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[2025] QCA 210
respondent. Leave to appeal sentence was refused, and the Court ordered non-publication of the applicant’s name, the complainant’s name and the Queensland town in which the offending occurred.
The applicant’s sentence for stalking his former partner was not reduced on appeal. The Court considered the offending serious because he used repeated threats and disclosures of private information to punish and humiliate her after she ended the relationship. It concluded that the sentence was within a sound exercise of sentencing discretion, despite the mitigating matters. It also rejected the claim that the sentencing judge wrongly attributed to the stalking harm that came from the complainant’s later conviction. The Court refused leave to appeal and made a non-publication order.
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2,097 words · generated 07/10/2026
In R v HDB [2025] QCA 210, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered an application for leave to appeal a sentence for unlawful stalking. The applicant had pleaded guilty to one count of stalking, which was a domestic violence offence. On 3 September 2025, the District Court sentenced him to nine months’ imprisonment and fixed his parole release date at 2 December 2025 ([2]–[3]).
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The offending occurred over approximately three weeks, from 2 to 24 December 2020. The applicant was then 57 and the complainant, his former partner, was 33. They had been in a relationship for about eight years and had two children together ([7]). The relationship had ended on 16 November 2020. The agreed facts recorded that the decision to end it was not mutual: the applicant wanted it to continue ([9]).
The offending involved controlling, harassing and threatening communications. The applicant sent abusive messages, demanded information about the complainant’s private life, denigrated her, and questioned her ability to care for the children ([8]). At least 78 messages contained some form of threat to tell others about private sexual conduct involving the complainant. The applicant also sent messages saying that he had made disclosures to named people, and messages indicating that he was monitoring her movements ([11]).
The Court recorded evidence of significant impacts on the complainant. She feared leaving home and feared that the applicant would continue telling people, including her family and children. She received abuse in public and online, and was afraid that the applicant might use violence against her ([12]). Her victim impact statement described feeling worthless and powerless, anxiety, hypervigilance, occasional depression and fear of going out ([13]).
The applicant sought leave to appeal on two proposed grounds: that the sentence was manifestly excessive, and that the sentencing judge had conflated harm caused by the stalking with harm arising from the complainant’s own offending ([4]). The Court refused leave and made an order prohibiting publication of the applicant’s and complainant’s names and identification of the town where the offending occurred ([5]).
The Court did not treat the fact that the offending lasted about 21 days, involved no threats of physical harm, or occurred without a domestic violence order as decisive. It acknowledged the mitigating matters raised by the applicant, including his guilty plea, employment, limited relevant criminal history and lack of further offending over about four and a half years ([22], [26]). The plea was late, but it had utility because it spared the complainant from giving evidence. The sentencing judge had also taken account of the anxiety caused by the case being listed for trial on three occasions ([14]–[15]).
The Court emphasised that unlawful stalking covers a wide variety of conduct and therefore has “no well-defined or constraining range” ([23]). That observation explains why the Court did not treat the sentence in R v Maxwell [2018] QCA 17 as fixing a benchmark. The sentencing judge had referred to Maxwell, while identifying differences in the offending and maximum penalties ([20]). The Court’s own conclusion was based on the circumstances of this offence and the applicable sentencing principles, rather than a simple comparison of sentence lengths.
The aggravating features were central. The offending was domestic violence and involved threats to reveal highly humiliating information about conduct that had taken place privately. The applicant not only threatened disclosure but made disclosures, and the Court accepted that he acted vengefully to cause reputational harm because the complainant had left the relationship ([24]). It considered those circumstances particularly serious and supportive of imprisonment ([25]).
The Court also considered whether the mitigating circumstances meant that the applicant should not serve actual time in custody. It concluded they did not. The serious nature of the offending called for a sentence reflecting denunciation and deterrence, notwithstanding the late but useful plea and the other mitigating matters ([26]). It held that nine months’ imprisonment, with parole release after three months, was “neither plainly unreasonable nor unjust” and did not show a misapplication of sentencing principles ([27]).
The second ground concerned the source of the complainant’s humiliation and harm. The applicant argued that it flowed from her subsequent conviction for bestiality. The Court accepted that the conviction involved significant public humiliation, but focused on what the applicant knew and did when he committed the stalking. At that time, the complainant’s private conduct was something about which the applicant alone had knowledge ([30]). The Court read the sentencing judge’s remarks as sentencing the applicant for his own deliberate threats and disclosures, intended to cause reputational and psychological harm ([31]). It identified the betrayal of the private conduct as the source of the harm described in the agreed facts ([32]). It therefore rejected the alleged conflation.
