R v Hassan

Judicial Task on Sentencing 8In the circumstances of this present case, it is appropriate that I remind myself of the judicial task on sentencing. That is, how a judge, in each individual case, must go about the task of fixing a sentence which accords with the legislation, the principles of the common law and is appropriate in the particular factual circumstances of this case. 9In the present system of criminal justice, I must exercise a discretion as to what sentence should be imposed upon Mr Hassan by applying well-identified principles of law to the facts which I find: R v MacDonell (NSWCCA, 8 December 1995, unreported) per Hunt CJ at CL at [1]-[2]: 10The principles of law are well established and can be conveniently summarised in the following way: "1. Where, following a trial by jury, a person has been convicted of a criminal offence, the power and responsibility of determining the punishment to be inflicted upon the offender rests with the judge, and not with the jury...; 2. Subject to certain constraints, it is the duty of the judge to determine the facts relevant to sentencing. Some of these facts will have emerged in evidence at the trial; others may only emerge in the course of the sentencing proceedings ...; 3. The primary constraint upon the power and duty of decision-making ... is that the view of the facts adopted by the judge for purposes of sentencing must be consistent with the verdict of the jury. This may produce the result that, in a particular case, the view of the facts which the judge is obliged to take is different from the view which the judge would have taken if unconstrained by the verdict ...; 4. A second constraint is that findings of fact made against an offender by a sentencing judge must be arrived at beyond reasonable doubt ...; 5. There is no general requirement that a sentencing judge must sentence an offender upon the basis of the view of the facts, consistent with the verdict, which is most favourable to the offender.... However, the practical effect of 4 above, in a given case, may be that, because the judge is required to resolve any reasonable doubt in favour of the accused, then the judge will be obliged, for that reason, to sentence upon a view of the facts which is most favourable to the offender ...". R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 at 377-378; see also Cheung v The Queen [2001] HCA 67; (2001) 209 CLR 1. 11Although in an exceptional case, it is open to a judge to make an enquiry of the jury to determine the basis upon which they arrived at a verdict of manslaughter, I did not do so, because this is not such an exceptional case. As well, it is no part of the sentencing function for me to attempt to discern the basis upon which the jury reached their verdict. But rather, in sentencing Mr Hassan, I am obliged to do so, upon findings of fact which I alone make, but with the constraint that those facts must be consistent with the jury's verdict. 12Sentencing is not an exercise of mathematical precision leading to a single correct answer. Rather, having determined the appropriate facts which relate to the offence, the proper approach to sentencing is to identify all of the factors that are relevant to sentencing in this case, identify their significance with the particular circumstances of the offence and then to make a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence having regard to the purpose for which a sentence is to be imposed: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [51] per McHugh J; Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120 at [26]. 13I will apply these principles in the course of this sentence.

The Relevant Legislation & Common Law principles 14The Parliament of NSW has set out the purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender. Section 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provides that those purposes are: "(a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence; (b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences; (c) to protect the community from the offender; (d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender; (e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions; (f) to denounce the conduct of the offender; (g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community." 15It is self evident that these purposes overlap, may be in conflict, and cannot be considered in isolation, one from the other in their application to a particular case. These purposes do not rank in any order of priority. 16The terms of s 21A(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, mean that the Parliament has preserved the entire body of judicially developed, or common law, sentencing principles: R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131; (2004) 60 NSWLR 168 at [56]-[57]: Muldrock at [18]. These common law principles have been developed over time by courts to provide guidance for the exercise of the sentencing discretion by every judge. The principles are to be found in decided cases. 17Of particular relevance here, is that any sentence which is imposed should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence: Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 472 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ. 18This is a case where, given the nature of this particular offence, that is, one associated with domestic violence by a man against a woman, the principles of general deterrence and institutional denunciation of the crime involved must play an important, although proportionate role: Regina v Greene [2001] NSWCCA 258 at [16]. General deterrence is a powerful factor in the protection of the public by making it clear that others who may be tempted to engage in similar conduct will meet with severe punishment. 19I will need to bear in mind the legislation by which I am bound and the principles which the Courts have determined, when proceeding on this task of sentencing Mr Hassan.

