R v Hide

Texts Cited: Nil

Category: Sentence

Parties: Rex (Crown)
Peter Hide (Offender)

Representation: Counsel:
Ms L O’Sullivan (solicitor-advocate) (Crown)
Mr Barnes (Offender)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Maguire & McInerney (Offender)

File Number(s): 2023/00118866

Publication restriction: Nil

REMARKS ON SENTENCE

Introduction

1. The offender is to be sentenced for:

2. One offence under s 51D(2) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), of possessing more than three unregistered firearms. This offence carries a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment. A Standard Non-Parole period of 10 years’ imprisonment has been prescribed for it. I will refer to this offence as the ‘sequence 14 offence’.

3. One offence under s 51F of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), of possessing digital blueprints for the manufacture of firearms. This offence carries a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. I will refer to this offence as the ‘sequence 5 offence’.

4. In addition, the Offender has asked that the Court take into account another offence when setting a sentence for the sequence 14 offence. This is an offence under s 65(3) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), of possessing ammunition without a permit, or without being authorised to have a firearm which takes ammunition. The maximum penalty for this offence is a fine of 50 penalty units. I will refer to this offence as ‘the Form 1 offence’.

5. The Offender has never held a licence or permit authorising him to possess or use any kind of firearms or ammunition.

6. By way of background, on 12 April 2024 a search warrant was executed at the Offender’s home. Police found 3D printers and digital blueprints for the making of firearms and ammunition. When they returned the following day, they found numerous items throughout the house. These included metalwork machines, firearm parts which had been manufactured using the 3D-printed process, privately made metal firearm parts, commercially made firearms parts, live ammunition, and ammunition which had been made by the 3D printing process.

7. The Offender was arrested for the above charges on 13 April 2023. He went into custody and remained there until 26 March 2024, on which date he was granted conditional bail. This means that he has spent a total of 11 months and 13 days in custody for these charges. Since the date of his release he has been subject to strict bail conditions, which include daily reporting to police.

8. He entered pleas of guilty to the sequence 5 and sequence 14 offences on 27 February 2025.

9. The sequence 14 offence involves the use by the Offender of the 3D-printed process for manufacturing firearms. The sequence 5 offence deals with the Offender’s possession of digital blueprints for the making of firearms, using the 3D-printed process. Some of the ammunition the subject of the Form 1 offence was also made using the 3D-printed process.

10. 3D printers are used to create physical three-dimensional objects from digital designs, by layering material in an additive process. This process uses raw materials that are either polymer plastics or metals. Most 3D printers are relatively inexpensive.

11. Firearms and firearm parts are able to be manufactured using a 3D printer and digital blueprints. Firearms produced by this process do not have serial numbers and as a result they are technically untraceable. They are an alternative source of firearms and ammunition for persons who would not be able legally to own them, or who are unable or unwilling to source them from the black market or from other criminal networks.

Details of the Offences

The Sequence 14 Offence

10. Section 51D(2) of the Firearms Act 1996 (‘the Act’) prohibits a person from the unauthorised possession of more than three firearms, any one of which is classified as a ‘pistol’ or a ‘prohibited firearm’. It is a more serious offence than one under s 51D(1) of the Act, which prohibits a person from the unauthorised possession of more than three firearms, and carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment.

11. On the Offender’s premises police found seven firearms, all but one of which was either a pistol or a prohibited firearm. They consisted of a shortened firearm and six homemade pistols, none of which was registered. All six of the pistols appeared to have been privately made, and had no serial numbers.

12. The shortened firearm was a ‘.22 Long Rifle calibre’ self-loading rifle. It was missing the stock, which is the part of the firearm that provides its structural support.

13. Pistol 1 was an imitation self-loading pistol. Pistols 2 and 3 were single shot ‘9mm Parabellum calibre’ pistols, each of which was missing its trigger mechanism. Pistols 4, 5 and 6 were revolvers of unknown calibre, each of which was missing its cylinder. The cylinder is the part of the firearm which holds cartridges. A cartridge is a complete unit of ammunition containing a bullet, propellant or gunpowder, an ignition device and a casing which holds these items together. In the case of single shot pistols like Pistols 2 and 3, the chamber would hold only one cartridge.

14. With the exception of Pistol 1, all the firearms were missing a part. However section 4(2) of the Act makes clear that for the purposes of the Act, a firearm includes “anything that would be a firearm if it did not have something missing from it, or a defect or obstruction in it”.

15. Ammunition was also found at the Offender’s premises, and is the subject of the Form 1 offence. The ammunition consisted of eighteen ‘9mm Parabellum calibre’ cartridges; eight ‘.22 Winchester Magnum Rimfire calibre’ cartridges; and a 12-gauge shotgun cartridge. A number of live and 3D-printed cartridges was also found.

The Sequence 5 Offence

16. Police found numerous digital files in the Offender’s possession. Of these, forty were firearm files and they are the subject of the sequence 5 offence. They consisted of the following:

17. Eight files which were digital blueprints to produce firearm parts. These were found in a 3D printer. Four of the files were incomplete or corrupted. The remaining four files were complete and were made available to print

18. Twenty-four files of which 10 files, when printed, would make firearm parts. Seven of these 10 files would form parts for a firearm known as a ‘Washbear’ 3D-printed revolver/pepperbox. This firearm is a pistol as defined in s 4(1) of the Act. It is also a ‘prohibited pistol’ pursuant to s 4C of the Act. A Washbear revolver is primarily made from 3D-printed materials, and is capable of firing multiple shots without reloading. The agreed facts noted that this firearm, once manufactured, would be missing some components such as the cylinder rod, trigger and certain pins and retainers. A further file from among the 10 files, when printed, would form other firearm parts being two cylinders and a frame, all suitable for a Washbear type 3D-printed revolver/pepperbox.

