R v Hawkins

Category: Sentence

Parties: Rex (Crown)
Jordan Hawkins (Offender)

Representation: Counsel:
Mr W. Martin - Crown
Mr S. Bouveng – Offender
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) – Crown
Pendlebury Legal – Offender

File Number(s): 2023/00315557

Publication restriction: Pursuant to s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings Act) 1987 (NSW) there is to be no publication of the name of or any information that identifies or is likely to lead to the identification of the complainant.

Judgment

1. Jordan Hawkins is to be sentenced for three child sexual offences contrary to provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) committed against the same 15-year-old child on 24 September 2023. The 1st count is the offence of grooming that child for unlawful sexual activity contrary to section 66EB(2A). The 2nd and 3rd counts are each an offence of having sexual intercourse with that child in circumstances of aggravation, namely causing actual bodily harm to the child contrary to section 66(C)(4). Each of those three offences carry a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 12 years and have a prescribed standard non-parole period of 5 years.

2. A statement of agreed facts concerning the offences has been tendered and it reveals the following matters.

3. Mr Hawkins was 26 years old at the time he committed these offences. The victim was 15 years, 11 months and 15 days old. At the time of the offending the victim lived in out-of-home care and was supported by youth workers from an agency that provides such services.

Count 1

4. The offender and the victim met via the social media platform, Facebook, and soon thereafter on 20 September 2023 commenced a frequent exchange of text messages via the Facebook Messenger application. Those messages included the offender informing the victim that he was 26 years old, to which the victim wrote “I’m 15 but I’m 16 next month.” The offender and the victim exchanged messages about where they lived in Tamworth. They exchanged photos of one another.

5. The conversation between the offender and the victim moved to meeting each other in person, and the offender asked the victim this question “Any sexy pics of you? xx”. The victim asked the offender what time he wanted to meet up and the offender replied he was free any time that night. The victim and the offender exchanged further messages, including a message containing a sexualised image of the offender.

6. At 4.23pm the same day, the offender and victim continued to exchange messages, including sexually explicit messages that were either deliberately, accidentally or unknowingly misspelt. Suffice to say, it is apparent that the offender asked the victim about performing fellatio on him and the victim told the offender, “I’m into kinky sex”.

7. Other exchanged messages make it clear that the offender knew the victim was supervised by a support worker. At one point the offender suggested the victim could attend his place after his parents had gone to sleep at about midnight.

8. At 11.32am on 21 September 2023, the offender initiated a further Facebook Messenger chat with the victim. Further messages were exchanged on 22 September 2023. At 10:01pm the offender sent a question mark symbol to the victim who did not reply until 6:57pm the following day. The message was unremarkable. The message was “Just woke up haha.”

9. At 6.07pm on 24 September 2023, the offender initiated a conversation with the victim about them meeting in person, including references to possible rendezvous locations.

10. Eventually they agreed to meet at a location within Hyman Park in South Tamworth. They agreed to meet there and walk to somewhere else.

11. The victim arrived at Hyman Park at about 7pm. Closed-Circuit Television footage recorded the victim entering the park, walking to a playground area and taking a seat. From there the victim sent a message to the offender saying, “I’m here” and at 7:05pm made a call to the offender which was not answered. They did, however, speak in a later call and they agreed to meet.

12. At 7:17pm, Closed-Circuit Television footage recorded the victim and the offender walking in an easterly direction and past the Mobil Petrol Station on Kent Street. By that time the offender had committed the offence charged in the 1st count. The pair continued walking along Kent, Belmore and George Streets. They walked on from the end of George Street and along a small hill with a bicycle path on it. On the grassy unkept side of the hill were a number of concrete blocks with large blue letters spray painted on them. The victim and the offender sat down next to one of the blocks with a large ‘S’ painted on it.

Count 2

13. The offender then proceeded to commit the offence charged in the 2nd count. He leaned in and kissed the victim who responded by pushing him away. The offender grabbed the victim by the hair and pushed the victim’s stomach and hips against the concrete block. He said, “be quiet.” He reached into his pockets and pulled out his wallet, keys, and a serrated knife with a black handle. He put those three items on the side of the concrete block. The facts state the victim was scared by the sight of a knife.

14. The offender pulled down the victim’s tracksuit pants and underwear. By this point he had also pulled his own shorts and underwear down. He inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina. This hurt the victim who screamed and cried. The offender told the victim to “shut up” and continued doing what he was doing.

