1. In relation to the offence of aggravated robbery on 27 July 2012, Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

2. In respect of the charge of assaulting [redacted] and occasioning actual bodily harm, Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

3. In relation to the charge of, on 17 May 2013, recklessly causing damage to property, namely, an internal wall belonging to the Southern Cross Club, Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendations as to how she should be dealt with.

4. In relation to the charge of assaulting [redacted] and, therefore, occasioning him actual bodily harm, Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

5. The charge of possessing a knife on 27 July 2012 be dismissed and Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

6. The count of unlawful possession on 27 July 2012 be dismissed and Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

7. The charge of trespass on 14 December 2012 is dismissed and Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

8. The charge of possessing an offensive weapon on 16 December 2012 be dismissed and require Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

9. The charge of possessing a knife on 16 December 2012 be dismissed and require Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

10. The charge of possessing cannabis be dismissed.

11. Kristy Louise McGuckin is not guilty, by reason of mental impairment of the charge of offensive manner on 17 May 2013 and she submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendation as to how she should be dealt with.

12. Kristy Louise McGuckin is not guilty, by reason of mental impairment, of the charge of common assault on 17 May 2013 and she submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendations as to how she should be dealt with.

13. Kristy Louise McGuckin is not guilty, by reason of mental impairment, of the charge of resisting a public official on 26 May 2013 and she is to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order

14. The charge of minor theft on 26 May 2013 be dismissed and Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

15. The charge of minor theft on 26 May 2013 be dismissed and Kristy Louise McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

16. Kristy Louise McGuckin is not guilty, by reason of mental impairment, of the charge of common assault on 27 May 2013 and she submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendations as to how she should be dealt with.

CRIMINAL LAW - Offences - Transferred charges - Aggravated robbery - Assault - Common assault - Minor theft - Act in a manner offensive - Recklessly causing damage to property - Trespass - Possession of an offensive weapon - Possession of cannabis - Resist public official

Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 24, 26, 300, 308, 319, 321, 334, 382, 392

Drugs of Dependence Act 1989 (ACT), s 171

Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (ACT)

Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 68E, Pt 8

Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), ss 28, 310, 321, 324, 403

Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610

R v McGuckin [2014] ACTSC 242

R v Smith [2012] ACTSC 146; (2012) 269 FLR 233

1. Kristy Louise McGuckin faces a number of mental challenges as a result of her paranoid schizophrenia. This has led her into the criminal justice system on a number of occasions.

2. On 18 September 2014, I found her not guilty, by reason of mental impairment, of offences of aggravated robbery, two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and one offence of recklessly causing damage to property. See R v McGuckin [2014] ACTSC 242. In my reasons I set out, in some detail, her history of mental illness and also referred in some detail to a large number of reports from psychiatrists who examined her.

3. There was some disagreement about the proper diagnosis to be made, but I found that it was, as I have indicated above, a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. It was this that affected her commission of the offences and which led to the verdict as required under s 28 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) of not guilty, by reason of mental impairment,. I sought submissions as to the appropriate orders to be made. There are, in reality, only two possibilities, but it is necessary for me to carefully consider them.

4. The first question is to determine the nature of the offences. Aggravated robbery is an offence under s 310 of the Criminal Code and attracts a maximum penalty of 2,500 penalty units, or imprisonment for twenty-five years, or both. Assault occasioning actual body harm is an offence contrary to s 24 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) which provides for a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. Recklessly causing damage to property is an offence prohibited by s 403 of the Criminal Code, for which the maximum penalty is 1,000 penalty units, or imprisonment for ten years, or both.

5. Thus, these offences are serious offences and are punishable by imprisonment for twelve months or more. As to whether they are serious offences depends upon the interpretation of s 300 of the Crimes Act, which requires them to be offences of violence and also punishable by imprisonment for twelve months or more.

6. There is no doubt, therefore, that offences of aggravated robbery and assault occasioning actual bodily harm are both serious offences within the meaning of s 300 of the Crimes Act. The offence of damaging property is more problematic. In common parlance it may be said to be an offence of violence, but I addressed that matter in R v Smith [2012] ACTSC 146; (2012) 269 FLR 233 and held there that violence in the context of whether or not an offence is a serious offence does not include violence against property.

7. Accordingly, while the offences of aggravated robbery and assault occasioning actual bodily harm are serious offences, it does not seem to me that the offence of recklessly causing damage to property is a serious offence.