19. Eighteen files of which sixteen, when printed, would form firearm parts. Of these, 14 when printed would form parts for the ‘Washbear’ type 3D-printed revolver/pepperbox.

20. The facts noted that for some of the above files, the products were substitutable for others. This would make it possible to build a firearm with an eight-chamber cylinder instead of a six-chamber cylinder.

21. Throughout the premises police also found numerous polymer and metal firearm parts which appeared to have been privately made. They included multiple firearm barrels, pistol frames, pistol handles, trigger mechanisms, receivers, and magazines.

Material Tendered in the Sentence Hearing

19. In addition to the agreed facts, the documents tendered in the sentence proceedings included the Offender’s criminal history, a sentencing assessment report prepared by Community Corrections Officer Anika Dawes, and a report of psychologist Ms Ivanka Manoski. I will summarise these.

The Offender’s Criminal History

20. The Offender has prior convictions for drink driving and driving with illicit drugs present in his blood. For these offences he has generally received fines and driving disqualifications.

The Sentencing Assessment Report

21. This report was unable to be prepared until August 2025, due to repeated failures by the Offender to respond to contacts made by officers of Community Corrections.

22. On 22 August 2025 Community Corrections officer Anika Dawes assessed the offender. She reported that:

23. The offender is now 41 years old and lives in accommodation owned by his mother. He has a supportive relationship with both his mother and his sister. He was married for a period in his mid-twenties and has a daughter with his former wife. However he has had no recent contact with his daughter, who is now aged 12 years.

24. He was diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) at the age of ten, for which he uses prescribed medication of dexamphetamine.

25. As an adult he has worked for many years as a mechanic. However, six months before his arrest on 13 April 2023 he returned a positive result in routine drug screening at his workplace. He said that he explained to his employer that this result was due to his prescribed medication, but that his employer nevertheless terminated his employment.

26. He said that his condition of ADHD causes him to “hyper-fixate” on specific topics of interest, one of which is the mechanics of firearms. After he lost his job he was “in a poor headspace” and had too much free time. He pursued the manufacture and mechanics of firearms as a hobby. He denied any financial incentive for this activity. He said he had not thought this behaviour through, and described it as “stupid”.

27. He was willing to undertake psychological intervention. The author did not provide details of the nature or purpose of such intervention.

28. The author assessed that the Offender was at a medium-low risk of reoffending.

The Report of Psychologist Ivanka Manoski

24. The Offender’s legal representatives requested psychologist Ms Ivanka Manoski to prepare a psychological assessment for the purpose of his sentencing. Ms Manoski assessed the Offender on 16 April 2025, and provided a report.

25. Ms Manoski reported that the Offender engaged “superficially” with the assessment process, providing minimal responses and showing unwillingness to discuss certain topics. She found him “evasive” and tending to minimise his offending. He had limited insight into his offending behaviour, and how it may have been associated with the impact of his upbringing.

26. The Offender told Ms Manoski that his parents separated when he was a young child and he grew up with his mother and sister. He saw his father regularly and regards him as a supportive person. For the past two years he has been in a relationship which he described as “solid” and supportive.

27. At the time of the offending the Offender was using his prescribed medication of dexamphetamine.

28. The Offender told Ms Manoski that from the age of 10 he was subjected to physical abuse, but he would not identify the perpetrator. He said only that he was struck with boots and poles and was punched, receiving bruises. The Offender also told Ms Manoski that he had been bullied in primary school, and did not have any friends until he went to high school.

29. Ms Manoski commented that due to the Offender’s reluctance to discuss these childhood experiences, it was difficult to assess their impact upon him. She thought the Offender needed psychological assistance to explore these matters, but she queried whether he would be willing and motivated to accept this.

30. After high school the Offender obtained qualifications as a mechanic and an auto electrician, and a certificate in Advanced Automotive Technologies. He worked in car dealerships, but this was disrupted when he was charged with a serious offence, for which he was refused bail. In 2017 he was found not guilty of this charge and was released from custody.

31. After that he held a job as a head mechanic for five years but then lost this job. The Offender told Ms Manoski that this was because he was being repeatedly harassed by police in front of his workplace, causing his employer to dismiss him. He then obtained another job as a technical support coordinator, but after five years he was fired from this job too. He said this was because his employer discovered he had ADHD. He said he was unable to pursue unfair dismissal proceedings, because his employers’ lawyers “stonewalled” him.

32. The Offender’s loss of his job six months before he was charged for these offences led to a deterioration in his mood and functioning. He experienced low mood and difficulty sleeping and felt “isolated and alone”. He also struggled financially. He said he had engaged in the offending to assist with his depressed mood, saying “I tried to keep busy doing what I was charged with”.

33. In Ms Manoski’s opinion, at the time of the offending the Offender was suffering “persistent depressive disorder, severe”. She considered there was likely to have been a causal relationship between the offending, and his poor mental health at that time. He was unlikely to have been thinking about the consequences of his behaviour. She considered that the Offender continued to suffer a severe depressive disorder, with symptoms of poor sleep, energy levels and concentration. He was stressed about the impact of these proceedings on himself, his partner and his family.

