the appellant legitimately operated a debt collection business from 2008 until 2013. Her business, Black Collections Pty Ltd (‘Black Collections’), acted for commercial entities and on their behalf collected debts from clients. The appellant's business limited the process of collecting unpaid debts to making phone calls. There was no physical contact with debtors.
In the relevant period, a condition for the operation of the appellant's business was the holding of a Commercial Agents and Private Inquiry Agents License ('CAPI license'), issued by NSW Police. This license required that the person running the debt collection business and staff employed to pursue unpaid debts were vetted and authorised.
Through incompetence and probably because of the involvement in the business of her then partner, Stuart Crabbe, the appellant's repeated attempts to renew her CAPI license failed. From late 2013, her business operated without the required CAPI license.
The appellant knowingly misrepresented that her business was appropriately authorised. Those representations were as follows:
Sequence 1: On 16 December 2016, the appellant sent an email to Ms Scott, Collections Manager of IPF Digital Australia Pty Ltd (‘IPF’), in which she falsely and deliberately misrepresented that Black Collections held a CAPI licence.
Sequence 2: on 18 August 2017, the appellant signed a second deed of agreement with IPF stating that Black Collections held all necessary licenses, when Black Collections did not hold a CAPI license. On 7 March 2018, the appellant forwarded an email to a member of staff at IPF providing the details of the asserted CAPI license. On 8 March 2018, she sent a further email to the same staff member attaching a false Master CAPI license.
The appellant's offending involved making knowingly false representations that Black Collections held a CAPI licence to an institutional client, IPF, and then receiving commissions for work then carried out. This conduct occurred firstly between 16 December 2016 and 17 August 2017, and again in the period of 18 August 2017 to 13 March 2018.
Throughout the first period, the appellant's business received $118,420 in commissions from IPF. During the second period, the appellant's business received $100,286 in commissions from IPF.

Although a business such as that run by the appellant is no longer required to hold a CAPI license, during the relevant period such a license was required. Compliance with regulatory measures is not optional.
That the appellant's business no longer needs such authorisation does, to an extent, reduce the seriousness of the business operating without the license. However, that was not the reason for the bringing of the prosecution. In fact, the appellant's business was separately prosecuted for operating without the CAPI license. The business pleaded guilty and was fined. These two offences relate to the dishonest receipt of money.
On the appellant's behalf, it was submitted that both the appellant's business and the client business, IPF, were sophisticated entities, treating each other at arm’s length and not in a relationship of trust and confidence. I do not find this submission persuasive. This is because the essential features of both offences were dishonest representations made by the appellant to IPF.
In a business environment, deliberate deception about a crucially material factor, carried out to obtain a financial benefit must be deterred. Offenders who engage in such behaviour are, absent a compelling reason, appropriate vehicles for general deterrence.
I also do not accept that the offending merely consisted of sending two emails. Both offences involve the dishonest receipt of money over a period of time. The second offence involved a false representation in a written agreement, then two emails, with the latter attaching a bogus CAPI certificate.
I do accept the offences were not sophisticated, and whilst motivated by the prospect of the receipt of money, this was to advance the interests of the business and were not motivated by out and out greed.
The Crown drew the Court’s attention to R v O’Dwyer [2024] NSWDC 11 and the remarks of Anderson SC DCJ at [37] regarding the factors relevant to the objective seriousness of an offence contrary to s 192E(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW):
the advantage obtained by the offender;
whether the loss is retrievable;
the length of time over which the deception occurs;
motive;
the planning and sophistication; and
whether there is a breach of trust.
The essential feature of the appellant's offending the subject of this appeal was her deliberate and dishonest misrepresentations of the situation to IPF and then benefitting financially because of those dishonest misrepresentations.
In typical fraud related offending, an offender dishonestly and deceptively obtains a benefit from another individual or entity in circumstances where that benefit is wholly unwarranted. A common example is an employee who embezzles funds from their employer, often through quite elaborate deceit.
In this case, the appellant's business provided a genuine service to IPF by chasing and recovering unpaid debts. There is no suggestion that the appellant falsely misrepresented to IPF the amount of work performed by her staff or in some other way deceived IPF.
The period in which each offence was committed is measured in months. The financial benefit for each offence was quite significant, but not enormous. There is no evidence that the appellant enriched herself at anyone else's expense, other than depriving another appropriately authorised business from receiving the work from IPF. Her mistake was to continue to pursue work for the business. Although that was motivated by financial gain, I am not convinced it was greed, as the Crown submitted at [16] of their supplementary submissions. In this way, the present case can be contrasted with the typical fraud case. I accept the Crown's supplementary submissions at [18]:

