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[2025] QCA 246
respondent. The appeal against conviction was dismissed.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Marius argued that the jury might have misunderstood a phrase in the trial judge's directions to mean that every possible capacity had to be impaired before diminished responsibility could apply. The Court of Appeal read the phrase alongside the rest of the directions. It concluded that “all three” referred to the three elements of the defence, while the capacities under consideration were alternatives. The written questions reinforced that reading. The appeal was dismissed.
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2,026 words · generated 07/10/2026
The Queensland Court of Appeal considered Marius’s appeal against his murder conviction. The jury convicted him on 7 December 2023. His sole appeal ground was that the trial judge misdirected the jury about diminished responsibility (paras [2]–[3]). The appeal was heard on 20 October 2025 and dismissed on 5 December 2025. Boddice JA gave the reasons, with Mullins P and Brown JA agreeing (paras [1], [41]–[42]).
The trial concerned the death of a man who shared a residence with Marius and two other people. The Crown case included evidence that Marius and the deceased had a poor relationship, that the deceased had asked Marius to leave the residence, and that Marius had spoken about wanting to harm him before striking him repeatedly on the head with a home-gym pulldown bar (paras [7]–[14]). The appeal did not challenge the jury’s assessment of those events or the evidence generally. It raised only the alleged error in the directions about diminished responsibility.
The jury’s relevant tasks were to decide whether the Crown had proved beyond reasonable doubt that Marius intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm and, if so, whether diminished responsibility meant he should not be convicted of murder (para [6]). Four psychiatrists gave evidence. They differed about whether Marius had an abnormality of mind and whether any relevant capacity was impaired, and their opinions depended on the accuracy of the versions Marius had given them (paras [18]–[23]). The Court of Appeal did not decide those medical questions afresh. It considered whether the jury had been properly directed to decide the defence.
The point of dispute arose from the trial judge’s explanation of the defence. The judge identified abnormality of mind, impairment of a relevant capacity, and substantial impairment. In explaining those matters, the judge said, “All three must be found” (para [25]). Marius argued that this could have led the jury to think all three possible capacities had to be impaired, rather than one or other of the capacities relevant to his case (para [30]). The Court rejected that reading after examining the summing up as a whole.
The Court’s reasoning turned on context. Boddice JA did not isolate the words “all three must be found”. The judgment explains that the trial judge had already told the jury what the three elements were: a state of abnormality of mind; impairment of the capacity to control actions or to know that the act ought not be done; and substantial impairment (paras [34]–[36]). In that sequence, “all three” referred to those three elements, not to a requirement that every possible capacity be impaired.
The judge had also expressly directed the jury to the capacities in issue. The words used were “the capacity to control his actions or to know that he ought not do the act” (para [34]). The word “or” mattered to the Court’s assessment: the jury was not told that both capacities had to be impaired. The judge later said the jury had to decide whether “one or more” of those capacities was impaired and whether the impairment was substantial (para [27]). The Court saw that later direction as consistent with the earlier explanation.
The Court also considered the direction about unanimity. The trial judge told the jury they did not have to agree unanimously on the particular capacity or capacities impaired, provided they agreed that a capacity was impaired. The judge added that they might decide both capacities were impaired, or neither, and that it did not have to be one or the other (para [38]). This passage reinforced the Court’s view that the jury had been directed to consider the identified capacities as alternatives.
The written questions supported the same reading. Question 3 asked whether the abnormality of mind impaired Marius’s capacity to control his actions, “or” to know he should not do the act. It also told jurors they did not need unanimity about the particular capacity or capacities, only about whether a capacity was impaired (para [28]). The judge described the questions as optional, but the Court did not treat that feature as undermining the directions. It found that the questions correctly and succinctly stated how the law applied to the case and could serve as a useful aide-mémoire (para [39]).
The Court’s conclusion was not that written questions can always cure unclear oral directions. Its stated reasoning was case-specific: the oral summing up itself identified the relevant capacities and the three elements, later directions reinforced that explanation, and the written questions were consistent with it. On that combination of directions, the Court found no appreciable risk that the jury had misunderstood the phrase (paras [32]–[39]).