8. Following a finding of a special verdict (s 321 of the Crimes Act), the Court, under s 319 of the Crimes Act, may either order that the person be detained in custody until the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the ACAT) orders otherwise or, having considered the matters set out in s 308 of the Crimes Act, order a person to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order, in the case of serious offences.

9. In the case of offences that are not serious offences which, in this case, refers to the offence of recklessly damaging property, I may either make an order requiring Ms McGuckin to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendations as to how she should be dealt with, or make any other orders I consider appropriate.

10. In this case, however, there were other charges that had been preferred against Ms McGuckin as well. These were transferred to this Court under Pt 8 of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT). That Part was added to the Act on 2 April 2014. It permits this Court, when dealing with an accused person, to deal also with other offences which are summary offences or certain indictable offences capable of being dealt with summarily and which, absent the provisions of the Division, would have to be or ordinarily would be dealt with by the Magistrates Court, thus requiring further appearances and the undesirable possibility that relevantly related offences would be dealt with separately by two different judicial officers.

11. The relevant provisions of the Division are as follows:

68CA Definitions--pt 8

In this part:

back-up offence, in relation to an indictable offence (the first indictable offence), means an offence--

(a) that is--

(i) a summary offence; or

(ii) an indictable offence that is capable of being dealt with summarily by the Magistrates Court under the Magistrates Court Act 1930, part 3.6 (Proceedings for offences punishable summarily); and

(b) at least some of the elements of which are similar to the elements that constitute the first indictable offence; and

(c) that is to be prosecuted on the same facts as the first indictable offence.

related offence, in relation to an indictable offence (the first indictable offence), means an offence, other than a back-up offence -

(a) that is--

(i) a summary offence; or

(ii) an indictable offence that is capable of being dealt with summarily by the Magistrates Court under the Magistrates Court Act 1930, part 3.6 (Proceedings for offences punishable summarily); and

(b) that arises from substantially the same circumstances as those from which the first indictable offence has arisen.

68D Back-up and related offences

(1) This section applies in the following circumstances:

(a) if the Magistrates Court commits an accused person for trial or sentencing to the Supreme Court under any of the following provisions of the Magistrates Court Act 1930:

(i) section 90B (Back-up and related offences--transfer to Supreme Court);

(ii) section 92A (1) (Committal for sentence for indictable offence tried summarily);

(iii) section 94 (1) (b) (Discharge or committal for trial);

(iv) section 291G (2) (Childrens Court may send cases to Supreme Court for sentencing);

(b) at the conclusion of the trial of an accused person for an indictable offence, or in the course of a sentencing proceeding.

(2) The court must deal with any back-up or related offence with which the accused person has been charged if the court considers that it is in the interests of justice.

(3) The court may deal with a back-up or related offence with which an accused person has been charged even though it is not doing so in relation to a back-up or related offence with which another accused person in the same proceedings is charged.

68E Procedure

(1) The court shall deal with a back-up or related offence under this part -

(a) without a jury; and

(b) on the basis only -

(i) of evidence given during the trial of the accused person for any indictable offence in the same proceedings; and

(ii) of any additional evidence given under this section.

(2) The prosecutor or the accused person may, with the leave of the court, call additional evidence in relation to the back-up or related offence.

(3) In sentencing or otherwise dealing with a person for a back-up or related offence, the court has the same functions as the Magistrates Court.

68F Remission of back-up and related offences to Magistrates Court

The court may, at any time, remit a back-up or related offence being dealt with under this part to the Magistrates Court.

12. There are, however, a large number of these offences. The issue then is whether I should deal with them or remit them to the Magistrates Court. Neither the prosecution nor the defence sought that I should remit them to the Magistrates Court.

13. Having considered the matters carefully, it seems to me that they are all relevantly related and can be dealt with, and should be dealt with, by me. In order to understand the issues, it is helpful to summarise the offences with which I tried Ms McGuckin and entered a special verdict. The details are set out in R v McGuckin and I do not need to repeat them.

14. When summarising the evidence I will refer directly also to the relevant transferred charges.

Offences related to the offence of Aggravated robbery

15. On 27 July 2012, Ms McGuckin used a pair of scissors to threaten security officers of a Civic supermarket, whilst stealing items which she had taken from the supermarket. When police arrived and subdued Ms McGuckin, they searched her and found a blue pocket knife and a green flick knife in her possession.