34. Ms Manoski concluded that the Offender’s poor mental health was largely related to his current life stressors and was unlikely to significantly change until those circumstances changed. She considered that the Offender’s current mental state will likely make his time in custody more onerous.

35. Ms Manoski explored the Offender’s attitude to the offending. When she asked about his possession of live ammunition, he replied that he had “found it in a cleanup” and had taken it because he had been curious. He said he did not have a weapon to place it in.

36. The Offender claimed that he did not believe he was breaking the law because none of the weapons he had made were usable, as they did not have chambers. He said he was only interested in their mechanics, which was why he had searched information online. He denied that he experiences any homicidal ideation or plans to harm anyone.

37. Ms Manoski reported that:

“Overall Mr Hide engaged in minimisation and justification of his engagement in the offences and did not appear to be cognisant of the consequences”.

38. She assessed his risk for reoffending as at the medium level. She based this on his previous criminal history, his lack of employment and his “current problematic views related to his offending in that he continues to engage in minimisation”. She described these views as “cognitive distortions regarding his offending” and said that he showed limited insight into what he had done. She thought his poor mental health was also a risk factor, given its connection with the current offences. His risk for reoffending could reduce with employment, prosocial leisure activities, and psychological intervention.

39. Ms Manoski also observed that the Offender felt “victimised*”* by certain people. These included his most recent employer, who had told him that he was being dismissed because he was “a danger to himself and others”. The Offender continued to feel resentful about this, and about his belief that the employer had prevented him from pursuing legal redress. Ms Manoski also noted that the Offender was resentful about the police. He claimed that he was unable to get work because “the police made sure of that”. By this he meant that due to his bail conditions he was obliged to report frequently to police.

40. Ms Manoski considered that the Offender needed to develop a sense of agency for his own decisions and actions, and not engage in a “victim stance mentality”. She explained this as follows:

“One of the impacts of his collective negative experiences over his life, including his relationship difficulties, has been the development of a victim mentality, where Mr Hide views himself as wronged by others, which in turn impacts negatively on his mental state.”

41. Overall, she recommended that he obtain assistance in developing insight into his offending behaviour. He needed to be challenged as to the “cognitive distortions” which had led him to commit these offences. He also needed therapy to help manage his mental health symptoms, and to process his difficult early life.

The S****entencing Factors

42. In determining an appropriate sentence for these offences the Court must take into account the matters set out in s 21A(2) and (3) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1986 (NSW), as well as any other objective or subjective factors affecting the relative seriousness of the offence. The Court must also have regard to the purposes of sentencing set out in section 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1986 (‘CSPA’).

I will commence with the objective seriousness of the offending.

Objective Seriousness of the Offending

The Sequence 14 Offence: Possess More Than 3 Unregistered Firearms

43. The Offender was charged with possessing seven firearms, none of which was registered. I have described the nature of the firearms above, and that the six pistols appear to have been privately made.

44. The maximum penalty prescribed for an offence is relevant in determining the appropriate sentence, as it expresses the seriousness of the offence as viewed by the legislature and public perception: R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131. The sequence 14 offence carries a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment. This makes clear the intention of Parliament that courts are generally to regard these offences as very serious ones.

45. The offence also carries a standard non parole period of 10 years’ imprisonment. Pursuant to section 54B(2) of the CSPA, a standard non-parole period for an offence is a matter to be taken into account by a court in determining the appropriate sentence for an offender, without limiting the matters that are otherwise to be taken into account.

46. There are well settled principles which apply when a Court is sentencing for firearm-related offences. When assessing their seriousness, the Court is to keep firmly in mind the principles and objects of the legislation which criminalises this conduct: R v Tolley [2004] NSWCCA 165 at [53].

47. Section 3(1) of the Act sets out its primary principles as:

48. confirming that the possession and use of prohibited weapons and firearms is a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety; and

49. improving public safety by imposing strict controls on the possession and use of prohibited weapons and firearms.

50. Public safety is therefore the critical principle underlying these offences. Appellate courts have repeatedly emphasised the obligation on sentencing judges to give effect to this principle. In the case of Chandab v R [2021] NSWCCA 186 at [81] Wilson J made this statement:

“It is important in approaching the imposition of sentence for firearms offences to give full weight to the clear intent of the legislative scheme that criminalises possession of prohibited firearms or pistols … firearms in the hands of those not permitted to possess them, and even more so in the hands of the criminally minded …. represent a clear and profound threat to the safety of the community … such offences must be treated as serious contraventions of the criminal law – to punish offenders, to deter others, and to protect the community.”

49. In R v Mahmud [2010] NSWCCA 219 at [71] RS Hulme J said the following (Giles JA and Latham J agreeing):

“The possession of firearms, except where necessary and by persons authorised to have them, is calculated to lead to substantial damage. The courts have a duty to impose penalties that conform with the legislative intention and operate as real disincentives to those otherwise attracted to the illegal possession of firearms.”

50. In sentencing the Offender for this offence, I am therefore to take account of the fact that his unauthorised possession of the seven firearms is serious offending, that his possession of these firearms subverted the intended operation of the Act, and that his sentence must reflect the high importance of community safety.

51. The legislative objects set out in section 3(2) of the Act are also relevant. These include:

52. to establish an integrated licensing and registration scheme for all firearms

53. to provide strict requirements that must be satisfied in relation to the licensing of firearms and the acquisition and supply of firearms

54. to ensure that firearms are stored and conveyed in a safe and secure manner.

