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[1921] HCA 15
High Court of Australia
1921-07-01
Starke JJ, Per Higgins J, Rich J
Original judgment source is linked above.
H.C. or A. should be allowed and judgment entered for the plaintiff on the
plaintiff on demurrer. Respondent to pay costs of appeal.
wee ¥ itors for the appellant, J. W. Maund & Christie. Solicitors for the respondent, Pigott «£ Stinson. [a RL ie
Ex rarte THE BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY COMPANY LIMITED.
H.C. of A. Industrial Arbitration - Special Tribunal - Juriadiction - Dispute - Parties - Organ-
April 4, 8, wen. 4 15, 18, 20-Commonrenth Conciliation and. Arbitration Aet 1904 136 "0 (a. 18 of 1901 - No BI of 1020, sc. 19,2, 210,22, 29,5, Rp cs. Held, by Knox C.J., Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ., that the only capacity and power posed hy an organization register under the Common: sults Contin ond Arbation Ate to put forward claims on beh perone who have become members pursuant fo it rules
By the rules of an organization registered under the Commonwealth Concilia- tion and Arbitration Act membership was limited to " employees engaged in or {in eonnection with the coal and shale industry." A company carried on the business of an iron and steel manufacturer, and in that business employed 'workmen who were engaged in converting coal purchased by it into coke for 'use in connection with the production of iron and stecl
onnection with the coal and shale industry, and were therefore not eligible for membership of the organization.
Haid, therefore, by the whole Court, that a claim made upon the company by the organization for wages and conditions of labour to be paid and granted {ots members and an omission by the company to grant the claim did not 'onstitute an industrial dispute between the organization and the company 'of which a Special Tribunal appointed under the Industrial Peace Act 1920 'ould have cognizance.
Hala, also, by the whole Court, that on the evidence no industrial dispute 'existed between the company and its coke workers
Per Higgins J. + For the purpose of a conference under see. 18 of the Indus. trial Peace Act 1920 the word" person" does not include a corporati for a reference of a dispute to a tribunal under see. 20 the dispute must be stated, and the disputants named or indicated in some way - preferably by
On 23rd December 1920 the Broken Hill Proprietary Co, Ltd. "received a document dated 21st December 1920, which was headed "Industrial Peace Acts 1920. - Coke Industry Special Tribunal. - "In the matter of an actual, threatened, impending or probable "industrial dispute - Between the Australasian Coal and Shale
"Hala, by the whole Court, that those workmen were not employed in or in H.C. ov As
. Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, to show eause why a writ of prohibition should not issue to prohibit the above. mentioned persons and the Federation from further proceeding upon 'a reference to the Tribunal purported to have been made by the chairman thereof on 29th December 1920; and from further pro- ceeding in any respect before that Tribunal, and from making any Co. Lr, award or order, in respect of any alleged industrial dispute between
the Company and its employees engaged as coke workers who are de facto members of the Federation. There was an alternative claim for a writ of certiorari.
'The grounds of the order nisi were as follows :- -
(1) That the appointment of the said Coke Industry Special Tri- Dunal is bad and not in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act 1920;
(2) That the Industrial Peace Act 1920 does not authorize the appointment of a special tribunal save in relation to a particular specified dispute;
(3) That the said Coke Industry Special Tribunal has no juris- diction to entertain or deal with industrial disputes as to persons employed as coke workers in the iron and steel manufacturing industry ;
(4) That there was at the time of the creation of the said Special Tribunal no industrial dispute with reference to persons employed 'as coke workers in the iron and steel manufacturing industry extending beyond the limits of any one State or at all, nor was there any such industrial dispute at the time of the service upon the Broken Hill Proprietary Co, Ltd. of the notice or summons of 21st December 1920, nor at the time of the holding of the conference of 29th December 1920 nor at the time of the so-called reference of the so-called dispute by the chairman of the said Special Tribunal to the said Special Tribunal ;
(6) That the Special Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain or otherwise deal with the wages or conditions of persons employed as coke workers in the iron and steel manufacturing industry of the Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. ;
(6) That there is no evidence of the existence of any dispute as 'to any industrial matter between an employer or association of
on the one hand and an organization of employees within ing of the Industrial Peace Act, on the other hand, or of any dispute as to which a conference has been held under 18 of the said Act and as to which agreement has not been as to the 'whole of the dispute, and which has been referred 'othe Special Tribunal in accordance with sec. 20 of the said Act, so "far as relates to persons employed as coke workers in the iron and 'steel mannfacturing industry ;
(7) That secs, 15 and 16 of the Industrial Peace Act 1920 are beyond the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth. The other material facts appear in the judgments hereunder.