16. As a result, she was also charged with possession of the knives, without reasonable excuse, an offence under s 382 of the Crimes Act, for which the maximum penalty is ten penalty units, or imprisonment for six months, or both. This is a summary offence which has been transferred to this Court. No challenge was made to the facts set out above for this offence and I am satisfied that my findings of fact are as set out above.

17. Police also located property which appeared to be stolen from other nearby stores, including a water bottle, four pairs of gloves, a resistance band and hand weights.

18. Ms McGuckin was charged with unlawful possession of stolen property, an offence against s 324 of the Criminal Code, which sets out a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units, or imprisonment for six months, or both. It is, therefore, also a summary offence and which has also been transferred to this Court.

19. Again, there was no challenge to the facts and I make findings accordingly.

20. These offences were contemporaneous with the offence of aggravated robbery. There were, however, differences. Ms McGuckin clearly had the goods from the other store before she engaged in a theft from the supermarket. She also, it would appear, came with the knives already in her possession. The reasoning which led me to find that she could not control her conduct when committing the aggravated robbery where she picked up scissors, when challenged, do not seem to me to apply. I do not enter a special verdict in respect of these offences. They are, however, clearly related offences committed at a time when she was mentally impaired and which mental impairment was relevant to the offending.

Offences committed close in time to the offence of Assault occasioning actual bodily harm

21. Ms McGuckin was being transported to the Magistrates Court when she refused to dismount from the vehicle in which she was being transported and attacked an officer on 20 December 2012. This was the first offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, for which I entered a special verdict. Ms McGuckin was, at the time, in custody because of offences she had earlier committed.

22. On 14 December 2012, she had entered into the Westfield Woden Shopping Centre from which it appears she had been banned. She was charged with trespass under Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (ACT) which provides for a maximum penalty of 10 penalty units. This is a summary offence and was transferred to this Court.

23. Again the facts were not disputed on my findings accordingly.

24. I have, however, no evidence of her mental condition at the time when she trespassed on the premises, though she was clearly impaired two days later. I do not consider that I have sufficient evidence to make a finding necessary for special verdict.

25. On 16 December 2012, Ms McGuckin went to the emergency department of the Canberra Hospital where she sought treatment for a sore knee. She was triaged to wait, became aggressive and pulled a knife, with which she threatened a nurse.

26. She was charged with possessing a knife without reasonable excuse, a summary offence which I have already described above. She was also charged with possessing an offensive weapon with intent to use it to commit violence, an offence against s 321 of the Crimes Act for which the maximum penalty is a fine of $2,000, or imprisonment for one year, or both. It is, accordingly, a summary offence.

27. Both of those summary offences have been transferred.

28. The knife charged in the first offence is the same knife that is the weapon referred to in the second offence. The elements of the offences are slightly different so that it may be that both of them can properly be prosecuted. No submissions were made to me about that.

29. In any event, following Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610, I do not consider that additional penalties could be imposed for both offences, since the first seems to be subsumed in the second.

30. Ms McGuckin was taken into custody and searched. She was found to have some cannabis. That is an offence against s 171 of the Drugs of Dependence Act 1989 (ACT), which carries a maximum penalty of one penalty unit. It is a summary offence and an offence for which only a fine is a penalty.

31. Again, the facts set out for all those offences were not challenged and were not in dispute, and I make appropriate findings. They were all offences that were transferred to this Court.

32. Ms McGuckin was examined by a psychologist three days later because of her behaviour in the emergency department. She was then calm and had normal thought forms. She was assessed, however, as at risk of suicide and selfharm and, though with a history of violence, no current thoughts or plans of violence. She had chronic symptoms of mental illness and dysfunction that gave the clinical impression that this may lead to aggression. She was described as having chronic impulse control problems.

33. Given the circumstances, I cannot find that her mental illness had the relevant effect there for the offences, such that a special verdict was appropriate. She was, however, clearly, at the time, mentally impaired.

Offences related to the offence of Recklessly causing damage

34. Ms McGuckin went to the Southern Cross Club on 17 May 2013 where she demanded repayment of money which she said she had been promised when she had earlier reported a problem with a poker machine. She became aggressive and damaged a wall. This was the offence of recklessly causing damage for which I entered a special verdict.

35. When arrested by police she became abusive and aggressive. She kicked a female police officer on the officer's right knee, causing pain. She was charged with common assault, an offence prohibited by s 26 of the Crimes Act, which attracts a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment. It is, therefore, a summary offence and it was transferred to this Court. The facts were not challenged and I find that these events occurred.