The appeal ground failed because the Court found no wrong decision or misdirection concerning diminished responsibility (para [40]). It therefore dismissed the appeal against conviction (para [41]).
The judgment gives a concise account of the directions on diminished responsibility that were relevant to this appeal. The trial judge told the jury that, if the prosecution proved the relevant murderous intent beyond reasonable doubt, the jury should consider whether diminished responsibility applied. The jury was told that the defence had to be raised and proved by the appellant on the balance of probabilities (para [24]). The judge then described the relevant matters as abnormality of mind, impairment of a relevant capacity, and substantial impairment (paras [25]–[27]).
The judgment also records the trial judge’s explanation that an abnormality of mind could arise from arrested or retarded development, inherent causes, or disease or injury, including psychological injury. It records the direction that intoxication did not itself amount to an abnormality of mind and was not to be taken into account when considering whether an abnormality impaired the relevant capacities (para [25]). These are directions reproduced in the judgment, not an exhaustive account of the law.
The decision’s contribution, on the material provided, is its application of a whole-summing-up approach to the specific alleged ambiguity. The Court assessed how the directions worked together rather than treating one sentence as determinative. It found that the phrase “all three must be found” referred to the three elements just identified, because the judge had named the capacities in issue and later clarified that one or more could be impaired (paras [34]–[38]).
The supplied judgment does not set out a “before” position through discussion of earlier cases, nor does it cite legislation or earlier decisions. It therefore does not provide a basis for describing how the law changed, or for identifying a new rule that displaced prior authority. The safe account is narrower: the Court applied the law as stated in the trial directions and rejected the asserted misdirection on the facts of this summing up.
Likewise, the judgment supplies no post-decision cases or commentary. It was delivered on 5 December 2025, and the materials provided contain no later judicial treatment. Whether later courts have followed, distinguished, or developed the reasoning cannot be determined from this source.
At [32], Boddice JA said that “a consideration of the summing up as a whole” supported the conclusion that there was no misdirection. In plain English, the Court did not decide the appeal by looking at one phrase alone. It asked what a reasonable reading of all the directions together would convey.
At [34], the Court noted that the judge had directed the jury to consider whether abnormality of mind impaired the capacity to control actions “or” to know that the act ought not be done, and whether the impairment was substantial. In plain English, the jury was told which capacities mattered in this case, and the directions did not say that all capacities had to be impaired.
At [36], the Court explained that “all three must be found” referred to abnormality of mind, impairment of a relevant capacity, and substantial impairment. In plain English, the three things that had to be established were elements of the defence, not three separate capacities.
At [38], the Court relied on the later explanation that jurors did not need to agree unanimously on the particular capacity impaired. In plain English, the direction permitted the jury to agree that the defence was established without every juror choosing the same one of the identified capacities.
At [39], the Court called the written questions a useful aide-mémoire, while noting that the jury was not required to use them in any particular way. In plain English, the written questions could help the jury follow the issues, but the Court assessed them as part of the overall directions rather than as a mandatory checklist.
The decision is most directly relevant where an appeal alleges that a particular phrase in a jury direction about diminished responsibility was ambiguous, but the rest of the summing up may clarify its meaning. The factual feature that mattered was the sequence of directions: the judge identified the relevant capacities, described the three elements, later referred to “one or more” capacities, and supplied written questions that stated the alternatives (paras [34]–[39]).
It may be relevant where the alleged error concerns whether a jury was told that all capacities must be impaired, rather than whether one or more specified capacities was impaired. The decision shows the significance, in this appeal, of the wording “or”, the later reference to “one or more”, and the direction about unanimity on the particular capacity (paras [34], [37]–[38]).
The case should not be read as deciding that every direction using “all three” is adequate, or that written questions automatically cure a misdirection. The Court’s conclusion depended on its reading of this particular summing up as a whole. The judgment does not decide how a different direction, different statutory wording, or different set of capacities would be treated.
Nor does it resolve disputes about the medical evidence. The appeal ground did not challenge the jury’s findings on the evidence, and the Court did not determine whether Marius in fact had an abnormality of mind or whether his capacities were substantially impaired. It decided the alleged jury-direction error only.