The order nisi now came on for argument. The only grounds argued were those numbered 4 and 5,
Innes K.C, (with him J. A. Ferguson), for the prosecutor. 'The "employees of the Company who are engaged in coke making are not engaged "in or in connection with the coal and shale industry," and so are not eligible for membership under the rules of the Federa-
the disposal of coal and shale which has been won. This is borne
'out by see. 15 of the Industrial Peace Act 1920, which gives a Special "Tribunal power, in the ease of a producing industry, to inquire into
all matters relevant to the dispute "from the point of production
to the final disposal of the commodity by the employer." Where a | person purchases coal and for the purpose of his business of manu- _ facturing iron and steel employs workmen to convert the coal so | purchased into coke, those workmen are engaged not in or in con- tection with the coal and shale industry but in connection with the iron and steel industry. The coke workers employed by the
Company not being members of the Federation, no dispute has been _ Proved between them and the Company ; for the only demand made 'Was for the members of the Federation, and the dispute in respect of
that demand was the only dispute considered at the conference or _ Tlerred to the Special Tribunal. Even if persons who are de facto 'members of the Federation are to be treated as members, there is
no evidence of any industrial dispute between the Company and its employees engaged in making coke, for there is nothing more than a paper demand. The case then falls within The King v. President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration ; Ex parte William Holyman & Sons Ltd. (1).
J. A. Browne (with him Cantor), for the respondent Federation, An organization as defined by the Industrial Peace Acts 1920 is not confined to organizations registered under the Commonwealth Con- ciliation and Arbitration Act. The organization in the present case consists of those who were legally members of the registered organiza- tion and also those who were de facto its members, including the coke workers in the employment of the Company, and the demand was made on behalf of all. One of the disputes which was being considered at the conference was a dispute in the coke industry, and there was evidence to support a finding that the coke workers employed by the Company were parties to that dispute, Coke workers are engaged in or in connection with the coal and shale industry, whether they are employed by owners of coal mines in converting coal into coke for the purpose of disposing of the product of the mines or whether they are employed by iron and steel manu- facturers in doing the same work for the purpose of manufacturing iron and steel. 'The coke workers of the Company are therefore members of the Federation de jure as well as de facto
Leverrier K.C. and Jaques, for the Commonwealth intervening, did not argue.
'The following written judgments were delivered : -
Kyox C.J., Gavan Durry, Powers, Ricu anp Starke JJ. An Order in Council was passed and published in the Commonwealth Gazette on Sth October 1920. It appointed a Special Tribunal to be known as the Coke Industry Special Tribunal. The Tribunal
of a chairman, Mr. Charles Hibble, and representatives H.C. or A. employers and employees. The Order purported to be made in '92!+ 2 of the Industrial Peace Act 1920. tr Kise "On 2ist December 1920 the chairman, purporting to act under iy eue; tee. 18 of the same Act, summoned the Broken Hill Proprietary Co, Bx panre td, and others to attend a compulsory conference presided over Hitt Puo- by the chairman of the Coke Industry Special Tribunal. At this 'Go Le "conference the chairman referred to and read a statutory declaration gy.ccq7 "of Mr, A. C. Willis, dated 17th December 1920, and a log of wages, et 33# e,, exhibited to that declaration, which had been filed with him, A Sstker. discussion then took place on the attitude of the State of Victoria towards the 'Tribunal, and the chairman said that Mr. Willis's declaration showed " that there is in existence an industrial dispute both in the coal and coke industries and that these disputes have actually extended beyond the limits of any one State." Mr, Mitchell, for the Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd., attempted to intervene, but was requested not to interrupt at that stage. The chairman "added :- - " This affidavit " (declaration) "also sets out that the log embodying the dispute has been served upon the respondent colliery proprietors and coke manufacturers and others, and that they have not either granted the log or agreed to a conference to discuss it, and it is my intention, if there is no agreement arrived at | here to-day, to refer the dispute to the Special Tribunals for adjudica- tion at dates comparatively early." Some of the colliery repre- Seisives said they were willing that the claims raised by the log should be referred to a Special Tribunal. 'The chairman then asked the representatives of the coke manufacturers, and Mr. Mitchell as | Yepresenting the iron and steel industry, whether they admitted having received the log and that no agreement had been arrived at. These representatives replied in the affirmative. After inquiring if any further attempt should be made to discuss the log in conference and obtaining no reply, the chairman said : - * I hold that a dispute does exist, and one that brings it within the jurisdiction of the Coal Industry Special Tribunal" (a tribunal that had also been con- stituted under the Industrial Peace Act 1920) " and also that a dispute 'tists in the coke industry which brings it within the jurisdiction of the Coke Industry Special Tribunal, and as chairman of both
Tribunals it is my intention now to refer the respective disputes to the Tribunals for awards to be made in connection therewith. No doubt all the questions of jurisdiction will be placed before the respective Tribunals to determine." The matter referred to the Special Tribunals must be gathered from these extracts from the transcript of the shorthand notes of the conference. No formal order of reference was drawn up by the chairman, The chairman called a meeting of the Special Tribunal for 10th January 1921.