The Facts 20I find the facts of the matter, which are consistent with the verdict of the jury, to be as follows. 21Mr Hassan was born on 1 January 1958, and was, accordingly, 54 at the time he killed his wife. Prior to his moving to Australia in 2008, Mr Hassan had spent his whole life in the Sudan. 22His wife, Mariam Yousif, was born in May 1987 and was, accordingly, 24 years old at the time of her death. Although born in the Sudan, Ms Yousif grew up and was educated in Australia. 23Mr Hassan and Ms Yousif were married in the Sudan in 2003. He was then 45 years old and she was 16. They lived in the Sudan together whilst their first two children were born, and then returned to Australia in 2008. 24Initially they lived in Melbourne with Ms Yousif's mother. However, after a few weeks, they moved to Sydney, where they lived with a friend, then at premises in Punchbowl, and ultimately at an apartment which they rented at Wiley Park. 25After they moved to Sydney, Ms Yousif stayed in close contact with her mother and her younger sister, Cathy. She would speak to them frequently by telephone, often more than once each day. 26In January 2010, the youngest child of Mr Hassan and Ms Yousif was born. The birth took place in Melbourne, where Ms Yousif stayed for about a month. She returned to Sydney with her newborn baby and her other children, and resumed living with Mr Hassan. 27It seems that from about that point of time the marital relationship deteriorated. The cause of that deterioration is not entirely clear. There were, however, a number of events which no doubt aggravated the relationship. In the first place, there was a significant age difference between the couple. Secondly, having been raised in Melbourne, Ms Yousif seemingly had a more relaxed approach to socialising with the broader community. Mr Hassan thought that she should not have such broad interaction. There were cultural differences in their relationship about the appropriate bounds of adult behaviour. Thirdly, Mr Hassan was critical of the way in which his wife was bringing up their children. He thought that her discipline was too harsh. 28Fourthly, Mr Hassan on a number of occasions secretly recorded his wife having conversations with her mother and sister on the telephone, and also interacting with their children. He did this in a furtive and concealed way. This attempt at covert recording was discovered on more than one occasion by his wife, and she, in no doubt forceful terms, expressed her dissatisfaction to Mr Hassan with this conduct. He saw nothing wrong with it. Finally, Mr Hassan did not get along well with Ms Yousif's family and, did not approve of the behaviour of some members of Ms Yousif's family, particularly her brother. 29The marital relationship deteriorated to such an extent that in October 2011, Ms Yousif and her three children left their apartment in Sydney and moved to Melbourne. She told her mother and sister that her husband, Mr Hassan, had, in accordance with Muslim law, divorced her. Mr Hassan accepts that this is what happened. 30Ms Yousif lodged an application for public housing and took steps to enrol her children in school or preschool in Melbourne, in the vicinity of where she was temporarily living with her mother. This separation lasted a number of weeks, and terminated when Mr Hassan telephoned and informed Ms Yousif that he had "rescinded" their divorce because he was not in a rational state of mind when he first divorced her. At his request, she returned to Sydney with her children and resumed cohabitation with him. 31On 17 April 2012, Ms Yousif rang her husband at work to discuss with him the fact that she had found a coffee grinder which had been rendered inoperative by the cutting of the electric power cord. She did not speak to her husband in that phone call, but he returned her call during that day. They had an argument. She accused him of cutting the power cord to the grinder. He denied it and blamed their 7 year old son. Unsurprisingly, Ms Yousif did not accept that their son would have been able to, nor did he, cut the power cord. Mr Hassan, who was obviously angry, told Ms Yousif that she should wait until he got home. 32Before coming to find the balance of the relevant facts, I need to make some observations about the account of facts given by Mr Hassan prior to, and during, the trial. Mr Hassan gave evidence at the trial before the jury with the assistance of an interpreter. My comments about his evidence make due allowance for this fact. He did not give any further evidence during the sentencing hearing. 33I found Mr Hassan to be an unimpressive witness. Frequently, he gave answers which were inconsistent with evidence which he had earlier given, he gave answers which were evasive, and I thought deliberately so, on some occasions, and he displayed a degree of resentment in having to answer questions which challenged any answer or explanation which he had given. For example, in one account in evidence, he said that on the evening of her death, his wife attempted to commit suicide, and that he sustained his arm injury trying to stop her. Another account suggested that she attacked him whilst he was asleep and he sustained the injury when he was defending himself and prior to removing the knife from her. These accounts cannot stand together. 34Accordingly, I am not able to accept his evidence simply because he has given his account of what happened. To the extent that objectively, or else independently, established facts contradict his evidence, I have generally accepted those facts. In following this course, I bear in mind that any finding which is adverse to Mr Hassan must be one of which I am persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt. 35There were a number of other phone calls on that day between Ms Yousif and Mr Hassan. Mr Hassan offered an explanation that they were made to discuss the selling of household items in advance of a proposed move to Perth. Whilst I accept that there may have been, in the past, some discussions about a possible move to Perth, I am well satisfied that there was no discussion on that day about selling household items in advance of moving to Perth. Had such a discussion taken place, I would have expected Ms Yousif to have told her mother and sister, but she did not do so. 36During the course of this day, Ms Yousif told both her sister, and later her mother, that she and Mr Hassan had argued over the telephone on that day, and Mr Hassan was angry. I am satisfied that this is in fact what occurred. 