The supplied judgment contains no discussion of later decisions, and no subsequent treatment is included in the provided material. It would therefore be unsupported to say that later courts have followed, distinguished, or applied R v Marius.
Within the judgment itself, there are no cited precedents whose relationship to the decision can be extracted. The reasoning is presented through the Court’s assessment of the trial judge’s directions, rather than through an express discussion of earlier appellate authorities. Any account of the decision’s later precedential influence would require sources beyond the judgment supplied here.
The judgment does not explain how its approach would apply where the oral directions were materially less complete, where the relevant capacities were not expressly identified, or where later directions conflicted with an earlier statement. Those are not issues the Court needed to decide on this appeal.
It also does not examine the legal framework through statutory text or cited authorities. The judgment reproduces the trial judge’s explanation and decides whether the jury was misdirected in this case. It does not provide a detailed account of the historical development or broader boundaries of diminished responsibility.
The role of written jury questions is considered only in the circumstances before the Court. The judgment says these questions were accurate, succinct and useful, but optional. It does not set out a general test for when written questions can clarify oral directions, or when an optional document might fail to address a misleading oral direction.
Finally, the decision leaves the psychiatric disagreement and the factual application of diminished responsibility untouched. The psychiatrists’ opinions differed, and each opinion depended on the accuracy of Marius’s reported account (paras [18]–[23]). Because the sole appeal ground concerned the directions, the Court did not decide which psychiatric account was correct or whether the defence was factually made out.
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Marius [2025] QCA 246
PARTIES: R / v / MARIUS, Coskun Jaques / (appellant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 240 of 2023 / SC No 1162 of 2022
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 7 December 2023 (Martin SJA)
DELIVERED ON: 5 December 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 20 October 2025
JUDGES: Mullins P and Boddice and Brown JJA
ORDER: The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – EFFECT OF MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION – where the appellant was convicted after trial before a jury of murder – where the trial judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the Crown had established that the appellant intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, the jury was to consider the question of diminished responsibility – where the trial judge provided to the jury a written set of questions, directing them that they could use them or not use them as they wish – where the trial judge directed the jury in respect of those questions – whether the trial judge misdirected the jury in respect of the defence of diminished responsibility
COUNSEL: D J Walsh, with N J Brown, for the appellant / M B Lehane for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Phillips Crawford Lawyers for the appellant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
MULLINS P: I agree with Boddice JA.
BODDICE JA: On 7 December 2023, a jury found the appellant guilty of murder.
The appellant appeals that conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge misdirected the jury in respect of the defence of diminished responsibility.
Trial
The indictment alleged that the appellant murdered the deceased on 10 May 2019.
At trial, it was admitted that on 10 May 2019, a call was placed with the Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) at 17.01; that two police officers were detailed to attend the deceased’s residence at approximately 17.31; that the police officers were unable to find any signs of life at the residence at approximately 17.46; that a QAS vehicle arrived at the residence at 18.09; and that the QAS issued a life extinct certificate declaring the deceased’s life to be extinct at 18.12.
The issues for the jury at trial were whether the Crown had established, beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, and if so, whether the appellant was to be found not guilty of murder on the grounds of diminished responsibility.
Evidence
In May 2019, the appellant and the deceased were sharing the residence with two other people. The appellant was an active user of methylamphetamine. The deceased was also involved in the drug scene, albeit more recently.
The appellant and the deceased had a poor relationship. The deceased had asked the appellant to leave the residence a number of times.
On or about 7 May 2019, the deceased told the appellant to leave, alleging that the appellant had been stealing the deceased’s belongings.
On 10 May 2019, the appellant arrived at the residence at approximately 3.20 pm. He joined one of the other occupants of the residence, who was in the backyard drinking with his girlfriend. The appellant complained that the deceased had kicked him out of the house and was “treating me like a dog”.
At about 3.30 pm the deceased and the other occupant arrived at the residence. The deceased went into the living room and fell asleep.
After the deceased fell asleep, the appellant went to the garage area with those he had been drinking with in the backyard. Whilst there, the appellant spoke of wanting to harm the deceased.
