[1999] NTSC 94
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of the NT
1999-09-03
Riley J
Original judgment source is linked above.
R v Kanaris [1999] NTSC 94
The accused is charged with various counts relating to the supply of heroin,
the possession of a trafficable quantity of heroin, the possession of anabolic
steroids, the possession of cannabis and the simple possession of heroin.
For present purposes the Crown case is that prior to 8 March 1996 the
accused made arrangements for the delivery to him in Darwin of 28 grams of
heroin. Police became aware of this and conducted what has been described
as a "controlled delivery". Police seized the parcel and substituted plaster
of Paris for some of the heroin. The parcel was collected by police at Ansett
Freight in Darwin on 7 March 1996. On Friday 8 March 1996 an officer
wearing Ansett Freight clothing delivered the parcel to the accused at the
premises of Yesterdays Autos. The accused took possession of the parcel
and opened the covering box. The heroin was located in a Post-Pak
envelope inside that box. He secreted the Post-Pak (which was at that time
At around 12 pm on 8 March 1996 Gail McNamara, a person to whom it is
alleged the accused had supplied heroin from August 1995 to that date,
phoned the accused to arrange for a further supply to her of heroin. The
accused got into a vehicle and drove to the Shell Service Station on the
corner of Daly and McMinn Streets to deliver heroin to Ms McNamara.
Police followed but were observed by the potential purchaser who waved the
accused away. The accused became aware of the police presence and a car
During the course of the car chase the accused released the contents of three
foils of heroin into the air as he drove. He was finally pulled over at the
At 12.40pm police attended at Yesterdays Autos and conducted a search of
the premises where they located the Post-Pak of heroin, 11 foils of heroin,
steroids, cash and other drug paraphernalia. A fingerprint on one of the
foils was found to match a fingerprint of the accused.
At 12.57pm the accused was logged into the watchhouse at the Peter
At 4.10pm police attended at the accuseds home at 433 Trower Road
Brinkin and conducted a search of his bedroom where a foil of heroin,
steroids, cannabis and other items were found and seized.
At 5.32pm the accused was removed from the cells for the purpose of
partaking in a record of interview. That record of interview was conducted
between 5.47pm and 6.52pm. At the conclusion of the record of interview
personal details were obtained from the accused and he was returned to the
watchhouse at 7.50pm. He was then formally charged. Prior to that time he
had been held under s 137 of the Police Administration Act.
At 8.15pm the accused spoke to his brother-in-law, who is a solicitor.
The accused faces seven counts contained in the one indictment and those
Between 1 August 1995 and 7 March 1996 at Darwin in the Northern
Territory of Australia unlawfully supplied to Gail McNamara heroin,
a dangerous drug specified in Schedule 1 of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
Section 5(1) & (2)(a)(ii) of the Misuse of Drugs Act
On 8 March 1996 at Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia
unlawfully supplied to Gail McNamara heroin, a dangerous drug
specified in Schedule 1 of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
Section 5(1) & (2)(a)(ii) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
On 8 March 1996 at 25 Daly Street, Darwin in the Northern Territory
of Australia unlawfully possessed a Postpak of heroin, a dangerous
drug specified in Schedule 1 of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
AND THAT the unlawful possession involved the following
the amount of the dangerous drug was a traffickable quantity.
Section 9(1) & (2)(b)(ii) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
On 8 March 1996 at 25 Daly Street, Darwin in the Northern Territory
of Australia unlawfully possessed 11 foils of heroin, a dangerous
drug specified in Schedule 1 of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
AND THAT the unlawful possession involved the following
the amount of the dangerous drug was a tr affickable quantity.
