R v Hasem [2026] QCA 9

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: R v Hasem [2026] QCA 9

PARTIES: R / v / HASEM, Raphee Ronnie / (appellant)

FILE NO/S: CA No 52 of 2023 / DC No 610 of 2022

DIVISION: Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING: Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Cairns – Date of Conviction: 1 March 2023 (Farr SC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON: 3 February 2026

DELIVERED AT: Brisbane

HEARING DATE: 1 April 2025

JUDGES: Bond JA, Brown JA, Freeburn J

ORDER: Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE – MISDIRECTION – where the appellant was convicted of unlawful assault causing grievous bodily harm – where the appellant stabbed the complainant – where the appellant had been at the complainant’s residence the day of the offending – where the appellant was found by police some 30 minutes after the offending with a cut to the face and a swollen eye – where the appellant did not call or give evidence – where defence counsel did not pursue a direction that the evidence raised the possibility of self-defence – where the trial judge considered that the possibility of self-defence was a matter of speculation such that no direction was required to be given – whether there was a miscarriage of justice as a result of the trial judge not giving a direction to the jury to consider whether the prosecution had excluded the possibility that the complainant was acting in self defence under s 271 or s 272 of the Criminal Code (Qld) / CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE – MISDIRECTION – where the prosecution identified alleged lies told by the appellant in her statement to police – where the appellant had given different responses to police each time she was asked – where the lies were alleged by the prosecution to constitute consciousness of guilt – where the relevant lie identified in the trial judge’s summing up was “that she came to the park area from a different direction altogether” – whether the trial judge’s identification of the lie in summing up lacked the level of precision required to be given to a jury to determine whether a lie was told / CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE – NON-DIRECTION – where the prosecution contended that the appellant told lies to the police in relation to a knife found near her – where the prosecution contended that the appellant’s statement contained three lies, that “she denied owning the knife, she denied touching the knife and she even denied seeing the knife” – where the trial judge identified two lies in summing up, being “that she had never seen that knife previously and had never touched it” – where the prosecution never established that the knife was owned by the appellant – whether the lack of a direction in relation to ownership of the knife constitutes a miscarriage of justice / CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE – MISDIRECTION – whether the trial judge’s direction outlining the alleged lies in the terms set out above was inadequate in not providing further possible innocent explanations as to why the appellant may have told lies / Criminal Code (Qld), s 271, s 272 / Brawn v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 872; (2025) 423 ALR 69; [2025] HCA 20, considered / Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; [1993] HCA 63, considered / MDP v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 969; (2025) 423 ALR 204; [2025] HCA 24, considered / R v Kelleher [2024] QCA 99, cited / R v Smart [2023] QCA 222, followed / Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234; [2000] HCA 28, considered

COUNSEL: A I O'Brien, with E K O'Brien, for the appellant (pro bono) / S L Dennis for the respondent

SOLICITORS: Gilshenan & Luton Legal Practice for the appellant (pro bono) / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

1. BOND JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Brown JA and the order proposed by her Honour.

2. BROWN JA: Ms Hasem was convicted of unlawful assault causing grievous bodily harm following a two week trial. In the present appeal, the court must determine, first whether the trial judge failed to leave self-defence for the jury’s consideration. Secondly, it must determine whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that a lie could be relied upon as consciousness of guilt and further whether the directions given as to whether the lies could be relied upon as evidence based on consciousness of guilt were adequate.

Background

3. The evidence of the circumstances of the offending came from the complainant. The complainant had met the appellant when he found her crying. He took her to his father’s unit where she stayed the night with him and left the following morning. That afternoon the appellant ran into the complainant again. She returned with him to the same accommodation. The appellant apparently fell asleep and was woken up by the complainant and told to leave as he wanted to go out. When she refused, he pulled her up by the arm. He gave evidence that he then opened the back door of the unit and felt a jab in his back. According to the Crown’s case the appellant had grabbed a steak knife and stabbed the complainant in his back.