37Mr Hassan left his work at about 4.35pm. He travelled home. It is unclear at precisely what time he arrived home, but I am satisfied that it was at or about 6pm. I am also satisfied that Ms Yousif died at about 11pm. The question of what occurred in the five hours whilst Mr Hassan and Ms Yousif were at home together was a matter of contest in evidence. 38As Mr Hassan was the only eyewitness to the events during this part of the evening, and I do not accept his various accounts of the events, there is little evidence about what happened, and it is not correct for me to speculate. One thing which is clear is that whatever transpired that evening was not particularly noisy because the next door neighbour, Mr Eaton, did not hear anything untoward prior to the arrival of the police officers. 39By about 8.30pm, I am satisfied that the children had been put to bed in the front bedroom of the apartment, which was their room. 40During those five hours there were a number of verbal arguments, about a variety of matters, between Ms Yousif and Mr Hassan. These arguments caused Ms Yousif to be upset and scared of her husband. She spoke on the telephone with her mother, and her sister. She was clearly unhappy and distressed. 41At some point during the evening, Ms Yousif changed into her nightwear. It consisted of a pair of underpants and a long, blue T-shirt which stretched down to about her knees. She had no other undergarments on. She went to bed. She covered herself with a pink and red blanket. I do not think that she fell asleep. 42I am satisfied that Mr Hassan, having returned home, had a shower and changed into clothes which were street clothes and not of a kind which he would wear to bed. He was wearing these clothes when arrested later in the evening. 43However, it is clear that at the time when he attacked Ms Yousif, Mr Hassan had lost his self-control to such an extent that he must have formed an intention to kill Ms Yousif. Such a finding is consistent with the jury's verdict. 44What caused Mr Hassan to lose his self-control is unable to be precisely determined, except that I am persuaded that it must have consisted of words said by his wife to him in the course of one of the verbal exchanges which occurred between them that evening. 45Whilst I cannot be satisfied as to exactly what was said, the most likely account is that which was given by Mr Hassan in his evidence, when he said that his wife said to him words to the effect that he was not a man, the children were not his but were another man's and he should take a look in the mirror, and further that these words were accompanied by swearing on her part. 46Although, as I have said, I generally do not accept his evidence, this explanation which he gave, I do accept. I do so because it accords with the probabilities of what occurred and it provides the only rational explanation as to the cause of Mr Hassan's loss of control. 47At about 11pm, after a number of verbal arguments I accept that Ms Yousif said something like the words to which I have just referred to Mr Hassan which caused him to lose his self-control, take up a large knife, and brutally attack his wife. He stabbed her at least 14 times. The stab wounds were distributed over the front upper part of Ms Yousif's torso, on the back of her arms and her fingers, on her upper left thigh at the rear, and one large stab wound in her back. 48The evidence of Dr Van Vuuren, the expert pathologist, satisfies me that of all of the wounds, two of them - one which entered from her back and penetrated to a depth of 150mm, and the other which entered from just under her left breast and penetrated into her heart - were the most likely to have caused the death of Ms Yousif. 49The distribution of the wounds and their number, and in particular, the depth of a number of the wounds, up to 150 mm, delivered through a blanket, persuade me beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Hassan mounted the brutal and vicious assault on the deceased whilst she was on or in the bed and cowering under one of the blankets. She received defensive wounds to her arms and hands as she attempted to cover her upper body during the assault. The wounds to her thigh and her back were, I am satisfied, sustained during this assault as she curled up and tried to turn away from her husband while he attacked her. She no doubt fought back. That is how she got the wounds to her hands. 50At some stage, in the course of this frenzied attack, Mr Hassan sustained a laceration to his left upper arm. The course of the attack forced Ms Yousif off the bed and onto the ground where she bled profusely. Mr Hassan left the room and left his wife to die. She did so quite quickly. 51He then proceeded to wash himself in the bathroom, leaving smears of his wife's blood in the bathroom and on the floor. He took the knife and concealed it in a cupboard in the children's room. He woke his children and dressed them. He called 000 and told the operator that he required the ambulance and police because he had "trouble with his wife". 52Accordingly, to summarise, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that against a background of marital disharmony, on the evening in question, one or more arguments took place between Mr Hassan and Ms Yousif. Those verbal exchanges culminated in Ms Yousif questioning Mr Hassan's manhood and whether he had fathered their children, and she verbally abused him by swearing at him. 53As a consequence of this verbal assault, Mr Hassan lost his self-control to such an extent that he brutally stabbed his wife to death. 54I have concluded that the degree of provocation offered by the verbal arguments and insults was at the lower end of the scale, particularly given the maturity of Mr Hassan as a 54 year old man. I have also concluded that the loss of self-control occurred very shortly after the verbal arguments and insults. I have also concluded that the attack was vicious and brutal and was completely excessive when all of the circumstances are considered. 55Mr Hassan falls to be sentenced for the manslaughter of his wife upon the basis of a low level verbal provocation which was shortly thereafter followed by an excessively violent and brutal attack.