Section 9(1) & (2)(b)(ii) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
On 8 March 1996 at 25 Daly Street, Darwin in the Northern Territory
of Australia unlawfully possessed anabolic steroids, a dangerous
drug specified in Schedule 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
Section 9(1) & (2)(f)(ii) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
On 8 March 1996 at 433 Trower Road, Darwin in the Northern
Territory of Australia unlawfully possessed a foil of heroin, a
dangerous drug specified in Schedule 1 of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
Section 9(1) & (2)(c)(ii) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
On 8 March 1996 at Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia
unlawfully possessed cannabis, a dangerous drug specified in
Schedule 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
Section 9(1) & (2)(f)(ii) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
The accused seeks a direction that counts 1 and 2 be separately tried. Those
counts relate to the supply of heroin to Ms McNamara. The first count,
which is based upon the testimony of Ms McNamara, alleges that the
defendant supplied her with heroin on unspecified dates between 1 August
The second count is based upon the evidence summarised above relating to
the accused having received a telephone call from Ms McNamara on
8 March 1996, his travelling to the Shell Service Station to provide her with
Mr Tippett, who appeared with Mr Dalrymple on behalf of the accused and
presented this part of the argument, did not make any submission that the
various counts could not be joined in the same indictment pursuant to s 309
of the Criminal Code. The thrust of his submission was that I should
exercise my discretion under s 341(1) of the Code to direct that there be a
separate trial in respect of counts 1 and 2. Section 341(1) is in the
"(1) Where before a trial or at any time during a trial the court is of
opinion that the accused person may be prejudiced or embarrassed in
his defence by reason of his being charged with more than one
offence in the same indictment or that for any other reason it is
desirable to direct that the person should be tried separately for any
offence or offences charged in an indictment the court may order a
separate trial of any count or counts in the indictment."
The accused says that he is both prejudiced and embarrassed in his defence
as a result of him being charged in the manner set out in the indictment.
In relation to count 1 it was his submission that the evidence is entirely
contained in the evidence of Ms McNamara. In relation to count 2 it was
submitted that there was no evidence that Ms McNamara received heroin on
8 March 1996. It was said that the closest the Crown case came to that
occurring was the evidence of Ms McNamara that she made a telephone ca ll
after which she went to an area near the Shell Service Station on Daly Street
where she expected to meet the applicant to receive some heroin. No
transaction took place on that day. It was therefore submitted that the
counts were "a transparent attempt to link allegations of supply with later
allegations of possession." It was submitted that this was a device which
was artificial and designed to facilitate the improper use of evidence on one
set of offences to support or corroborate the evidence of Ms McNamara that
In his submissions Mr Tippett acknowledged that it was not necessary that
Ms McNamara actually receive heroin for the accused to be found guilty of
supply. Section 3(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act makes it clear that a person
may be guilty of supply of a dangerous drug if the person takes, or
participates in, a step in the process of that supply. It was on that basis that
the Crown presented its case in relation to count 2.
Further it was submitted on behalf of the accused that Ms McNamara is an
indemnified witness and as such warnings of the kind discussed in R v Chai
(1992) 60 A Crim R 305 would be required. It was submitted that if all of
the counts were heard together such a warning "would be completely
undermined by the presence of evidence of possession that is inadmissible
upon the two counts of supply". It was also submitted that there would need
to be a corroboration direction in relation to the evidence of Ms McNamara
and "that direction would be given in the face of a direction that the jury be
required to disregard the substantial body of evidence related to the counts
of possession in the context of such a direction". It was then said that the
warnings could not effectively overcome the adverse effect on the jury of
hearing the substantial body of inadmissible and consequently prejudicial
evidence relating to the charges of possession upon the charges of supply.
In reply Mr Karczewski who appeared on behalf of the Crown submitted that
the evidence relating to the possession of heroin on 8 March 1999 would
also be called in relation to counts 1 and 2. The evidence of the obtaining of
the Post-pak of heroin and the subsequently discovered 11 foils found in the
premises (one of which contained the finger print of the accused) is
independent evidence, not coming from Ms McNamara, that corroborates her
evidence. It is independent testimony that affects the accused by connecting
or tending to connect him with the crime. It implicates him in that it
demonstrates a fund of heroin from which the supply to Ms McNamara could
have been made as she claimed. The evidence indicates that the heroin
which was released in the course of the car chase was not heroin in the
possession of the accused for his personal use and it therefore serves to
corroborate Ms McNamaras evidence that the accused was dealing in heroin
On that basis it was submitted that the evidence was admissible in relation
to counts 1 and 2 and, as presently informed, I agree that that is so.