4. The complainant gave evidence of what had occurred during the trial. He was cross-examined extensively, including it being put to the complainant that he had hit the appellant with his fist while they were on the bed. He denied it. Although there were a number of questions put to the complainant suggesting he was responsible for an injury to the complainant’s eye he denied he had physically assaulted her.

5. Shortly after, the appellant was found by the police at a nearby park with a knife next to her. This interaction was caught by the police body-warn camera and the video evidence was presented at trial. The appellant was sobbing and according to one of the police officers she looked like she had been assaulted as she had a cut on her face and the wound was oozing and there was also swelling to her eye. A police officer gave evidence that he thought that the injuries would have happened that day or that afternoon. The appellant told an officer that her injury was caused by her having been assaulted by six Aboriginal people that day.

6. The appellant did not give evidence as was her right.

7. The prosecution, as part of its case, relied on lies told by the appellant as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The prosecution also relied on DNA evidence as evidence connecting both the appellant and the complainant with the knife found near the appellant when she was located by police.

No direction as to self-defence

8. At trial, defence counsel floated with the judge the possibility that the assault was not unlawful. However, counsel did not seriously pursue that in terms of directions that should be given. In particular, counsel did not contend that the evidence raised as a possibility self-defence under any of the provisions such that the assault was lawful. The trial judge considered that the evidence did not raise any possible defence and that it was a matter of speculation such that no direction was required to be given.

9. The first ground of appeal contends that there was a miscarriage of justice as a result of the trial judge not giving a direction to the jury to consider whether the prosecution had excluded the possibility that the appellant was acting in self-defence under s 271 or s 272 of the Criminal Code. If self-defence is fairly raised on the evidence, it must be left to the jury to determine whether the Crown has excluded the defence beyond reasonable doubt.

10. If such a direction was required to be given it would be an error of law within the meaning of the second limb of s 668E of the Criminal Code.¹

Contentions

11. The appellant contends self-defence was grounded in the following evidence:the appellant’s own statement that she “got assaulted”;the evidence of injuries on the appellant’s face just after police had found her at the park some 30 minutes after the incident where the complainant was stabbed;the cross-examination of the complainant which raised:his earlier police statement which made reference to a possible physical altercation with the appellant;that he had been drinking and smoking cannabis;that his memory was incomplete;that he sometimes becomes violent when he drinks;his inability to provide any coherent explanation about how the appellant suffered the injuries;the relationship between the complainant and appellant and circumstances in which they met;the complainant’s “unlikely” account of how the stabbing occurred; and the presence of knives on the floor of the unit.

12. The Crown contends that the evidence did not raise self-defence and that it was not required to be left to the jury.

Provisions as to self-defence

13. If section 271(1) applies, it is lawful for a person to use any such force as is necessary for defence, even though such force may cause death or grievous bodily harm if:the Defendant was unlawfully assaulted; andthe Defendant did not provoke the assault; andthe force used by the Defendant was reasonably necessary to make effectual defence against the assault; andthe force used was not intended, and was not such as was likely, to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

14. Section 271(2) provides a defence if the Crown cannot exclude beyond reasonable doubt the following:the defendant was unlawfully assaulted; andthe nature of the assault was such as to cause reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm; andthe defendant believed on reasonable grounds that [he/she] could not otherwise save [himself/herself] from death or grievous bodily harm than by using the force which was used.

15. Section 272 applies to provide a defence as self-defence when:the defendant first assaulted or provoked an assault from the complainant/deceased; andthe deceased/complainant then assaulted the defendant; andthe assault on the defendant was committed with such violence as to cause reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm; andthe assault on the defendant induced the defendant to believe on reasonable grounds that it was necessary for the defendant’s preservation from death or grievous bodily harm to use force in self-defence.