Police Investigation 56The police secured the crime scene at the apartment and, having arrested Mr Hassan, took him to the Campsie Police Station. 57After he received medical treatment, he participated in an electronically recorded interview commencing at about 4am. It concluded at about 6.30am. The interview was conducted with the assistance of an Arabic interpreter. The transcript of the interview, Exhibit T, contains an accurate record of what Mr Hassan said. In short, he told the police that his wife had attacked him whilst he was in the bedroom. He attempted to defend himself and took the knife from the deceased. He told the police that his wife continued to "swear at him" and to call him a number of names. He said as a result of that, he retaliated but could not recall the details of what it was that he had done to his wife. 58I am well satisfied that this account of what occurred which suggests that he killed his wife whilst acting in self-defence was incorrect, and Mr Hassan must have known it to be incorrect when he gave the police that version. The correct sequence of events was as I have earlier recounted. Mr Hassan was provoked by Ms Yousif immediately before the attack, he was not acting in self-defence.

Specific Statutory Considerations 59Section 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act identifies a number of matters which the Parliament has provided as aggravating factors to which regard must be had in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed. As well, there are matters in mitigation to which regard must also be had. It is appropriate to commence with the aggravating factors. 60There are a number of matters which may be regarded as aggravating factors within the meaning of the legislation. However, I am satisfied that to the extent that they are applicable, I should not have any additional regard to them, as they are included in the offence and do not merit separate consideration. 61There are a number of mitigating factors to which I am required to have regard, and to which I do. They are, first, that the offence was not part of a planned or organised criminal activity: s 21A(3)(b). The offence did not have any degree of planning about it. It was not, I am satisfied, part of any planned or organised criminal activity. It was more reactive to the situation in which Mr Hassan found himself. This has a mitigatory effect. 62Secondly, another specified mitigatory matter is whether the offender was provoked by the victim: s 21A(3)(c). I have found that Mr Hassan was provoked, and hence has been found guilty of manslaughter and not murder. No further weight ought be attributed to this consideration because it has already been taken into account. Thirdly, it is relevant to note that the offender had no prior criminal convictions and was a person of good character which are matters of mitigation: ss 21A(3)(e) and 21A(3)(f). Here the Crown accepted that Mr Hassan was, prior to the events of 17 April 2012, a man of prior good character. I take this mitigating factor into account. 63Next, I am required to have regard to Mr Hassan's prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of re-offending: s 21A(3)(g) and 21A(3)(h). In the proceedings on sentence, a report of Ms Delphine Bostock, a psychologist, was tendered. She expressed the view that, providing he receives appropriate support, the likelihood of Mr Hassan committing further offences in the future is minimal. I accept this unchallenged opinion; 64It appears from Ms Bostock's report that Mr Hassan has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, largely because he did have any apparent empirically-based criminogenic needs associated with violence, and did not have any prior history of criminal conduct. I accept that this is so, and proceed on the basis that Mr Hassan has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation. 65Finally, where an offender has shown remorse, such demonstration can mitigate any offence: s 21A(3)(i). Save for his early plea of guilty, I see no evidence of remorse whatsoever in the attitude of Mr Hassan to what has occurred. On the contrary, the version of events he gave to police, and much of his evidence in this Court, tell against a finding that he is, in any respect, remorseful for what has occurred. Whilst this does not aggravate any sentence, it simply means that Mr Hassan is not entitled to the benefit of a demonstration of any remorse or contrition. The plea of guilty does not reflect any significant degree of remorse. After all, there could never be any doubt as to who killed Ms Yousif. The plea was a pragmatic offer reflecting the circumstances in which Mr Hassan found himself, rather than a demonstration of any remorse. 66The totality of the evidence reveals to me a man who feels unable to demonstrate any regret for what he did, and a man who feels wronged by his current predicament. He regards himself as the victim of what occurred and not a perpetrator. He continues to advance excuses for what occurred, largely about his wife's conduct towards him which he continues to regard as inappropriate, which do not persuade me that he shows any true remorse for what he has done, nor that he readily accepts any moral responsibility for what he has done. 67I will, in imposing a sentence, have regard to all of these matters.