36. It seems to me that the impairment that Ms McGuckin suffered, which resulted in me entering a special verdict, was present in the same way when Ms McGuckin committed this offence. In my view I should find that she was not guilty of that offence by reason of mental impairment.

37. Ms McGuckin's behaviour in the foyer of the Southern Cross Club was also aggressive and loud. She used offensive language and shouted at and threatened staff. She was charged with behaving in an offensive manner, an offence against s 392 of the Crimes Act, which attracts a maximum penalty of $1,000 fine. It is a summary matter and has been transferred to this Court.

38. Again, no facts were challenged and I make the appropriate findings. Further, the behaviour was part and parcel of her conduct which led me to enter a special verdict on the offence of recklessly causing damage.

39. In my view, the same position applies and I find that on this charge she was not guilty, by reason of mental impairment.

Offences related to the offence Assault occasioning actual bodily harm

40. On 26 May 2013, Ms McGuckin went into a supermarket at the Erindale Shopping Centre and when challenged, as she was suspected of stealing goods, she bit one of the members of staff trying to restrain her. This was the assault occasioning actual bodily harm for which I entered a special verdict.

41. She was found later to have stolen a number of items from the supermarket, which were valued at $495.15. She was charged with minor theft, an offence against s 321 of the Criminal Code, for which the maximum penalty is 50 penalty units, or six months' imprisonment, or both. It is, therefore, a summary offence and has been transferred to this Court.

42. I find the facts as above as they were not in dispute. While her conduct, when challenged, was clearly affected in the relevant way by her mental impairment, such that a special verdict was appropriate on the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, I do not consider that I can be satisfied that the same applies to her stealing of the items which had, by that time, already occurred. She was, however, clearly mentally impaired at the time.

43. She was also charged with stealing other items stolen from the supermarket. This was also an offence of minor theft, which I have described above (at [41]), and also a summary offence, as I have also noted and one that was transferred. I make findings in accordance with those facts as no challenge was made to them.

44. Again, while Ms McGuckin was mentally impaired, I do not consider that the circumstances justify me entering a special verdict but that the circumstances of the offence justify another response.

45. Ms McGuckin resisted police when they arrived at the scene and struggled aggressively. As a result she was charged with resisting a public official in the exercise of his duty, an offence against s 149.1 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), for which the maximum penalty is two years' imprisonment.

46. It is a summary offence and has also been transferred. I am satisfied, in the absence of challenge, that these are the facts I should find.

47. Since that event was contemporaneous with, and part and parcel of, the events that led to the assault occasioning actual bodily harm for which I entered a special verdict, I should also find Ms McGuckin not guilty of this offence, on the ground of mental impairment.

48. There was one further offence which was alleged to have occurred the next day, on 27 May 2013. As the facts of this offence were not otherwise adduced in the Crown case on the trial I gave leave for the facts to be adduced and they were not challenged.

49. They showed that Ms McGuckin was being transported to court on 27 May 2013 and she again refused to get out of the ACT Corrective Services vehicle. She was coaxed by a police officer who put his arm in to get her out, but she bit it on the top of his right forearm. The police officer then punched Ms McGuckin in the chest and she released her bite.

50. She was charged with common assault, a summary offence which I have earlier described. It was also transferred to this Court.

51. The facts were not in dispute and I make the appropriate findings. In the light of the finding of Ms McGuckin's mental health on the previous day and the effect that the circumstances of her being challenged and threatened have on her paranoid schizophrenia which led me to the making of a special verdict on the first charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm in very similar circumstances, I am satisfied that Ms McGuckin was not guilty of this offence, on the ground of mental impairment.

52. So far as the offences for which I have not entered a special verdict are concerned, I am satisfied that, under s 68E(3) of the Supreme Court Act, I have the same powers as the Magistrates Court, when dealing with the transferred offences. In particular, I am satisfied that I can act as though I were the Magistrates Court under s 334 of the Crimes Act.

(1) This section applies where, in proceedings to which this division applies before the Magistrates Court, that court is satisfied that -

(a) the accused is mentally impaired; and

(b) on an outline of the facts to be alleged in the proceedings, or any other evidence the Magistrates Court considers relevant, it would be appropriate to deal with the person under this division.

(2) If this section applies, the Magistrates Court may by order -

(a) dismiss the charge and require the accused to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order; or

(b) dismiss the charge unconditionally.