Even if some of the evidence is not to be admitted because of the
circumstances prevailing when the matter proceeds to trial, this does not
mean that there should be an order for separate trials of counts 1 and 2.
Provided that an appropriate direction can be given to the jury as to the use
it should make of evidence admissible towards proof of one offence but not
admissible towards proof of another a direction to the jury may be sufficient
to guard against the risk of impermissible prejudice. If such a direction is
not sufficient to guard against the risk of impermissible prejudice then
separate trials should generally be granted: Sutton v R [1984] HCA 5; (1984) 152 CLR 528
at 541-2. It is a matter for the Court to consider whether impermissible
prejudice would arise in the circumstances of this case and whether such
prejudice could not be cured by direction given at the trial. As presently
informed I do not see that any significant evidence, inadmissible towards the
proof of the guilt of the accused of counts 1 and 2, will be received by virtue
of these counts being heard at the same time as the remaining counts or vice
versa. In the event that this may turn out not to be the case then I am of the
view that an appropriate warning can be given to avoid the risk of
Further, the accused has not identified any specific defence in relation to
any of the counts which would give rise to prejudice should the matters be
heard together. The submissions of Mr Tippett were couched in terms of
It is to be expected that there will be numerous directions required to assist
the jury in its deliberations in this matter. Directions as to corroboration of
the evidence of Ms McNamara and directions arising out of her status as an
indemnified witness are likely to be required. I do not see these directions
as being unacceptably "undermined" by the seven counts being heard
together. In cases such as this there will always be the risk that
circumstances will arise where appropriate directions to the jury will not
provide a sufficient safeguard against prejudice to the accused so as to
ensure that he receives a fair trial. However, in the circumstances of this
matter, I do not consider that the risk is such as to require that there be a
I therefore reject the application to direct that there be a separate trial of
The Crown wishes to lead evidence from Brigid Young who was, at the
time, a Police Auxiliary working at the Berrimah Police Watchhouse.
Ms Young was aware that the accused was in custody in relation to drug
offences, including possessing heroin, and was held pursuant to s 137 of the
Police Administration Act during further investigation. Her evidence is as
"Whilst the Deft. was being processed, he was observed to complain
about pain, suffer uncontrollable shaking and was beginning to
He continued to be processed, however I noticed he appeared pale
and the previous symptoms continued. He began to double over and
held on to the fingerprint bench to steady himself. Again I asked if
"Yeah, Im alright. How long is this going to take?"
"A few hours at least, as there is paperwork to complete and
then they will charge you when the file is done and all that
He accepted this and appeared to be looking better. We talked about
being born in Darwin and discussed the high school we attended,
being Nightcliff High School. We further discussed many Greek
families in Darwin and I informed him my sister -in-law belonged to
one of them and although he didnt know her, he stated he knew of
He then again appeared pale and was stooped in his posture and said
I was concerned he was in discomfort and was watching him to try
and identify if he was faking illness or if he was genuinely sick.
I asked if he was taking any medication or if he had any pre-existing
condition that he had not informed the receiving members about. He
He was returned to cell M6 after processing and he continued to be
"Because I feel like shit, I want something to fix this up"
"When did you have your last hit? You are obviously going
"Depends, I couldnt have any before ,,cos your mob chased
I returned to the main charge room area and notified the Watch
Commander S/Sgt Swift of the Defts condition. He advised me to
monitor him and to call up a unit if Deft required transportation to
At 2015 hrs, the Defts brother-in-law called the watchhouse and
prior to Deft receiving call, permission was sought from Det. Martin.