The judgment does not announce a new legal test or state that it changes the law on sentencing unlawful stalking. Its contribution is an application of sentencing principles to the particular facts before the Court. The Court’s express observation is that unlawful stalking covers a particularly wide variety of cases, with no well-defined or constraining sentencing range ([23]). This means the judgment should not be read as setting a general nine-month benchmark for other stalking offences.
The Court’s reasoning is fact-sensitive. It assessed the sentence in light of the seriousness of the conduct, the domestic violence context, the threats and actual disclosures, their humiliating character, the applicant’s purpose, the effect on the complainant, and the mitigating circumstances ([23]–[27]). It did not identify a numerical range or a general rule that every similar offence requires imprisonment. Rather, it concluded that imprisonment was supported by the circumstances of this offending ([25]–[26]).
The judgment refers to R v Maxwell [2018] QCA 17, which the sentencing judge had considered when comparing sentences ([20]). The supplied judgment does not set out a detailed analysis of Maxwell as a precedent or say that it was followed, distinguished, or overruled. It records the sentencing judge’s comparison and the different features and maximum penalties noted there. The Court’s own reasoning rests on the applicant’s offending and the relevant sentencing principles ([23]–[27]).
Nothing in the supplied reasons describes how later courts have treated R v HDB. The judgment was published on 31 October 2025, and the material provided contains no subsequent decisions. A conclusion about later treatment cannot be drawn from this text alone.
At [23], the Court says: “There is no well-defined or constraining range for unlawful stalking offences.” In plain English, stalking offences can differ substantially, so the Court did not consider a single fixed sentencing range suitable. Sentences need to be assessed against the specific offending and relevant circumstances.
At [24], the Court identifies the private nature of the information, the threats and actual disclosures, and the applicant’s vengeful purpose. This explains why the duration of the offending was not the only measure of seriousness. The Court treated the use of private information to punish the complainant after she left the relationship as an important aggravating feature.
At [25], the Court says the circumstances “supported a conclusion that a sentence of imprisonment was the only appropriate sentence.” This is the Court’s conclusion about this applicant’s conduct, not a general rule for all unlawful stalking cases.
At [26], the Court acknowledges the guilty plea, lack of relevant criminal history and absence of further offending, but concludes that these factors did not warrant a finding that the applicant should avoid actual custody. The paragraph also refers to denunciation and deterrence as sentencing principles relevant to the seriousness of the conduct.
At [27], the Court concludes that the sentence was “neither plainly unreasonable nor unjust.” In context, this means the proposed manifest excess ground did not establish a basis for appellate intervention. The Court also expressly said that the sentence did not exhibit a misapplication of sentencing principles.
At [32], the Court identifies the betrayal of private conduct as causing the harm described in the agreed facts. This passage is important to the second ground. The Court distinguished harm caused by the applicant’s threats and disclosures from the public humiliation associated with the complainant’s later conviction.
At [33], the Court says that leave would be futile because both proposed grounds were devoid of merit. This states why the application failed.
The reasoning is most directly relevant to sentence appeals involving unlawful stalking where the alleged excess must be assessed against repeated coercive or humiliating conduct, rather than duration alone. In this case, the Court considered a three-week course of domestic violence offending involving at least 78 threatening messages, monitoring, actual disclosures and a stated purpose of causing reputational harm ([8], [11], [24]).
The case may also be relevant where an offender uses private information disclosed during an intimate relationship as a means of control or retaliation after the relationship ends. The Court regarded the fact that the information concerned conduct undertaken privately, and was known to the applicant, as significant to both the seriousness of the offending and the breach of trust ([24], [30]–[32]).
It may also assist in understanding an argument that a sentencing judge attributed harm to the wrong cause. The Court examined the sentencing remarks as a whole and asked whether the sentence was based on the offender’s conduct or on the complainant’s own later conviction. It concluded that the judge had focused on the applicant’s disclosure conduct and its impact ([29]–[32]).
The decision should not be treated as resolving every case involving disclosure of private information, stalking, or domestic violence. The Court expressly noted the wide variety of unlawful stalking cases and the absence of a constraining sentencing range ([23]). Differences in duration, threats, purpose, actual disclosure, impact, plea timing and personal circumstances may matter.
