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[2025] NSWDC 514
General information, not legal advice.
District Court of NSW
2025-12-04
Newlinds SC DCJ
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Hampstead [2025] NSWDC 514
Hearing dates: 4 December 2025
Date of orders: 4 December 2025
Decision date: 04 December 2025
Jurisdiction: Criminal
Before: Newlinds SC DCJ
Decision: (1) For Counts One and Two, after a deduction of 25% for the plea of guilty, the Offender is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 2 years to be served in the community pursuant to an Intensive Correction Order, to commence on 4 December 2025 and expire 3 December 2027, on conditions.
(2) The Offender is disqualified from driving for a period of 2 years commencing 4 December 2025.
Catchwords: CRIME — Violent offences — Aggravated assault with intention to steal taxi — Armed with knife — Driving offences — Drive manner dangerous
SENTENCING — Relevant factors on sentence — Offender in drug-induced psychosis at time of offending — Significant mental health and drug use history — Significant criminal history — Offender has shown significant efforts at rehabilitation since offending — Offender already served 132 days in custody and 9 months in full time residential rehabilitation program — Term of imprisonment appropriate — Further period of full-time custody not in long-term best interest of Offender or community — Sentence to be served pursuant to intensive correction order
Legislation Cited: Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(5AA)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 154C(2)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 166, s 167
Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 117(2)
Cases Cited: Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571
Dixon v The Queen [2019] NSWCCA 85
DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194
Pattison v R [2007] NSWCCA 186
R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111
R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566
Ryan v R [2011] NSWCCA 250
Shaw v R [2008] NSWCCA 58
Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465
Category: Sentence
Parties: Rex (Crown)
Daniel Hampstead (Offender)
Representation: Counsel:
L Missiris (Solicitor) (Crown)
H Murphy (Offender)
Solicitors:
ODPP (Crown)
Legal Aid (Offender)
File Number(s): 2024/365051
Publication restriction: Nil
On 2 October 2024, at Surry Hills, Mr Hampstead (“the Offender”), who has significant mental health and drug addiction history, together with a substantial criminal history, was in a taxi, wherein he wrongly told the driver the taxi belonged to his father and demanded the driver (“the Victim”) allow him to take the taxi. The Victim refused. The Offender then produced a box cutter-style knife and held it up to the Victim and again demanded the Victim get out of the car, which the Victim did. The Victim was scared and distressed, and the Offender then drove away in the taxi. The Victim immediately contacted police and, as the taxi had a GPS tracking device on it, provided that information to the police.
The Offender then drove the taxi around for about 15 minutes, travelling through a stop sign at about 40 km/h without stopping. Another taxi, which had the right-of-way, had to use its brakes to avoid collision. The Offender then drove through a red light, where he accelerated and almost collided with a number of pedestrians. The Offender continued to travel through several red lights along Elizabeth Street at about 40 to 50 km/h, moving on and off the tram lines and drove beside an oncoming tram, mounting the curb. He then drove the wrong way down a one-way street, swerved through ongoing traffic, and almost collided with several vehicles after going through yet another red light. The speed limit for all of this activity was 40 km/h. The highest speed the stolen taxi was recorded at was 81 km/h, which was only for a short duration, however, throughout most of the episode, the taxi was travelling somewhere between 50 and 65 km/h.
The Offender was eventually apprehended by police, wherein he again asserted wrongly that the taxi was his father's.
The Offender participated in a recorded interview voluntarily, where he was clearly incoherent in his thinking, but made a number of admissions and gave the box-cutter knife to police.
Leaving to one side the mental state of the Offender at the time, the offending was, to my mind, very serious, insofar as both Counts are concerned. Whilst the stealing did not involve any actual violence, there was most certainly a threat of violence and the Victim’s will was overborne in that he was made to exit the taxi so that it could be stolen. As far as the driving in a manner dangerous charge is concerned, I consider the conduct to be serious.
It needs to be immediately said that, at the time of the offending, it is clear that the Offender was in a delusional, drug-induced psychosis caused by the use of drugs. He was homeless, was untreated as to his mental health, had recent hospital admissions, and had a diagnosed substance misuse disorder. He was under the influence of drugs at the time, which was the cause of the psychosis.
