//
[2025] NSWDC 557
General information, not legal advice.
District Court of NSW
2025-11-28
Haesler SC DCJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
Zoe will write a short plain-English brief of this judgment and email it to you: what it was about, what the court decided and why. It can take up to a minute.
General information, not legal advice.
Or create a free account to save it and ask Zoe follow-up questions.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Fretwell [2025] NSWDC 557
Hearing dates: 28 November 2025
Date of orders: 28 November 2025
Decision date: 28 November 2025
Jurisdiction: Criminal
Before: Haesler SC DCJ
Decision: Aggregate sentence of imprisonment of 7 years with a non-parole period of 4 years 6 months
Catchwords: CRIME — Violent offences — Recklessly cause grievous bodily harm
CRIME — Driving offences — Failure to stop and assist after vehicle impact causing grievous bodily harm
CRIME — Domestic violence — “Domestic violence offence” — Contravene ADVO
SENTENCING — Aggravating factors — Breach of conditional liberty — Record of previous convictions
SENTENCING — Mitigating factors — Plea of guilty
SENTENCING — Relevant factors on sentence —Significant injury — Pedestrian v Truck — Deterrence — Form 1 offences — Moral culpability — Multiple offences — What is a ‘crushing sentence’? — Aggregate sentences — Objective seriousness — Proportionality
SENTENCING — Sentencing procedure — Expert reports — Instinctive synthesis
SENTENCING — Subjective considerations on sentence — Mental health — Post Traumatic Stress Disorder — Offender a victim of crime
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Crimes (Domestic and Personal) Violence Act 2007 (NSW)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Attorney General's Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 No 1 of 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 518; (2002) 56 NSWLR 146
Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; (2013) 249 CLR 571
Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Beattie [2017] NSWCCA 301
Hoskins v R [2020] NSWCCA 18
MAK v R; MSK v R [2006] NSWCCA 381
Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357
Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 37; (1998) 194 CLR 610
R v Alcock [2023] NSWDC 326
R v Brennan (a pseudonym) [2023] NSWDC 328
R v Clinch (1994) 72 A Crim R 301
R v Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510
R v Gee [2023] NSWDC 327
R v Herring (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 203
R v Kominkovski [2023] NSWDC 511
R v Love [2023] NSWDC 609
R v Munn [2022] NSWDC 264
R v Qutami [2001] NSWCCA 353
R v Windle [2012] NSWCCA 222
Ryan v The Queen [2001] HCA 21; (2001) 206 CLR 267
Suksa-Ngacharoen v R [2018] NSWCCA 142
The Queen v De Simoni [1981] HCA 31; (1981) 147 CLR 383
Category: Sentence
Parties: Gregory Ian Fretwell (the offender)
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Representation: Counsel:
T McKenzie
Solicitors:
Badarne Lawyers (for the offender)
E Costigan for the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
File Number(s): 2024/415382
Gregory Fretwell was born in 1975. He is to be sentenced today for three serious matters.
The first, causing grievous bodily harm, being reckless as to causing actual bodily harm, carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. There is also a standard non parole period of 4 years imprisonment: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 35(2).
There is an offence of failing to stop and assist after vehicle impact causing grievous bodily harm: Crimes Act, s 52A(b)(2). The maximum penalty is 7 years imprisonment with an automatic licence disqualification of 3 years or 12 months minimum.
Another matter of contravening a prohibition and restriction in an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (‘ADVO’) comes to the Court on a s 166 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) certificate: Crimes (Domestic and Personal) Violence Act 2007 (NSW), s 14(1). Its maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment.
The maximum penalties are important guides and the standard non-parole periods, where it applies, are important guides to the exercise of my sentencing discretion. They convey Parliament’s view of the relative seriousness of the offence and content should always be given to standard non-parole periods when formulating an appropriate sentence.
Fretwell is 50 years old. He born in 1975. Until his mid-forties he was entitled to be regarded as an upstanding citizen. There are some matters in his Queensland record which are of no consequence and, as far as I am aware, they are no longer offences in Queensland where they may be in New South Wales. He was able to work in solid employment and gain qualifications, help his family, raise a family, contribute to the community as a volunteer in a number of capacities, Royal Fire Service, SES and a Volunteer Coast Guard.
It would appear in 2020 when his long-term marriage came to an end there a significant stress on him. There was also stress in relation to litigation because of asbestos found at the house he owned.