Plea of Guilty 68When these proceedings were before the Local Court in 2012, and before Mr Hassan was committed for trial, he offered to plead guilty to the offence of manslaughter. That offer was not accepted by the Crown. Had the plea been accepted, there would have been a substantial benefit to the administration of justice in New South Wales. 69Mr Hassan is, in accordance with the authorities, entitled to a full discount of 25 per cent on any sentence imposed: R v Borkowski [2009] NSWCCA 102; (2009) 195 A Crime R 1. The Crown expressly conceded that this was the correct approach.

Mr Hassan's Criminality 70It is appropriate to make an assessment of the objective criminality involved in Mr Hassan's offence. This is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to Mr Hassan, and is to be assessed wholly by reference to the nature and circumstances of the offence: Muldrock at [27]. 71In my assessment, the criminality was very serious. Mr Hassan has killed his much younger, much smaller wife in their home by brutally attacking her in a frenzied way as she defended herself, showing her no mercy at all. But this happened because he was provoked into losing his self-control, which explains why he is guilty of the lesser offence of manslaughter and not murder. 72Manslaughter is an offence which can be constituted by a wide variety of factual circumstances. However, each circumstance has as a constant that a human life been feloniously taken, which is a key element in the assessment of the gravity of the circumstances of each case. 73As I have earlier said, I am satisfied that in the circumstances of this case, the provocation was at a low level, and although the loss of self-control was almost immediate, the degree of violence inflicted on Ms Yousif was excessive. I regard this case as showing why the offence of manslaughter is properly regarded as a major crime, and this case is a most serious example of it.