The supplied judgment contains no material about later judicial treatment of R v HDB. It was published on 31 October 2025, and no later decisions are included in the materials provided. Accordingly, it is not possible from this source to say whether later courts have followed, applied, distinguished or questioned its reasoning.
The only other decision identified in the judgment is R v Maxwell [2018] QCA 17. That case was cited by the sentencing judge as a comparator. The reasons record differences, including the domestic violence order breach and an additional offence in Maxwell, and a different maximum penalty ([20]). The supplied text does not give enough information to describe Maxwell beyond what the judgment records, nor does it establish a wider line of subsequent cases.
For research purposes, the judgment’s own most clearly stated points are narrower: sentencing unlawful stalking requires attention to the particular circumstances because the offence covers a wide range of cases; and the sentencing judge’s reasons should be read as a whole when considering whether the sentence was based on a mistaken view of the harm ([23], [29]–[32]).
The judgment leaves open how the same sentencing principles would apply to other combinations of facts. It does not set a sentencing range for stalking involving threats to disclose private information, nor does it say what sentence would be appropriate where there are threats but no actual disclosure, a different duration, or different impacts. Its express warning about the wide variety of cases indicates that those questions depend on the circumstances ([23]–[27]).
The reasons also do not provide a general method for separating harm caused by an offender’s conduct from harm associated with a complainant’s later conviction or other events. The Court resolved the issue by reading the sentencing judge’s remarks in context and identifying the conduct the judge had treated as causing harm in this case ([30]–[32]). It did not formulate a broader test.
The judgment mentions Maxwell but does not undertake a detailed appellate comparison between the two cases. The supplied reasons do not explain whether the Court regarded the sentence in Maxwell as a useful comparator beyond the features recorded by the sentencing judge ([20]). Nor do they identify later cases applying either decision.
Finally, the Court made a non-publication order because of the nature of the disclosures and their impact, with both parties supporting the order ([34]). The reasons do not set out a general test for non-publication orders. The basis available from this judgment is limited to the circumstances and order described in the reasons.
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v HDB [2025] QCA 210
PARTIES: R / v / HDB / (applicant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 216 of 2025 / DC No 219 of 2023
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at [Redacted] – Date of Sentence: 3 September 2025 [Redacted]
DELIVERED ON: Date of Orders: 24 October 2025 / Date of Publication of Reasons: 31 October 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 24 October 2025
JUDGES: Bond and Boddice and Doyle JJA
ORDERS: Date of Orders: 24 October 2025
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where, on 3 September 2025, the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful stalking – where the offence was a domestic violence offence – where the applicant was sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment – where the applicant had a parole release date fixed at 2 December 2025 – whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive – whether the sentencing judge conflated the harm to the complainant from the offence and the harm arising out of her own offending / R v Maxwell [2018] QCA 17, cited
COUNSEL: M Hibble for the applicant / M A Green for the respondent
SOLICITORS: [Redacted] for the applicant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
BOND JA: For the reasons given by Boddice JA, I joined in the making of the orders on 24 October 2025.
BODDICE JA: On 3 September 2025, the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful stalking. The offence was a domestic violence offence.
On the same date, the applicant was sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment. His parole release date was fixed at 2 December 2025.
The applicant sought leave to appeal sentence. Should leave be granted, he relied on two grounds. First, that the sentence was manifestly excessive. Second, that the sentencing judge conflated the harm to the complainant from the offence and the harm arising out of her own offending.
On 24 October 2025, the Court ordered that the application for leave to appeal sentence be refused and that there be no publication to the public in connection with the proceeding before the Court of the name of the applicant or of the complainant or identification of the Queensland town in which the offending conduct occurred.
These are my reasons for joining in those orders.
Offence
The offence was committed between 2 December 2020 and 24 December 2020. At that time the applicant was aged 57 years. The complainant, who had been in a relationship with the applicant for approximately eight years between 2012 and 2020, was aged 33 years. There were two children from that relationship.
The offence was particularised as conduct extending over a period of approximately three weeks, during which the applicant exhibited controlling, harassing and threatening behaviour. That behaviour involved the applicant sending the complainant messages containing abuse, threats and demanding information about her private life. Within these messages, the applicant frequently called the complainant derogatory names, described her as an irresponsible mother, questioned her ability to properly care for the children and consistently denigrated her intelligence, worth and appearance.