If one puts all those matters to one side, I consider the objective seriousness of the offending involving the stealing of the motor vehicle to be relatively high. True it is that there was no planning involved and the motivation of the Offender to steal the taxi appears to have been driven by a delusional belief that the taxi belonged to his father, however, there was a knife involved, and a threat of violence implicitly made to the Victim who would undoubtedly have been fearful. He was, of course, in a position of vulnerability because he was a taxi driver.
That being said, the taxi was only in the hands of the Offender for about 15 minutes before he was apprehended and no actual violence was involved.
As to the driving dangerous charge, in my opinion, the objective seriousness is high. It is only by luck that a person or people were not seriously injured or killed, and the driving was incredibly dangerous to the public. However, again, it only went on for a short period of time.
As I have already said, the Victim was in a vulnerable position as a taxi driver, albeit I have already taken that into account when assessing the objective seriousness of the offending and it is important that I do not double count in that regard. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise the vulnerability of the Victim.
The Offender has submitted that the following would be considered as mitigating factors:
There is no evidence of injury, emotional harm, or loss / damage caused by the offence;
The offence was not planned or part of an organised criminal activity;
The Offender has good prospects of rehabilitation;
The Offender has shown genuine remorse; and
The Offender pleaded guilty.
I accept each of those matters, other than I am sure the Victim was extremely scared during the robbery. The consequences to him have been significant. They have been put before me in a Victim Impact Statement and are an important reminder of the impact of this sort of crime on victims, but, I am sorry to say, in my view are no more than are to be expected as a consequence of this sort of crime, which is one of the reasons the maximum penalty for Count One is so high.
The Offender’s subjective background is contained in the Psychological Report of Dr Clara Fritchley, Clinical Psychologist, dated 26 November 2025.
In summary, I am satisfied that:
The offending occurring in the context of homelessness, severe substance dependency and symptoms of a drug induced psychosis;
Since being charged with the offences, the Offender has worked hard to address his substance dependencies and build lifestyle stability, and has completed 8 months of a residential rehabilitation program at Wayback;
His presentation to Dr Fritchley displayed no guardedness or defensiveness;
He was separated from his twin sister at birth and adopted – he was exposed to parental alcohol use and verbal aggression. He was advised at 4 years old that he was adopted;
His parents used physical punishment to curtail his difficult behaviour;
He left his parents’ house when he was 13 years old;
He was introduced to illicit substances at 13 years of age, including amphetamines and heroin. He was first introduced to crystal methamphetamine at 16 years old.
He found school difficult, leaving in year 9 (14 years old), with a subsequent diagnosis of ADHD;
From very early adolescence, he has struggled with a range of severe addictions and polysubstance use. There are diagnoses of cannabis use, stimulant use, and other substance use disorders which have “been consistent and severe, particularly over the last decade, and has impaired his function, negatively impacting on all domains of his life.”; and
He has current diagnoses of ADHD and major depression disorder with anxious distress – severe and recurrent.
The Offender has shown remorse and insight, practically, by his pleas of guilty and in the expressions of regret and remorse to Dr Fritchley and the author of the Sentencing Assessment Report dated 24 November 2025.
Mr Alnaser, in his Sentencing Assessment Report, notes at page 3:
“[The Offender] demonstrated positive insight into the impact of his offending, acknowledging the fear the taxi driver would have experienced having a weapon drawn on him. He further recognised the potential psychological harm that may have resulted from the incident, including ongoing stress or trauma.”
The Offender’s record is not insubstantial and involves examples of similar offending. He has served a number of terms of full-time imprisonment.
The Offender’s prior record does not act to increase the objective seriousness of the offence, and it is not open to the Court to use prior convictions to determine the upper boundary of a proportionate sentence: R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566 at [25]; Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; Dixon v The Queen [2019] NSWCCA 85. However, prior convictions may be relevant to the determination of whether leniency should be extended: Shaw v R [2008] NSWCCA 58 at [21; Pattison v R [2007] NSWCCA 186 at [39].
Community Corrections assess that the Offender presents a medium risk of recidivism. It is clear that his ongoing rehabilitation, is linked to his risk of reoffending.
