[2025] NSWDC 482
General information, not legal advice.
District Court of NSW
2025-11-21
Priestley SC DCJ
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Knox (a pseudonym) [2025] NSWDC 482
Hearing dates: 17 November 2025
Date of orders: 21 November 2025
Decision date: 21 November 2025
Jurisdiction: Criminal
Before: Priestley SC DCJ
Decision: The offender is convicted of counts 1-7 inclusive on the indictment.
The indicative sentences both prior to and after the application of the 25% discount are set out above.
The offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment to date from 24 August 2023 with a non parole period of 10 years, expiring on 23 August 2033 and with a balance of term of 4 years, expiring on 23 August 2037.
Catchwords: CRIME — Child sex offences — Sexual intercourse with child — Circumstances of aggravation — Child abuse material — Production
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Cases Cited: Cayhadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1
DB v R [2024] NSWCCA 18
Hall v The Queen [2021] NSWCCA 220
Hillman v R [2021] NSWCCA 43
Muldrock (2011) 244 CLR 120
R v Fisher [2024] NSWCCA 191
R v Holder [1983] 3 NSWLR 245
R v Pearce [2020] NSWCCA 61
RA v R [2024] NSWCCA 149
The Queen v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54
Category: Sentence
Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Knox (a pseudonym)
Representation: Counsel:
Mr J. Hanna for the Crown
Mr J. Watts for the Offender
Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions for the Crown
Legal Aid Commission for the Offender
File Number(s): 2023/00269692
On Monday 17 November 2025 XY (“the offender”) appeared for sentence in respect of 7 charges. At the conclusion of the hearing the matter was adjourned for judgment to 21 November 2025. This is that judgment.
The table below sets out the 7 charges. The charges are all under the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 and the table sets out the relevant maximum sentences for each of those offences, and in connection with the section 61M(2) offences the relevant standard non parole period.
| Section | Charge | Max sentence | SNPP | | 66EA; | adult maintain unlawful relationship with child | Life | | | 91K(3) | film person in private act without consent aggravated | 5 years | | | 61M(2) | indecent assault where victim under 16 | 10 years | 5 years | | 61M(2) | indecent assault where victim under 16 | 10 years | 8 years | | 91P(1) | intentionally record intimate image w/o consent DV | 3 years | | | 91H(2) | possess CAM | 10 years | | | 547E(2) | possess beastiality material | 3 years | |
The dates of the offending will be referred to in the summary of the facts below.
In relation to the maximum sentences and, in respect of the section 61M(2) offences, the standard non-parole period, those matters are taken into account as legislative guideposts, indicating the legislature’s view of the seriousness of the offending to assist in arriving at the appropriate sentences. In relation to the standard non-parole periods I note that in Muldrock (2011) 244 CLR 120 at [29] the High Court made clear that it has application even when the offending is not considered to be in the middle of the range of seriousness as that term is used in section 54A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (“CSPA”). The standard non-parole period is an indication of the legislative view of the seriousness of the offence.
There are no matters to be taken into account by way of the Form 1 procedure.
The offender was arrested on 24 August 2023 and has remained in custody since that time. The sentence to be imposed will date from 24 August 2023. The defendant was not on conditional liberty at the time of his arrest and indeed but for a minor matter in 1983 has no criminal history outside of these offences.
The offender was born in 1963. He married A in 1993. They had four children B, born in 1988, C who was stillborn in 1994, a foster child D born in 1997 and E born in 2002. E is the victim of Count 1, an offence under section 66EA, and of count 2. From 2002 to 2019 the offender and his family lived at H St Old Town. In about 2006 or 2007 B moved out to live with his partner F and they subsequently married in 2014. In about 2007 or 2008 the offender and A separated but remained living in the same house with the children but for B.
Between 6 March 2007 and 5 March 2015 the offender maintained an unlawful sexual relationship with E. In that period E was aged between 4, (though the indictment pleads the age of 5 so the commencement date on that basis would be 6 August 2007), and 12 years old. The unlawful acts relied on for constituting the offence are touching the victim’s vulva, and having sexual intercourse by way of cunnilingus, fellatio, and penile / vaginal sexual intercourse.
In 2007 and 2008 A was working night shifts. A would sleep in bed with E until she left at about 9PM. The offender would sleep in the same bed once A had left for work. When E was about 5 or 6 years old she woke up with her pants off and her legs in a triangle shape. That presumably means that either her legs were spread apart or that the bottoms of her feet were touching, also resulting in her upper legs being spread. When she woke up the offender was shining the light from his phone on her vagina and touching her vulva with his fingers.
This happened many times. On one occasion the offender said “I’m just checking for myself”. This was a reference to the fact that E was born with a congenital condition causing her to develop a double uterus and two vaginal openings. E understood that was what he meant and she lay frozen, confused and afraid until her father stopped. This first occurred after B had moved out of the house which E believes was in 2007 or 2008.
The agreed fact is that this type of genital touching occurred on a regular basis between the ages of 5 to 10 years of age. It always occurred when her mother was at work and her brother D was asleep in another bedroom. Due to the frequency of the assaults E cannot determine how many times it took place.
The same conduct occurred on occasions when E was asleep in the lounge next to her cousin G ([13] of agreed facts). The agreed fact about this is that during the four years from 2008 to 2012 when E was between 6 and 10, G would wake on “some” occasions to see the offender leaning over to touch E. She says she saw this at least three or four times. The agreed fact at [39] does not state whereabouts on the body of E, G saw the offender touch E. Further submissions were sought as to what inference should be drawn from [39]. The offender’s position is that the facts do not allow for an inference that the touching seen by G was skin on skin on the vulva as opposed to some other form of sexual touching. In other words, the offender accepts these agreed facts amount to agreement of sexual touching being seen by G, but says the facts do not allow for a determination of just what that sexual touching was.
The Crown argues that because [13] states “That conduct” also occurred when E was sleeping with G in the lounge, with reference to [39], that the agreed facts should be read to mean what occurred in the lounge was the same conduct described in the pars preceding [13], namely skin on skin touching of the vulva.
The difficulty in these facts was raised after the sentence hearing when the further submissions were sought. It was not an issue raised by either party. I accept the position to be as the Crown argues it to be, due to the phrasing of [13], which gives content to what G saw which is referred to at [39]. What G saw occurred in the period 2008-2012, so no later than when E was 10, and so within the same period of the sexual touching occurring in bed with the offender.