55. The first two of these objects have particular relevance to the circumstance that all but one of the firearms possessed by the Offender were 3D-printed and hence untraceable, making them attractive to criminal users. Their untraceability represents another way in which the Offender’s activities subverted the intended operation of Australia’s gun control laws.

56. The sentencing submissions of the Crown and of Counsel for the Offender cited the case of R v Mack [2009] NSWCCA 216, in which Davies J (McClellan CJ and RA Hulme J agreeing) identified matters to be considered in assessing the objective seriousness of an offence under s 51D(2) of the Act. These are:

57. the number of firearms possessed;

58. the number that are prohibited or are pistols;

59. their nature and type;

60. the purpose for possessing them;

61. any evidence linking their possession to drug activity being carried on in the premises; and

62. the location of the firearms and security under which they were kept.

63. The Crown submitted that in light of the above factors as well as the importance of public safety, the offending was at least at the mid-range of objective seriousness. On behalf of the Offender, Mr Barnes submitted that the Court would find it to be below the mid-range of objective gravity given the absence of evidence that the Offender was financially motivated, and that the firearms were not operable. I will consider each of these factors in turn.

64. There is no evidence that the Offender’s possession of the firearms was connected with drug activity carried out in his home.

65. The Offender possessed multiple firearms. Furthermore, for this offence to be committed it is sufficient that there be only one firearm which is classified as a ‘prohibited firearm’ or ‘pistol’, with the remaining firearms being unregistered. Relevantly, all but one of the Offender’s seven firearms was a prohibited firearm or a pistol, the significance of this being that those six firearms could be easily concealed. The fact that almost all the firearms in the Offender’s possession were of this nature increases the objective seriousness of his offending.

66. In addition, the shortened firearm is a prohibited weapon, meaning that it could not have been registered even if the Offender had sought to do so.

67. It is the case that the firearms were missing some of their parts and therefore were not operable at the time of the Offender’s arrest. Counsel for the Offender submitted that the possession of unserviceable weapons is objectively less serious than the possession of serviceable ones.

68. In R v Mezzadri [2011] NSWCCA 125 at [19] Adams J (with Hodgson JA and Hall J agreeing) held that possessing unserviceable weapons is less objectively serious than the possession of serviceable weapons, but that the extent to which the weapon is inoperable will be relevant. Adams J observed:

“Of course the degree to which the weapons in question were unserviceable, that is to say whether the missing parts were capable of being found and the ease with which the gun could be made to work would be relevant.”

60. Adams J went on to observe that no such evidence had been placed before the Court. She concluded that the absence of evidence that the weapons were serviceable was “a material objective consideration which … pointed to the lower end of objective seriousness together with the lack of any intention to repair, use or dispose of them.”

61. In the present case, there was likewise no evidence as to the ease or difficulty with which the Offender, or others who might obtain possession of the firearms, could make them work. This would have assisted in assessing the degree of potential harm which flowed from the Offender’s possession of them. It may have been useful for example to hear evidence as to whether the many 3D-printed firearm parts found in the Offender’s possession (for example the trigger mechanisms) if fitted to the firearms could have made them operable.

62. As there was no such evidence before me, I approach the matter on the basis that the firearms were not in an operable condition when they were seized, and that this makes the offending objectively less serious.

63. In considering the nature of the seven firearms, it is relevant that six were without serial numbers. This is characteristic of 3D-printed firearms. It ensures that they avoid the operation of Australia’s gun control laws. In particular those which aim to ensure that firearm components are registered and therefore traceable, and that their owners are subject to mandatory background checks. The absence of serial numbers on six of the firearms possessed by the Offender increases the objective seriousness of his offending.

64. The Court must also consider the Offender’s purpose in possessing the firearms. To the author of the sentencing assessment report the Offender said that his purpose in making the firearms and the firearm parts was to pursue “a personal hobby”, and that he was not financially motivated. To Ms Manoski he denied plans to harm anyone, saying that he had pursued these activities “to keep myself busy.”

65. There is no direct evidence that the Offender’s purpose in possessing the firearms was that they be used. I note however that according to the agreed facts, Pistols 2 and 3 are both classified as ‘9mm Parabellum calibre single shot pistols’. The ammunition found at the Offender’s home included 18 cartridges described as ‘9mm Parabellum calibre cartridges’. The Offender’s possession of a type of ammunition which appears to match two of the pistols suggests that he may have intended that the pistols be used. However, no evidence was placed before me to confirm that these cartridges were in fact suitable for any of the pistols. I conclude that it cannot be ascertained either way if the Offender intended that the firearms be used.

66. As submitted by the Crown, the large number of firearms, firearm parts and ammunition in the Offender’s possession raises concern as to what his purpose was in possessing the seven firearms. This concern is not alleviated by the implausible response he provided, when asked by Ms Manoski how he had acquired the ammunition. He replied that he had “found it in a clean-up”.

67. In my view the evidence does not enable a conclusion as to what the Offender’s purpose was in possessing the firearms. I accept however that there is no evidence that it included an intention to sell them. This finding lessens to an extent the offending’s objective gravity.

68. Additional matters are relevant when assessing the potential harm of this offending, and hence its objective gravity. These include the security under which the firearms were kept.

69. In R v Cromarty [2004] NSWCCA 54, the Offender had been found in possession of a very large cache of firearms. These were found throughout his home and workshop. The Offender had put in place some limited security measures, such as deadlocks and sensors and an alarm for the workshop and home.

70. In common with the present case, there was no evidence that the respondent possessed the firearms for the purpose of selling them, or that he had links with criminal organisations. The sentencing judge found that he had “a passion and obsession with firearms … and an almost morbid unwillingness to part with them, knowing that to do so would see them destroyed.”