Divorce is up there with a death of a partner as a major stressor in anyone’s life. So too is Supreme Court litigation. To compound the matter, as I am well aware in February 2021, Fretwell was the victim of a serious and violent crime, a home invasion when a number of men armed with machetes entered his home and stole his only valuable asset, an opal collection worth some hundreds of thousands of dollars. I am aware of that matter because I sentenced the offenders: R v Love [2023] NSWDC 609; R v Gee [2023] NSWDC 327; R v Kominkovski [2023] NSWDC 511; R v Munn [2022] NSWDC 264; R v Brennan (a pseudonym) [2023] NSWDC 328; R v Alcock [2023] NSWDC 326.
It is not surprising given the seriousness of that robbery that he was subsequently diagnosed with Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (‘PTSD’). A condition he still suffers from.
After the relationship with his wife ended, he formed another relationship with the first complainant in this matter. That relationship had its ups and downs. In September 2024 an ADVO was put in place.
The complainant in that matter has a twin brother. He was very protective of his sister. He never got on with the offender. It would appear that in October 2024 the female complainant told Fretwell that their relationship was finished. He continued to send text messages to her.
On 6 and 7 November 2024 he was sending texts and voice messages while she was at work. It is accepted that the level of communication was relentless. On that day he sent over 150 text messages; professing his love, demanding she respond and see him, and telling her he was stressed and suicidal. There were 50 voice messages that went for at least 45 minutes, ranging from a few seconds to quite long messages. In some he was calm but in most of them he was crying and yelling. He told the female complainant that he loved her and at other times he accused her of cheating.
In one voice message he said:
“I need you … it shouldn’t be a problem. I need you, I’m begging you. For everything I’ve said to you this afternoon, for you still not to be here, is incredibly fucking cruel, incredibly fucking heartless …”
He followed up with, “No Amber, I’m not of sound mind, I haven’t been for a long time …”.
It is those messages, text and voice, which are in clear breach of the ADVO. They are the matters for sentence that came to the Court on a s 166 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 certificate.
It appears that the female complainant and her twin lived in the same house in southern Wollongong. On 7 October they had to go to a local store. At 7.30 PM the female complainant drove from her home in her Ford Territory with her brother in the passenger’s seat.
They entered a roundabout as the offender in his white Toyota Landcruiser was coming in the opposite direction. He used the roundabout to perform a U-turn so he was driving directly behind them. The female complainant noticed the headlights of his vehicle, which were familiar to her. She told her brother, “I think that’s Greg.”
As the Toyota continued to follow them her brother became angry. He wanted her to stop the car. He wound the window down, stuck his arm out waved it at the offender. He wanted Fretwell to be aware someone else was in the car.
The Ford Territory drove on and Fretwell followed in his Toyota. At times he drove close behind. Sometimes he would pull up beside her, sometimes he would move in front in the parallel lane and then drop behind. Sometimes he came quite close. Both vehicles however kept below the sign posted speed limit of 80 kilometres per hour. At one point the complainant’s brother threw plastic bottles out the passenger window. After he did so Fretwell backed off momentarily, but he continued to follow them closely.
This occurred for approximately four kilometres. It is the stalking matter to be dealt with on the Criminal Procedure Act Form 1. The Ford Territory was driven down the Princes Highway until it came to a large two-lane roundabout.
The female complainant’s vehicle was in Lane 2 of 2. Fretwell’s vehicle was behind but in Lane 1. When she stopped at the roundabout the complainant’s brother took off his seatbelt, pulled on the handbrake and got out of the vehicle closing the door behind him. He took two or three steps towards the back of his sister’s car towards where the offender was driving his vehicle.
Fretwell saw him on the road. He accelerated, veering his vehicle to where his victim was standing. The Toyota collided with the victim near the passenger side taillight pinning him against the Ford. Fretwell continued to drive, dragging his victim across the passenger’s side of his sister’s Ford in a side swipe motion. He came to rest in front of his sister’s vehicle. That offence is the cause grievous bodily harm as to causing actual bodily harm offence for sentence.
He continued to drive straight through the roundabout. That is the fail to stop and assist offence. He dove to Dapto Police Station, which was relatively close. There, despite the fact he had a mobile phone in the car, he borrowed a phone off a passerby and called triple-0. He requested an ambulance. He gave them the location of the collision. He told the operator it was an “absolute emergency” and “someone’s been hit, someone’s been hurt”. When asked if anyone was injured, he responded, “yes”. He gave a false version of events to a witness and the operator.
“Having reference to the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), it is my opinion that [the victim] suffered Grievous Bodily Harm taking into account not only the type of injuries, the location of the injuries, and the low likelihood of complete healing and rehabilitation, but also that the injuries nearly resulted in his death.”