The conduct of the offender is plainly sexual touching, it is skin on skin on the most intimate part of the child’s body. It occurs routinely at night and what is described as a regular basis over a five-year period.
It is agreed that beyond the age of 10 there were occasions where E would wake to the offender massaging her vulva which extends the period of the sexual touching beyond that five-year period.
The offending escalated over time to include cunnilingus, fellatio and penile vaginal intercourse; see at [15]. The agreed facts then state at [16] that each incident occurred for what felt to the victim like 30-60 minutes duration late at night when A had left for work. What is not clear is whether that is a reference to the escalated conduct of sexual intercourse or the conduct overall, including the sexual touching. The facts continue at [17] to state that when E tried to move away the offender would sometimes respond “I do this because I love you. Is that okay?” She would nod in agreement because she wanted to please him and do as she was told. On some occasions the offender referred to the possibility of going to gaol because of what he was doing; on others he would ask the victim if she liked it. I proceed on the basis that the description as to “each incident” is a reference to the whole of the unlawful acts being relied on, so the events of sexual touching as well as sexual intercourse. Principally that is because of the reference to “each incident” being in a separate par to the reference to the sexual intercourse, and because of the references to what the offender would say on varying occasions, which plainly infers that the occasions being spoken about are more than the at least 4 occasions of sexual intercourse.
The offending became less frequent when at about age 10 E intentionally stopped sleeping in her parents bed. Just when the sexual acts ceased altogether is not clear on the facts. The Crown submission is that the sexual relationship was maintained over a period of 8 years, which is in line with the indictment. It would mean that E was aged from 5 (noting the inconsistency in count 1 noted above), to 12. On any view the duration is at least 7 years and 7 months, so that little if anything turns on this lack of clarity. The period from when E turned 10 (6 August 2012) to 5 March 2015 (the end date on the indictment) is 2 years and 7 months. The last specific date of an unlawful sexual act occurring is the cunnilingus referred to below, which occurred when E was 11, so between 6 August 2013 and 5 August 2014). With that as a guide, all the unlawful sexual acts may have occurred in the period of either 6 March (or 6 August) 2007 to 5 August 2014. Against that however is that it is accepted that the sexual touching continued after the age of around 10 but on a less frequent basis. The duration of the unlawful sexual relationship is a relevant factor to consider in assessing the objective seriousness of the offence. On the facts of this case, whether the duration is considered to be 7 years, or 8 years will have little impact on that assessment.
In respect of the unlawful sexual acts of intercourse the facts are a little imprecise. In the way that [22] and [28]-[30] are expressed the facts appear to state a specific limit on the number of times the fellatio and cunnilingus occurred whereas [27] simply states that the example given was not the only occasion of penile vaginal intercourse. The basis on which the sentence will be given is that fellatio occurred two or three times when E was under 10, the cunnilingus occurred on one occasion and there was more than one occasion of penile vaginal intercourse. The lack of certainty about this is added to by the heading preceding paragraph 20 of “examples of specific occasions” but with the facts then being more broadly stated as just recounted.
In terms of fellatio the example given is of the offender lying naked with his undies around his ankles on the bed and he would guide E down to his penis by saying “rub my penis” or “put your mouth around it and suck on it”. She felt scared and confused and performed fellatio on the offender.
In terms of the penile vaginal intercourse the example given is of when E was about 10 and the offender inserted the tip of his penis into her vagina. She was lying naked on her back on her father’s bed. He was naked. He kissed her lips and inserted his tongue into her mouth and pushed his erect penis into her vagina. Due to her congenital condition his penis could enter only a short distance. When he stopped pushing his penis into her vagina he then rubbed it on her vulva whilst kissing her mouth. E was in shock wondering why he was doing that.
In terms of cunnilingus the example given which on the facts reads as a single incident, a view not contradicted by the earlier paragraph 15, is of when E was 11 and she woke up to her father pulling her to the end of the bed by her legs. The father was kneeling on the floor. E had no underwear on or pants. She tried to wriggle away but he held her and licked her vagina and inserted his tongue inside her vagina. She froze and hoped a neighbour would look in the window. She remembers this occurring the year before B married F which would place it as being 2013.
Due to the lack of clarity, or precision, of the facts concerning the number of occasions of sexual intercourse, the parties were invited to state their positions. The offender submitted sexual intercourse occurred “at least” 4 times, and the Crown submitted it occurred on “more than 4 occasions”, which are two ways of saying the same thing, and are consistent with facts just recounted.
The gravamen of count 1, the s66EA offence, is the maintenance of an unlawful sexual relationship with a child, by virtue of the commission of two or more unlawful sexual acts against the child; see RA v R [2024] NSWCCA 149 at [92]. The purpose of the 2018 amendments included that it would not be required to specify the particulars of the unlawful sexual acts to the same degree as if they were charged as separate offences; see [88] of RA citing the second reading speech, and see also s66EA (4) and (5). At the same time it is relevant in determining the seriousness of the offence to take into account, if the evidence permits it, just what the extent of the unlawful sexual acts were. For example, if the case was one of accepted penetrative sex weekly for a period of years, then all else being equal, that would be a more serious example of the offence than a case of sexual touching on 3 occasions over the same period.