Sentence hearing
According to the Agreed Statement of Facts, the relationship between the applicant and the complainant ended on 16 November 2020. The decision to end the relationship was not mutual. The applicant wanted the relationship to continue.
During the relationship, the applicant and the complainant had engaged in sexual activities involving their dog. Those activities were captured in videos and photographs, copies of which had been retained by the applicant.
Over the period of offending, the applicant sent at least 78 text messages that included some sort of threat to tell the complainant’s friends and family about the complainant having engaged in sexual conduct with the dog. He also sent multiple text messages confirming that he had followed through with the threats, listing the people he had told. In one of the text messages, the applicant said that he so despised the complainant that he wanted to “destroy her reputation with everyone” and that he did not “give a shit about any consequences”. In addition to those text messages, the applicant also sent messages indicating that he had been monitoring the complainant’s movements.
The Agreed Statement of Facts contained the following in relation to the effect of the conduct on the complainant:
“22.Messages on the [applicant’s] phone indicate that he followed through on his threats and actually told multiple people about the complainant’s sexual history. This included people the complainant was friends and worked with.
23.The complainant became fearful of leaving the house due to retribution from the public. She was scared that the [applicant] wouldn’t stop telling people and her family and children would become aware. The complainant received comments on her Facebook page where people ‘bark’ at her. She ceased attending certain locations in public as she was aware the [applicant] had told them information about her. One on [sic] occasion when out with friends, the complainant was waiting for a taxi when a complete stranger started to abuse her, calling her a ‘dog fucker’.
24.The complainant was also fearful of the [applicant] committing violence against her because she was living by herself, and he was driving past her house throughout the night. She was fearful that he was going to take her back to his place or commit violence against her. She was aware he was angry and unpredictable.”1
Sentencing remarks
The sentencing judge recorded that the applicant had pleaded guilty to the charge on the eve of trial, over four and a-half years after the offending itself. The sentencing judge accepted that the plea was to be taken into account in the applicant’s favour, as the plea did have utility, saving the complainant from having to ultimately give evidence and be cross-examined. However, the sentencing judge did not accept that the plea exhibited much remorse as it was in the face of a very strong prosecution case with the applicant’s offending being revealed by an analysis of his mobile phone.
Further, the complainant, although being saved from having to give evidence, therefore suffered much more anxiety than would otherwise have been experienced by pleas of guilty at an earlier time. The sentencing judge noted that the matter had been listed for trial on three occasions and that the complainant had been conferenced on each occasion.
The sentencing judge found that the applicant’s unlawful stalking was “appalling grubby behaviour”, showing a complete disregard for the complainant’s wellbeing, as well as the wellbeing of the applicant’s children. The applicant “just wanted to inflict maximum damage out of a sense of vengeance and control”.2
The sentencing judge recorded that the applicant was currently employed, had not committed any offences since the offending and that there had been no breaches of court orders relating to the complainant and other family members. Further, the applicant’s criminal history contained no entries for domestic violence offending, although it did contain entries for weapons offences and other offences, including having been sentenced in 2021 for multiple counts of bestiality for which the applicant had been fined.
The sentencing judge said:
“It is true that the agreed statement of facts discloses that the complainant was also sentenced for multiple counts of bestiality on 14 September 2021. But what is clear is, at the time of the offending before me, this was a private thing that you had both engaged in and there was no apprehension that the offending was going to come to light, and much less result in the public humiliation which your conduct the subject of this sentence ensured.”3
“You wanted to cause maximum reputational and psychological damage to the complainant. You had, on your mobile phone, particularly degrading and humiliating images and you were prepared to disclose them. You threatened her that you would disclose information that was particularly humiliating and degrading and you did so. I am imposing this sentence to make it clear that the community, acting through the court, absolutely denounces your conduct.”4
The sentencing judge referred to a Court of Appeal decision of R v Maxwell in which concurrent terms of imprisonment of 18 months for attempting to pervert the course of justice and 15 months for unlawful stalking, were imposed in respect of a 62 year old offender with a limited relevant criminal history, who had pleaded guilty in respect of the offending over a period of six weeks.5 The sentencing judge noted that an aggravating feature in that case was that the offending was in breach of a domestic violence order and that there was an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice. The sentencing judge accepted that those aggravating features were not present in the applicant’s offending. Further, the maximum penalty for the offending in Maxwell was 7 years’ imprisonment, whereas the maximum penalty for the applicant’s offending was 5 years’ imprisonment.