At approximately 5.00 pm, the appellant grabbed a pulldown bar attached to the home gym in the garage and went back into the residence where he struck the deceased on the head multiple times with the pulldown bar.
Shortly after inflicting those blows, the other occupants of the house observed the deceased with a small white sheet over his face. The appellant was hunched over the deceased, speaking in his ear. The deceased was moaning.
Later that evening, the appellant travelled by car to the residence of an acquaintance. The next morning, he travelled by car to Coffs Harbour.
On 12 May 2019, the appellant was arrested by police. During his interview on 14 May 2019 with police, he admitted to having been seated in a chair near the pulldown bar, which was always attached to the home gym. Although he could not remember whether he took the pulldown bar from the home gym, he admitted that shortly after attacking the deceased, he had lied when he told one of the other occupants of the residence that he had been engaged to do a hit on her and the deceased and that he decided not to go through with the agreement in respect of her. He also told police that the deceased had previously tried to kill him by placing a pillow over his face. The deceased had also told others that he wanted to get rid of the appellant.
The appellant also made admissions, when giving evidence in his own defence at trial. He described getting angrier and angrier as he was talking about the deceased, prior to striking the deceased. He denied saying words that he wanted to kill the deceased, but admitted saying something along the lines of tying up the deceased to get some information from him about raping girls and raping the appellant’s mother. He also denied picking up the pulldown bar from the garage. The appellant said when he approached the deceased, he felt very anxious and felt like he was starting to lose control. He was hearing a voice that he had regularly heard on previous occasions. The voice was telling him to stand up for himself. The appellant said he then blacked out and could feel himself swinging and hitting the deceased with the pulldown bar. The pulldown bar came from inside the sliding door. He could not recall how many times he struck the deceased, but recalled pouring a pot of water to wash the blood off his face and saying, “I’m sorry. I love you.” and “I hope you suffer”.
Summing up
The trial judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the Crown had established that the appellant intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, the jury was to consider the question of diminished responsibility. The trial judge directed the jury that the law provided that a person who would otherwise be guilty of murder is not to be convicted of that offence, but is to be convicted of the offence of manslaughter if, at the time of the act causing the death, that person’s capacity to understand what he was doing or to control his actions ought to know that he ought not do that act, as substantially impaired because of an abnormality of mind. The jury were directed that it was a defence and it was for the appellant to raise it and prove it, on the balance of probabilities.
The trial judge then directed the jury:
“So let me go to the elements of this partial defence. You would acquit the [appellant] of murder if he satisfies you of each of these elements. One, at the time of the doing of the act which killed the deceased, namely hitting him on the head with the bar, the [appellant] was in a state of abnormality of mind and the state of abnormality of mind impaired his capacity to control his actions or to know that he ought not do the work, and that the impairment was substantial.
So there has to be a state of abnormality of mind. That abnormality of mind has to impair his capacity to control his actions or to know what he was doing – that he ought not do the act and the impairment must be substantial. All three must be found. I need to remind you now that these terms are legal rather than scientific or medical terms. You would have gained – you would have grasped that from the psychiatrist’s evidence. They do not use terms such as ‘abnormality of mind’. And while they have spoken about that topic, they do not decide that point. You do.
Now, of course, you will give careful attention to what the experts have said and the assistance they have given you. Let me come, then, to the first element concerning an abnormality of mind. The psychiatrists gave evidence on this. I am not going to take you to the large parts of the evidence given by the psychiatrists which have been read out to you only recently, but I will say this. The law speaks of an abnormality of mind and says that it arises from one or more of three sources.
The first is a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind, and you will recall that being spoken of. The second is inherent causes. The third is induced by disease or injury, and that injury can be either physical or psychological. And you have heard that referred to. Intoxication at any level does not amount to an abnormality of mind and intoxication is not to be taken into account when considering whether an abnormality impairs one or more of those three capacities. Both Dr Varghese and Dr Goldfeder said that in the absence of intoxication, whatever it was if it was there, there was still substantial impairment.”2
“When you are considering this point the issue is whether there was an abnormality of mind. It does not matter what the cause of that abnormality is if you find there was one. Thus, you could all agree that there was an abnormality, but for different reasons. You do not have to agree on the basis or source of an abnormality. You only have to agree that there either was or was not an abnormality.