The offences are relatively serious. They are clearly not trivial.
There was no loss to IPF. The offences involved limited planning and sophistication. There was a clear breach of trust, as was indicated in the Crown's supplementary written submissions at [13].
The appellant is a person with no prior convictions and was a person of prior good character. Both these features are mitigating. I accept the Crown's supplementary written submissions at [21(a)] that in this case prior good character is of reduced weight, as this was a reason Ms Medley was in the position of Company Director and trusted by IPF to carry out debt collection on its behalf.
At the time of the offences, the appellant was 46-47 years old. She has not re-offended in the period since she was charged. This is a positive feature, and I accept she is unlikely to re-offend and that her prospects of rehabilitation are good.
Although much of what the appellant asserted in her evidence was not accepted at first instance, or by me on the conviction appeal, her personal history of struggling as a single parent to raise two sons, her intra-family conflict and precarious mental health during the relevant periods was not in dispute.
Although the offending on each occasion was over a period of months and was deliberately deceptive, I accept it can be categorised as an aberration in the context of a person who otherwise has never offended. I accept that she was experiencing significant external stress at the relevant time. I accept that she took advice from and relied upon Mr Crabbe, to her significant detriment. However, I do not accept the history she provided to Mr Awit at [67] of his report. I do, however, accept on the balance of probabilities her more general history regarding her struggles in the period after the breakdown of her marriage in 2008 at [2]-[5] of the report. The offending occurred at a time of lengthy turbulence and distress. Those factors place the offending into context. Consistent with Ms Medley’s otherwise good character, they support the conclusion that the conduct is an aberration. However, these factors do not provide a causal link with the offending or lessen Ms Medley’s moral culpability.
The appellant, as was her right, has strenuously disputed her guilt. As outlined in the judgment on the conviction appeal, I did not accept much of her evidence. Relevantly, she denied ever deliberately and dishonestly making the relevant misrepresentations.
During the severity appeal, the appellant tendered a letter she had written that stated at [27]-[29]:

I note the written submissions on the relevance of delay for the appellant mirror those sentiments consistent with the case of R v Todd (1982) 2 NSWLR 517, and the well-known reasons of Street CJ, and subsequent cases.
The Crown invited the court to conclude the appellant is not rehabilitated because of her lack of contrition/remorse and failure to accept responsibility. I agree that those two features do not advance the appellant’s case. However, the question of rehabilitation and probability of further offending are matters that are of benefit to the appellant.
I also conclude that the long delay has caused Ms Medley ongoing anxiety and distress and should be taken into account.
The appellant also submits at [12] of the written submissions that in this period of delay she has demonstrated substantial rehabilitation, including engagement within the community and working as a Business Development Manager without further offending. I accept this is so.
Additionally, the appellant, in her letter to the court, points to asserted 'extra curial' punishment in the form of:
Tarnished business and personal reputation because of various ASIC Media Releases on the ASIC website (see [10]-[13] and [16]).
Loss of prospective clients because of the ASIC Media releases (see [10]).
Ostracisation by former clients and business associates (see [12]).
Stress and anxiety to Ms Medley her friends and family (see [16] and [20]).
Mental health issues stemming from financial uncertainty (see [21]).
Closure of Macquarie Bank Cash Management Accelerator Account, Macquarie Bank Cash Management Account, Morgan's Wealth and Share Portfolio account, and cancellation of Qantas Premium Platinum Card (see [23]-[26]).
The appellant, in her letter, complained of the actions of ASIC in reporting the progress and final resolution of the criminal proceedings on its website. It was submitted that as a result, the appellant experienced humiliation and social ostracisation, a form of extra-curial punishment.
Non-curial punishment addresses circumstances where an offender has suffered some significant detriment that can properly be characterised as punishment for the offence (Jehad Jodeh v R [2011] NSWCCA 194 at [49]; Ashley v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 131 at [53]).
The Crown disputes these factors amount to non-curial punishment and notes the absence of evidence of asserted distress and anxiety of friends and family. The Crown submits that the factors are no more than consequences flowing from her convictions.
On my assessment, the ASIC publications were warranted because of need to inform and deter others of the consequences of acting dishonestly in business dealings. The withdrawal by various institutions of the appellant’s rights of access and use of things, like the closure of bank accounts, revocation of Qantas card, loss of business clients and ostracization do amount to some non-curial punishment. However, the weight to be given to this is limited.