The sentencing judge concluded:
“Balancing the aggravating features, which include the extreme betrayal of trust; the significant number of threatening messages; the disclosures you made and the damaging threats that you made; the fact the offending was domestic violence offending; and the significant impacts on the complainant’s wellbeing as a consequence of this, with the fact that you have not committed any offences in the four and a-half years after the offending for which I am sentencing you; the absence of domestic violence history in your criminal history; and the utility of the plea in saving the complainant from giving evidence, I am of the view that, notwithstanding s 9(2) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 states that a sentence of imprisonment should only be imposed as a last resort, it is appropriate to sentence you to a term of actual imprisonment.
You are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for nine months. I set a parole release date of 2 December 2025.”6
Consideration
The applicant submits that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, as the applicant’s offending did not occur whilst subject to a domestic violence order, took place over only 21 days and did not involve any threats of physical harm. Further, the applicant had a criminal history of little relevance, had not engaged in any further conduct involving the complainant over a period of some four and a-half years, was in full-time employment, and had pleaded guilty.
Whilst it may be accepted that those factors all exist, there is no well-defined or constraining range for unlawful stalking offences, as those offences include a particularly wide variety of cases. Allowing for that fact, an application of relevant sentencing principles to the circumstances of the applicant’s offending and his many mitigating circumstances, supports a conclusion that a sentence of 9 months’ imprisonment, with parole release after 3 months, fell well within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion.
The aggravating circumstances of the applicant’s offending included that the offence was a domestic violence offence and involved threats to disclose humiliating personal details about sexual conduct which had taken place in private, about which others would not know. The threats included statements that he had made actual disclosures to named persons. Reprehensibly, that conduct was engaged in vengefully, to cause maximum reputational harm to the complainant, all because she left the relationship.
Those circumstances made the applicant’s conduct particularly serious and supported a conclusion that a sentence of imprisonment was the only appropriate sentence.
Further, the applicant’s mitigating factors, including the entry of a plea of guilty, albeit late but with utility, lack of relevant criminal history, lack of further offending over an extended period of time, were not such as to warrant a conclusion that the applicant ought not serve actual time in custody. The very nature of the applicant’s offending and its serious circumstances, called for a sentence which reflected the relevant sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence.
Against that background, a sentence of 9 months’ imprisonment, with parole release after serving 3 months of that sentence, was neither plainly unreasonable nor unjust. Further, such a sentence does not exhibit any misapplication of sentencing principles.
The other proposed ground of appeal is also without merit.
First, the sentencing judge’s reference to images possessed by the applicant was correct. The assertion that they were stored on the applicant’s mobile phone was erroneous, but of no moment to the gravamen of the applicant’s conduct, namely, the threat to disclose those images to others.
Second, whilst the applicant submits that the complainant’s humiliation and harm flowed from her subsequent conviction of offences of bestiality, at the time that the applicant committed the offence, the complainant’s private actions were something about which the applicant was the only person who had knowledge.
Conclusion
As the proposed grounds of appeal were devoid of merit, a grant of leave to appeal sentence was futile.
Having regard to the nature of the disclosures and their impact on the complainant, it was also appropriate to make the non-publication order. The making of such an order was supported by both the applicant and the respondent.
DOYLE JA: I have had the advantage of reading the draft reasons for judgment of Boddice JA. I agree with his Honour’s statement of the reasons with which I agree for having joined in the orders given on 24 October 2025 refusing leave to appeal and for non-publication of certain matters.
R
HDB [2025] QCA 210
Leave to appeal sentence was refused, and the Court ordered non-publication of the applicant’s name, the complainant’s name and the Queensland town in which the offending occurred.
Although it may be accepted that a conviction for such offences involved significant public humiliation, a consideration of the sentencing judge’s remarks supports a conclusion that the sentencing judge properly sentenced the applicant on the basis that the applicant’s conduct had been engaged in to cause maximum reputational and psychological damage to the complainant, and involved disclosures that were particularly humiliating of the complainant.
Third, the applicant’s threat to disclose them and then doing so, involved a huge betrayal of trust. It was that betrayal of what was privately engaged in conduct, that caused the complainant the harm referred to in the Agreed Statement of Facts.