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[2026] NSWDC 10
General information, not legal advice.
District Court of NSW
2026-02-18
Priestley SC DCJ
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: R v JA (No. 2) [2026] NSWDC 10
Hearing dates: 9 February 2026
Date of orders: 18 February 2026
Decision date: 18 February 2026
Jurisdiction: Criminal
Before: Priestley SC DCJ
Decision: (1) The application by the Crown for a Registrable Person Order is dismissed.
Legislation Cited: Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000
Cases Cited: R v JA [2026] NSWDC 7
Category: Sentence
Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
JA (Offender)
Representation: Counsel:
Mr J Hanna for the Crown
Ms M Cusack for the Offender
Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions for the Crown
Legal Aid Commissions for the Offender
File Number(s): 2024/233361
On 24 October 2025 JA was found guilty by a jury of one count under s66A and one count under s66DA(b), and on 13 February 2026 he was sentenced to 2 CCOs. For the full facts of the matter and the assessment of objective seriousness, and a consideration of the offender’s subjective case, see R v JA [2026] NSWDC 7 (the sentence judgment). These reasons should be read in conjunction with the sentencing judgment.
Having announced the sentence, the Crown sought a registrable person order (RPO) pursuant to section 3C of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (the Act). Although not initially, the offender now opposes the making of such an order on the basis that the court would not be satisfied the order is necessary because the offender does not pose a risk to the lives or sexual safety of one or more children or of children generally. By s3C(1)(b), where the offender is a child when the offence/s were committed, as the offender was in this case, the Court needs to be satisfied there is such a risk. There is no such discretion where the offender was an adult at the time the offence/s were committed, and where a conviction is recorded.
Section 2C of the Act defines “Risk to sexual safety of children” and is in the following terms:
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person poses a
"risk to the lives or sexual safety of one or more children, or of children generally" if there is a risk that the person will engage in conduct that may constitute a Class 1 offence or a Class 2 offence against or in respect of a child or children.
(2) In order for a court to be satisfied that a person poses a risk to the lives or sexual safety of one or more children, or of children generally, it is not necessary for the court to be able to identify a risk to particular children, or a particular class of children.
(3) A court is to take the following into account in determining whether a person poses a risk to the lives or sexual safety of one or more children, or of children generally--
(a) the seriousness of each registrable offence committed by the person,
(b) the age of the person at the time each of those offences was committed,
(c) the age of each victim of each of those offences at the time that the offence was committed,
(d) the seriousness of any other offences committed by the person,
(e) the impact on the person if the order being sought is made compared with the likelihood that the person may commit a registrable offence,
(f) any other matter that the court considers to be relevant.
The Crown argues that the RPO should be made. In support of this argument the Crown relies on the fact of there being 2 offences, the finding that other offending was found to have occurred, the continued denial of guilt, and his psychiatric state, for which he is required to be treated under the terms of the CCOs. Added to this is the offender’s ongoing contact with children within his family, and quite possibly, and indeed in my view unavoidably to some degree, in the community.
The offender argues the offender does not pose a risk to the lives or sexual safety of one or more children or of children generally. Reference was made to the second reading speech introducing this provision. From that part of the second reading speech that was quoted, it is apparent that the present provision of the Act is an amended provision, with the amendment providing for the discretion now found in s3C(1)(b), which was not present before. In that speech it was stated:
The updated approach in relation to persons under the age of 18 who commit registrable offences strikes the right balance between ensuring the most serious offenders can still be subject to registration requirements and alleviating the burdens of reporting for people under 18 who are unlikely to pose an ongoing risk to the lives or sexual safety of others”
There is a consistency in this approach with the principles of sentencing of young people. Those principles were referred to in the sentencing judgment and shortly stated involve a greater emphasis on rehabilitation, and seek to promote the prospects of the young person in their adult life, without unduly hindering them owing to their conduct at an age when they were not fully developed and mature.
The factors in s2C(3) of the Act and set out above, save for subs (e ) and (f), have been considered in the sentencing judgment, and those considerations are repeated here. For each offence I found the offence was in the low range of objective seriousness. The offender was either 15 or 16 for count 2, and 16 at the time of count 3. The victim was aged 6. There was found to be other occasions of offending, but just what was involved beyond the conduct being similar to counts 2 and 3, and just how often, was not able to be determined. There is no evidence on the impact on the offender if the order is made beyond what may be gleaned from the Form 3 that is completed if the RPO is made, which sets out the offender’s reporting obligations (which were said in submissions to extend for 7 years), and notes impacts on the offender’s work and life and otherwise, eg travel. That impact I find is significant, and contrasts with the finding of a low likelihood of reoffending.
The section allows any other matter considered relevant to be taken into account. In my view it is plainly very relevant to consider the likelihood of the offender re offending, a matter envisaged by s2C(3)(e). This was an issue determined in the sentencing judgment. At [50] the offender was found to be unlikely to reoffend, to have excellent prospects of rehabilitation, and it was noted that it was now more than 2 years since count 3 and the offender had lived without incident with his younger stepsisters and had advanced himself in his young life. At [47] the offender was found to be a young hard working well supported pro social individual. I would add that the evidence in the sentencing hearing showed the offender to be a member of a online gaming community. There was no suggestion of any inappropriate use of the internet in any way.
I have considered the parties submissions, in particular the submission of the Crown based on the other times of sexual misconduct, and the fact of the offender’s need for psychological treatment. Yet the first of those factors occurred at the time the offender was young and immature, and the conduct can only be found to have been of a similar objective seriousness as counts 2 and 3. The second factor favours the exercise of the discretion, because it provides an extra guard to the offender re offending, which has already been found to be low.
In my view an RPO should not be made. I reach this conclusion having considered the above matters, but predominantly due to the established low risk of re offending, and to give effect to one of the objects of sentencing young people, to promote their rehabilitation and likelihood of, in this case, continuing to be a contributing pro social member of the community. That in my view is something better achieved, without, as it was put in the second reading speech, “the burdens of reporting”, a statement that I take to mean not just the practical burden of reporting, but also restrictions that are placed on a registrable person, in connection with for example work and travel.
Lastly, the Crown considered it relevant to conclude its submissions by stating it is not the role of the prosecution to prepare or complete the order or the notice to the offender that is required when an RPO is made. Just why not is not stated. The submission arises due to an exchange that occurred at the hearing, where the Court suggested the process would be more efficient if it was not left to the judge in a busy list to fill out the forms, including the offender’s name, and CNI and MIN numbers and other information not readily known to the judge, nor readily found in the material. That this was happening at all arose in turn from the apparent belief of some that the legislation requires the form filling to occur in open court. Just what provision is said to provide for this is not clear.
Section 3J of the Act provides that the Court must “arrange” for the person to be given a copy of the documents in question and verbally explain certain matters. In my view this does not extend to the judge doing the form filling; the court can satisfy its obligations by directing the party seeking the order to bring in the completed form, ready in the event the order is made. The documents can then be provided to the offender in court, or indeed he may in this way have an opportunity to read them before any order is made. The party seeking the order is invariably the Crown.
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