71. In the Crown appeal the Court did not find otherwise, but concluded that the sentencing Judge had not given sufficient weight to the objective gravity of the offending. The sentencing judge had erroneously regarded the primary objective of s 51D of the Act as the punishment of criminals who were warehousing illegal firearms.

72. Kirby J (Simpson J and Bell J concurring) at [86] held that the purpose of the legislation was “broader than that”, and extended to punishing conduct of:

‘ … stockpiling of weapons, as happened here, where that stockpile was vulnerable and if violated, may feed the market in the illegal supply of firearms.’

73. The Court therefore found that the objective gravity of the offending had been underestimated. The offending required, at [89]:

‘ … a sentence which unmistakeably denounced the conduct, a sentence which would operate as a deterrent to likeminded offenders’.

74. A sentencing court must therefore have regard to the Act’s objective of preventing firearms from making their way onto the market in illegal firearms, in circumstances where an individual’s stockpiling of them is vulnerable. This objective remains significant, regardless of whether the offender has the intention to sell the firearms, and regardless of whether he or she has connections with criminal groups.

75. In the present case there is no evidence that the Offender had the seven firearms on his premises with any consideration to keeping them secure from others, whether criminally minded or not. This increases the objective seriousness of the offending. The Offender risked feeding the market in the illegal supply of firearms, heightening the public risk which flowed from his offending.

76. The Offender claimed that he did not know that he was breaking the law by possessing these firearms. He stated the belief that his creations could not be guns because they were missing their chambers.

77. The Offender’s claim that he believed he was not breaking the law by possessing firearms which were missing a part cannot be accepted. The Offender told the author of the sentencing assessment report that he was fixated on the manufacture and mechanics of firearms. He told Ms Manoski that this fixation caused him to make online searches on the home-made manufacture of firearms. This evidence, together with his acquisition of a large number of digital blueprints for the manufacture of firearms, leads me to infer that he had conducted extensive online research into these subjects. It is implausible that he was unaware of the illegal nature of his activities.

Determination of Objective Gravity

78. In summary, there is no evidence that the Offender possessed the seven firearms for the purpose of sale, or that his possession of them was associated with drug activity being carried on in his home. The objective gravity of the offending is also lessened by the fact that the firearms were not in an operable condition when they were seized.

79. On the other hand the legislative guideposts imposed by the high maximum penalty, and the prescribing of a standard non parole period, make clear the very serious nature of the offending. In addition, the number of weapons, their particular nature, and the risks involved in their unsecured possession are factors which increase the objective gravity of the offending.

80. For these reasons I assess the objective seriousness of the offending as just below the mid-range.

The Sequence 5 Offence: Possess Digital Blueprints

81. This is an offence under s 51F of the Act, of possessing digital blueprints for the manufacture of firearms. It carries a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment.

Objective Seriousness

82. In assessing the objective seriousness of this offending, I have considered the number of digital blueprints, the nature of the firearm which they were designed to create, the purpose for which the Offender possessed the blueprints, and the risk of harm which flowed from that possession.

83. The Offender possessed 40 files which, when 3D printed, would produce firearm parts. This is an extensive collection and attests to the determination which he brought to his project of making a firearm or firearms.

84. It is relevant to consider the nature of the firearm which the files were designed to create. According to the agreed facts, 32 of the Offender’s 40 digital files, when printed, would form parts specifically for the manufacture of a firearm known as a ‘Washbear’ 3D-printed revolver/pepperbox. The firearm, once produced, would be missing some components such as the cylinder rod, trigger and certain pins and retainers.

85. As to the nature of this firearm, the agreed facts stated that the Washbear 3D-printed revolver is a ‘prohibited pistol’ under the Act, being small in size and offering the advantage of concealment. A high risk of public harm would therefore attach to the unauthorised possession of such a firearm. The level of risk is evidenced by the fact that the possession of just one firearm within this category, out of a group of three or more firearms, attracts the higher penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment.

86. In addition, this type of firearm is capable of firing multiple shots without reloading. Notably the blueprints included some which would enable the Offender to build an eight-chamber cylinder as well as a six-chamber one.

87. The nature of the firearm for which the blueprints were designed, and therefore the potential for harm flowing from their unauthorised possession, heightens the objective seriousness of this offending.

88. As for the Offender’s purpose in possessing the blueprints, it could not be submitted (nor was it submitted) that he did not intend to use them to make firearm parts. A very large number of 3D-printed firearm parts was found in the Offender’s home. They included multiple firearm barrels, pistol frames, pistol handles, trigger mechanisms, receivers, and magazines. The Offender has not been charged in relation to his possession or manufacture of these firearm parts, and the sentences which he receives for the two offences before me will not take this conduct into account.

89. Nevertheless, the presence of these 3D-printed parts throughout the Offender’s home permits the strong inference that his purpose in possessing the blueprints was to use them to make firearms or firearm parts.

90. The question arises as to what the Offender intended to do with the parts he made using the blueprints. Counsel for the Offender submitted that the Offender’s purpose in possessing the blueprints was solely to pursue his passion for the mechanics and manufacture of firearms. There was no evidence that he intended to sell the resulting products, and no evidence that he had associations with any criminal groups.