At [102] of RA a non exhaustive number of factors were set out which are relevant to consider in determining the gravity of the offence. By reference to those matters, I make the following findings:
(a) The facts establish that in the period from August 2007 (that date is adopted rather than March 2007 as there is an unamended inconsistency in the indictment, which I have treated as reflecting an error in the start date rather than in the age of E), when E was 5, through to 2012 when E was aged 10 there was regular sexual touching, so a period of 5 years. Also in that period and also when E was 11, there were instances of sexual intercourse as described in the facts. Further, the sexual touching continued beyond the age of 10, so beyond 2012, but on a less frequent basis. Just when the last occasion of a sexual touching occurred is not clear, other than it cannot be later than 5 March 2015. Similarly, just when there was the last occasion of sexual intercourse is not clear. Penile vaginal intercourse occurred on more than just the occasion recounted in the facts, but it cannot be determined if the other occasion or occasions were before or after that time, when E was 10. The act of cunnilingus described in the facts occurred when E was 11, so no later than 6 August 2014. That date is just 6 months short of the end of the date range pleaded in the indictment, and results in a duration of 7 years, with a strong likelihood that there was some sexual touching thereafter, and possibly a further instance of penile vaginal intercourse. I proceed on the basis that the duration of the unlawful sexual relationship was no less than 7 years and no more than 7 ½ years (that being on my interpretation the full period of the indictment). That is a lengthy period of time and the frequency of the unlawful sexual acts only diminished by reason of E removing herself from the parents bed and not by reason of some act of the offender. It is noted that he did not pursue her to her alternate bedroom, with the same earlier regularity, however that is not mitigatory, but simply a matter to take into account in the overall assessment. (b) The relationship is obviously one of father and daughter in which these sexual acts were committed. As such there is plainly a position of authority and one of great trust which self-evidently has been grossly violated. (c) E was 5 years old at the commencement of the conduct so far below the age of 16 which is for the offence the statutory definition of “child”. In contrast the offender was born on 12 September 1963 so was 44 at the beginning of the unlawful sexual relationship. That of course is a significant age differential but is what would be expected when the relationship is of father and daughter. (d) For the offence to be made out the number of sexual acts required is 2. The sexual touching here occurs regularly over a 5-year period, and then is less frequent for another 2 to 2 ½ years. The occasions of sexual intercourse at best for the offender consist of two occasions of fellatio, one occasion of cunnilingus and more than one occasion of penile vaginal intercourse. The number of unlawful sexual acts well exceeds the statutory threshold of 2. With respect to the sexual touching, the agreed fact is that it occurred on a regular basis, and with such frequency that E cannot determine how many times it took place. It occurs at times when A is at work, but it is not stated how often A works. There may have been as many as five opportunities per week for this to occur. Then again, it may not have occurred weekly although the facts suggest that is possible. If weekly, over a 5 year period, it means the sexual touching occurred up to 250 times. There is in this calculation an uncomfortable degree of speculation. Allowing for that an estimate might be made that this offending of sexual touching occurred as much as 100 times over the five-year period. That equates to about once a fortnight, and given the agreed fact is of it occurring regularly, that seems possible. Even if regularly is taken to mean monthly, the number approximates 60 occasions. The range of possible estimates demonstrates the danger of seeking some degree of precision as to the number of times this sexual touching occurred. I note that in R v Fisher [2024] NSWCCA 191 at [126] similar language is used, ie one victim in that case, CH said it occurred so many times she lost count; it was also described as occurring routinely, and also the evidence allowed for a finding that in a certain period it occurred once per month. I have come to the conclusion that it would be the wrong approach to try and place some number on the occasions of sexual touching. As the Crown submitted, supported by RA, the gravamen of the offence is the maintenance of the unlawful sexual relationship, as already noted at [24] above. In terms of its extent, it consisted of the range of unlawful sexual acts described above which extended to sexual intercourse on more than 4 occasions, and the sexual touching as described on a regular basis over a period of 5 years with such frequency that E cannot determine how many times it occurred, and it continued with less frequency thereafter. In contrast, in the case of a second victim (MH) in Fisher, MH gave an estimate of 120 to 140 occasions of sexual abuse. Evidence of that type is not available in respect of E, nor was it available in the case of CH in Fisher. (e) The nature of the unlawful sexual acts is of sexual touching and of sexual intercourse. The far more frequent sexual act is sexual touching. The acts of sexual intercourse should be viewed as extending to more than 4 occasions in the duration of the unlawful sexual relationship.
It is also relevant to note s66EA(8) specifically deals with when the court is sentencing for the offence and mandates the court must take into account, but is not limited by, the maximum penalty for the unlawful sexual acts engaged in by the accused during the period in which the unlawful sexual relationship existed. In this case the relevant unlawful sexual acts are the offences provided for by sections 61M(2), 66A(2) and 66C(2). The parties agree that the maximum penalties and standard non parole periods for those offences at the relevant time are respectively 10 years with a standard non parole period of 5 years, 25 years with a standard non parole period of 15 years up to 31 December 2008 and thereafter the maximum penalty was life imprisonment, and 20 years with no standard non parole period.
I take those maximum sentences and standard non parole periods into account. The unlawful sexual acts relied on to make out the elements of the s66EA offence are viewed by the legislature as serious offences, particularly the s66A(2) and s66C(2) matters.
It hardly needs to be said that the fact that the acts of sexual intercourse relied upon cannot be quantified with more precision than to say they occurred more than 4 times is hardly mitigatory of any assessment of objective seriousness. The correct approach is not to find an absence of relevant factors to lessen the seriousness of the matter, but to take all the facts and circumstances of the facts of the offending into account to assess just how serious objectively the offending is.
The sexual intercourse acts add significantly to what is already a very serious example of this type of offending. The offender has regularly sexually touched E for a period of five years and continued on with unlawful sexual acts for a further period of 2 ½ years. As noted when recounting the facts all of this occurs in her home at the hands of her father, that is at a place and by a person where and with whom she should feel safe, loved and protected. Instead for all that time she was abused and taken advantage of.
My assessment of the objective seriousness of count 1 is that it is a serious example of a very serious offence. The offender submitted that there was no utility in trying to make the assessment on some notional scale, and noted it was not a standard non parole period matter. Mr Watts who appeared for the offender no doubt had the passage from the judgment of Rigg J in Fisher at [126] in mind. Her Honour referred to a number of cases, including R v Pearce [2020] NSWCCA 61 where the potentially unclear nature of such terminology has been referred to; see at [58] of Pearce. The Crown argued the objective seriousness was towards the high end. That perhaps is the type of imprecision being referred to in Pearce; where does the high end start, and how far towards that high end is the Crown assessing this offence? Plainly the Crown, quite rightly in my view, submits that this is a serious example of this offence, and Mr Watts in no way shied away from accepting that proposition. At the risk of being imprecise, but in an effort to make clear the reasoning of this judgment, I would place the objective seriousness of this offence towards the top of the middle 20%.
Section 91K(3) makes it an offence for a person, for the purpose of obtaining sexual arousal or gratification, to film another person engaged in a private act in circumstances of aggravation. In this case the circumstance of aggravation is that the victim, E was aged under 16 at the time, being the period 2013 to 2014 and at which time she was aged between 10 and 12. The filming occurred whilst E was in the shower. She noticed her father’s mobile phone resting against the outer edge of the bathroom window and freaked out. She took the phone, stopped the recording and deleted the video and then put the phone back. It is this occasion that founded the charge. The agreed facts however are that E recalls it happening a further four or five times and each time it happened she deleted the recording. The offending was not a one off incident, and in any event in light of count 1 this could hardly be said to be an aberration.