Legal principles

16. The legal principles which apply were uncontroversial. The law in relation to whether the self-defence was fairly raised on the evidence and should have been left to the jury was conveniently summarised by Bond JA in R v Kelleher as follows:²

“[8]It is settled law that if there was evidence which fairly raised any of the defences suggested by the ground of appeal, the legal or persuasive burden was on the Crown to exclude beyond reasonable doubt the proposition that the accused was acting in circumstances giving rise to the defence – that is, to exclude any reasonable possibility that that proposition was true.

[9]As to whether any of the suggested defences were fairly raised on the evidence such that they should have been left to the jury, the question for the trial judge was whether, on the version of events most favourable to the accused that was suggested by the evidence, a properly instructed jury acting reasonably might fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in circumstances giving rise to the defence. Or, to put it another way, the question for the trial judge was whether, on such a version of events such a jury could be left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the defence had been negatived.

[10]It should be emphasised that the question for the trial judge – and for the appellate court where it is suggested that the trial judge erred – is a question of law on which there can be only one correct answer. The question posed in the previous paragraph is not to be answered by a prediction of what the trial judge (or the appellate court) thinks that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably would do. The enquiry is as to what such a jury could do.

[11]That said, the proper analysis must necessarily act on the basis that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably will form logical conclusions by logical reasoning and not by mere speculation. Thus in R v Clarke when considering whether an innocent explanation posited for the first time on appeal should have been left to the jury, Hunt CJ at CL remarked that the jury could not act upon “some fanciful supposition or possibility not reasonably to be inferred from the facts proved”.

[12]Finally, it is important to appreciate that where a posited defence has both subjective and objective elements, both elements must be considered. If, for example, a defence would exist if the accused relevantly acted while holding a particular belief on reasonable grounds, then the defence would not be fairly raised on the evidence unless there was evidence which fairly raised both the subjective aspect of the hypothesis (namely that the accused actually held the relevant belief when the accused relevantly acted) and the objective aspect of the hypothesis (namely that the belief, if held, could be regarded as held on reasonable grounds). If the evidence fairly raised the defence, the ultimate legal onus on the prosecution would be to prove beyond reasonable doubt either that the accused did not hold the belief or that any such belief was not held on reasonable grounds.

[13]Thus in R v Markovski, where the issue was whether the defence of aiding in self-defence under s 273 of the Criminal Code together with the excuse of mistake of fact under s 24 of the Criminal Code should have been left to the jury, Bowskill CJ observed:

‘In determining whether such a defence should be left to the jury, the question to be asked is whether there is evidence, direct or inferential, which, taken at its highest in favour of the accused, could lead a reasonable jury, properly instructed, to have a reasonable doubt that the defence had been negatived (that is, to legitimately conclude that there existed a reasonable possibility that the accused held the honest and reasonable, but mistaken belief). But, as was said in CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440 at 447 [8]:

“The concept of evidentiary onus itself needs to be understood in the light of the subject matter to which it applies; here, honest and reasonable belief, a concept that has a subjective element of a kind that ordinarily is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, and an objective element that must be capable of being measured against the evidence by a tribunal of fact.”

As already noted, evidence of the relevant state of mind may be derived by inference; but “inference must not be confused with speculation”. Whether described as an evidential onus or not, the requirement to point to evidence which raises the issue of mistaken belief for the jury’s consideration is not discharged by reference to speculation or “suppositions about mere possibilities” – there must be some foundation for it. ...’”

(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)

17. The appellant submits that the jury may have concluded that the Crown had not excluded self-defence “based on no more than a judgment”.³ The appellant relies on the evidence of the relationship between herself and the complainant, the injuries to her face, the improbability of the complainant’s account of how the stabbing occurred and his response to questions that he had punched or threatened the appellant, which was said to involve some minor equivocation. The appellant further contends that given the Crown had alleged that she had told lies in other respects, it was open for the jury to reject her explanation for her injury, namely that it was a result of an assault by six Aboriginal people, and consider the circumstances from which it could be inferred that the injury was caused by the complainant.

18. There is no issue that circumstantial evidence from which inferences may be drawn can be sufficient to raise self-defence. It may be accepted that the evidence of the injuries that were observed by the police officers when they found the appellant some 30 minutes after the offending incident could give rise to an inference that the appellant had been assaulted and that the assault may have been a recent assault committed that day. Similarly, a jury may not have disregarded the appellant’s explanation that she had been assaulted by six Aboriginal people.

19. At the trial, it was generally uncontentious that the appellant had been at the complainant’s residence that day.

20. The real question is whether taking the evidence at its highest there was any evidence to suggest that the appellant had been responsible for the assault or whether, even if the complainant’s explanation is put to one side, it is left to speculation as to how the assault occurred and who inflicted it. The complainant rejected the suggestion in cross-examination that he had punched the appellant in the eye and hurt her.

21. While the appellant sought to rely on the implausibility of the complainant’s explanation for the appellant’s injuries, that relies on evidence from which the inference could be drawn that he knew the explanation. Other than the possible inference drawn from the proximity of time between when the offending incident and when the appellant was found with injuries, there was no evidence which could logically link the complainant to the appellant’s injuries and from which it could be inferred that he knew how the injuries occurred let alone that he could be responsible for those injuries. It is a matter left to speculation.

22. Nor does the complainant’s evidence that he was stabbed “out of the blue” make the sequence of events which he described implausible, particularly when he gave evidence that the offence was preceded by his trying to get the appellant to leave in circumstances where she resisted doing so.

Directions as to lies constituting consciousness of guilt inadequate?

28. The appellant contends that there were a number of errors in the directions to the jury as to lies said to constitute ‘consciousness of guilt’.

29. The trial judge in his direction given in the summing up identified the lies as:⁷

“Now, you did hear, though, that recorded conversation between police officers and the defendant. And the Prosecution relies on a couple of things that she said during that conversation as showing that she is guilty of the offence or the action of inflicting the wound to the complainant. Now, the lies that the Prosecution refer to and allege are lies, are, one, that she came to that park area from a different direction altogether. And, secondly, that she had never even seen that knife previously and had never touched it. The Prosecution says to you that you would, on the evidence, be satisfied that both of those statements were lies.” (emphasis added)

30. The first complaint raised by the appellant is that the identification of the first lie lacked the level of precision required to be given to a jury so they could determine whether or not a lie was told, particularly as she had given different responses to police each time she was asked.

31. The prosecutor in his address stated that “[t]he Crown say that what she said about where she came from is another lie that goes to consciousness of guilt”,⁸ asserting she was by her lie avoiding telling police that she’d come from the complainant’s apartment.

32. The second complaint relates to the lies told by the appellant to the police in relation to a knife found near her. The prosecutor closed the Crown case contending that as part of the evidence there were three lies in relation to a knife found near the appellant. Those lies were that, when questioned by police, “she denied owning the knife, she denied touching the knife and she even denied seeing the knife. Despite these claims, her DNA was found on the knife, along with the blood and the complainant’s DNA.”⁹ The prosecutor stated in relation to each of those three statements to police that, “The Crown suggests that these comments are lies and the reason she told those lies to police is because she knew that if she told the truth it would implicate her in the offending.”¹⁰

33. As is evident from the above extract from the summing up, the trial judge only gave instructions to the jury that they had to consider whether two of the statements as to the knives were capable of constituting lies which were capable of being evidence of her consciousness of guilt, namely, that she had not seen the knife nor touched the knife.

34. The appellant complains that the Crown never established that the knife found was not owned by the appellant and therefore the statement denying she owned the knife was not capable of constating a relevant lie. The appellant therefore complains as to the lack of direction given in relation to the ownership of the knife that no lie was established and that it could not constitute consciousness of guilt.¹¹

35. The appellant’s third complaint is that the trial judge’s direction was inadequate in not providing further possible innocent explanations as to why the appellant told lies.

36. The appellant’s final complaint is that the direction was inadequate insofar as it gave two potential uses for the lies, one being as to the offence of grievous bodily harm and the other as to part of the offence, namely stabbing or wounding, without explaining how the jury was to regard each potential use.

Lack of precision

37. Dealing with the first complaint, it is uncontentious that a lie relied upon must be precisely identified.¹²

38. The trial judge did direct in precise enough terms for the jury to comprehend the lie being relied upon. It was not one response that was relied upon by the prosecutor but all the appellant’s responses which were consistent, regardless of the detail, namely that she had not come from the direction of the complainant’s unit when the police found her.

39. When the appellant was questioned a number of times about where she had been prior to her being found, she gave differing answers. When she actually answered the question, her answers were consistent in indicating that she had come from a different direction to the complainant’s unit. She generally stated that she had gone from Central but other times responded with hand signals. The common feature of all her responses is that she had not come from the direction of the complainant’s unit. That was the lie. Each response did not have to be precisely identified for the jury to determine what her responses were and whether it was a lie. What was clear was that her responses all equated to the fact that she had not come from the direction of the complainant’s unit and had come from a different direction from where the unit was located. The circumstances in which the statements were made was captured on the police body cam. There was no lack of precision in terms of the lie and how it was said to be a lie. The trial judge correctly described it as “that she came to that park area from a different direction altogether”.¹³ The jury were sufficiently informed of the identification of the lie and would not have been in doubt as to the nature of the lie that they had to consider.

40. As to whether it was a lie, the jury could rely on the fact that no challenge was made on behalf of the appellant at trial that she had been at the complainant’s unit at the time of offending.

41. The direction was not inadequate in this regard.

Three lies but directed as to two

42. As to the second complaint, the prosecutor opened the Crown’s case by referring to the appellant telling the police that in relation to the knife located near her “she denied owning the knife, she denied touching the knife, and she even denied seeing the knife.”¹⁴ The prosecutor referred to the three statements as lies in the closing address.

43. The ownership of the knife found near the appellant was never proved at trial. The statement made by the appellant in relation to the knife, that “[i]t wasn’t mine”, could not have constituted a lie which could give rise to consciousness of guilt.

44. The prosecutor wrongly grouped the lie with other alleged lies that the appellant was said to have told in relation to the knife which could properly constitute a lie giving rise to consciousness of guilt. However, when addressing the jury as to the basis upon which it could be satisfied it was a lie, the prosecutor stated “[a]nd we know that she lied about that because of the DNA evidence.”

45. When asked by police about where the knife that was near her had come from, she stated “I don’t know. I haven’t even seen it”.¹⁵ When asked whether she had touched the knife she stated “I haven’t touched it”.¹⁶ There was DNA evidence and a presumptive blood test supporting the fact that the appellant and complainant likely had contact with the knife handle. Therefore, there was unquestionably a proper basis to contend that her denial as to having seen or touched the knife was a deliberate lie in order to deflect from the truth of the matter, namely that she had seen and touched that knife.

46. Given the lack of evidence as to ownership and the reliance on DNA evidence to prove the lie in relation to not having touched or seen the knife, the trial judge properly identified the relevant lie as being that the appellant had never seen the knife previously and had never touched it, not that she didn’t own it.¹⁷

47. The complaint is that the trial judge failed to give a direction that the ownership of the knife wasn’t a relevant lie in considering whether the appellant had told a lie giving rise to consciousness of guilt and that the prosecutor’s grouping it with the other lies relied upon should be disregarded. There was no a risk of doubt or confusion for the jury arising from the prosecutor referring to the ownership of the knife as a relevant lie or impermissibly reasoning as to what were the relevant lies. The prosecutor’s reliance on the DNA evidence and presumptive blood test to contend that the jury should find the appellant had told lies bore no connection with the ownership of the knife. In the absence of any evidence as to ownership, no further direction was required. The relevant lies said to be lies constituting consciousness of guilt were clearly identified by the trial judge. He did not need to identify that the ownership of the knife was not such a lie. The failure to give a direction was not an error of law, nor did it result in any irregularity in the trial.

Assault not subject of direction

49. The appellant contends that there should have been a direction that the statement by the appellant that she had been hit by six Aboriginal people at Cairns Central was not a lie that could be evidence of consciousness of guilt. There was no basis for such a direction to be given either to avoid confusion amongst the jury or ensure a fair trial. The Crown did not contend that it could be a lie which constituted consciousness of guilt. In fact, the Crown explicitly stated it was not relied upon for that purpose. The Crown in its address, by stating that it was a matter for the jury to decide how they viewed the matter, did not suggest otherwise. The jury were expressly told by the prosecutor that there was no evidence to suggest that it was a lie and it was not relied upon as a lie said to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. The notion that the prosecutor, by telling the jury that it was a matter for them to determine whether or not they accepted that the appellant had been assaulted as she stated to the police, could cause the jury to impermissibly reason that if they did not accept the appellant’s statement she had lied because she was guilty of the offence, is fanciful. The trial judge did not identify it as a potential lie in the summing up. There was no need for a direction clarifying that it was not relied upon for that purpose.²²

Should the direction have concluded more alternative reasons for telling a lie

50. The appellant further contends that the direction as to consciousness of guilt was deficient by not setting out a full list of possible alternative reasons for the appellant having told a lie, particularly that the appellant may have been in shock. The direction given in that regard relevantly was in the following terms:

“Now, before you can use that evidence - that is those two things that she said - against her, you must be satisfied of a number of matters. And unless you are satisfied of these matters you cannot use the evidence against her. First, you must be satisfied that she told a deliberate untruth. There is a difference between the mere rejection of a person’s account of events and a finding that the person has lied. In many cases where there appears to be a departure from the truth, it may not be possible to say that a deliberate lie has been told. The defendant may have been confused or there may have been other reasons which would prevent you from finding that she has deliberately told an untruth. Ultimately, it is a question for you to determine if that was a deliberate lie in respect of each of those two areas.

Secondly, you must be satisfied that the lie is concerned with some circumstance or event connected with the offending conduct. That is the stabbing of the complainant. You can only use a lie against the defendant if you are satisfied, having regard to those circumstances and events, that it reveals a knowledge of the offence. That is the offence of stabbing him or some aspect of it. And, thirdly, you must be satisfied that the lie was told because the defendant knew that the truth of the matter would implicate her in the commission of the offence. That is, the offence of stabbing.

The defendant must be lying because she is conscious that the truth could convict her. Now, there may be reasons for someone to lie, apart from a realisation of guilt, and people sometimes have innocent explanations for lying. No real explanation has been placed before you here, although Mr Feeney submitted to you, of course, that this was just rather childish behaviour and may be borne of panic at seeing police officers. That type of thing. But, remember, you can only use the evidence of these purported lies against the defendant if you are satisfied that she lied, out of a realisation that the truth would implicate her in the commission of the offence, and that is the offence of inflicting the wound. The stabbing of the complainant.”²³ (emphasis added)

51. The appellant contends that the direction did not meet what was required by the majority in Edwards v The Queen,²⁴ where the majority stated what should be included in the direction, namely that:

“Moreover, the jury should be instructed that there may be reasons for the telling of a lie apart from the reali[s]ation of guilt. A lie may be told out of panic, to escape an unjust accusation, to protect some other person or to avoid a consequence extraneous to the offence. The jury should be told that, if they accept that a reason of that kind is the explanation for the lie, they cannot regard it as an admission.”²⁵ (Emphasis added)

52. The appellant contends that as a matter of law the jury had to be directed as to all the possible reasons for the lies being told. The list of matters referred to by the majority in Edwards were given as an of example of alternative reasons for a lie being told, rather than a prescriptive list. It is clear from the majority’s statement that the jury must be directed “there may be reasons for the telling of a lie apart from the reali[s]ation of guilt”²⁶ (footnotes omitted). While not determinative, this accords with the Benchbook.²⁷ Examples of those possible reasons should be given to exemplify that part of the direction, but the appellant’s argument elevates those particular reasons to being required to be given as a matter of law. There may be other possible reasons aside from those referred to by the majority in Edwards.

53. The direction clearly informed the jury that they had to consider whether there were other possible explanations for the telling of a lie. The trial judge explained to the jury first that a lie may not be a deliberate untruth and may be due to confusion or some other reason. Later in the direction it was further explained that there could be reasons for someone to lie apart from a realisation of guilt. While it was said no real explanation had been placed before the jury, the trial judge then referred to possible explanations given by the defence, including panic, for the lie being told. The direction did not confine the possible alternative reasons for telling a lie with the trial judge referring to “That type of thing”. A lie being told out of shock is just one other possible explanation of why the appellant may have told an untruth. That may have been a possible explanation, but the evidence did not raise it specifically. The direction made clear to the jury that they were in no way confined by the examples given as the only possible reasons why the appellant may have told an untruth. The direction was not inadequate and accorded with what was required at law. It was not necessary for the jury to be given a shopping list of possible alternative explanations, as long as it was made clear to them that they had to consider, as the direction given made clear, that there may be other explanations of a similar nature for the lie being told. There was no error of law by the trial judge in this regard.

54. The second aspect of the appellant’s complaint is that the reference by the primary judge to the fact that “people sometimes have innocent explanations for lying… [n]o real explanation has been placed before you here”²⁸ diminished the direction and may have caused the jury to impermissibly reason that there was no real alternative explanation for the lie and/or that the appellant bore the onus of having to identify such an explanation.

Was a direction required as to the use of the lies for the offence

58. The further complaint made by the appellant is that the direction given by the trial judge was that the lies, if they were to be used, were to be used to establish that the appellant was guilty of the offence or the action of inflicting of the wound to the complainant. The appellant contends that while the trial judge referred to two potential uses, namely the commission of the offence of grievous bodily harm or part of that offence, or the stabbing or wounding, he did not direct the jury about how those two uses could differ. In addition, there was a reference to “the offence of stabbing”,³² which was not the offence with which the appellant was charged. The appellant contended that it was important that the jury was directed that the lie was told because the appellant had struck a blow with a knife or the lie was told because she had inflicted a mortal or life threatening wound. There was however no need for such an explanation, given the Crown’s case for the offence of grievous bodily harm was particularised by reference to the stabbing of the complainant. The stabbing and the grievous bodily offence in this sense were not distinct. One of the critical matters in issue was whether the injury caused by the stabbing was grievous bodily harm. The stabbing and grievous bodily harm were inextricably linked. It was not a matter upon which a separate direction had to be given. There is no deficiency in not elaborating further as the appellant contends.

Third ground abandoned

59. As to the third ground that there was miscarriage of justice caused by the failure to direct the jury about the availability of wounding as an alternative charge to grievous bodily harm, that ground was not pressed by the appellant and ultimately was abandoned.

60. In all of the circumstances no ground of appeal has been established by the appellant. The appeal must fail.

Order

61. The order that I consider should be made is:

Appeal dismissed.

62. FREEBURN J: I agree with Brown JA.

Footnotes

1. MDP v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 969. ↩

2. [2024] QCA 99 at [8]-[13], per Bond JA with whom Morrison JA and Crow J agreed. ↩

3. Stevens v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 319 at [30] per McHugh J. ↩

4. AB Vol 2 81/6-9. ↩

5. AB Vol 1 18/37-38. ↩

6. See eg, AB Vol 2 82/14-16. ↩

7. AB Vol 1 26/14-21. ↩

8. AB Vol 1 20/7-9. ↩

9. AB Vol 1 10/8-10. ↩

10. AB Vol 1 19/29-31. ↩

11. This was added as an appeal ground during the hearing, for which the appellant was given leave. ↩

12. R v Smart [2023] QCA 222 at [85] per Boddice JA (with whom Dalton and Flanagan JJA agreed). ↩

13. AB Vol 1 26/18-19. ↩

14. AB Vol 1 10/8-11.