91. I accept there is no evidence that the Offender possessed the blueprints for the purpose of making firearms parts for sale. But I do not accept the related submission that because there is no evidence that he had connections with criminal groups, it must follow that his purpose in possessing the blueprints did not include anything of a sinister nature. By its nature, the acquisition of digital blueprints to make firearms enables a person to obtain firearms, without the need to seek them from criminal groups or to the black market. Of itself, the lack of evidence that the Offender had such connections does not exclude the possibility of an illicit or anti-social purpose on his part.

92. The evidence does not enable a conclusion as to what the Offender’s purpose was in acquiring such a large number of blueprints for the manufacture of firearms. However, I accept that there is no evidence that his purpose included using the blueprints to make firearms for sale to others. This lessens to an extent the objective gravity of his offending.

93. In assessing objective gravity, the Court must take into account the high maximum penalty which applies to this offence, which evidences the intention of the legislature that it be treated as serious offending.

94. In addition, as emphasised by appellate courts, sentencing judges are to give effect to the underlying principles and objects of the Act, which include maintaining a licensing and registration scheme for all firearms, and providing strict requirements around the acquisition and supply of firearms.

95. Relevant to this, digital firearm blueprints enable a person to manufacture guns outside the regulatory frameworks which are vital to community safety. They enable the person to do this without being subject to licensing requirements, mandatory background checks, or the registration of firearm components. The person is able to do this anonymously with their own resources, using a process that is entirely separate to that of a conventional and regulated factory one. In effect the possession of such blueprints enables a parallel and entirely unmonitored means of acquiring weapons. The risk to public safety which flows from this conduct is obvious.

96. Blueprints also enable the creation of firearms and firearm parts which are untraceable and therefore of great value to criminal users. By his possession of the blueprints and his clear intention to use them, the Offender subverted the intended operation of Australia’s gun control laws. This is a significant matter in assessing the objective gravity of this offending.

97. Taking all the above into account, I assess the objective gravity of the sequence 5 offence as at the mid-level of seriousness for offending of this kind.

98. I now turn to the circumstances that are personal to the Offender.

The Circumstances Personal to the Offender

Guilty Pleas

99. The Offender’s early pleas of guilty entitle him to a discount of 25% for the sentences for each of the offences.

The Offender’s Prior History

100. The Offender’s prior offences are not particularly relevant to this offending. They do however disentitle him to the leniency he would receive if he had no previous convictions.

The Offender’s Mental Health

101. Counsel for the Offender submitted that the Offender suffered mental health issues which had contributed to his offending, such that the Court would consider his moral culpability to be reduced. In addition, they would make the conditions of custody weigh more heavily on him.

102. In understanding the Offender’s mental health conditions and their impact on his offending, I was assisted by the report of Ms Manoski which is summarised above.

103. In short, Ms Manoski considered that at the time of the offending the Offender suffered “persistent depressive disorder, severe”, and that he continued to suffer this condition. In the period leading up to his commission of the offences, his mood and functioning had deteriorated due to the loss of his job, and he became fixated on making firearms as a way of assisting with his depressed mood. Ms Manoksi also considered that his poor mental health made him less likely to have considered the consequences of his behaviour.

104. It is clear from Ms Manoski’s report that she considered that the symptoms of the Offender’s depressive condition had contributed to his offending. However, she did not make any finding as to the possible contribution of his condition of ADHD. The Offender told the author of the sentencing assessment report that after losing his job he had become fixated on the mechanics of firearms and had been unable to “sit still”. However, he also told her that he had remained compliant with his ADHD medication. In her report Ms Manoski recorded the opinion of the Offender’s treating psychiatrist Dr Sharat Lal, that the Offender’s symptoms and functioning improved when he used his medication. She reported that the Offender had also told her this.

105. The conclusion I reach is that the evidence is not sufficient to find that the Offender’s condition of ADHD contributed in any significant way to his offending. However, there is evidence that his depressive condition did so, causing him to seek distraction from his low mood by immersing himself in the project of making firearms.

106. In accordance with the principles of D**irector of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1 (‘De La Rosa’), I find that the Offender’s moral culpability is somewhat reduced by reason of the impact of his mental health conditions. Further, I accept Ms Manoski’s opinion that the Offender’s poor mental health will make the conditions of custody more burdensome for him.

107. It is also necessary to consider the extent to which the Offender’s poor mental health reduces the weight given to the principles of general and specific deterrence. And further, whether its connection with his offending bears upon the principle of community safety. These matters are addressed below.

The Offender’s Upbringing

108. Also relevant to this sentence are the principles discussed in a line of cases, including Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571. These establish that an offender’s background of deprivation or abuse is a relevant factor when determining sentence. Such a background may reduce an offender’s moral culpability, because it has impaired their capacity to make appropriate decisions, to mature, and to learn from experience.

109. Ms Manoski reported that the Offender told her of physical abuse during his childhood, involving being punched and hit with objects. She noted the difficulty of assessing the impact of this upon the Offender’s development, owing to his reluctance to discuss it with her.

110. The extent of the Offender’s childhood abuse remains uncertain, as does its possible impact on his capacity to make appropriate decisions as an adult. In these circumstances, the extent to which it can operate to reduce the Offender’s moral culpability for these offences must be limited

Remorse and Contrition

111. Remorse may be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing, on the basis that it indicates rehabilitation and the unlikelihood of further offending: Stojanovski v R [2013] NSWCCA 334 at [41] (Simpson J, Hoeben CJ at CL and Johnson J agreeing).