This offending occurred when E was well under 16 and it occurred in the home and as with count 1 is carried out in breach of trust. It is a serious violation of the victim’s privacy and I assess it as close to but slightly below the mid point of objective seriousness.
Counts 3 and 4 both have G as the victim and are offences under section 61M(2). It is agreed by the offender that there were further instances of similar offending, to the extent that it is agreed that this conduct occurred on every occasion the victim slept with E on the lounge in the period 2008-2012, something which occurred often. These 2 offenses were not isolated incidents. The Crown explanation of the two counts, which is consistent with the offender’s position but perhaps expressed more severely, is that the agreed facts show a course of conduct of such offending, and that the 2 counts are individual particularised instances at the beginning and the end of the period in which it occurred. Hence count 3 occurs when the child is under the age of 10 and count 4 occurs when she is aged between 10 and 12, and self-evidently in each case under the age of 16, an element of the offence.
The facts are briefly stated but still make out a serious example of indecent assault. The facts for both counts are to the same effect and are of the victim waking up to find the offender with his hand down the front of her pajama pants and undies. He used his fingers to massage her vulva. She would roll over and cause the offender to stop and walk away.
This is skin on skin touching on the most intimate part of a young female. It commences when she is asleep during the night. It occurs in circumstances of a sleep over at a friend’s home, and is perpetrated by the friend’s father, into whose care the victim has been entrusted.
I would assess both counts 3 and 4 as being of equal seriousness, which I assess as being serious examples of indecent assault. In respect of these offenses there is a standard non parole period. I would assess these two counts as not being in the middle of the range of seriousness as that term is used in s54A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, (CSPA) but rather as being just below that point. The reason for that is the facts do not disclose in either case how long the assault endured, and in count 3 it ended when the victim rolled over causing the offender to stop and walk away. I infer count 4 ended in similar circumstances, for although it is not stated how it ended, the facts regarding count 3 in reference to “other occasions” say the victim would make some noise which would cause the offender to stop, and count 4 is framed by reference to those other occasions, stating “on one of these occasions”.
The victim in respect of count 5 is F, the wife of B and thus the daughter in law of the offender. The essence of the offence is recording an intimate image, which is done without consent, and knowing there is no consent. On 29 August 2019 the victim was staying the night at the offender’s home with her two children. This occurred at the time each Thursday whilst B and F were building their house. There were others in the house. F had a shower. When drying herself she noticed a phone sitting on the window ledge leaning against the glass. She accessed the phone and noticed it was recording in video mode. She played the video and could see herself naked in the shower. She sent a text to B and spoke with the offender to keep him occupied. The offender left the room; panicking, F left the house and hid. Soon after B arrived. B confronted the offender and asked him how he could do this. The offender stated “you need to bash me” and "I need to be punished”. At one point he said sorry to F. It was after this incident that the offender commenced living in the flat downstairs.
The conduct occurred on one occasion. It occurs in what is in effect an extension of the victim's home and occurs in a place where it can be expected that the person will be naked. The victim is an adult female, rather than a female child, though that is not factor that mitigates the offence.
Given the circumstances in which this offence occurred, namely at the family home of the victim’s husband, this is not a matter of minimal seriousness, yet it is not relatively of the same degree of seriousness as any of counts 1-4. As a guide, it is about half way to the mid point of objective seriousness
Counts 6 and 7 emerged upon the offender’s arrest in 2023 which followed disclosure being made by E in the circumstances set out in the agreed facts. Before that there had been in 2015 disclosure by G including her confronting the offender on Facebook. The offender said to G at that time “do what you gotta do but you’ve got no proof”. No action eventuated at that time.
Following count 5, A contacted the offender’s brother and when he then spoke to the offender the offender admitted count 5.
As a consequence of count 5 B and F and their children did not interact with the offender for several years. Also following count 5 the offender lived in the downstairs granny flat rather than in the main part of the house.
He made disclosure on 28 May 2023 to her fiancé. The next week A confronted E about the conduct which E confirmed, and A confronted the offender who denied the allegation. That was in late May or early June 2023.
On 17 June 2023 the offender messaged E by Facebook in which he said “Hello [E] I’m sorry I am going to prison for what I done to you” and “no I wont let you relive it I’ll end it so you won’t go through the pain I love you. There is a will in my bedroom and a funeral plan I can’t excuse myself but I will not let you suffer by going to court to relive it. Goodbye my beautiful daughter.”
The offender also messaged his brother saying he was going to kill himself and confessing to molesting his daughter 7 years ago. He said it had come to a head and that rather than having E go to court he would end it so no one would need to suffer. He said that he was not proud of what he had done but was not going to gaol.
The offender then contacted crimestoppers and told them of his sexual abuse of his daughter 5 or 6 or more years ago and asking if she would need to go to court.
Concerns were raised and the offender was stopped by police near Bowraville, New South Wales. He had a large knife with him and said his intention was to self harm. He was transferred to hospital. He again made statements against his interest namely that he had sexually assaulted his daughter 7 years ago. He told police that it happened once and that was plainly false. Statements were taken from E, G and F. A search warrant seized a computer, a phone and a handwritten letter, and a second phone was later seized. The offender exchanged messages with his brother. Those messages included saying that he was in big trouble. He told his brother he thought suicide would give justice to E and F. He also stated that he was proud of E for speaking out.
The police examined the offender’s phones and computer. The computer that was seized had nothing of interest. However, counts 6 and 7 emerged from the contents of the phones.
Count 6 is a charge of possessing child abuse material in breach of section 91H(2) of the Crimes Act. The basis of the charge is 4 category 1 images. Category 1 is where the material is of a child involved in a sexual act or where the genital region of the child is exposed and/or focused on. One of the images is a screenshot that had been saved which depicts four small images. Only one of those four images is described and shows a fully clothed real girl aged between 8 and 12. Behind the child is a naked woman bent over on their hands and knees having sexual intercourse with a man. A second screenshot shows a woman naked from the waist down pulling a child’s leg up towards her with the child not appearing to have any underwear. A third image is of a 2 to 3-year-old child with a close shot up her skirt showing no underwear and revealing her vagina and buttocks. The fourth image shows two girls between 11 and 13 lying naked on the bed. One girl has her legs spread apart and holds a pink dildo near her vagina.