I turn now to the second part you need to consider, and that relates to the capacity or lack of capacity of the [appellant] to do certain things. The capacity of thought that the [appellant] says was impaired by the abnormality of mind is the capacity to control his own actions or the capacity to know that he should not do the act. Now, the reference to ‘capacity to control’ is to mental capacity, not physical capacity.
You are not worried about arms and legs and things like that, nothing to do with autonomic reaction. It is mental capacity. And when you consider the capacity to know that he ought not do the act, the test is this; whether the accused had the capacity to reason that the act is wrong according to the standard of reasonable persons. That is the test to apply to determine whether there was or was not the capacity to know that he should not do the act.”3
“So I have spoken to you about abnormality of mind. I have spoken to you about the capacities. The next and final element is that those capacities I have spoken about where [sic] impaired substantially. You have to decide whether one or more of those capacities was impaired and if so, whether it was impaired substantially. And that word ‘substantial’ or ‘substantially’ is an everyday word with everyday meaning. You should, though, take this into account. A trivial impairment is not a substantial impairment. And on the other hand, an impairment may be substantial without it being total.
It is for you to determine whether the impairment of the [appellant’s] capacities, if you find that they were impaired, to control his own actions or to know that he ought not do the act was substantial. And again while it is your decision, you will be no doubt assisted by the evidence given by the psychiatrists.”4
“Question 1
Are you satisfied – beyond a reasonable doubt – that when the [appellant] struck the deceased on the head he did so intending to either kill the deceased or cause him grievous bodily harm?
If no, find the [appellant] not guilty of murder.
If yes, go to question 2.
Question 2
Are you satisfied – on the balance of probabilities – that at the time of the killing the [appellant] was in a state of abnormality of mind?
[You do not have to agree unanimously on the cause or type of abnormality of mind. You only need to agree that there was or was not an abnormality of mind.]
If no, find the [appellant] guilty of murder.
If yes, go to question 3.
Question 3
Are you satisfied – on the balance of probabilities – that the state of abnormality of mind impaired the [appellant’s] capacity to:
control his own actions, or
know that he should not do the act.
[You do not have to agree unanimously on the particular capacity or capacities which were impaired. You only need to agree that there was or was not a capacity which was impaired.]
If no, find the [appellant] guilty of murder.
If yes, go to question 4.
Question 4
Are you satisfied – on the balance of probabilities – that the impairment was substantial.
If no, find the [appellant] guilty of murder.
If yes, find the [appellant] not guilty of murder.”5
“The first question you would readily understand from everything that has been said. The second question is about abnormality of mind and there is a reminder there that you do not have to agree unanimously on the cause or type of abnormality of mind. You – you have to agree that there was or was not an abnormality of mind. Similarly on balance, on the issue of capacity, you do not have to agree unanimously on the particular capacity or capacities, just that a capacity was impaired. And I can add to that, that you might decide both were or both were not. It does not have to be one or the other. And finally, there is the question about substantial impairment. So you might find those of use as you go through your consideration.”6
Consideration
The appellant submits that the trial judge misdirected the jury as to the defence of diminished responsibility because the trial judge’s statement “all three must be found” left it open for the jury to conclude that the trial judge was directing the jury that all three possible capacities of the abnormality of mind must be proven, not one or other of the two capacities said to have been impaired by the appellant’s abnormality of mind. It is submitted that this misdirection arose by reason of the trial judge correctly stating the law as to abnormality of mind with reference to the three relevant capacities, but not thereafter reminding the jury that in the appellant’s case only two of those capacities arose for consideration.
The appellant submits that the misdirection was not corrected by the provision of the written questionnaire which, it is accepted, correctly and succinctly detailed the application of the law to the facts of the case. The trial judge properly directed the jury that it was a matter for them how they used or if they used that document in the course of their deliberations.
The difficulty with the appellant’s submissions is that a consideration of the summing up as a whole amply supports the conclusion that there was no such misdirection.
First, the trial judge’s reference to the law, insofar as diminished responsibility was concerned, correctly stated the law for the jury’s consideration.