A sentence must be proportionate to what was done. That requires a judge assess the objective seriousness. That assessment is essential to set the parameters of the appropriate sentencing outcome. I have to consider the manner in which the injury was inflicted, the reason for the infliction of the injury and the circumstances the offence.
I have to consider the result of the offender’s conduct and the nature of any injury caused. Here, an element of the offence is causing grievous bodily harm and by any measure the harm here was serious and significant.
There is a wide range of matters covered by the phrase ‘grievous bodily harm’. The elements of the offence as to what was intended or foreseen, that is recklessness. An injury is caused recklessly if the person who commits it realised that actual bodily harm may possibly be inflicted on the victim by his actions, yet he went ahead and acted as he did: Crimes Act, s 4A. Although the element may be established by proof of intention or knowledge, I find that his plea involves an acceptance by Fretwell, that he actually thought about the consequence of his act and he at least realised the possibility of actual bodily harm occurring.
The offence punishes the causing of the grievous bodily harm to the person and the act that he did to cause that injury and his intention. The recklessness is to the extent of the injury. He cannot be punished for intentionally causing more serious harm than assault occasioning actual bodily harm: The Queen v De Simoni [1981] HCA 31; (1981) 147 CLR 383. But the extent of the grievous bodily harm suffered is an important measure.
I was reminded that Courts have to be particularly careful given that s 21A(2) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act can be a trap encouraging judges into double counting matters in aggravation and I will not do so. My focus is on the facts of what occurred and the consequences of the offender’s action.
The victim was close to death that night. He will suffer the consequence for the rest of his life. His measured Victim Impact Statement reflects the medical material before me. He does not appear to attempt to exaggerate in any way. That statement will be taken into account.
Here the offender used his Toyota Landcruiser, in effect, as a weapon; and a Toyota Landcruiser with a bull bar is a formidable weapon. In a statement to his psychologist the offender spoke of this being an “accident”. This was not an accident.
As the facts note, he accelerated and drove towards the Ford Territory knowing that his victim had just left that car and was on the roadway. The best that can be said for him, and what reduces this below the worst case, is that what he did was unplanned and utterly impulsive.
Seeing the victim leave the vehicle, Fretwell would have had no time to think through the consequences of what was, I accept, a spontaneous action, which involved deliberately driving towards his victim.
It was an offence that by any measure falls well above the mid-range of objective seriousness.
A driver who fails to stop and render assistance after an accident commits a serious offence. In some situations that failure alone could lead to a police investigation being compromised or a charge being avoided. It is possible, and I have been involved in cases, where death results from such a failure. But here, this charge is for sentence alongside the matter that caused injury.
Despite its high maximum penalty, a stop and render assistance offence will rarely bear the same degree of moral culpability as the principal offence: Hoskins v R [2020] NSWCCA 18 at [14]-[15] (Basten JA).
Here in particular, although he did not stop, Fretwell drove immediately to a nearby police station. He called triple-0. He would have known that others at the scene would have rendered assistance to the victim immediately. While there is a suspicion he disposed of the dash cam USB card, he is not charged with a hinder offence. This is not a circumstance of aggravation in this matter, as it has not been provided beyond reasonable doubt.
While morally reprehensible his conduct in leaving the scene did not add significantly to the criminality involved in the incident and he did not, by simply fleeing, hinder the police investigation. It falls low in the range of matters of this type.
The offender bombarded the female complainant in an attempt to manipulate her. He seemed to have blamed her for not supporting him. He had no regard for her. His clear disregard for the terms of the ADVO and the well-being of someone he had lent on for support when troubled make this a serious offence.
The criminality of breaching an ADVO rests, not only in the extent of the communications and what was said and threatened, but the complete disregard for the Court order which undermines the authority of the courts. If court orders and Apprehended Violence Orders are ignored as Fretwell did, the law and the courts are diminished as is the court’s capacity to protect individuals. Such matters are treated seriously, and additional punishment is required for this matter: Suksa-Ngacharoen v R [2018] NSWCCA 142 at [132]; Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 37; (1998) 194 CLR 610; Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150.
Other factors that aggravate the sentence were there that Fretwell was subject to a Community Release Order and on bail. He was also subject, of course, to the ADVO, but that matter cannot be double counted.
He has a criminal record, but the breaches have already been taken into account. He is he is not entitled to the leniency often given to first offenders and it is important to note that the offences, which commenced with the break-up of his marriage in 2020, appear to have a domestic violence component.
The case for the offender is set out in a report of Mr Borenstein, a psychologist. There are portions of it that go to the offender’s view of the objective facts. Those matters are not on oath. They simply repeat what the offender said: R v Qutami [2001] NSWCCA 353. They contradict the Agreed Facts and the plea of guilty, which was adhered to today. I pay them no regard so far as my assessment of objective seriousness are concerned.