Count 3

15. The offender then committed the offence charged in the 3rd count. After a period of time, the offender removed his penis from the victim’s vagina and inserted his penis into the victim’s mouth. The facts state that the offender was rough. The offender continued to have oral intercourse with the victim until he ejaculated on to the victim’s face.

16. The offender said, “That was feral.” He gathered his belongings and walked off in the direction of George Street. The victim wiped away the semen and sat down next to the concrete blocks “for a few minutes to recover”.

17. The matter was reported to the police on 25 September 2023. They attended the scene and forensically examined the concrete blocks. Subsequent testing located the DNA of the offender and the victim.

18. Subsequent forensic testing also identified the offender’s DNA and semen on the hooded top that the victim used to wipe away the semen. The offender’s DNA was also identified on the interior of the crotch of the victim’s underwear.

19. The offender was arrested and charged on 5 October 2023. He has been remanded in custody pending sentence since then.

20. The statement of agreed facts states that the victim did not consent to the sexual intercourse, but that the Crown cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt that the offender knew or was reckless about that fact.

21. The statement of agreed facts further states:

“The offending had a significant impact on the victim’s wellbeing. They were unable to go into details about the offending to police during their JIRT interview. On 9 December 2024 the victim participated in giving prerecorded evidence about the matter. At that time, they still could not talk about the offending, due to the impact it caused.”

22. The Court has been assisted by the submissions advanced by the prosecution and the defence in assessing the objective seriousness of the offending and the moral culpability of the offender. It is trite, but important, that I note that facts adverse to the interests of the offender will only be taken into account if those facts have been established beyond reasonable doubt, whereas facts submitted to be in favour of him need only be proved on the balance of probabilities.

Objective Seriousness

23. The objective seriousness of each of the offender’s crimes will be assessed wholly by reference to the nature of the offending and without reference to matters personal to him. I will address the subjective factors that affect the relative seriousness of the offence and the moral culpability of the offender after considering the matters personal to the offender.

24. Neither the statement of agreed facts nor anything else establishes beyond reasonable doubt any factors that aggravate or mitigate the objective seriousness of the 1st count.

25. The 2nd and 3rd third counts involve sexual intercourse with a child. Part of the assessment of the objective seriousness of such an offence includes taking into account the nature of the sexual act. The inclusion of multiple acts of sexual penetration as possible offences of unlawful sexual intercourse does not mean each category of sexual penetration is as heinous as another: Ibbs v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 447 at [452] per Mason CJ and Wilson, Brennan, Toohey & Gaudron JJ. While there is no hierarchy of such sexual acts, it is generally accepted that some forms of sexual activity may be regarded as more serious than others. This is a consideration that is necessarily modified by the context in which the offence occurred and other circumstances of the particular offending: R v PGM (2008) 187 A Crim R 152 at [26] per Fullerton J.

26. The act of sexual penetration in the 3rd count was fellatio. While penile/vaginal penetration as charged in the 2nd count might be taken to be more serious than enforced fellatio, that does not mean that enforced fellatio necessarily falls somewhere below a notional midpoint of objective seriousness. In R v AJP (2004) 150 A Crim R 575 Simpson J stated (at [24]):

“There are many instances of conduct that come within the definition of sexual intercourse that would be significantly less serious than enforced fellatio.”

27. The nature and extent of the planning involved in the commission of the 2nd and 3rd counts neither aggravates nor mitigates the objective seriousness of the offending.

28. The duration of the conduct in each offence was relatively brief. Whilst short lived, the gravity of the offences in the the 2nd and 3rd counts ought not be downplayed.

29. That the victim was less than a month short of turning 16 years of age is a matter that neither enhances nor diminishes the objective seriousness of either offence.

30. I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the injury or emotional harm caused to the victim by any of the offences was not substantial.

Moral Culpability

31. An offender’s moral culpability (and the Court’s assessment of it) is a sentencing consideration separate from the objective seriousness of the crime: Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at [477].

32. It is not in dispute that the offender is entitled to a discount of 25% for the utilitarian value of his pre-committal plea of guilty to the first count.

33. Counsel for the offender originally submitted that the offender should be afforded the same quantified discount on the second and third counts as they are “new count” offences within the meaning of section 25D of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). The argument being that the particularisation of the aggravating element of the infliction of actual bodily harm underwent a substantial change from the old count offence to the new count offence.