This is a low number of images and it does not involve any penetrative sex of any of the children concerned. It is something made more serious by the very young age of one of the children being 2 to 3 years of age. Overall the offence is at a low level of objective seriousness.
Count 7 is a charge of possessing bestiality material. There were three saved screen shots. One is a grid pattern showing small images including a horse ejaculating into a woman’s face and tongue and a close shot of a snake inside a human vagina. Images include a human being anally penetrated by a horse’s penis. One image is of a woman’s vagina being penetrated by a thin long unknown animal body part believed to be male animal genitalia.
A second saved screenshot shows a gorilla having sexual intercourse with a woman and another shot is of a horse's penis penetrating a woman’s vagina.
The third screenshot again has a grid pattern of different images. Images include a pig mounting a human and a dog mounting a man with the penis of the dog inserted into the man’s anus.
These images are the depth of depravity. It is difficult to conceive that the people involved do so of their own free will, or are not motivated by desperation related to money or some other issue. Not unlike the damage caused by child abuse material, there must be damage suffered by those who take part in creating this material. Like count 6 the low number of images dictates a fairly low level of seriousness but that initial view must be tempered by just how depraved the material is, though again that is the nature of the offence. The range of animals involved is striking; a gorilla, a pig, a horse, a dog and a snake. Despite the number of images being few, the offence is certainly not at the bottom of the range of seriousness, and I assess it as being half way towards the midpoint of objective seriousness.
In dealing with counts 1 through to 5 I have not identified specific aggravating features as being aggravating. In relation to counts 1 and 2 the Crown relies on the statutory aggravating factors of the offence occurring in the home of the victim, the abuse of trust and it being a series of criminal acts. I have taken those factors into account in the way argued for by the accused namely when determining the objective seriousness of the offence and so I will not take them into account a second time.
In respective counts 3, 4 and 5, it is well arguable that the aspect of being a home or home like situation, and that there is a relationship of trust, sufficient to aggravate the matter, however, again, I have those factual circumstances into account in assessing objective seriousness.
The offender relied upon a psychological report of Ms. Laura Durkin dated 3 November 2025. The offender in an affidavit affirmed on 10 November 2025 confirmed that what he had said to Ms. Durkin was true and he was not cross-examined on that affidavit. The offender also relied on a letter that he had written dated 14 November 2025. The letter was addressed to the three victims, family and friends and the court. I have read that letter and it is an exhibit and I take it into account. It was not read on to the record as the family members including the victims who were in court did not wish to hear it and I took the view that in the circumstances to read it onto the record may be distressing to the victims and so their wishes were respected.
As noted the letter is addressed to all 3 victims. In the letter amongst other things the offender says that he “hopes that you receive the help and love you all deserve”. It is clear that the offender is addressing each of the victims. He states that he is proud of them for taking action against him. He expresses his deep sorrow and regret and describes himself as an evil nasty person and a waste of space who does not deserve the air that he breathes and that he will go to hell for his actions. He talks of taking the love that he had and throwing it away. He states that he will always love and cherish “you all” knowing it will not be returned. He again expresses his true sorrow and remorse.
The psychological report sets out his family and developmental history. The offender in his written submissions has set out some relevant parts relied upon. This includes the submission that the offender’s upbringing was marked by significant disadvantage and trauma, a submission which I accept based on the content of the report. The offender was one of 7 children with one dying in infancy. The family moved regularly due to economic hardship. The offender’s father died in his presence when the defendant was 8. His mother was to re-partner twice.
There is a history given of the offender’s father having a second family in Melbourne and not liking the female children with the suggestion that his sisters may have been sold or given away. The offender was not aware of the second family until recent times.
Despite the number of siblings at one stage the offenders’ mother had only care of him and one of his brothers. The other two brothers were in care. Between 1973 and 1976 the offender and his brother who had been with his mother were placed in a boys' home reportedly due to his mother’s inability to manage their challenging behaviour. It was whilst in the boys’ home that the offender was sexually assaulted consistently by another boy and a house master. When he returned to the mother’s home in 1976 her new partner was abusive to both the offender and his mother, abused alcohol and sexually abused the offender. This new partner also had a girlfriend who is said to have participated in some of the sexual abuse perpetuated against the offender. In addition to that he was also sexually abused by a family relation namely his uncle. Amidst all this the offender attended 11 different schools and with his education ending in year 9.
The offender then commenced work at age 14 and was offered an apprenticeship as a mechanic. That did not materialize and he worked as a labourer. He stole from that business leading to losing that job and that is the only offence that he had committed prior to the present offending. He joined the RAAF but was dismissed for consuming cannabis after 2 ½ years. He operated a store in Sussex Inlet then sold that in 1996 and thereafter worked as a truck driver and also occasionally a taxidriver.
The offender met A in 1987 and B was born in 1988. Their second child was stillborn in 1994. A had suffered a fall at 28 weeks pregnant but they did not have her checked by a doctor and the offender blames himself for not causing that to happen.
The offender said that he viewed pornography for arousal and was first exposed to it through his stepfather’s collection of pornographic material which included bestiality. A feature of the consultation is the difficulty the offender has in discussing parts of his sexual life and other parts of his behaviour, in particular the offending. For example at [27] he initially denied deviant sexual arousal to either children or animals but then said he viewed beastiality out of curiosity and was unable to confirm he was not aroused by it. It is said he was reluctant to discuss these potential areas of sexual interest but did express confusion concerning what is sexually arousing for him. The report notes that on his own account his sexual interests are somewhat diverse and have varied over time and it is said that this may reflect his poor insight into his sexual orientation / arousal, inappropriate sexual exploration and hypersexual tendencies / a preoccupation with sex; at [27]. He could not identify what motivates him to engage in sex and has little insight into his beliefs about sex including as to the impact of sexual abuse which seems to be a reference to his own sexual abuse; at [28]. This is said to reflect a general lack of insight into his sexual experience, preferences, orientation and interest. I accept these views expressed by the psychologist, the conclusion of a lack of insight seems a logical one where he is unable to identify the motivation for his behaviour.
There is no drug and alcohol history of any note.
In relation to the offending the offender could not account for why he felt the need to inspect his daughter's vagina repeatedly if it was for no other purpose than curiosity. I find it is fairly plain that the suggestion of it being curiosity was just an excuse for the aberrant behaviour.