Dr Fritchley opines that the Offender’s prospect for the future and rehabilitation is presently positive, noting at page 22:
“To his credit he is a working hard to address his difficulties. He has made significant gains over the past eight months in his capacity to manage life without the use of substances and in building lifestyle stability. He expressed a strong motivation to continue to remain abstinent from crystal methamphetamine with recognition of the devastating impact this drug has upon all aspects of his life. [The Offender] will however require high intensity, ongoing psychosocial support and treatment interventions to be put in place to support him in this goal.”
“This impact of a custodial environment at this stage of Mr Hampstead’s rehabilitation would be devastating and the gains he has made would be severely undermined. He would be unlikely to access the ongoing treatment intervention he requires within a custodial environment, and his exposure to an antisocial peer group would increase. Moreover, he reported that he does not cope well in a custodial environment. I note that during past incarceration, he has experienced high distress and self-harm and suicidal ideation. His mental health would likely deteriorate in custody placing him at risk of relapse to drug use.”
It is submitted on behalf of the Offender that his rehabilitation is at a critical juncture – in a controlled environment, he has been able to maintain an offence free lifestyle with ongoing support to treat his mental health and substance abuse disorders. His prospects can only be described as good if he is able to maintain abstinence from crystal amphetamine and other illicit drug use and engage in ongoing mental health treatment and secure housing. It is submitted ultimately that if he can do so, his prospects of rehabilitation should be regarded as good. He will require the ongoing and robust support of Community Corrections to assist him in maintaining stability and abstinence once he graduates from Wayback, which will occur next week on the 10 December 2025.
On the other hand, the Crown submits that the Offenders prospects of rehabilitation must remain guarded, the Sentencing Assessment Report assesses him as presenting a medium risk of reoffending and, whilst being in the Wayback rehabilitation program, the Offender has slipped on a number of occasions, so as to take illicit substances.
On balance, I am satisfied that the Offender’s prospects of rehabilitation are perhaps not good but are better than are contended by the Crown.
More importantly, I think that his rehabilitation “journey" is at a reasonably critical juncture and I am not at all sure that a period of full-time imprisonment at the moment would be anything other than detrimental to those prospects.
“Where an offender is suffering from a mental illness, intellectual handicap or other mental problems the courts have developed principles to be applied when sentencing. They can be summarised in the following manner:
• Where the state of a person’s mental health contributes to the commission of the offence in a material way, the offender’s moral culpability may be reduced. Consequently, the need to denounce the crime may be reduced with a reduction in the sentence…
• It may also have the consequence that an offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a reduction in the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed…
• It may mean that a custodial sentence may weigh more heavily on the person. Because the sentence will be more onerous for that person the length of the prison term or the conditions under which it is served may be reduced…
• It may reduce or eliminate the significance of specific deterrence…
• Conversely, it may be that because of a person’s mental illness, they present more of a danger to the community. In those circumstances, considerations of specific deterrence may result in an increased sentence.”
Dr Fritchley’s Report outlines that the Offender consumed crystal methamphetamine on the day of the offending and that he had, approximately two weeks earlier been suffering delusions in hospital. I am satisfied that he was suffering delusions on the day of the offending relating to the rightful ownership and possession of the taxi. Indeed, during his police interview he presented as dishevelled and disorganised in his thinking.
According to Dr Fritchley, at page 26:
“Drug-induced psychosis significantly impairs the capacity for sound decision-making and interferes with the ability to accurately assess risk, anticipate consequences, or interpret situations rationally. Moreover, cognitive functions including judgement, impulse control, attention, and problem-solving are markedly compromised. In Mr Hampstead’s case his perception of reality was distorted, and his thinking became disorganised. His capacity to behave in a rational manner was impaired.”
The Offender’s drug induced psychosis plainly reduced his capacity for judgment and sensible thinking.
The Crown accepts that the Offender was exposed to drug addiction at an early age, entitling the Offender to some leniency and also, I think, reducing his moral culpability. However, the Crown emphasises that under s 21A(5AA) of the Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“Sentencing Procedure Act”), self-induced intoxication cannot be taken into account as a mitigating factor on sentence and submits that, notwithstanding that the Offender was exposed to drug use from an early age, it remains self-induced.