34. The Crown has consistently submitted the offender is only entitled to a discount of 5% for the utilitarian value of the plea on the second and third counts. Ultimately, I am satisfied that that is correct by reason of the application of sections 25D and E of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

35. However, the offender’s pleas of guilty have a mitigating value beyond their utilitarian value. The proper construction and application of the sentencing discounts for guilty pleas for offences dealt with on indictment as set out in section 25D was considered in Doyle v R (2022) 108 NSWLR 1; [2022] NSWCCA 81 at [6]–[19], where it was not only said that the section 25D discount is mechanical in the sense that it is fixed by statute and operates without any element of discretion “for the utilitarian value of a guilty plea”. It was also held that an offender’s acceptance of responsibility and willingness to facilitate the course of justice are conceptually different from, and require separate treatment to, the utilitarian value of the guilty plea as part of the process of instinctive synthesis entailed in the sentencing exercise, with remorse also to be taken into account along with the degree to which the administration of justice has been facilitated.

36. I note that in supplementary submissions, counsel for the offender stated that, “In relation to Counts 2 and 3 (s.66C(4) x 2), the offender is entitled only to a discount of 5% for his plea of guilty [by reason of] sub-section 25E(3)(c) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act”. It was further submitted that the offender should receive a discount in the penalty that would otherwise have been appropriate “having regard to the degree to which the administration of justice had been facilitated by the defence”. That latter submission is based on the history of the matter and the stance taken by the offender from the pre-committal stage to the entering of the pleas of guilty to the second and third counts.

37. I accept the relevant assertions made on behalf of the offender and am satisfied that the administration of justice has been significantly facilitated by the offender for these five reasons:

38. At all times after the pre-committal case conference, the offender admitted the sexual intercourse which is the subject of the second and third counts.

39. The offender offered to plead guilty to having had sexual intercourse with the victim, in the absence of any circumstance of aggravation contrary to section 66C(3), before and after his committal for trial.

40. The offender offered to plead guilty to 2 aggravated sexual intercourse offences contrary to section 66C(4) before the pre-recorded hearing started.

41. The pre-recorded hearing was adjourned because the victim was unable to continue giving evidence and the offender continued to offer to plead guilty to those offences without any knowledge as to whether the victim would return to give evidence establishing the commission of the second and third counts.

42. If the victim did not give such further evidence, there was no prospect of a conviction on the aggravated sexual intercourse offences charged in the second and third counts.

43. The Crown fairly submits that whilst late, the offender’s pleas of guilty spared the victim from having to continue giving evidence, particularly about the offending, a matter which the victim was unable to speak about during the pre‑recorded hearing portion of the trial that concluded when the offender pleaded guilty to the 2nd and 3rd counts.

44. Nevertheless, I am not satisfied that the offender has shown any remorse to the extent that it should sound in mitigation.

45. In supplementary submissions, the Crown conceded that the offender is entitled to some discount for his attempts to facilitate the course of justice, “whether as a mitigating factor or pursuant to s 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act discount”.

46. I have been assisted by the parties drawing my attention to the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision in the case of Droudis v R [2020] NSWCCA 322 where the Court (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and Hamill J) held on the one hand (at [100]-[104]) that when taking into account matters under section 22A as part of the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing, there is no requirement for a sentencing judge to specify a percentage discount or to quantify mathematically the extent by which the sentence has been reduced. On the other hand, their Honours also held (at [105]) is was desirable to specify the penalty which would be imposed but for the facilitation of the administration of justice where the facilitation has made a significant difference to the sentence. The rationale for that was stated as being, “It has the benefit of providing transparency to the sentencing process and encouraging accused people and their legal representatives to conduct criminal trials efficiently and expeditiously”.

47. For the foregoing reasons, I will further discount the penalty to be imposed on the 2nd and 3rd counts in the order of 20% to reflect the facilitation of justice by the offender as provided for in section 22A.

Criminal Antecedents

43. Mr Hawkins has a history that includes his convictions for previous criminal offending, including convictions for an assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed in January of 2023 and possessing house breaking implements in September 2013. The material tendered also includes a record that in 2015, the charges then on foot against Mr Hawkins concerning allegations of armed robbery, assault with intent to rob, larceny and reckless wounding were dismissed under section 33(1)(c) of the Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW). I put those dismissed allegations to one side and ignore them for the purposes of the present sentencing exercise, beyond noting that it is something that illustrates that Mr Hawkins has had a long history of demonstrated mental ill-health.