Both parties placed reliance on paragraph 36 of the report. For the offender reliance was placed on the fact that his beliefs and attitudes supportive of sexually abusive practices are possibly informed by his own abuse experiences but it is then said that he has no insight into that and is reluctant to disclose such views. The offender particularly relied on the view that the offender’s lack of insight is unsurprising given he has not engaged in treatment and explored these issues. The Crown relied on that part of the passage that suggests the offender maintains permissive beliefs about sexually abusive conduct and that he likely has negative and/or harmful views about females/women and that he has experienced a preoccupation with sex and struggled to regulate himself sexually.
It is obviously important to not just extract a line or two from a particular paragraph. What is plainly being said at [36] is that the report writer considers that it is likely that the beliefs and attitudes of the offender are negative towards females, that he struggles to regulate himself sexually, that he lacks insight and that his beliefs and attitudes are possibly informed by his abuse experiences.
The Crown relies on the use of words such as “possibly” and “likely” to suggest the court would not be persuaded that there is a connection between the child sexual abuse of the offender and the offence is now being considered. The standard of proof on the offender for what is to be taken into account in favour of him is the balance of probabilities; see The Queen v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54 at [27]. In my view the language used here satisfies that onus, particularly where there was no challenge to the report which was admitted to evidence without objection and was not the subject of cross-examination.
Paragraph 37 contains some interesting observations about how to treat the reported remorse of the offender. The evidence in my view is very strong that he is truly regretful, sorry and remorseful for his acknowledged wrong conduct though that is not to ignore evidence going in both directions. There was the initial exchange with G in 201 concerning the offending against her in which he did not come out and make admissions, and indeed seems to taunt her by saying she had no proof. There is then his dealings with his brother in 2019 where he made no admissions concerning anything beyond the video of F. In 2023 once the disclosure was made by E in 2023, when the offender was confronted by A he denied the allegation. Yet soon after he was very forthright with his brother and in his messages to E. The offender pleaded guilty at an early time, and although there was initially a challenge to the facts, the evidence on this hearing does not allow for an assessment of that issue. Paragraph 37 of the report suggests that overtly he makes clear he is remorseful but appears to have difficulties with complete accountability. This is said to be “not unsurprising” (which seems to be a case of a double negative not conveying what is meant) “given he is untreated and seeking to make sense of the situation and conduct”. What the report writer seems to mean is that it is not surprising that he struggles to take complete accountability in his untreated state. That he is remorseful is also supported by the letter tendered at the hearing.
The views of the report writer I accept and do seem to make sense namely sexual assault as a child would have a distorting effect on the offender’s views regarding sexuality. There is no real issue about his expression of remorse; the question is whether he is capable of properly accepting his wrongdoing, or has proper insight into it. It is favourable to the offender that he is remorseful but perhaps adverse to him is that subject to being treated and counseled an assessment of his prospects is made more difficult. The report writer concludes that section by referring to the offender being ashamed of his conduct and saying that he is proud of his daughter for speaking out because he did not.
The assessment is that he suffers from symptoms of PTSD but that is said to be a preliminary diagnosis as his poor insight prevents the giving of a sufficiently comprehensive account of his internal experiences.
There is then a lengthy consideration of risk assessment. On the static 99R tool he is assessed as below average risk for being charged with another sexual offence within five years; at [49]. Confusingly that is said to mean that he is considered a slightly greater risk of reoffending than typical of offenders in the middle of the risk distribution whereas by being below average risk one would expect him to be slightly lower than that category. It is said that out of 100 offenders 86 would have a higher score than the offender suggesting he is low in that group. It is noted that reoffending rates for sexual offences are in general substantially lower than for non-sexual offending. Reliance on the static 99R is then qualified as not being specifically developed with Australian samples.
There is then reference to the risk for sexual violence protocol version 2 and an analysis is carried out using that tool. It considers dynamic factors. The conclusion on that assessment is that the offender poses a moderate risk of re offence. Overall the conclusion reached is that the offender's risk of sexual offending is considered to be in the moderate/average risk range, with the prospect of online offending being more likely than contact offending.
In her formulation the psychologist notes the early life of the offender and the sexual abuse suffered. It is considered at [57] to have been likely to have contributed to the offender's sexual functioning and further isolated him. He has limited understanding of his psychology and emotions. At [57] the view expressed is that the offender’s sexual offending is in part a function of poor coping with his unprocessed trauma and a reaction to problems in his relationship with his former wife. The offending is said to also appear to be a function of poor sexual self-regulation, limited insight to his sexual interest and boundaries and motivated by distorted perceptions and attitudes.
I have considered the parties submissions concerning the objective seriousness of the 7 offences and reached the conclusions stated above. I accept the submission for the offender that it is count 1 that dominates the sentence, but by no means does that result in the other counts being disregarded. This is particularly so given that counts 3, 4 and 5 involve a second and third victim, and counts 5, 6 and 7 occur at a significantly later time than the other offences.
The offender submitted that the facts of the offender’s developmental years supported a finding of profound disadvantage so that the principles of Bugmy apply. There was no real challenge to the submission, and rightly so when the economic hardship, the inability of his mother to care for him, the placement in a boys home, his education ending in year 9, and the sexual abuse from numerous people is considered.
The principles of De La Rosa were also relied on. It should be borne in mind that no causal connection is required for there to be a benefit to an offender arising from De La Rosa, or Bugmy. The offender argues based on [43] and [57] of the psychological report that the offending is in part a function of poor coping with unprocessed trauma (a view supporting a diagnosis of PTSD was expressed), and a reaction to problems in the offender’s marital relationship. For these reasons it is argued the offender’s moral responsibility is lessened.
There is very little evidence as to why this offending has anything to do with the marital relationship, other than the possibility of it leading to the offender looking for another sexual outlet, which does not assist him.
As just noted, it is not necessary for a causal connection to be established between the offending and the offender’s background for the offender’s moral culpability to be lessened, nor for the principles of De La Rosa to be enlivened, which of course can work against an offender’s interests as well as favour them. I do however accept that there is some connection between the abuse suffered by the offender and the offending, in the way described by the psychologist, and as the offender has argued. As indicated in the discussion at [64]-[68] above I accept the offender's beliefs and attitudes are informed by his abuse experiences, and are supportive of sexually abusive practices. The offender’s moral culpability is lessened as a result.