(3) In determining whether to make an order under subsection (2) (a) or (b), the Magistrates Court shall have regard to -

(a) the nature and seriousness of the mental impairment; and

(b) the period for which the mental impairment is likely to continue; and

(c) the extent to which by reason of the accused's mental (a) the nature and seriousness of the mental impairment; and

(d) whether the ACAT could make an order under the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994, section 26 (What ACAT must take into account) or section 27 (ACAT may not order particular drugs etc); and

(e) the seriousness of the alleged offence; and

(f) the antecedents of the accused; and

(g) the effectiveness of any order previously made under subsection (2) (a) or (b), including to the extent to which -

(i) the order assisted the accused to obtain appropriate treatment and care for his or her mental impairment; and

(ii) access to that treatment and care has enabled the accused to modify his or her behaviour, being behaviour of a kind that has previously resulted in the accused having been charged with an offence.

(4) Despite subsection (2), the Magistrates Court may only make an order under that subsection in relation to proceedings with respect to an indictable offence that may be heard and determined summarily with the consent of the director of public prosecutions.

(5) If the Magistrates Court makes an order under subsection (2) (a), the order operates as a stay of proceedings, or of further proceedings, against the accused in relation to the offence.

(6) If the Magistrates Court makes an order under subsection (2), it must not make an order under any of the following provisions of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 for the offence:

(a) section 13 (Good behaviour orders);

(b) section 17 (Non-conviction orders - general);

(c) section 19 (Reparation orders - losses and expenses generally);

(d) section 20 (Reparation orders - stolen property).

(7) An order under subsection (2) does not constitute a finding that an offence has or has not been committed.

54. These matters referred to in s 334(3) of the Crimes Act have, for the most part been dealt with either earlier in these reasons or in R v McGuckin. The principal reason for dealing with some offences under this section is the nature of the offence and the inclusion of relevant elements in other offences to which they are relevantly related or because of the nature of the offences otherwise.

55. In the circumstances of this case where Ms McGuckin has been in custody for a considerable period of time it seems to me that it would be appropriate to proceed in that way for a number of the offences.

1. In relation to the offence of aggravated robbery on 27 July 2012, I order that you submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

2. In respect of the charge of assaulting [redacted] and occasioning actual bodily harm, I order that you submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

3. In relation to the charge of on 17 May 2013 recklessly causing damage to property, namely, an internal wall belonging to the Southern Cross Club, I make an order requiring you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendations as to how you should be dealt with.

4. In relation to the charge of assaulting [redacted] and, therefore, occasioning him actual bodily harm, I order that you submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

5. In relation to the charge of possessing a knife on 27 July 2012, I dismiss the charge and require you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

6. On the count of unlawful possession on 27 July 2012, I dismiss the charge and require you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

7. In respect of the charge of trespass on 14 December 2012, I dismiss the charge and require you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

8. In respect of the charge of possessing an offensive weapon on 16 December 2012, I dismiss the charge and require you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

9. In respect of the charge of possessing a knife on 16 December 2012, I dismiss the charge and require you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

10. In respect of the charge of possessing cannabis, I dismiss the charge unconditionally.

11. In relation to the charge of offensive manner on 17 May 2013 I find you not guilty, by reason of mental impairment.

12. In respect of the charge of acting in an offensive manner on 17 May 2013, I make an order requiring you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendations as to how you should be dealt with.

13. On the charge of common assault on 17 May 2013, I find you not guilty, by reason of mental impairment and I require you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendations as to how you should be dealt with.

14. On the charge of resisting a public official on 26 May 2013 I find you not guilty, by reason of mental impairment, and require you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order

15. On the charge of minor theft on 26 May 2013, I dismiss the charge and require you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

16. On the charge of minor theft on 26 May 2013, I dismiss the charge and require you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.

17. On the charge of common assault on 27 May 2013, I find you not guilty, by reason of mental impairment, and I make an order requiring you to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendations as to how you should be dealt with.

57. [His Honour then spoke directly to Ms McGuckin]

58. Ms McGuckin, I appreciate your mental health challenges and I have taken those into account. It seems to me that you are able to live in the community, but only if you continue with your mental health treatment and get some support and assistance, and that is where you should be, not in prison. But if you continue to behave in this manner and carry out particularly serious offences then it is almost inevitable that the Court will have no option but to make custodial orders from time to time. It appears that there was a long period there when, in particular, with the care of Professor Henderson you were doing very well. I hope that is a possibility that you will be able to be restored and can deal with that. You may be seated.

I certify that the preceding fifty-eight [58] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Chief Justice Refshauge.