Second, the trial judge thereafter specifically directed the jury that they would acquit the appellant of murder if they had been satisfied of each of these elements, namely, that at the time of doing the act of hitting the deceased on the head with the pulldown bar and thereby killing him, the appellant was in a state of abnormality of mind; that the state of abnormality of mind impaired his capacity to control his actions or to know that he ought not do the act; and that the impairment was substantial. That direction specifically directed the jury to the relevant capacities in issue in the appellant’s case.
Third, the trial judge reinforced that direction by immediately directing the jury:
“So there has to be a state of abnormality of mind. That abnormality of mind has to impair his capacity to control his actions or to know what he was doing – that he ought not do the act and the impairment must be substantial. All three must be found.”7
The reference to “all three must be found” could only reasonably be understood to refer to the three issues, namely, a state of abnormality of mind, that the abnormality of mind impaired the capacity to control his actions or to know that he ought not do the act, and that the impairment must be substantial.
Fourth, once the summing up is considered as a whole, there is no basis to conclude that there was an appreciable risk that the jury impermissibly reasoned that the trial judge’s reference thereafter in the summing up to “You have to decide whether one or more of those capacities was impaired, and if so, whether it was impaired substantially” referred to anything other than the two capacities that the jury had expressly been directed were in issue on the evidence.
That this is so, was confirmed by the later reference in the trial judge’s summing up to there not having to be an unanimity as to the particular capacity. As the trial judge directed the jury:
“The second question is about abnormality of mind and there is a reminder there that you do not have to agree unanimously on the cause or type of abnormality of mind. You – you have to agree that there was or was not an abnormality of mind. Similarly on balance, on the issue of capacity, you do not have to agree unanimously on the particular capacity or capacities, just that a capacity was impaired. And I can add to that, that you might decide both were or both were not. It does not have to be one or the other.”8
Conclusion
Order
That the appeal against conviction be dismissed.
There were discrepancies between those versions and the appellant’s evidence, but those discrepancies are not relevant to a consideration of the appellant’s ground as it relies solely on there being a misdirection as to the defence of diminished responsibility. ↩
AB 260/5–35. ↩
AB 262/35–263/5. ↩
AB 267/10–23. ↩
AB 271–AB 272. ↩
AB273/5–15. ↩
AB 260/15–20. ↩
AB 273/6–13. ↩
R
Marius [2025] QCA 246
The appeal against conviction was dismissed.
Four psychiatrists were called at trial. Each gave evidence of the version of events given by the appellant in their discussions with him. Each conceded that their opinions were based on those versions being accurate.1
Dr Varghese opined that the appellant had a psychiatric condition, namely, a severe disorder of personality. Whilst that disorder did not constitute an abnormality of mind, an abnormality of mind could arise out of a personality disorder if someone was having an experience of micro psychosis. The abnormality derived from an arrested development of mind because the personality failed to develop along normal lines. It could also arise from psychological injury.
Dr Varghese opined that at the time of the commission of the offence, the appellant had such an abnormality of mind, that that abnormality of mind impaired the mental component of the appellant’s capacity to control his actions, and that the impairment was substantial.
Dr Goldfeder opined that the appellant had an abnormality of mind, in that the appellant suffered from a prominent personality disorder which was fuelled by a psychosis. The abnormality of mind which arose from a psychological injury or an inherent cause and arrested development, at the time of the offence, impaired the appellant’s capacity to know that he ought not do the act of striking the deceased. The appellant’s capacity to control himself was also impaired at that time, although Dr Goldfeder preferred the view that the impairment was to the capacity to know that he ought not to do the act. In Dr Goldfeder’s opinion, the impairment was substantial.
Dr van de Hoef opined that the appellant had a severe personality disorder, but that it was in a waning drug-induced psychotic disorder which constituted an abnormality of the mind. In her opinion, this personality disorder caused no more than a trivial impairment of the appellant’s capacity to know he ought not to do the act. That was the only capacity in which there was any impairment.
Dr Scott opined that there was no abnormality of mind. The appellant had a borderline personality disorder, but not psychotic illness. Personality disorders could not amount to an abnormality of mind, even though people with personality disorders could be very impulsive and have difficulty controlling their emotions and actions.