As to the offender’s state of mental health, specifically the assessment as to PTSD, I take that into account only in that it supports the factual history that he gives concerning his childhood abuse, and that it may make custody more onerous for him. The benefit is however rather limited, a view supported by the fact he has endured more than 2 years of custody without any notable incident or worsening mental health.
It was submitted that without yet having the benefit of treatment, a fair assessment of the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation could not be made. The submission was that it could be expected that treatment would occur and his prospects improve as a result.
The Crown challenged this submission. In my view the submission is too speculative. The offender’s attitudes canvassed in the report influenced his conduct at about the age of 44 to 52, and stem from events as a child, and so are well entrenched. Just how likely it is that those attitudes can be addressed cannot be determined with any certainty on the evidence.
At the same time, when the question is framed in terms of the likelihood of reoffending, on the facts it seems to me that the likelihood of reoffending will necessarily be reduced from what they were prior to disclosure being made by E, at least in terms of any contact offending, as there will likely be far less opportunity. This is supported by the offending since 2013 (or, allowing for some less frequent unlawful acts in the scope of count 1, 2015), being limited to the filming offenses and possessing unlawful material. That lack of opportunity, together with this sentence, will in my view render the offender a risk of reoffending likely lower than that arrived at overall by the psychologist, whose assessment had a number of qualifications. The assessment in regards to non contact offending, that is, on line, is more problematic and not as favourable.
The parties were at issue on the question of the offender’s good character. The offender seeks to rely on his record showing no offending other than the minor offence in 1983, and nothing adverse recorded against him whilst in custody. The offender argues this is not a case where the good standing of the offender has enabled the offending, as for example might be the case with a priest or a teacher. The Crown argues, if not that it was enabling, that the long period of unlawful behaviour denies the offender any benefit of what might once have been his good character.
I find the offender had the opportunity to commit counts 1-5 not due to his standing in the community, but by reason of being the father of E and a member of the household. Section 21A(5A) therefore does not prevent taking good character or a lack of previous convictions into account. In my view this only modestly assists the offender. He obtains some leniency by reason of being a law abiding pro social member of the community until about the age of 44. Yet from that point on he could not be so described, and the benefit dissipates, something the offender recognised in submissions.
The offender is entitled to a 25% discount in respect of any sentences due to the time at which he entered his plea. I note that he did enter his guilty plea to count 1 later than the other counts, but this does not impact on the discount.
The Crown accepted that this being the offender’s first time in custody was a basis for an allowance for special circumstances. Beyond that however, it was said any finding of special circumstances would be limited, given that the statutory ratio would likely see a period of years under supervision given the likelihood of a significant sentence.
The offender relied on the principle of totality, and cited both Cayhadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1 and R v Holder (1983) 3 NSWLR 245. I will address the issue of totality once the indicative sentences are stated.
Both parties made submissions in respect of a number of “comparable cases”. In deference to those submissions I will note what was said in respect of just three of them. They are of some assistance, however I note the oft stated caution of the limited utility of “comparables”, and that each case of course turns on its own particular facts and circumstances.
The offender in R v Fisher [2024] NSWCCA 191 was the uncle of the two victims, MH and CH. The offender was found guilty after a trial of one count of s66EA against each victim, and of possessing child abuse material being two photos of CH (count 4). The unlawful sexual acts founding the s66EA charges were sexual touching and digital penetration re CH when she was aged 8 to 12 (count 1) and sexual touching, including the touching of the victims genitals with his penis, and cunnilingus re MH when she was aged 7 to 11 (count 5). The alleged duration of the relationships were 4 years and 3 years in respect of CH and MH respectively, though on appeal in respect of CH it was expressed to be at least 1 ½ years. Indicative sentences were determined at first instance to be 6 years (count 1), 1 year (count 4) and 7 years (count 5), and the aggregate sentence was 10 years with a non parole period of 7 years 6 months. This sentence was held to be manifestly inadequate. In resentencing the offender, indicated sentences were of 11 years, 1 year and 10 years in respect of counts 1, 4 and 5 respectively, and it was noted the blunt tool of the Judicial Commission statistics showed few cases of s66EA where a sentence was less than 7 years. The offender in Fisher received no discount given it was a jury verdict. An aggregate sentence of 15 years with a non parole period of 11 years and 3 months was the ultimate result.
The Crown relied on DB v R [2024] NSWCCA 18, where the aggregate sentence for 6 offences including 2 counts under s66EA was 19 years with a non parole period of 14 years and 3 months. Like Fisher, this case is immediately distinguishable from the present involving as it does 2 counts, not 1, under s66EA, though the indicative sentences provide some guide. There was also 2 counts under s91G of using a child under 14 to produce child abuse material (with a maximum sentence of 14 years and a non parole period of 6 years). The remaining 2 counts were of carrying out a sexual act towards a child under 10 (maximum sentence 7 years) and possessing child abuse material (maximum sentence 10 years). As a rough guide, and by reference only to the maximum sentences for the various offences in DB as compared to the present case, DB can be seen to be a case of more serious offending overall. The offender in DB was entitled to a 25% discount due to the timing of his plea. The sexual acts founding the s66EA charge concerning Child 1 were sexual touching, having her masturbate his penis, digital penetration, cunnilingus and attempted penile vaginal intercourse. In respect of Child 2 for the second s66EA charge the unlawful sexual acts included sexual touching, and pressing his penis against her clothed body and encouraging her to touch his penis. The indicative sentences for those two offences were arrived at by the sentencing judge and left undisturbed on appeal were 12 years in respect of Child 1 and 8 years in respect of Child 2.
The Crown suggested the most helpful case was Hillman v R [2021] NSWCCA 43. In that case the offender was sentenced for one count under s66EA held to be “well above the mid range”, 2 counts of s61M(2) and one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The indicative sentence imposed on appeal for the s66EA offence was 14 years and 7 months, with a starting point of 19 years and 6 months before the discount for the early plea of guilty. The unlawful sexual acts founding the s66EA offence included sexual touching, digital penetration, cunnilingus and penile vaginal intercourse. The conduct commenced in 2006 when the victim was 6 and ended in 2015.
To emphasise the caution expressed earlier as to the utility of comparable cases, the above consideration of Fisher, DB and Hillman does not seek to outline the subjective cases of the offenders, though I note in Hillman it was said the offender’s subjective case was not particularly compelling. The cases do however provide some guidance, with the caveats already noted. In broad terms these three cases each involve more serious conduct than the present; Fisher and DB both involve 2 counts of s66EA, and in Hillman the conduct extended over a longer period and could be said to be more serious. Fisher and DB give some assistance because of the indicative sentences stated for the separate s66EA offences.
