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[2025] QCA 70
respondent. The application for leave to appeal sentence is refused.
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The applicant argued that his sentence was unfairly different from Johnson’s because his parole eligibility came later. The Court accepted that parole consequences matter to the parity assessment, but said they must be considered with the whole circumstances. The applicant was the driver who pursued and struck the motorcycle, had a worse criminal history, and had offended shortly after release on parole. Those differences justified the sentencing disparity. The Court refused leave to appeal.
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1,882 words · generated 07/10/2026
In R v Latter [2025] QCA 70, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered an application for leave to appeal sentence. The sole proposed ground was that the sentencing judge had erred in law by failing to apply the parity principle between the applicant, Latter, and his friend and co-accused, Johnson (paras 1–3).
The sentencing outcomes differed in two important respects. Latter received 10 years imprisonment for manslaughter, with a serious violent offence declaration under s 161B of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). He also received two years imprisonment for stealing $9,200 from the deceased, to be served concurrently. The judgment states that, under s 182(2)(a) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), Latter was eligible to apply for parole after serving 80 per cent of his term (para 1). Johnson received nine years imprisonment for manslaughter. The sentencing judge did not set a parole eligibility date for him, with the judgment describing s 184(2) as having the consequence that Johnson was eligible for parole the day after serving half the period of imprisonment (para 2).
The offending arose from Johnson’s wish to re-establish his relationship with Ms Rowe, who had been in a relationship with Mr Opacic. Johnson planned to assault Mr Opacic before he arrived at the prison to meet Ms Rowe on her release. Latter knew about that plan and agreed to accompany Johnson as backup if Johnson was attacked (paras 6–9).
After a confrontation, Mr Opacic rode away on his motorcycle. Latter started and drove the Toyota Camry, with Johnson as a passenger, in pursuit. The Camry struck the rear of the motorcycle. Mr Opacic fell and suffered catastrophic fatal injuries. Latter then took Mr Opacic’s backpack, which contained $9,200 (paras 10–13).
The Court refused leave to appeal. It concluded that, although Latter’s parole eligibility consequences were more onerous, the difference between the sentences did not create an unjustified disparity when the circumstances were considered as a whole (paras 20–24).
The Court’s starting point was the parity principle as set out in the High Court’s decision in Green v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49, which it quoted at paragraph 4. The passage explains that an appellate court may reduce a sentence that is not itself manifestly excessive to avoid marked disparity with a co-offender’s sentence. The relevant sense of grievance is assessed objectively. It is not enough that the person appealing feels aggrieved. Differences between co-offenders, including criminal history, general character, and the role each played, may justify different sentences.
The Court applied that framework to Latter and Johnson by comparing their roles and personal circumstances. Latter had a worse criminal history than Johnson. His history included an 18-month sentence for robbery in 2017 and a three-year sentence imposed in January 2021 for property, weapons and domestic violence offences. He was released after serving four months on 27 May 2021, and committed the present offences after being on parole for five weeks (paras 15–16).
The Court also treated their roles in the fatal events as materially different. Johnson planned violence against Mr Opacic. Latter’s proposed role had been to observe and intervene if Johnson was attacked. But the fatal collision was caused by Latter’s driving: he drove at high speed in deliberate pursuit and struck the motorcycle (paras 9, 11–13, 17–18). The Court stressed that Johnson’s encouragement did not mitigate Latter’s culpability. Nor did the fact that Latter had no personal reason to harm Mr Opacic reduce the seriousness of his own conduct in causing the collision and death (para 18).
The parole comparison was expressly considered, rather than ignored. The Court acknowledged that the applicant’s time in custody before parole eligibility was “more onerous” (para 22). It nevertheless held that the parole difference did not determine the parity question by itself. The Court assessed that difference in the context of Latter’s greater culpability, his offending shortly after release on parole, and the serious violent offence declaration that followed from the sentence (paras 19–22).
The conclusion was that the disparity was justified, and that there was no justifiable sense of grievance (paras 22–23). Accordingly, the Court refused leave (para 24).
The judgment does not describe a change in the law, nor does it set out a detailed account of the historical development of the parity principle. Its stated legal framework comes from Green v The Queen, which it quotes at paragraph 4. That passage situates parity appeals within statutory appellate powers and explains that the common law norm informs the exercise of those powers, subject to applicable sentencing statutes.
The judgment’s contribution in this case is an application of that framework to a sentencing comparison where parole eligibility differed substantially. It confirms that the difference in parole consequences is relevant, but not conclusive. The Court states that the serious violent offence declaration does not mean the parity principle is to be ignored, while also stating that the differences between parole eligibility periods are not the only relevant consideration (para 21).
The Court’s reasoning therefore focuses on an assessment of the whole circumstances. A comparison of nominal prison terms or parole dates alone would not capture its stated analysis. The judgment places the offenders’ relative culpability, criminal histories, and conduct in the foreground, then considers the parole consequences alongside those matters (paras 5, 19–22).
The judgment does not provide the text of ss 182, 184 or 161B, nor does it comprehensively explain their operation. The descriptions here are limited to how the Court summarised their consequences in this case. On the source provided, it would not be possible to claim that the judgment altered the statutory rules or established a new general parole calculation.
At paragraph 4, the Court quotes Green for the test that disparity must be such as to create “a justifiable sense of grievance” or the appearance that justice has not been done. In plain English, a difference between co-offenders’ sentences does not automatically justify appellate intervention. The relevant question is whether the difference is objectively unjustified, taking account of the reasons for treating the offenders differently.
At paragraph 5, the Court says the disparity was justified by the co-offenders’ different criminal histories and general character, and “more importantly” by their respective roles in the offending. This identifies the features the Court regarded as decisive in the comparison between Latter and Johnson.
At paragraph 17, the Court states: “It was his driving, at high speed, in deliberate pursuit of Mr Opacic, that caused the death.” In plain English, the Court did not treat Latter as merely accompanying Johnson or providing backup. It focused on Latter’s direct conduct as the driver in the fatal collision.
At paragraph 21, the Court says that the automatic serious violent offence declaration does not mean the parity principle is to be ignored. That means the sentencing consequence did not remove the need to consider whether the difference between co-offenders was justified. The following sentence adds that parole eligibility differences are not the only relevant consideration.
At paragraph 22, the Court acknowledges that the time in custody was more onerous for Latter. It nevertheless concludes that the overall difference was not unjustified, given the difference in culpability, Latter’s offending while on parole, and the operation of s 161B(1) as a consequence of the 10-year sentence. The passage illustrates that acknowledging a more burdensome outcome does not itself resolve the parity inquiry.
The decision is most directly relevant to a sentence appeal where co-offenders receive different sentences or materially different parole consequences and the applicant argues that the difference creates a justifiable sense of grievance. It is particularly pertinent where the comparison involves a serious violent offence declaration and differences in statutory parole eligibility, because the Court addressed those features expressly (paras 1–3, 20–22).
The factual features that mattered in Latter were not limited to sentence length. The Court considered that one offender had a worse criminal history, had recently been released on parole, and personally drove the vehicle that caused the fatal collision, while the other offender’s role and relative culpability differed (paras 14–19). The case therefore illustrates an assessment that looks beyond the co-offenders’ labels or the fact that they were involved in the same course of events.
The decision should not be read as saying that parole eligibility is immaterial. The Court expressly acknowledged the more onerous parole position and said that the serious violent offence declaration did not displace parity analysis (paras 21–22). Rather, on these facts, the parole difference did not outweigh the other circumstances the Court considered relevant.
The judgment does not set out a checklist that mechanically determines the result in other cases. Its reasoning is tied to the circumstances before it, particularly the contrast between Latter’s driving and criminal history and Johnson’s position. It supports examining the role of each offender and the basis for the different sentencing and parole consequences, rather than treating any difference in parole eligibility as automatically decisive.
The judgment was delivered on 16 May 2025. The supplied text identifies no later decisions that have considered R v Latter. It is therefore not possible, on this source alone, to describe how later courts have treated it.
The cases mentioned in the judgment are not later treatments of Latter. Green v The Queen is cited for the parity framework at paragraph 4. R v Dang [2018] QCA 331 and R v Smith (2022) 10 QR 725 are referred to in footnote 1 in connection with the statement that a serious violent offence declaration does not mean parity is ignored (para 21). They pre-date Latter and are cited as supporting authorities for that proposition. The judgment does not provide enough detail about their reasoning to make broader claims about those decisions.
The decision addresses one applicant’s circumstances and does not determine how every difference in parole eligibility should be weighed. It acknowledges that the difference in time before parole eligibility was substantial and more onerous for Latter, but resolves the appeal by considering the whole circumstances, including culpability and criminal history (paras 21–22). The judgment does not state a numerical threshold at which a parole difference would become a justifiable sense of grievance.
The judgment also does not set out the statutory text of ss 182, 184 or 161B. It records the parole consequences and the serious violent offence declaration as they applied to the sentences before it. Questions about the operation of those provisions beyond the facts described would require examination of the statutory sources, which are not reproduced in this judgment.
Finally, the case does not decide how the parity analysis would apply where the co-offenders’ roles were more similar, their criminal histories were comparable, or the difference in parole eligibility arose for different reasons. The Court’s reasoning indicates that those circumstances would need to be assessed against the principles it recited from Green, but the judgment supplies no outcome for those hypothetical situations.
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Latter [2025] QCA 70
PARTIES: R / v / LATTER, Steven Dale / (applicant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 139 of 2024 / SC No 465 of 2024
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 23 May 2024 (Martin SJA)
DELIVERED ON: 16 May 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 13 March 2025
JUDGES: Boddice and Brown JJA and Crow J
ORDER: The application for leave to appeal sentence is refused.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – PARITY BETWEEN CO-OFFENDERS AND OTHER RELATED OFFENDERS – where the applicant received a sentence of ten years imprisonment for the offence of manslaughter – where the applicant received a sentence of two years imprisonment for the offence of stealing cash from the deceased – where the sentencing judge ordered the two years imprisonment sentence for the stealing offence to be served concurrently with the ten year manslaughter sentence – where the applicant, pursuant to s 182(2)(a) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), is eligible to apply for parole after having served 80 per cent of his term of imprisonment – where the applicant’s friend and co-accused received a sentence of nine years imprisonment for the offence of manslaughter – where the sentencing judge did not set any parole eligibility date for the co-accused – whether the sentencing judge erred in law and failed to apply the principle of parity in sentencing – whether there is a disparity between the sentences of the two co-accused such as to give rise to a justifiable sense of grievance / Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 182 / Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 161B / Green v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49, cited
COUNSEL: L D Reece for the applicant / D Kovac for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
THE COURT: On 23 May 2024, the applicant was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment with the declaration of a serious violent offence pursuant to s 161B of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) for the manslaughter of Mr Jacob Opacic. The applicant was also sentenced to two years imprisonment for the offence of stealing $9,200 in cash from the deceased, after he had run him down with a motor vehicle. The two years was ordered to be served concurrently with the 10 year manslaughter sentence. Pursuant to s 182(2)(a) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), the applicant is eligible to apply for parole after having served 80 per cent of his term of imprisonment.
The applicant’s friend and co-accused, Johnson, was sentenced to nine years imprisonment for the manslaughter of Mr Opacic. The sentencing judge did not set any parole eligibility date, with the statutory consequence under s 184(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) that Johnson was eligible for parole the day after he had served half of the period of imprisonment.
The applicant seeks leave to appeal on the sole ground that the learned sentencing judge erred in law and failed to apply the principle of parity in sentencing. The applicant argues that as the applicant is unable to apply for parole for eight years and his co-accused is able to apply for parole after four and a-half years, there is a disparity between the sentences of the two co-accused, such as to give rise to a justifiable sense of grievance.
The parity principle is discussed in Green v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462 per French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [31], as follows:
“[31] Because appeals are creatures of statute, the parity principle in appeals against sentence arises in a statutory context. The jurisdictions to entertain such appeals, conferred by statutes on courts of criminal appeal in Australia, are supported by powers to increase or reduce sentences affected by appealable error. In the exercise of those powers in appeals by convicted persons, and subject to the applicable sentencing statutes, a court may ‘reduce a sentence not in itself manifestly excessive in order to avoid a marked disparity with a sentence imposed on a co-offender’. The exercise of the statutory discretion is informed by the common law norm. Gibbs CJ said in Lowe v The Queen: ‘the reason why the court interferes in such a case is that it considers that the disparity is such as to give rise to a justifiable sense of grievance, or in other words to give the appearance that justice has not been done.’ The sense of grievance necessary to attract appellate intervention with respect to disparate sentences is to be assessed by objective criteria. The application of the parity principle does not involve a judgment about the feelings of the person complaining of disparity. The court will refuse to intervene where disparity is justified by differences between co-offenders such as age, background, criminal history, general character and the part each has played in the relevant criminal conduct or enterprise.” [footnotes omitted]
In the present case, the court ought to refuse to intervene because the disparity in sentences is justified by differences in the co-offenders’ respective criminal histories and general character and, more importantly, by reference to the part that each played in the relevant criminal conduct.
A brief history of the salient facts is that the applicant was a friend of Mr Johnson. Mr Johnson shared children with Ms Rowe, however, their relationship had failed. Mr Johnson wished to re-establish his relationship with Ms Rowe and for them both to obtain care of their children so that they could “be a family again”.
The deceased, Mr Opacic, had commenced a relationship with Ms Rowe. That relationship continued while Ms Rowe was an inmate at Numinbah Correctional Centre. Ms Rowe was due for release on 2 July 2021.
On the morning of Ms Rowe’s release, 2 July 2021, Mr Opacic rode his motorcycle from his residence at Caboolture with the intention of meeting Ms Rowe’s family in the prison car park at Numinbah Correctional Centre. It was Mr Opacic’s plan to take Ms Rowe from the prison after she was released to the Gold Coast for the weekend.
Mr Johnson was upset that Ms Rowe had pursued a relationship with Mr Opacic, and he planned to visit significant violence upon Mr Opacic before he arrived at the prison. Mr Johnson’s plan was then to demand that Ms Rowe leave the prison with him. Mr Johnson's plan was known to the applicant. The applicant’s planned role was to watch and observe the fight between Mr Opacic and Johnson, and “… If things get out of hand and Benny starts losing, then I’ll step in”. The applicant promised his friend Johnson that he would go with him and promised to have his friend Johnson’s “back” if there was a fight, with Johnson expressly asking the applicant “if he starts bashing me, you’ll step in,” to which the applicant agreed.
As it happened, the Toyota Camry with Mr Johnson and the applicant suffered a breakdown near the prison. After Ms Rowe’s family had collected her from prison with Mr Opacic following on his motorcycle, the vehicle in which Ms Rowe was a passenger had stopped to assist with the breakdown. Mr Opacic joined the group on his motorcycle, and there was an incident of aggression with the deceased Mr Opacic and Mr Johnson making aggressive gestures and yelling at each other. Mr Johnson attempted to attack Mr Opacic by collecting and wielding a star picket and so Mr Opacic rode his motorcycle away.
The applicant started the Toyota Camry, Johnson got into the front passenger seat, and the motor vehicle commenced pursuing Mr Opacic’s motorcycle. Mr Opacic’s motorcycle overtook one other motor vehicle at high speed, and then the Toyota Camry that the applicant was driving overtook the same vehicle at high speed, travelling over the double white lines to do so.
An oncoming road user described the motorcycle passing him at high speed and with deafening noise and with the motor vehicle driven by the applicant pursuing five meters directly behind the motorcycle. The Toyota Camry vehicle being driven by the applicant was halfway over the centreline, such that the oncoming road user had to move off to the left shoulder of the road.
Order
R v Dang [2018] QCA 331 at [37] per McMurdo JA with whom Gotterson and Morrison JJA agreed and referred to by Bond JA in R v Smith (2022) 10 QR 725 per Bond JA (with whom Morrison JA agreed) and see Applegarth J at [102] and [129]–[131]. ↩
R
Latter [2025] QCA 70
(2011) 244 CLR 462
The application for leave to appeal sentence is refused.
Physical evidence and the police traffic accident investigation revealed that the Toyota Camry struck the rear of Mr Opacic’s motorcycle. This caused him to lose control on a slight bend, come off his bike, with the closely pursuing Toyota Camry moving over the top of his body. The injuries to Mr Opacic were catastrophic, with fractures being sustained over the entire top part of his skull, his chest, a transection of his spinal column, and a flattening of his pelvis, as well as a complex fracture of the left leg. After mortally wounding Mr Opacic, the applicant took Mr Opacic’s backpack, which contained $9,200.
As to subjective factors, Johnson was 29 years of age and had a criminal history which commenced when he was 17 years old. Johnson had been imprisoned and was on a suspended sentence for domestic violence at the time of the offending.
As acknowledged in the applicant’s written submissions, the applicant had a worse criminal history than Johnson. The applicant’s criminal history commenced when he was 20 with minor drug offending, moving to more serious offending over time.
In 2017, the applicant was convicted of an offence of robbery and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. On 28 January 2021, the applicant was sentenced in the Maroochydore Magistrates Court for property offences, weapons offences, and domestic violence offences. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment and released after having served four months on 27 May 2021. The applicant therefore committed the subject offences after being on parole for five weeks.
As to objective factors, the applicant was the driver of the motor vehicle that struck Mr Opacic’s motorcycle. It was his driving, at high speed, in deliberate pursuit of Mr Opacic, that caused the death.
Further the interpersonal issue between the applicant’s friend, Mr Johnson and the deceased Mr Opacic did not decrease the criminal culpability of the applicant. Encouragement of the applicant by Mr Johnson to pursue Mr Opacic was not a mitigating factor. The applicant had no cause personally to inflict harm to Mr Opacic. He had agreed to be a backup for Mr Johnson, in the event he was attacked by Mr Opacic, not an active aggressor. Nothing in those circumstances detracted from the seriousness of the applicant’s criminal conduct in causing the collision with the motorcycle and Mr Opacic’s death.
The fact that the applicant was in charge of the motor vehicle which pursued and then struck Mr Opacic’s motorcycle, causing his death, having been released on parole but eight weeks earlier, justified the disparity in sentences.
Once that conclusion is reached, there is no basis to conclude that the sentence of 10 years imprisonment was unjust. The deferral of parole eligibility is until 80 per cent a consequence of that just sentence.
The circumstance of the automatic declaration of a serious violent offence does not mean the parity principle is to be ignored.1 However, the substantial differences between the respective parole eligibility periods is not the only relevant consideration.
Although the time in custody is more onerous for the applicant, the difference between the sentences does not give rise to an unjustified disparity when the circumstances are looked at as a whole, given the difference in culpability between the applicant and Mr Johnson, the applicant’s offending while on parole and the operation of s 161B(1) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) as a consequence of the imposition of the sentence of 10 years imprisonment.
There is no justifiable sense of grievance. Leave to appeal should be refused.