44. The previous convictions in 2013 and 2023 do not aggravate the seriousness of the offences committed by Mr Hawkins on 24 September 2023. They constitute aggravating subjective factors, notwithstanding the index offences are the only offences of sexual misconduct committed by Mr Hawkins. They are also pertinent to deciding where, within the boundary set by the objective circumstances, the sentence should lie.

Conditional Liberty

45. The offences of 24 September 2023 were committed at a time when Mr Hawkins was subject to a community corrections order for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed in January 2023. Offending whilst subject to such conditional liberty constitutes an aggravating subjective factor because it is an abuse of freedom to take the opportunity to commit further crimes. When offenders such as Mr Hawkins breach the non-custodial sentence imposed upon them, their actions give rise to the real risk that the whole regimen of non‑custodial sentencing options will be discredited in the mind of the community.

46. Moreover, the commission of the index offences of 24 September 2023 cast further doubt on Mr Hawkins’ guarded prospects of rehabilitation.

Pre-Sentence Custody

47. Any sentence of imprisonment should be fairly backdated to 5 October 2023 because that is the date that Mr Hawkins was remanded in custody for these offences to which he is to be sentenced.

Mental Ill-Health

48. The tendered subjective material notably includes the psychological assessment report by Dr Mamta Siddhu, dated 15 September 2025. Dr Siddhu not only assessed Mr Hawkins on 15 August 2025, she also reviewed medical records sourced from the Hunter Local Area Health District.

49. It is not in dispute that Mr Hawkins was diagnosed with Treatment Resistant Schizophrenia when he was about 18 years old. Nor is it in dispute that consequently he spent over 2 years continuously in mental health units in New South Wales as an involuntary patient between 2015 and 2017. During that time, he was treated with electroconvulsive therapy and has been on antipsychotic medication since that time to manage his symptoms. The psychological formulation and recommendations set out by Dr Siddhu in her report included that:

“[36] By all accounts, Mr Hawkins experienced stability in his early years. His parents were emotionally present and loving, and he lived in a safe community. He was not exposed to community violence, violence in the home, parental drug addiction or instability. Mr Hawkins was a shy child and his academic attainment was average. However, he began to associate with peers who endorsed cannabis use. Overtime he became addicted to cannabis, likely in an attempt to manage his psychotic symptoms that were beginning to emerge at the prodromal phase of his psychotic mental illness. His behaviour became more erratic and he was involved in offences, and was subsequently diverted to mental health services to receive assessment and treatment. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia and effectively treated with depot anti-psychotic medication that he has remained on. However, lengthy periods in hospital to manage his mental illness, in addition to limited social networks, limited employment or interests has left Mr Hawkins socially isolated and unable to effectively navigate intimate relationships. He has not had a relationship before and appears to have a limited understanding in terms of navigating emotional intimacy, in tandem with sexual intimacy for a healthy sexual relationship, worsened by his mental illness which although managed well, does still leave him feeling paranoid at times.

[37] Collectively, these factors interrupted Mr Hawkins’ sexual development pathway. His confidence in navigating age-appropriate sexual relationships was impacted and also left him feeling left behind. He did not have the social skills, confidence or maturity to manage this and found it easier to connect with younger people despite their inability to consent to sexual activity. He also consumed a considerable amount of alcohol that he was not used to doing, likely in an attempt to improve confidence and be more disinhibited. He was focused on having his sexual needs met and proceeded to navigate this in a threatening and violent manner, without consideration for the victim. It is in this context that the current offending is said to have occurred in his insight into his behaviour currently remains limited.

…

[48] Mr Hawkins’ offending is enmeshed with his limited social connections, interrupted sexual development pathway, poor coping strategies, and mental illness. As such, continued focus on these areas will be important to his longstanding recovery and rehabilitation. This is Mr Hawkins’ first sex offence and he requires targeted intervention to address his distorted thinking patterns that were present in the offending. I recommend he is referred to the Moderate Intensity Sex Offender Program (MISOP) for targeted and structured treatment to manage his future risk. This treatment is available in custody and community setting and will support Mr Hawkins to work on changing the thinking, attitudes and feelings that led to his sexual offending behaviour. The program is approximately six months in duration. If Mr Hawkins is sentenced to a community-based sentence, he can be referred to CSNSW’s Forensic Psychology Services (FPS) or LSC Psychology, for individualised treatment, both located in Surry Hills, Sydney.