'The Broken Hill Proprietary Co, Ltd., on 5th January 1921, obtained a rule nisi calling upon the chairman and members of the Coke Industry Special Tribunal and the Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation to show cause why proceedings upon the reference by the chairman should not be prohibited. 'The Special 'Tribunal has not entered upon the reference pending the determina- tion of this rule, Many grounds were taken in the rule nisi; but we have not found it necessary to consider more than two questions for the purpose of our decision - firstly, what was the dispute which the chairman actually referred to the Special Tribunal? secondly, whether that dispute or any dispute actually existed between the Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. and its employees,
The Special Tribunal, for the purpose of this case, can only have cognizance of or jurisdiction in an industrial dispute as to which a conference had been held and which had been referred to the Special Tribunal in accordance with sees. 18 and 20 of the Act (see sec. 15). We have already set out the proceedings before the con- ference for the purpose of showing the dispute that was referred to 'the Tribunal. It clearly appears that the claim made by the log constituted the dispute that was referred. Looking therefore to the log, we find that it was put forward by the Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation as a log of hours, wages, overtime ates, and conditions to be granted by employers to members of the above Federation, The Broken Hill Co. contends that no persons were at any material time in its employ who were members of the Federation according to law. It has, we think, made good this contention, and thereby established that it was no party to the dispute referred to the Special Tribunal.
'The Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation is am
nization registered under the Commonwealth Concitiation and H.C. or A. iration Act, and its rules provide that it shall consist of an 19% ited number of employees engaged in or in connection with the me ive and shale industry, together with such other persons, whether rate; ployees inthe industry or not, as have been appointed officers of BX Ramee Federation and admitted as members thereof. 'The Broken Hut PRo- Proprietary Co. Ltd. carries on the business of iron and steel turers, and in that business employs certain workmen Who gy, a5 engaged in converting coal into coke for use in connection with foven,3t7 3: e production of iron and steel. 'These workmen, it is said, have . admitted as members of the Coal and Shale Employees' Federa- 4s persons engaged in or in connection with the coal and shale The words are no doubt wide, but they do not cover
erimen adopted by the Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, "on a proper interpretation of their rules, is, we think, the trade or business of the employer. 'Thus, some employers extract: coal from the arth, convert some of it into coke, and distribute both coal and ake to consumers. Such a business would in point of fact: be part of the coal or shale industry, and all persons employed in that business are properly said to be employed in or in connection with 'that industry. A person, however, who carried on the trade or 'business of a baker using coal or coke for the purpose of heating his
__ The question whether a particular trade or business is or is not _Petbof the coal and shale industry must in all cases be a question of | fact. We hold that a steel and iron manufacturer who for the _ Purpose of his business uses coal in its natural state or after it has been transformed by him into coke is not engaged in the coal orshale _ industry, and that his employees are not employed in or in connection ith that industry. Our decision does not prevent the association
of workmen in any form they think fit. The Federation might have based its membership on the calling of coal workers or any other avocation of employees, but it has not done so, and we must: decide the matter on the words that were in fact chosen for the qualification of membership.
An argument was made that the coke workers in the employ of the Broken Hill Proprietary Co, Ltd. were de facto if mot de jure members of the Federation, and were therefore within the deserip- tion of "members" in the log. There is nothing in the Common- wealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act which authorizes so loose a connection between an organization and individuals ; and it is lear, we think, that the only capacity and power possessed by an organiza- tion is to put forward claims on behalf of persons who have been made members pursuant to its rules (see sees. 55, 19, 214, 21n, 22, 29). 'The provisions of sec. 214 do not impinge upon this proposition, for they merely provide a summary method of evidencing the matters of fact and of law involved in the question of membership.