112. Section 21A(3)(i) specifies that remorse on the part of the Offender is a mitigating factor, but only if:

(i) the offender has provided evidence that he or she has accepted responsibility for his or her actions, …

113. Remorse is not established unless there is evidence that the offender accepts responsibility for his or her criminal conduct. Acceptance of responsibility must entail something more than a plea of guilty: Barbaro v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288; 226 A Crim R 354 at [34]–[35] (Maxwell P, Harper JA and T Forrest AJA).

114. In the present case it was conceded by Counsel for the Offender that he had showed limited understanding of the impact of his criminal activities.

115. To the author of the sentencing assessment report the Offender expressed no real awareness that his activities were harmful and wrong. He stated only that his actions were “stupid” and that he had not thought his behaviour through.

116. Ms Manoksi did not form a positive view of the Offender’s remorse for his offending or his acceptance of responsibility for it. He had “engaged in minimisation and justification of his engagement in the offences and did not appear to be cognisant of the consequences”. These were “cognitive distortions” which hindered him from developing any real insight into what he had done.

117. Furthermore, he had developed a “victim stance mentality” which made him resentful of his former employer and the police. He viewed himself as wronged by them. In Ms Manoski’s opinion, he needed to develop a sense of agency for his own decisions and actions.

118. Ms Manoski’s opinion is borne out by the Offender’s explanation of how he had obtained the ammunition found in his house. His reply lacked any candour and gives little confidence that he accepts the wrongfulness of his actions.

119. The evidence does not support that the Offender has developed genuine remorse for his actions, or an appreciation of its potential harms.

**The Offender’**s P****rospects of Rehabilitation

120. Both Ms Manoski and the author of the sentencing assessment report drew a connection between the Offender’s poor mental health and his offending. Ms Manoski said that the Offender’s risk of reoffending would be moderated if he was able to positively engage in psychological assistance. He needed help in understanding the “cognitive distortions” present in his thinking about his offending. She also considered that he needed therapy to manage his mental health symptoms, and to help him come to terms with his difficult early life.

121. The author of the sentencing assessment report noted that the Offender was willing to “undertake intervention”. The nature or purpose of the intervention was not discussed.

122. Ms Manoksi was not confident that the Offender was able or willing to engage in psychological assistance. He had participated only “superficially” in her assessment, he had been “evasive”, and he had sought to justify and minimise his conduct. She observed that this was not uncommon for people like the Offender who had not previously undertaken treatment. She assessed his risk of reoffending as at the medium level, based on his cognitive distortions about his offending, his limited insight into it, and his victim mentality.

123. Based on the above evidence, I conclude that the Offender remains at risk of reoffending while he minimises his offending activities and fails to develop an appreciation of how his mental health impacts his behaviour. These factors also adversely affect the assessment of his prospects of rehabilitation.

124. I note that the Offender has family support and is in a relationship with a supportive partner. These positive features can assist in rehabilitation. But overall, the evidence does not support the conclusion that he has good prospects of rehabilitation; or that he is at a low risk for reoffending.

General and Specific Deterrence

125. Consistent with the principles expressed in De La Rosa, the Court is to consider what impact the Offender’s mental health conditions should have on the weight given to the principles of general and specific deterrence.

126. I find that the impact of the Offender’s mental health conditions reduces to a modest degree the weight that is to be placed on these principles.

127. I say it is a modest impact, because these are offences where a Court is expected to give effect to the clear intent of the legislation. Appellate courts have emphasised that when sentencing for firearm-related offences, Courts must give full weight to the reality that they are a profound threat to the safety of the community. They undermine Australia’s vital safeguards in the possession and use of firearms. The proliferation of 3D-printed firearms in particular is emerging as a serious and accelerating public safety challenge. The sentences which I impose for these offences must reflect a strong need for general deterrence.

Other R****elevant S****entencing Principles

128. In sentencing the Offender for these offences I have had regard to the other objectives of sentencing, namely the need to impose adequate punishment, to denounce the Offender’s conduct, and to rehabilitate him.

129. I also take into account the sentencing purpose of community protection. The link between the Offender’s poor mental health and his offending, and his limited appreciation of the need to address this, were matters which caused Ms Manoski to assess that he was at a medium risk of reoffending.

130. In R v Engert (1995) 84A Crim R 67 Gleeson CJ cited Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 and stated at [68] that:

“… in the case of a particular offender, an aspect of the case which might mean that deterrence of others is of lesser importance, might, at the same time, mean that the protection of society is of greater importance. That was the particular problem being examined by the court in the case of Veen (No 2). Again, in a particular case, a feature which lessens what might otherwise be the importance of general deterrence, might, at the same time increase the importance of deterrence of the offender.”

131. The Offender’s poor mental health and lack of understanding of his actions increase the need for a sentence which reflects specific deterrence and the need for community protection.

The Section 5 threshold

132. I come now to the question of whether a sentence of imprisonment is required. In considering this question the court must be satisfied that no other penalty is appropriate in all the circumstances.

133. The Crown submitted that for both offences this threshold had been met. Counsel for the Offender did not challenge this submission.

134. I have had regard to the maximum penalties for both offences, which make clear that the legislature generally expects courts to recognise that these offences are very serious ones. I have discussed above the impact of the factors set out in s 21A(2) and (3) of the CSPA. I have taken these into account in assessing the offences’ objective seriousness. These also include the Offender’s subjective features, being his early pleas of guilty and some moderation of his moral culpability due to the impact of his mental health conditions, and of his difficult upbringing. I have accepted that the Offender’s mental health conditions will likely make the conditions of custody more onerous for him. These features entitle him to a degree of leniency in his sentences.