[49] Mr Hawkins has struggled to develop age appropriate healthy intimate relationships. His trajectory to adulthood has been different to most due ot his lengthy mental health admissions and mental illness. This has left Mr Hawkins feeling disconnected from same age peers and is a factor in him seeking connection in unhealthy and inappropriate places, when considering the current offence, that is with children who are underage and vulnerable. Therefore, given his relational difficulties, previous violent offences, violence in the current offence and his lack of victim empathy, Mr Hawkins would also benefit from referral to EQUIPS Aggression program.”

50. On the basis of those conclusions and opinions by Dr Siddhu, counsel for the offender submits that this Court should find that the offender suffered from a mental condition at the time of the offending in 2023 and he continues to suffer now. Those matters should be taken into account by the Court when sentencing the offender, in a way that justifies the conclusion that the moral culpability of the offender is reduced and that a more lenient sentence, other than might otherwise be the case, is therefore appropriate.

51. The Crown, again, fairly does not dispute that the offender was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2015. The Crown submits that whilst this condition appears to have no direct bearing on the index offending it is accepted, as Dr Siddhu sets out at [31] of her report that the offender had an:

“… interrupted sexual pathway from puberty to adulthood. He has been unable to develop skills, knowledge and confidence that comes with transitioning into adulthood, including developing healthy sexual connections.”

52. The Crown does not take issue with Dr Siddhu’s opinion that this was caused, in part, by his mental illness and a three year long psychiatric admission during an important time in his sexual development. If accepted, the Crown submits that the Court may find the offender’s mental illness informs the assessment of moral culpability and the need to give effect to personal deterrence.

Consideration and Conclusions

53. In considering the foregoing matters and reaching conclusions as to what is a just and appropriate sentence, I start by observing the relevant maximum penalty for an offence is a legislative guidepost to be observed when exercising the sentencing discretion. The standard non-parole period prescribed by Parliament plays a similar role.

54. I have had regard to the objectives of sentencing referred to section 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). Sentencing an offender such as Jordan Hawkins, who suffers from a mental disorder, calls for what Gleeson CJ described in R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 as a “sensitive discretionary decision.” That is so because the sentencing exercise involves the application of the objective and subjective facts and circumstances of this case to the aforementioned purposes of sentencing, each of which cannot be considered in isolation, overlap and point in different directions.

55. I have also reminded myself of the principles to be applied when sentencing a mentally or cognitively impaired offender, as summarised by McClellan CJ at CL in DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1 at [177] (‘De La Rosa’). On that basis I am satisfied of the following.

56. The offender’s mental ill-health contributed to the commission of each offence in a material way. That is a matter that points in the direction of a reduction in his moral culpability. It also points towards reducing the need for giving effect to the sentencing purposes of denunciation and general deterrence.

57. I am also satisfied that a custodial sentence will probably weigh more heavily on Mr Hawkins by reason of his mental ill-health, and the associated limitations on his ability to appropriately interact with other people. That too points towards a reduction in the otherwise appropriate sentence.

58. However, mental illness is not only relevant to assessing an offender’s culpability. It is also relevant to assessing the level of danger the offender presents and the appropriate way in which the offender is to be rehabilitated. This is in fact the fifth of the five summary points made by McClellan CJ at CL in De La Rosa. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, because of his Treatment Resistant Schizophrenia, and in the words of Dr Siddhu, his associated “limited social networks, limited employment or interests”, the offender is “socially isolated and unable to effectively navigate intimate relationships”.

59. As Wood CJ at CL put it in R v Henry [1999] 46 NSWLR 346 at 394 [254]:

“… the community will readily understand that the offender who suffers from a mental disorder or abnormality is less in control of his or her cognitive facilities or emotional restraints, and in some instances lacks the ability to make reasoned or ordered judgments. Almost invariably there is a limited appreciation of the wrongfulness of the act or of its moral culpability which, although falling short of avoiding criminal responsibility, does justify special consideration upon sentencing.”

60. I am satisfied for the foregoing reasons that Mr Hawkins presents more of a danger to the community than he otherwise might by reason of his Treatment Resistant Schizophrenia, and the psychological sequalae of that condition. I note, in that context, that Dr Siddhu assessed Mr Hawkins as being in the ‘above average risk category’ for sexual or violent recidivism. In those circumstances, considerations of specific deterrence point towards an increased sentence.

61. In the circumstances of this case, having considered all possible alternatives, I am satisfied no penalty other than full-time imprisonment is appropriate.

62. In so finding, I am mindful of the requirement that the minimum period that should be imposed as a non-parole period must properly reflect the gravity of the offending and the punitive purposes of sentencing: R v Simpson [2001] NSWCCA 534; 53 NSWLR 704 at [59]. As well, adequate time should be allowed to assist the offender adjusting to post‑release life in the community. In this case I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities it is likely that Mr Hawkins will need to be monitored in the community, and that he may need sex offender treatment too.

63. When sentencing for crimes involving sexual interference with children, judges have an obligation to vindicate the dignity of the child victim, and by the length of the sentence imposed to recognise the harm done to the child. There is also, understandably, a community expectation that sexual offences against children will be severely punished. A proper sentence marks the Court’s view of the seriousness of the crime and should let other wrongdoers know the retribution that will fall upon them if they commit similar crimes.

Comparable Cases and Sentencing Statistics

64. Counsel for the offender has drawn the Court’s attention to, what are said to be, comparable cases as well as relevant sentencing statistics. I have had regard to that material whilst conscious of the need to seek consistency in the exercise of the sentencing discretion in the present case.

65. Although those comparable cases and statistics do stand as a yardstick against which to examine a proposed sentence, they do not establish a range of sentences that mark the outer bounds of the permissible discretion.

Special Circumstances

66. I am satisfied that the community would be best protected in the long term by the rehabilitation of the offender, including by way of his participation in the post-release treatment programs referred to by Dr Siddhu.

67. I also take into account that this is the offender’s first custodial sentence.

68. Combined, these considerations constitute special circumstances that justify a significant variation in the standard ratio between the head sentence and the non-parole period. They also, along with the offender’s pleas of guilty, are why a non‑parole period much lower than the prescribed standard non-parole period will be indicated.

High Risk Offender

69. As the offender is to be sentenced for a serious offence within the meaning of the Crimes (High Risk) Offenders Act 2006 I am required, by virtue of section 25C of that Act*,* to cause the offender to be advised of the existence of that Act and of its application to the offences for which Mr Hawkins is to be sentenced. Accordingly, I will adopt the practice in the Supreme Court and ask the lawyers for the offender to explain all of that to him.

Imposition of Sentence

70. I will impose an aggregate sentence, but before doing so I will record the indicative sentences.

71. On the 1st count, I indicate a sentence of imprisonment for 3 years with a non-parole period of 18 months.

72. On the 2nd count, I indicate a sentence of imprisonment of 4 years with a non-parole period of 2 years.

73. On the 3rd count, I indicate a sentence of imprisonment of 4 years with a non-parole period of years.

74. It is not a simple matter of adding up the indicative sentences to arrive at the aggregate sentence. That is because the aggregate sentence must be just and appropriate to the totality of the offending behaviour. In this case a straightforward arithmetical addition of sentences appropriate for each individual offence considered separately would mean an ultimate aggregate that exceeds what is appropriate called for in all the circumstances. Consequently, a downward adjustment in the aggregate sentence is required to achieve an appropriate relativity between the totality of the criminality and the totality of the imposed sentence of imprisonment.

75. The orders of the Court are as follows:

76. Jordan Hawkins is convicted of each of the three offences he committed on 24 September 2023.

77. Jordan Hawkins is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for 7 years with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months.

78. That sentence commences on 5 October 2023 and expires on 4 October 2030.

79. The non-parole period expires on 4 April 2027.

80. Jordan Hawkins will, therefore, be eligible for release to parole at the expiration of the non-parole period.

81. Pursuant to s 3C of the Child Protection (Offender*’*s Registration) Act 2000, the offender is to be a registerable person required to be recorded on the New South Wales Child Protection register for a period of 15 years commencing on 4 April 2027 and to expire on 3 April 2042.

82. I direct that the Court registry provide a copy of the registerable person order and the Form 3 document to Corrective Services and direct Corrective Services to then provide a copy of the registerable person order and the Form 3 document to the offender.

83. I further direct the Court registry provide a copy of the registerable person order and the Form 3 document to the New South Wales Commissioner of Police and to the supervising authority of the offender.

84. I note that there is a non-publication order in place that prevents the publication of the child victim or of anything that might directly or indirectly identify the child victim.

85. Finally, I ask that, along the warrant of commitment, the report of Dr Mamta Siddhu that was tendered in these proceedings is provided to Corrective Services to facilitate in the classification and treatment and ultimate parole order made by the Court.

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