The Deft was then removed from cell M6 and spoke to his brother -
in-law, Kelvin Strange, for only a few minutes and was returned to
The Deft began to dry wretch and I attended cell M6 to check on
him. He was again displaying the symptoms stated earlier and was
trying to vomit. He again asked how long it would be before he
"When I am informed then Ill let you know. How are you
I returned to the charge room and called Accident and Emergency at
Royal Darwin Hospital and spoke with a male doctor on duty.
I informed the doctor of the situation and he was not very
sympathetic and told me to give the Deft. some Panamax and see if
that alleviated any of the pain. In the event that did not seem to
assist, I could always arrange for him to be conveyed to RDH, but
told me to leave it for a while and give the Panamax time to work.
I re-attended cell M6 and gave the Deft. two Panamax at 2145hrs.
The Defts condition appeared to settle down after he was given the
At 2240hrs S/Sgt Mark Jeffs attended the watchhouse and prisoner
was taken to the charge room where he was formally charged and
bail refused. His rights were explained to him and he stated he
wanted to make application to a Magistrate for bail. S/Sgt Jeffs had
been informed of his condition and stated he wanted the Deft to be
conveyed to RDH and when that was done he would call the duty
The Deft was returned to cell M6 and attempts were made to get a
unit to convey Deft to RDH, however all units were busy on other
jobs at the time and as Defts condition did not deteriorate he had to
I ceased duty at 2300 hrs. The on coming shift were made aware of
the Defts condition and what steps had taken place during the course
of my shift and the arrangements to have Deft. conveyed to RDH for
The evidence of Ms Young was contained in two statutory declarations the
first (Exhibit P3) was made on 11 May 1997 and the second (Exhibit P4)
was made on 17 August 1999. Ms Young also gave evidence before me and
It is clear that Ms Young was not part of the investigative team. She was a
police auxiliary attached to the Watchhouse. Ms Young said, and for the
purposes of this application I accept, that in making the enquiries set out
above she was fulfilling what she called her "duty of care" to the accused to
"ensure that nothing untoward happens to (prisoners) whilst in the cells and
if they require medical treatment to seek it". When the information was
provided to her by the accused in relation to his use of heroin she made no
record of that other than to make the following entry upon the offender
journal (Exhibit P2) at 1950 hours on 8 March 1996:
"Young reports prisoner back from interview. No longer held on
s 137 PAA. Prisoner can be charged and have bail considered.
Members McDonagh/Martin objecting to bail, bail refusal to be done.
Prisoner is now being processed and is beginning to suffer with
withdrawals from heroin. He has not had any since this morning.
Pain/shakes and sweating beginning. S/Sgt Swift to be notified.
Prisoner may have to be conveyed to RDH later on shift."
Division 6A of the Police Administration Act deals with the recording of
confessions and admissions. Section 142(1) of that Act provides as follows:
"Subject to section 143, evidence of a confession or admission made
to a member of the Police Force by a person suspected of having
committed a relevant offence is not admissible as part of the
prosecution case in proceedings for a relevant offence unless �
where the confession or admission was made before the
commencement of questioning, the substance of the confession
questioning, the questioning and anything said by the person
and the electronic recording is available to be tendered in evidence."
Section 143 of the Act then provides:
"A court may admit evidence to which this Division applies even if
the requirements of this Division have not been complied with, or
there is insufficient evidence of compliance with those requirements,
if, having regard to the nature of and the reasons for the non-
compliance or insufficiency of evidence and any other relevant
matters, the court is satisfied that, in the circumstances of the case,
admission of the evidence would not be contrary to the interests of
The effect of s 142(1) is clear. Evidence of a confession or admission made
to a member of the police force is not admissible as part of the prosecution
case except in the circumstances provided for in par (a) and par (b). The
confession or admission will be admiss ible as part of the prosecution case if,
in the circumstances provided for in (a), the substance of the confession or
admission is confirmed by the person concerned, and in (a) and (b) the
confirmation or the confession or admission was electronically reco rded,
and where that recording is available to be tendered in evidence. In all other
cases falling within the ambit of s 142 the evidence will not be admissible
unless the Court permits its admission under s 143 on the basis that the
"admission of the evidence would not be contrary to the interests of justice".
In R v Charlie [1995] NTSC 153; (1995) 121 FLR 306, Mildren J considered what was meant
by the expression "questioning" in s 142 of the Act. He said (312):
"The word "questioning" is not defined by the Act. The questions
which were asked related only to whether the accused knew why he
was arrested and if he knew what his rights were. Section 142 is
designed to ensure that admissions made during questioning about
the offence is recorded. I consider that "questioning" means
questions about the circumstances of the offence: see R v
Maratabanga [1993] NTSC 45; (1993) 3 NTLR 77 at 91-92."
See also The Queen v Lees & Cameron (1997) 3 NTJ 1339 at 1362.
In this case the admission was not made "before the commencement of
questioning". All "questioning" of the accused had been completed at that
point in time. The record of interview was conducted between 5.47pm and
6.52pm. The conversation took place after that time.
Likewise the admission was not made "during questioning" but rather took
The position is that any admission made by the accused was made to a
member of the police force (Ms Young), by a person suspected of having
committed a relevant offence (the accused), and is therefore n ot admissible
by virtue of s 142 unless it falls within the exceptions provided for in that
section. It does not do so. The conversation occurred after the completion
of "questioning" and it was not electronically recorded.
Accepting that s 142(1) of the Police Administration Act applies to make the
evidence of any admission by the accused to Ms Young "not admissible as
part of the prosecution case", the question that then arises is whether there
is a discretion to admit the evidence pursuant to s 143 of the Act.
Section 143 permits "evidence to which this Division applies" to be
admitted. That section permits the exercise of a discretion to admit the
evidence because the evidence that is excluded under s 142(1) is "evidence
to which this Division applies". I am therefore required to consider whether
the admission of the "evidence would not be contrary to the interests of
It has been said that the purpose of s 142(1) is to safeguard a suspect against
unfair methods of obtaining incriminating evidence against him. The
primary object is not to protect the guilty from acknowledging their guilt but
to ensure that alleged confessions or admissions are genuinely and
voluntarily made and not unfairly obtained: R v Grimley (1994) 121 FLR
In the circumstances of this matter the conversation between the accused and
Ms Young was quite divorced from the interrogation procedure. It occurred
after questioning by investigating officers had been completed and it arose
out of the concern of Ms Young for the well being of the accused. She
sought information in order to determine whether some action ought to be
taken to protect his welfare such as having him taken to Royal Darwin
Hospital or, as in fact occurred, given some medication designed to relieve
his apparent extreme discomfort. To my mind it is clear that Ms Young was
at all times acting with the desire to fulfil the "duty of care" in relation to
the accused which had been imposed on her. Her questioning had nothing to
do with the investigative process and that is confirmed by the fact that her
conversation with the accused only came to light some 12 months after the
occurrence and then only in the course of her making a statement as to his
presence in custody. The detail of the conversation was not revealed to
others until the making of the statutory declaration in 1999 (Exhibit P4).
The information provided to Ms Young was voluntarily given by the
accused. There was, in the cross-examination of Ms Young, a suggestion
made that the conversation did not occur in the manner she described.
However, she denied that and no further challenge to the accuracy of her
evidence was forthcoming. There is no suggestion that the condition of the
accused at that time was other than as she described it or that the
information conveyed was other than the truth. The evidence is probative of
the accused being associated with heroin on that day, indeed having been in
possession of heroin on that day, and that there had been a car chase as
In the circumstances I rule that the evidence can be admitted.
R
Kanaris [1999] NTSC 94
(1984) 152 CLR 528
(1995) 121 FLR 306
(1993) 3 NTLR 77
(1994) 121 FLR
236