In my judgement, whilst it is true that the Offender voluntarily chose to take the drugs on the day, that is a consequence of him being addicted to the drugs, which addiction commenced at a time from choices he made as a very young teenager who had suffered from an extremely deprived upbringing. I do not think he should be held responsible for the choice he made at that age and, of course, his inability to become drug-free in the sense of beating his addiction is not necessarily a choice at all.
Whilst I do not take the drug use and its causal connection to the offending into account as a mitigating factor, I think I am entitled and will take it into account in the following ways. Firstly, it does reduce his moral culpability when considering the objective seriousness of the offending. It follows that the need to denounce the crime is reduced. Secondly, it also, in my judgement, renders the Offender an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence and I consider that incarceration will weigh more heavily on the Offender than others. Finally, it does provide an explanation for the offending.
On the other hand, as the Crown quite properly emphasises, the very mental health issues and drug dependency which I have spoken about do increase the prospects of the Offender reoffending and therefore questions of community safety loom large.
The offending here is serious, and the Offender has a significant criminal history which disentitles him to leniency.
On the other hand, the offending took place when the Offender was in a drug-induced psychosis, believing that the taxi belonged to his father.
The Offender made full admissions upon apprehension and has expressed significant remorse and insight into his offending.
The Offender has shown real insight and remorse in practical ways and, to my mind, a substantial determination with some, albeit not total, success towards getting himself drug-free.
If the Offender can become and stay drug-free, his prospects of having his mental health issues brought under control will be greatly enhanced.
I do not consider the Offender, in light of his background, mental health issues, and drug dependency at the time of offending, to be an attractive candidate to be used as an example to the rest of the community. Moreover, I do not think that a sentence of full-time incarceration will do anything to deter him from offending again in the future. The only thing that will stop the Offender offending again is if he can continue along the path he is on towards becoming drug-free and improving his mental well-being. I am conscious of the Offender’s significant criminal history involving similar offending and this does not bode well for the future.
I am satisfied that, if he continues on the path he is on, he does have a real chance of rehabilitating and not offending in the future, and that a period of full-time imprisonment at this stage of his rehabilitation would be detrimental to both him and the community. In other words, his prospects of being rehabilitated and not reoffending, whatever they may be, will be significantly greater if he remains in the community.
I take into account the 132 days of full-time custody the Offender has already served as a consequence of this offending and I also give weight to some of the period in full-time residential rehabilitation, albeit this was something he was going to have to do anyway if he was going to mend his ways.
Taking all those matters into account, I have determined that the s 5 threshold has been crossed, as is conceded on behalf of the Offender.
After a deduction of 25% for the early guilty plea and with some rounding in favour of the Offender, I consider the following to be appropriate indicative sentences:
Count 1 – 3 years’ imprisonment.
Count 2 – 6 months’ imprisonment.
I consider it appropriate that the sentences be served wholly concurrently and that there be an aggregate sentence of 3 years imprisonment.
For those reasons, I order the following:
For Counts One and Two, after a deduction of 25% for the plea of guilty, the Offender is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 2 years to be served in the community pursuant to an Intensive Correction Order, to commence on 4 December 2025 and expire 3 December 2027, on the following conditions:
(a) The Offender be of good behaviour. (b) The Offender report to Bankstown office of Community Corrections within 7 days of 4 December 2025 (11 December 2025). (c) The Offender comply with any directions of Community Corrections, including any requirement for counselling or other treatment so as to assist him to remain drug-free and assist in his mental health recovery. (d) For the avoidance of doubt, the Offender is not to take any illicit drugs unless prescribed by a medical practitioner.
**********
R
Hampstead [2025] NSWDC 514
(2013) 249 CLR 571
(2006) 66 NSWLR 566
(1988) 164 CLR 465
On that basis, the appropriate term of imprisonment would be 3 years, taking into account the time already served together with some of the time in rehabilitation, rather than backdate the sentence, I will take that period into account so as to reduce the sentence to 2 years. That term will commence today 4 December 2025 and expire 3 December 2026.
I consider that sentence should be served pursuant to an Intensive Correction Order on conditions. The safety of the community will be enhanced if he continues on his path of treatment.
The term of 2 years will commence from 4 December 2025 and expire 3 December 2027. I am satisfied that, in all the circumstances, that sentence should be served in the community pursuant to an Intensive Correction Order for a period of 2 years.