I would lastly note the reliance by the offender on the acceptance by Rigg J at [132] of Fisher of the submission that a 10 year sentence will be more than twice as onerous as a sentence of 5 years, particularly for a person (as here) who has never previously been imprisoned.
(a) To ensure the offender is adequately punished; (b) To prevent crime by deterring the offender and others from committing similar offences; (c) To protect the community from the offender; (d) To promote the rehabilitation of the offender; (e) To make the offender accountable for his actions; (f) To denounce the conduct of the offender; (g) To recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.
(a) Assessments of the objective seriousness of each count; (b) That the moral culpability of the offender is lessened; (c) That on balance the offender is truly remorseful and regretful; (d) The offender had a developmental background of significant disadvantage, including the trauma of significant childhood sexual abuse; (e) The accused lacks insight into matters of his sexuality, including his preferences, and the offending behaviour; (f) There is some connection between the offending and the abuse suffered by the offender as a child, as explained above. (g) Until the offender undergoes treatment it is not possible to make a considered assessment of his prospects of rehabilitation, though clearly he requires psychological treatment both as to his sexual offending and his trauma. (h) The risk of re offending of a contact type is now less than before, and significantly so when the fact of no contact offending occurring since 2015 is considered, and no offending at all but for the possessing unlawful material, since 2019. (i) The offender gains only a minimal benefit from his law abiding background up to 2007.
The finding of a lessened moral culpability does not negate the need for general or specific deterrence. In this case it tempers the need for general deterrence in a modest way, and in a lesser way it tempers specific deterrence. The offender plainly knows that his conduct was wrong (e.g. his early statements concerning going to gaol), and he has shown an ability to restrain his aberrant beliefs or attitudes, and the need for that restraint to continue should be reinforced. The harm to the victims needs to be recognised. Each victim provided a victim impact statement, showing the significant long term impact of the offender’s conduct. In respect of E in particular, her childhood was one where she was fearful of what may happen, of when the offender would abuse her, in contrast to what a child should expect of their parent in their home. The offender is to be held accountable, and his conduct denounced, particularly given that his concepts and beliefs are distorted. The recommendations for the rehabilitation of the offender of Ms Durkin include various counselling, and that will be able to occur both in custody, and also in his parole period which will be a reasonably long period just by reason of the statutory ratio. There will be a finding of special circumstances, but due to this being the offender’s first time in custody rather than any need for an extended period of supervision.
Before indicating the indicative sentences, I note s21A(2A) CSPA that the offender is to be sentenced in accordance with current sentencing patterns and practices. I note also the dates of the offending and that it is agreed the relevant maximum sentences and standard non parole periods are as set out in the table at [2] above.
I have considered above all relevant matters going to the objective and subjective aspects of this case, and have considered the purposes of sentencing. The sentence will be an aggregate one. The indicative sentence for each offence before and after the 25% discount for the early guilty pleas are set out in the below table and with the finding as to objective seriousness being noted for convenience, but which is not to suggest the approach is anything other than the instinctive synthesis approach. As to the two s61M(2) offenses, the indicative non parole periods are 20 months in each case, which is marginally less than the statutory ratio would determine. The reason the indicative non parole periods are less than the standard non parole period is because of the assessment of objective seriousness, the discount for the plea of guilty, and the subjective features of the offender, including his lessened moral culpability.
| OFFENCE | Description | Max sent | Obj ser | Ind before 25% discount | Ind after 25% discount | | 66EA | adult maintain unlawful relationship with child | Life | Serious (see at [30] above) | 12 years | 9 years | | 91K(3) | film person in private act without consent aggravated | 5 years | Below mid (see at [32]) | 1 ½ years | 13 months | | 61M(2) | indecent assault where victim under 10 | 10 years; SNPP 5 years | Below mid (see at [36]) | 3 years | 2 years 3 months | | 61M(2) | indecent assault where victim under 16 | 10 years; SNPP 8 years | Below mid (see at [36]) | 3 years | 2 years 3 months | | 91P(1) | intentionally record intimate image w/o consent | 3 years | Between low and mid (see at [39]) | 1 year | 9 months | | 91H(2) | possess CAM | 10 years | Low (see at [50]) | 12 months | 9 months | | 547E(2) | possess beastiality material | 3 years | Between low and mid ([see at 54]) | 12 months | 9 months |
To determine the appropriate aggregate sentence requires a consideration of the principle of totality. I note in the case of Hall v The Queen [2021] NSWCCA 220 Hulme J reviewed the principles of totality. He referred to R v Holder [1983] 3 NSWLR 245 which makes it plain that what is required for a sentencing judge is to evaluate the overall criminality involved in all of the offences and to adjust the aggregate sentence, "To achieve an appropriate relativity between the totality of the criminality and the totality of the sentences”. Put perhaps more simply his Honour referred to Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70 where it was said the Court, "Must look at the totality of the criminal behaviour and ask itself what is the appropriate sentence for all the offences."
Hulme J also referred to Cahyadi [2007] NSWCCA 1. At [27] of Cahyadi it was said in considering whether the sentence for one can comprehend the criminality of another:
"This is so regardless of whether the offences represent two discrete acts of criminality or can be regarded as part of a single episode of criminality. Of course, it is more likely that where the offences are discrete and independent criminal acts, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend the criminality of the other. Similarly, where they are part of a single episode of criminality with common factors, it is more likely that the sentence for one of the offences will affect the criminality of both."
The s66EA and the two s61M(2) offenses were occurring at overlapping times. The filming concerning E was also occurring at the end of that period. Those four offenses can more easily be seen to be a series of events in the one, albeit lengthy, period of offending, and I take that into account. The sentence however must recognise the fact of there being two victims amongst those offenses. The offence concerning the third victim F is quite distinct by reason of it being someone other than E or G, and also in terms of the time at which it occurred. Similarly the child abuse material and beastiality matters were uncovered in 2023, and for that reason and due to their distinctly different nature they stand alone. The essence of the principle of totality to ensure the result is proportionate to the overall criminality of the offending.
With that in mind the aggregate sentence will be 14 years, with a non parole period of 10 years.
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Orders included on cover page.
R
Knox
(2011) 244 CLR 120
(1983) 3 NSWLR 245