135. I have taken into account the need for the sentences to reflect the purposes set out in s 3A of the CSPA. The weight given to the purpose of general deterrence is moderated to only a modest degree by the Offender’s mental health, due to the significance which this principle is expected to be given.

136. I have concluded that in respect of both offences, the purposes of sentencing can only be met by a penalty of imprisonment.

137. The sentences of imprisonment which I impose will be backdated to reflect the period of time which the Offender has already spent in custody for them.

Accumulation, Concurrency and the Principles of Totality

138. I intend to impose an aggregate sentence for the two offences.

139. In determining an overall aggregate sentence, the principle of totality requires that the aggregation is “a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved’’: R v MAK; R v MSK [2006] NSWCCA 381 at [15], citing Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295.

140. In the present case it is appropriate that the sentence reflects a measure of concurrency. The two offences are distinct; nevertheless, the Offender committed both in pursuance of his fixation on making firearms. Furthermore, it seems likely that the firearms which are the subject of the sequence 14 offence were created using some of the blueprints which are the subject of the sequence 5 offence, or blueprints that were similar to them.

The Standard Non-Parole Period

141. The sequence 14 offence has a prescribed standard non-parole period of 10 years’ imprisonment.

142. Counsel for the Offender submitted that the court should not give significant weight to the role of the standard non-parole period, citing the case of K**G v R [2012] NSWCCA 10 per Basten J at [19]. Counsel submitted that the objective gravity of the sequence 14 offence was below the mid-range of seriousness and there were “significant mitigating circumstances”.

143. I am not able to accept this proposition. While I have assessed the objective gravity of the sequence 14 offence as slightly below the mid range, I do not agree that the Offender’s mitigating circumstances are significant. However, while I reject the proposal that I not give significant weight to the standard non parole period, it will be seen that in relation to this offence I have departed from it, for reasons which I will give.

Is there any Basis for a Finding of Special Circumstances?

144. Counsel for the Offender also submitted that there was a basis for the court to make a finding of special circumstances. This would result in an adjustment downwards of the non-parole period applying to the aggregate sentence. Counsel submitted that the Offender had certain needs which would support this finding, as follows:

145. a need for him to address his “further rehabilitation”;

146. a need to avoid or mitigate the risk of institutionalisation; and

147. a need to implement Ms Manoski’s recommended treatment plan.

148. The Crown submitted that the facts did not support such a finding.

149. Having considered this application for a finding of special circumstances, I do not consider that the grounds have been made out.

150. Special circumstances may be justified in cases where an Offender has good prospects of rehabilitation which would be assisted by a longer period on parole: Arnold v R [2011] NSWCCA 150 at [37]; RLS v R [2012] NSWCCA 236 at [120]. This would be relevant to the first and third grounds relied on by the Offender.

151. The evidence indicates that the Offender does require help in improving his mental health and thus reducing his risk for reoffending. In her report Ms Manoski gave a general indication of the areas where he would be assisted with psychological intervention. But the Offender has not demonstrated that he understands this need. Nor has he taken any steps to commence this process since Ms Manoksi prepared her report in April 2025.

152. The Offender has not spent significant periods of time in custody which might give rise to a risk of institutionalisation. He does not suffer significant physical and mental health problems, and there is no evidence that his incarceration would involve significant hardship for family members.

153. For these reasons I do not make a finding that there are special circumstances.

The Commencement Date for the Sentence

151. The Offender has spent a period of 11 months and 13 days in custody for these charges. In addition, since his release on bail on 24 March 2024, he has been subject to strict bail conditions.

152. Counsel for the Offender submitted that when setting the sentence, the Court would take into account the Offender’s lengthy period while subject to strict bail conditions.

153. In such cases the offender bears the onus of establishing whether bail conditions amount to quasi-custody on the balance of probabilities: La v R [2021] NSWCCA 136 at [59]; R v Quinlin [2021] NSWCCA 284 at [88]. As noted in those cases, all grants of conditional bail involve, or are highly likely to involve, some restriction. The question is whether the conditions of bail “are so harsh or restrictive that they may require a conclusion that at least some part of the period on bail should be treated as the notional equivalent of custody”: Quinlin at [45].

154. I did not receive specific submissions on this issue. Nevertheless, I am able to find that the Offender’s bail conditions, while appropriate, were onerous and have been complied with for a lengthy period. Their impact justifies a small reduction in the sentences that would otherwise be given.

The Indicative Sentences

155. I will firstly record the two indicative sentences. Each has been adjusted to reflect a discount of 25% for the Offender’s guilty pleas.

156. For the sequence 14 offence of possessing firearms, I impose an indicative sentence of 4 years and 9 months. This indicative sentence takes into account the Form 1 offence. I impose an indicative non-parole period of 3 years, 6 months and 20 days. It will be seen that this non-parole period is less than the standard non-parole period prescribed for this offence. This is because I have assessed the objective seriousness of this offending at below the mid-range; and I have had regard to the factors set out in s 21A of the CSPA, some of which as I have noted operate to reduce the Offender’s moral culpability for the offence.

157. For the sequence 5 offence of possessing digital blueprints for the manufacture of firearms, I impose an indicative sentence of 4 years and 2 months.

The Aggregate Sentence

158. The Offender is convicted of the two offences.

159. I impose an aggregate sentence of 5 years and 8 months, which is backdated to commence on 21 October 2024. This takes account of the period which the Offender has already spent in custody for these offences.

160. I impose a non-parole period of four years and three months. It also commenced on 21 October 2024. The Offender will be eligible for release to parole on 20 January 2029.

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