A submission was made that Fretwell has shown remorse. He said to Mr Borenstein that he expressed remorse and contrition and wishes to pursue psychological treatment to learn effective ways of achieving emotional regulation and manage his PTSD. But he also gave a version of events that sought to characterise the event as an accident and that show that he himself was frightened.
I accept that he is sorry for the predicament he is in and the consequences to himself. I accept that aware as he is of the harm that was caused his victim, he has a natural instinct to say, I wish it did not happen and that he did not suffer the way he had. He has accepted responsibility, but it is begrudging. I cannot find that he has any genuine remorse for the catastrophic harm that he caused. I do not however increase the sentence because of that finding.
The submission was made that his background is such that his moral culpability should be lessened because his capacity to mature and learn from experience was impeded. Reference was made to Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; (2013) 249 CLR 571.
There were problems with his family when he was younger but there is no indication his childhood had any lasting impact on his moral compass or his moral culpability. To the contrary, for the first 45 years of his life he was an engaged productive citizen who contributed to the community as a worker, a parent, a father, and by community service. It is clear however that following the break-up of his first relationship things went downhill and he suffered subject to a number of significant stressors and that meets the criteria for chronic and severe symptoms of PTSD.
There are elements in his psychological profile which note “unhappiness and apprehension”. He was taking anti-depressants. There is evidence of depression and anxiety, and that he “struggled emotionally”. It is clear that some of those matters are because of the predicament that he is placed in, but it is also clear that he was not in a good psychiatric state in November 2024, as is obvious from the commission of the breach offences when this offence occurred.
Any underlying mental illness or condition has to be taken into account, and I will do so. But this does not mean that the principles in regard to imposing a sentence which should deter him from future offending or deter others cannot be taken into account. There is a community expectation that anyone who did what he did would suffer appropriate retribution and others in the community must understand the consequence of using a motor vehicle to endanger someone and cause the injuries that were caused in this matter.
There are three matters for sentence. There will be some modest accumulation as between them. There will be a significant head sentence in this matter as against the maximum penalty for the principal offence.
The offender’s behaviour prior to when he first started offending four or five years ago, his problems coping in custody (and I do not ignore the lived experience of gaol), his need for assistance dealing with his PTSD and underlying psychiatric conditions (which will be best treated in the community rather than in custody) and his need for monitoring and assistance in adjusting to normal community life, require a finding of special circumstances.
He would like to be released so he can care for his elderly mother but sadly that cannot be. This is not a matter where her needs are said to meet the requirements commonly referred to as the Edwards test: R v Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510. But there will be a finding of special circumstances. His release however will be subject to a finding by the State Parole Authority. I will have a copy of Mr Borenstein’s report accompany the warrant.
Ms Costigan, for the Director, and Mr McKenzie, of counsel, provided comprehensive written submissions to which they spoke. I have sought to do justice to differences between them, and we have discussed many matters in the course of submissions. I do not intend to explicitly refer to each of the matters raised in the written submissions, but I have considered and addressed them in coming to my determinations.
Ms Costigan submits that the false narrative does him no credit, but post offence conduct does not aggravate the principal offence. She stresses appropriately the element of the offence, grievous bodily harm, and the extent of the grievous bodily harm revealed in the reports.
Mr McKenzie urged me not to impose a ‘crushing’ sentence: MAK v R; MSK v R [2006] NSWCCA 381; R v Clinch (1994) 72 A Crim R 301 at [306]. That is not impose a sentence that would ‘crush’ all hope for a productive life on release or cause the offender to lose motivation, abandon hope and not cooperate with gaol authorities which would reduce his chance of rehabilitation.
No sentence should operate to destroy prospects of rehabilitation and reform. An extremely long sentence can do that, but I have to impose a proportionate sentence. What may be seen as ‘crushing’ can depend on the perspective of the observer; whether they are the victim, the community, the appeal court or the offender themselves: Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Beattie [2017] NSWCCA 301; MAK v R; MSK v R.
I have sought in this judgment to identify relevant factors and discuss their significance, but I have to ultimately make a value judgment as to the appropriate sentence: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [51]. I take into account the maximum penalty here for the principal offence of 10 years and the plea of guilty. A court has to take into account all material facts, some here aggravate, some mitigate. I have to give weight to the conflicting purposes of sentencing which makes discretion so hard and more difficult, but that is my job.