Mr. Browne also contended that Mr. Willis personally placed the claims of the coke workers in the employ of the Broken Hill Pro- prietary Co, Ltd. before the chairman of the Special Tribunal. It is plain, on the evidence, that Mr, Willis was present at the con- ference as an officer of the Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, and that he put forward the log and nothing else, At one point of the argument Mr. Browne suggested that the association putting forward the log was not the registered organization known as the Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, but some new and larger unregistered association of the same name with different objects and rules. Apart from the inherent improbability of such a state of facts, it was pointed out from the Bench that the rule nisi was not directed to any such body nor to any proceeding taken by it. 'The argument: was not further pressed, and Mr. Browne thereafter showed cause on behalf of the registered organization,
We have now dealt with the dispute which was referred to the Special Tribunal, and the rule nisi might be decided on this ground alone, We have, however, heard a full argument upon the question whether any dispute existed between the Broken Hill Proprietary Co, Ltd. and the coke workers in its employ; and, as this question
ps of the greater importance to the parties, we thi 'sate our conclusions upon it also.
Tis settled law under the Arbitration Act that a dispute must be 'Tus Kexe jand genuine (Tramways CaseNo.2). Whetheritbereal and rpc ; genuine is always a question of fact, and upon proceedings in pro- EX Panzx
Bao "fibition the' fact must be determined by this Court on its own Hux Pro-
'independent view of the evidence. 'There is no difference under the "Gate Indutrial Peace Act eed
On the facts proved before us, we have no doubt that there was no Fone ree 'ral or genuine dispute between the Broken Hill Proprietary Co, Strit'3. Ind. and the coke workers in its employ. A log was served on the Company which only claimed for members of the Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, and these coke workers were never members "of this Federation for reasons already adduced. Further, these coke workers were, at the time, being paid wages under and in
H.C. or A. Federation or were satisfied with their conditions, as with the 12k admission of a dispute. The service of the log is therefore the only 'Tas Kixc evidence of any dispute, and in the cireumstances under which it was Hore; served we are quite unable to find any real or genuine dispute between the Company and its coke workers.
Hm Pno- In these cireumstances, should the rule nisi be made absolute or Co. Lx. discharged? It must be made absolute. The Special Tribunal has not yet met, but the chairman appointed a day for hearing,
' The granting of the rule nisi led to an adjournment of the hearing, but the facts are sufficient to warrant a finding that the Tribunal would enter upon a consideration of the matter affecting the Broken
We pass no opinion upon the validity of the provisions in the Industrial Peace Act 1920 relating to Special Tribunals. The matter has not been argued before the Court. But, if they have jurisdiction, a substantial adherence to the forms prescribed by the statutes under which they act is eminently desirable. A reference under see. 20 of the Industrial Peace Act might well be in writing, and should set forth the precise dispute and the parties to that dispute. And the Special Tribunal, before proceeding to award, should be satisfied that the dispute referred to it exists between the parties named. We make these observations in order to assist the Tribunals, and to point out that the limitations which the Constitu- tion imposes upon the industrial power of the Commonwealth and the limitation of jurisdiction imposed upon Special Tribunals under the Industrial Peace Act should be observed as well by Special Tribunals as by every other Court in the Commonwealth,
Hicerss J. A rule nisi has been obtained by the Company for a Prohibition directed against the chairman and members of a body called the " Coke Industry Special Tribunal " and the " Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, an organization registered under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act." There are several grounds taken in the rule; but I shall deal mainly with that which has been the subject of most argument - that there is no industrial dispute.
On Sth October 1920 there appeared in the Commonwealth
the Governor-General in Council had appointed a Special to be known as the Coke Industry Special Tribunal for the ention or settlement of any industrial dispute or disputes which
e arisen or which may arise "in the coke industry." I shall assume in favour of the respondents that a tribunal with such
ral functions is valid under the Act. On 10th December 1920 Tetter was sent by A. C. Willis, describing himself as general 'seertary of the " Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federa- 'tion," to the Company at its steel works, Newcastle. This letter dthat Mr. Willis had been instructed by the " Australasian Coal 'and Shale Employees' Federation" to forward a log of wages and conditions of work with a request that the Company would grant he claims in the log to the members of the said Federation in the "Company's employ. The letter asked for a reply within seven days, ither granting the claims or granting a conference with a view to 'anagreement ; otherwise, it would be assumed that the Company the existence of a dispute within the meaning of the 'Constitution. 'The log was enclosed : it was headed " Log of hours, 'wages, Ke., to be submitted to employers of the members of the above Federation" ; it contained thirteen claims, some of which could 'efer to men on mines only, but some of which might be applicable ko to coke workers, There was a fourteenth claim: "That Pending the final determination of the aforegoing log an interim award or agreement be made granting all members of the Aus- _ tralasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation (which includes the 'coke workers and brown coal workers)" certain increases in wages _ S8ftom 27th September 1920, The Company made no reply. By | Anotice dated 21st December 1920 Mr. Hibble, chairman of the 'Tribunal, summoned the "Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited " to attend a compulsory conference to be presided over by himself on 29th December at a certain place in Sydney (see. 18 of "the Industrial Peace Act). I pass by the curious fact that a company _ Scorporation - is summoned to attend ameeting. For the purpose 4@ conference under sec. 18, I think that a "person" does not
notice headed " Industrial Peace Act 1920," to the effect H.C. or A.
It is unnecessary to state in detail what took place at the con. ference. It was a conference in connection with a "Coal Industry, Special Tribunal" as well as the Coke Industry Special Tribunal, 'The log was the same in each case. 'There was no agreement. 'The chairman announced that he referred "the dispute so far as it
affects the coke industry" to the Coke Industry Special Tribunal,
which was to meet on 10th January 1921. In the meantime, on 5th January, the rule for prohibition was obtained.
It appears that there is an organization registered under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act under the name of the " Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation." The Jog was sent under this name, claiming wages and conditions for the members of the Federation. But, according to the constitution of the Federation, the only members allowed were " employees engaged in or in connection with the coal and shale industry." The words used are not " in or in connection with coal," or " in or in connection with coal industries"; and when one speaks of "the coal and shale industry," as a single industry, the meaning is surely the industry of extracting coal and shale, Coke is not made from shale, but shale is frequently lying over beds of coal. If there is any "coal and shale industry," it must be in the process of extraction from the earth, It is not enough to show that coke is "connected with" - coal, or jam with sugar; the employecs must. be engaged in the industry, or in connection with it (e.g., as surface-men or engineers in connection with coal mining, or as carpenters with jam factories)
I am of opinion that on the true construction of the rule coke workers - at all events, in an undertaking such as that of this Company at the steel works, which buys coal to make coke - cannot be members of this registered federation of employees in or in connection with the "coal and shale industry." The Federation actually tried to get an alteration of its constitution registered under 'the Conciliation Act so as to include coke workers, but it failed.
Prima jacie, therefore, there is enough to sustain the fourth ground taken in therule nisi, that there was no industrial disputeasto coke workers - actual, threatened, impending or probable - at the time that the conference was summoned or held or at the time of the reference to the Tribunal. Simply, the log was a claim by the
tion for its members; and no coke workers were members {tit appears that many coke workers in New South Wales and in sand - including some of the coke workers of this Company - "were treated as members and paid their subscriptions ; and it has "been ingeniously argued that this mixed body of men - men in the "goal and shale industry and men working coke - is an " organiza- "tion" within the meaning of the Industrial Peace Act (see sec. 4). " Itis contended that there may be an organization for the purposes of the Act even though it is not registered, and that a number of ~ menin two or more States engaged in coke working may, if associated, "be parties to an industrial dispute with their employers. I rather "think that this contention is right; but it does not settle the matter. "Whereis the dispute to be found ? The only evidence before us of
any dispute is that afforded by the letter of Mr. Willis of 10th . December forwarding the log and by the failure of the Company to 'comply with the demands of the log and letter. But log and letter Doth claim the wages and conditions for "the members of the "Federation" only, and these men are not members. For every dispute there must be disputants, and the only disputants on the employees' side are the Federation and its members, If it be said that the Federation meant to claim for these coke workers, loosely sociated, the letter and the log do not say so; and a dispute is 'reated not by what one thinks but by what one expresses." The thought of man is not triable" (per Brian C.J. (1)). Any employer 'who got log and letter was entitled to look at the constitution of the Federation - the only association that used the name - and say "This claim is made for members of the Federation; my coke workers cannot be members of the Federation." There is, indeed, inthe log a fourteenth claim, which I have set out above. It states, 43 a fact, that the Federation inclndes the coke workers and brown
for an "interim award or agreement " of certain increases in wages
Pending the determination of the log. I cannot find in the Act
any power to make such an interim award; but apart from that
their capacity as members of the Federation, and if they are not 7 (1) Y.B. 17 Edw. IV., 1 Paset
H.C. or A. 1921, 'Tae Kine Hour; Exrante Broken Hint Pro- PRIETARY Co. Lp.
members there is no claim. Counsel here appear for the registered organization, not for any loose association,
Tam therefore of opinion that no sufficient evidence of an indus- trial dispute has been adduced as to the coke workers in the employ ment of the Company, and, even if there were such evidence, this rule, if made absolute, will merely prohibit proceedings in arbitration as between the Federation - the registered organization - and the Company. The rule is expressly addressed to the registered organ- ization, not to any loose association or aggregate of persons. There _ appear to be other grounds - some taken, some not taken - which strike me as fatal to this proceeding before the Special Tribunal, assuming that it is an industrial tribunal within the meaning of the Act. I do not attach importance to the fact that there is no evidence of discontent expressed by the coke workers to the Com- pany before the log was sent. 'The explanation given by Barton J. in the case of Merchant Service Guild of Australasia v. Neweastle and Hunter River Steamship Co, (No 2j (1) corrects any idea that such expression is necessary. Ishall only add that, in my opinion, ground 5 - has been established, as expressed, though not, perhaps, as intended. For there has been no reference to the Tribunal of "the dispute," within sec. 20. "The dispute" means a definite dispute, and the chairman has not stated what dispute he refers to the Tribunal. For such a reference, the disputants - employers as well as employees or union - must be named or indicated in some way, as well as the 'matters in dispute (some of the claims in the log cannot refer to coke workers at all). Ido not say that the reference must be in writing, for the Act does not say so; but to put it in writing, in definite 'terms, would prevent any misunderstanding,
Rule nisi absolute. Prohibition granted against Charles Hibble, chairman, and the members of the Coke Industry Special Tribunal and the Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation jrom further proceeding so far as the Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. is
concerned upon the reference to the said H.C. or A. Special Tribunal made by the said Charles 192!
Hibble, chairman of the said Tribunal, on 'Tux Kino 290h December 1920, mote; 'EX Parte
| Solicitor for the prosecutor, 4. A. Rankin, Neweastle, by Minter, BROS
Solicitor for the respondent organization, Cecil A. Coghlan & Co, °° ¥™-
"Solicitor for the intervener, Gordon H. Castle, Crown Solicitor for 'the Commonwealth.
Public Service (Commonwealth) - Offcers in transferred Departments - Rights pre- H.C. of A. serecd - Rights under South Australian law - Removal on account of age - Life 199, lenure - Compulsory retirement under Commonwealth law - Civit Seroice Act 874 (8.A.) (87 & 38 Vict. No. 3), secs. 13, M4, 24, 25, 26, 28, 324 - Civil MecnounNe, Service Amendment Act 1881 (S.4.) (No. 231), ste. 4* - Commonswealth Public May 19, 20; Service Act 1902-1918 (No. 5 of 1902 - No. 46 of 1918), sees. 60, 73, 74, 78 - June t The Constitution (63 & 64 Vict. c. 12), se. 84. Knox 03. heel
"By wes, 24 and 25 of the Civil non-compliance, may remove such Gavan Duty, Genie Ac i674 (SA. itis provided uficer, wh shall thereupon be entitled gh nd that the Governor may dismiss from to the compensation provided by this SS"* 3- Uisofiee an ofcer guilty of a breach of Act." Seo. 4 of the Ciel Service Am Mailations or of conduct rendering ment, Act IS81 provides (infer alia) 'him unfit to remain in the Civil that "every officer in the Civil Service Servic. Sec. 26 provides that 'an on being removed from, or on being per- 'tfcer convicted of felony. or taking mitted to resign, his office on account 'the benefit of any Act for the relief of of illness, infirmity, age, abolition of ntolrent debtors shall be deemed to office, oF any other cause whatever, Juve forleited his ofice. Seo. 28 pro. except misconduct or ides that "the Governor may require rassment, shall, with the conse "5 officer, who has become incapaci. Governor, bo entitled to and shall be 'Asted for the performance of his duties, paid by the Treasurer" a sum of "trim his office, and, inthe event of money ascertained in a certain manner.