Victim Impact Statements 74The Court has heard statements read by or on behalf of each of Ms Yousif's mother, Hanan Zaki, and her sister, Dimyana Gabra. 75Clearly this crime has touched the members of Ms Yousif's family, and affected them all deeply. Her three children, the eldest of whom is now about 9 years old, have been left without a mother, and have now moved interstate to be cared for by family members. They will grow up without ever really knowing their mother, and enjoying her love and affection. 76I will have such regard to this evidence as the law permits: R v Previtera [1997] 94 A Crim R 76; s 28 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.

Subjective Circumstances of Mr Hassan 77Mr Hassan is now 56 years old. He was 54 when he killed his wife. 78He grew up in the Sudan in what seems to have been a loving family. He left school at age 14 to work and help support his family. He worked in the Sudan as an electrical technician. Although his work occasionally took him to the areas of conflict, he lived away from these areas, and generally stayed away from war zones. He lived in an area which was relatively safe. He was good at his work and made friends with some of his customers. 79Before marrying Ms Yousif, he was married to his first wife. They did not have children. Their divorce was amicable. 80Since 2008, when he came to Australia, he commenced employment once he came to Sydney and has largely remained employed ever since. 81With the exception of the conflict within his marital relationship, and his inability to get along with his wife's family, Mr Hassan seems to have had a relatively normal life, which for present purposes, can properly be regarded as unremarkable. 82In all respects, prior to the events in question, he was a man of good character. 83Whilst in custody, he has attempted to improve his English skills. He has attempted to, unsuccessfully so far, re-establish his relationship with his children. He has a degree of anxiety and depression which is a reaction to his present circumstances.

Sentence 84In considering the appropriate sentence to be imposed on Mr Hassan, I commence with the reminder that manslaughter involves the unlawful taking of a human life. It is a violation of the sanctity of human life, which is a concept at the heart of a civilised community. 85Ordinarily, a conviction for manslaughter of the seriousness here found warrants a substantial sentence because the demands of punishment, and the deterrence of the broader community against similar conduct, are of significant importance. 86I have discussed all of the facts which are relevant to this decision, and it is now necessary to make a value judgment as to what the appropriate sentence is. 87This is a very serious offence involving the killing of a young, defenceless woman. The killing was committed by her husband who was much older and more mature. There is no real explanation for his conduct except that he was provoked. There is certainly no justification for his viciousness and brutal and cowardly conduct. 88Without regard to any discount for his plea of guilty, I determine that the appropriate sentence is to be one of a total of 16 years imprisonment. 89However, that sentence is reduced because of his plea of guilty to a total of 12 years imprisonment. 90It is necessary to determine an appropriate period for Mr Hassan to serve as a non-parole period. This requires attention to be paid to the question of special circumstances. 91I am not satisfied that I should make a finding of special circumstances as the law permits: s 44(2) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. Mr Hassan submitted that special circumstances existed because of his need for rehabilitation upon release back into the community. That he has such a need cannot be doubted. However, I do not see in this case that the period provided in the statute would be inadequate for that purpose. I also accept that this is the first time for Mr Hassan to be imprisoned, and I also accept that his lack of easy facility with the English language will mean that his time in jail will be lonely because there will likely be little access to other prisoners who speak his native tongue fluently, Sudanese Arabic. 92However, I am not satisfied that I should make a finding of special circumstances notwithstanding these matters. Accordingly, the non-parole period ought be 9 years. 93I am well satisfied that the nature and seriousness of the crime means that any lesser penalty, even having regard to all of the subjective factors which weigh in favour of Mr Hassan, would be adequate to punish him, and to denounce the crime.

Offence of Serious Personal Violence 94I am required to warn Mr Hassan, which I now do, of the existence of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006, and the fact that that Act applies to the offence of which he has been convicted, and for which he is being sentenced. At some future point in time, an application may be made that notwithstanding the completion of his sentence, he nevertheless ought be detained in ongoing custody, or else ought be the subject of an extended supervision order impacting upon his liberty.

Sentence 95Mr Hassan, I sentence you to the following term of imprisonment: (1)A non-parole period of 9 years commencing on 17 April 2012 and concluding on 16 April 2021; (2)A balance of term of 3 years expiring on 16 April 2024; The first day upon which you will be eligible to be released is 16 April 2021.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 21 March 2014