Here, the deterrence of this offender will be served by any time in custody but others have to understand, that spontaneous though this action was, actions have consequences and here the actions and their consequences were significant. I have to impose a sentence that marks the Court’s view of the seriousness of the crime and lets others know what will happen if they commit similar crimes: R v Herring (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 203; Ryan v The Queen [2001] HCA 21; (2001) 206 CLR 267; R v Windle [2012] NSWCCA 222. And a sentence that meets community expectations in matters such as this, must also do justice to the history of a man who, for most of his life, was a productive useful citizen who hopefully on release will be able to prove to everyone that he can again lead a productive life in the community.
I have to indicate a sentence for each matter.
For the breach matter there will be a sentence of 9 months imprisonment indicated.
For the leave scene of accident there will be a sentence of 9 months imprisonment.
For the cause previous bodily harm, being reckless as to causing actual bodily harm, there will be a sentence indicated for 6 years and 6 months and a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months.
The aggregate sentence in this matter (reflecting a finding of special circumstances) is 7 years imprisonment. The minimum term that must be served in custody before being eligible for release to parole is 4 years and 6 months. The 7 year sentence will start the date that he went into custody, being 7 November 2024. There is a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months. He will be eligible for consideration for release on 6 May 2029. The parole period, if he is allowed it, will be 2 years and 6 months. The total sentence will expire on 6 November 2031.
There is a minimum period of driver’s licence disqualification of 12 months. I could have made it longer, but a licence is very important tool when someone is released from gaol. It can enable them to find employment and accommodation and rehabilitate in the community. That disqualification period will be stayed while he is in custody.
**********
R
Fretwell [2025] NSWDC 557
(2002) 56 NSWLR 146
(2013) 249 CLR 571
(2005) 228 CLR 357
(1998) 194 CLR 610
(2001) 206 CLR 267
(1981) 147 CLR 383
Police saw him at the front of the police station. He was placed under arrest for testing and soon after for failing to stop after a collision. He has been in custody ever since. He participated in an electronically recorded interview with detectives where he denied being in contact with the female complainant and gave another false version of events.
A search of his vehicle revealed that his mobile phone was on the passenger’s seat. He did have a dashcam facility in his car but there was no STD card in the dashcam.
At the time of the collision the female complainant heard the bang, but she could not see anything apart from plastic debris. She opened the driver door and ran to the front of her vehicle. There she saw her brother lying on the ground face down, his body and legs were twisted and he was groaning. His clothing had been ripped. She called triple-0, as did other witnesses. All rendered first aid to the victim until paramedics arrive. The victim was conscious at first but bleeding profusely. He lost consciousness. He was airlifted eventually to St George Hospital.
Examination of the scene revealed damage to the passenger’s side of the vehicle with large indentations. There were blood smears. Body matter was found between the panels of the rear bumper and rear passenger side. There were broken fragments of the vehicle and pieces of human bone, and other body matter was found. There were scrub marks and dents along the side of the vehicle. The victim’s shoe was found under the car. There are photographs in the Agreed Facts.
The victim was hospitalised for over five months. He was transferred between hospitals in Sydney and the Illawarra. He sustained injuries to his face and chin. He had, a dislocated and fractured shoulder, fractures to his legs, and a shattered pelvis.
He has had to return into hospital for major surgery. He had bone grafts to his femur and pelvis. He has been unable to walk since and uses a wheelchair. He has recurring pain over various parts of his body. They range from pins and needles to burning and stabbing pains. He suffered significant injuries to his genitals requiring surgical intervention. He may not be able to have further children.
Various medical reports before the Court confirm the nature and extent of his injuries and the extensive and varied treatments and his medical history. A poignant, simple phrase in some of the medicals, sums up the nature of the injuries. They record, “Pedestrian v Truck”.
The Crown sought an opinion from Dr Langcake, of St George Public Hospital, The report of 7 October 2025, comprehensively notes the extent of the injuries including images showing how badly damaged the leg and femur were. It notes that while the victim was undergoing debridement and dressing of various wounds in the operating theatre, he had a cardiac arrest requiring cardiopulmonary resuscitation. He underwent multiple operative procedures. He has significant damage to the complex network of nerves that go through the pelvis from the lower back to the legs. Because of the implants he had to receive there were infections, requiring long term antibiotics. He may be on antibiotics for the rest of his life. He has had further reconstructive surgery and complicated necrosis in the flaps which were placed on his thigh wound.
The report concludes he suffered “catastrophic injuries” and was “near death” when he arrived at St George Hospital.
He has ongoing issues with loss of function and mobility and will require more surgeries given the loss of bone as a consequence of his injuries.
It concludes: