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[2025] QCA 208
respondent. The application for leave to appeal against sentence was dismissed. The sentences imposed at first instance were not disturbed.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The Court of Appeal refused Mr Freemantle leave to challenge his 10-year sentence for drug trafficking. The trafficking was substantial, lasted about 10 months and escalated from storing drugs and cash to taking an active role in transactions. The sentencing judge took account of the guilty plea and personal circumstances, as well as the seriousness of the offending and the consequences of the serious violent offence declaration. Earlier cases helped frame the assessment but did not dictate a fixed sentence. The Court of Appeal was not satisfied that the sentence fell outside the permissible range or that the sentencing judge had made an error warranting appellate intervention.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
1,949 words · generated 07/10/2026
Neil Leslie Freemantle applied for leave to appeal against sentences imposed in the Supreme Court of Queensland. His sole proposed ground was that the 10-year head sentence for trafficking in a dangerous drug was manifestly excessive ([4]). The Court of Appeal dismissed the application ([53]).
Mr Freemantle pleaded guilty to 10 counts on 10 December 2021. These included trafficking over a period from 1 November 2017 to 11 September 2018; supplying cannabis on two occasions; possessing various drugs, including cocaine, MDMA, cannabis, diazepam and testosterone; and possessing items said to be used in connection with crime ([2]). On 27 January 2022, the sentencing judge imposed 10 years' imprisonment on the trafficking count, with parole eligibility set for 27 January 2030. A one-month sentence was imposed for diazepam possession. On the other counts, Mr Freemantle was convicted but not further punished ([3]).
The agreed facts described an operation run from a New Farm unit. At first, Mr Freemantle mainly stored drugs and illegally obtained cash for others, and others used the unit for transactions. Over time, his role increased. By the time police recordings began at the end of August 2018, he was engaging in all transactions. The recordings captured approximately 30 drug transactions over about 12 days, as well as conversations about concealing proceeds ([6]–[9]).
The drugs located at the unit had an estimated value, on the agreed figures, of between $681,336 and $1,031,052 ([10]). Police also found approximately $1.5 million in cash, some of which belonged to people higher in the syndicate and some of which Mr Freemantle owned personally ([14]). The sentencing judge accepted that Mr Freemantle did not know the commercial quantity of MDMA was at the premises ([12]). That issue was part of the sentencing facts; the appeal did not challenge the judge's finding about the relationship between the applicant's mental health and offending ([21]).
At sentence, the judge regarded the offending as very serious. He considered the guilty plea, Mr Freemantle's age, criminal history and mental health, and the impact of an automatic serious violent offence declaration. The judge stated that the criminality warranted more than 10 years, but imposed 10 years after allowing for personal circumstances and the plea ([20]–[23]). The appeal question was not whether a shorter sentence could have been imposed. It was whether the 10-year sentence was outside the permissible range or otherwise affected by an error warranting appellate intervention.
The Court of Appeal applied the established distinction between a sentence that is severe and one that is manifestly excessive. At [26], Freeburn J quoted the principle from R v Jackson: there is no single “right” penalty, and an applicant must show that the sentence is beyond the allowable range or affected by an error of fact or law. A different judge placing different weight on the circumstances does not, by itself, demonstrate error.
The applicant argued that a sentence between 9 and 9½ years was within range, but that 10 years was outside the permissible bounds ([24]–[25]). The court treated that as a narrow contention requiring support in the circumstances, not as a conclusion that followed simply from the existence of lower sentences in other cases.
The sentencing judge had regard to the key features of the offending: its duration, the high-level wholesale quantities, the variety of drugs, the substantial cash, and Mr Freemantle's increasing role. The judge also considered mitigation, including the guilty plea and personal circumstances, and specifically addressed the effect of the serious violent offence declaration that followed from a sentence of 10 years or more ([20]–[23], [51]). The Court of Appeal found no basis to say those matters had been overlooked or that a relevant principle had been misapplied.
The court also examined a series of earlier Queensland Court of Appeal decisions. Its summary at [49] was deliberately qualified. Trafficking cases differ in the nature of the enterprise and the offender's role; mitigating factors vary; a plea or subordinate role can place a sentence either side of 10 years; and the serious violent offence declaration may affect the sentencing assessment. These observations did not establish a fixed tariff.
Ultimately, the applicant did not establish a misapplication of principle or that the sentence was “plainly unreasonable or unjust” ([52]). The court concluded that the proposed manifest excess ground would be unsuccessful and dismissed leave ([52]–[53]).
The judgment does not purport to change the legal test for manifest excess. Rather, it applies the principles it identifies through R v Jackson and the cited sentencing authorities. The operative approach is that the sentence must be assessed against a permissible range, and appellate intervention is not justified just because another sentence might have been appropriate ([26]).
The decision also restates the role of comparative sentencing decisions. At [50], Freeburn J says comparable cases help provide a benchmark for consistency, but are flexible guidance rather than strict rules. The paragraph refers to R v Muirhead; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) for the proposition that no two cases are alike. The judgment's own survey illustrates this point: the earlier matters varied in trafficking duration, scale, the offender's role, plea timing, criminal history and mitigation ([30]–[48]).
The judgment discusses the potential significance of the serious violent offence declaration. At [22]–[23], the sentencing judge had considered that a sentence of 10 years or more would require Mr Freemantle to serve 80 per cent before parole eligibility. At [49], Freeburn J notes that courts will often give weight to that consequence. The judgment does not treat that consequence as fixing the head sentence, nor does it provide a general rule that a sentence should be set below 10 years to avoid the declaration.
The source does not establish what the law was before the cited authorities or how the law changed after this decision. It provides a synthesis of the authorities relevant to this sentence application and applies them to Mr Freemantle's circumstances. Claims about subsequent doctrinal change would require material beyond this judgment.
At [26], the judgment quotes R v Jackson: “There is no one ‘right’ penalty in any case. There is always a range of permissible sentences.” In plain English, sentencing is not a calculation that produces one uniquely correct number. A sentence may be open to appeal only if it crosses the legal boundary of what is permissible, rather than because a different judge might have chosen a lower figure.
At [49], the court identifies several features that make comparison difficult: the nature of the enterprise, the offender's role, mitigation, the guilty plea and the declaration's consequences. In plain English, two cases may both involve drug trafficking yet still differ in ways that matter to sentence. The court's survey is therefore a source of guidance, not a table from which a sentence can be selected mechanically.
At [50], the court states that comparable cases offer “flexible guidance rather than impose strict rules”. This means sentencing comparisons are useful for consistency, but cannot replace an assessment of the actual offending and offender. The court expressly recognises that no two cases are alike.
At [51], Freeburn J records that the sentencing judge took into account the seriousness of the offending, mitigating factors, the plea, yardstick cases and the consequences of the serious violent offence declaration. In plain English, the appeal court considered whether the sentencing process had addressed the main relevant considerations, rather than deciding the sentence afresh.
At [52], Freeburn J concludes that the applicant had not established a misapplication of principle or that the sentence was plainly unreasonable or unjust. This is the reason the appeal ground failed. The court did not need to find that 10 years was the only possible sentence; it held that the applicant had not shown a basis for appellate intervention.
This decision is most directly relevant to sentence appeals alleging manifest excess in serious Queensland drug-trafficking cases, particularly where the proposed argument depends on comparison with other sentencing decisions. It addresses how a court may assess trafficking that takes place over an extended period, involves wholesale quantities and substantial proceeds, and includes a role that changes over time ([6]–[16]).
The judgment may also be relevant where an offender argues that a sentence just above a particular threshold is excessive because a lower sentence would avoid the consequences of a serious violent offence declaration. The sentencing judge expressly considered the 80 per cent requirement, and the Court of Appeal included the declaration's effect among the factors that courts may weigh ([22]–[23], [49], [51]). The judgment does not say that this consequence dictates a particular head sentence.
It is also relevant to arguments based on yardstick cases. The court reviewed decisions involving principals and subordinates, different trafficking periods, pleas and personal circumstances. It cautions against treating any one of those comparisons as a mandatory sentencing range ([41]–[50]).
The decision should not be read as deciding every sentence appeal involving drug trafficking, nor as establishing that 10 years is a minimum, maximum or standard sentence. Its conclusion is tied to the facts and arguments before the court. The judgment's own account emphasises that the role, scale and circumstances of each enterprise can vary.
The supplied judgment contains no decisions issued after R v Freemantle was delivered on 31 October 2025. It therefore does not show how later courts have treated or applied this decision, and no later treatment can be reliably stated from this source alone.
The judgment does explain how it uses earlier decisions. Freeburn J considers R v Malone and other Court of Appeal authorities as yardsticks, and summarises their relevance to trafficking cases with different features ([30]–[48]). In particular, the discussion of R v Carlisle cautions against treating the distinction between “principals” and “subordinates” as a rigid division. The precise participation and scale of the enterprise vary ([40]–[43]). The court also refers to R v Johnson, R v Safi and R v KAQ when discussing the ranges and considerations appearing in earlier cases ([46]–[48]).
Those references show the role of precedent within this judgment: earlier cases inform consistency, but the court applies them in light of the present facts. They do not provide evidence of how subsequent courts have treated Freemantle itself.
The judgment resolves the proposed ground on the record before it, but leaves broader questions outside its scope. It does not prescribe how much weight a sentencing judge must give to the serious violent offence declaration in every case. It records that the declaration's consequences were considered here and that courts often give them weight, while leaving the assessment to the circumstances ([22]–[23], [49], [51]).
Nor does it specify a numerical range applicable to all wholesale trafficking cases. Its survey identifies sentences around or on either side of 10 years in different circumstances, and expressly rejects strict rules derived from comparable cases ([49]–[50]). How a later case compares will depend on its own features.
The judgment also does not decide whether a different sentence, such as 9 or 9½ years, would have been preferable. The legal question was whether the 10-year sentence was manifestly excessive, not whether another penalty could reasonably have been imposed. That distinction follows from the principle at [26].
Finally, the source gives no later case history for R v Freemantle. Its subsequent treatment, including whether later courts apply, distinguish or qualify it, cannot be assessed from the judgment supplied.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Freemantle [2025] QCA 208
PARTIES: R / v / FREEMANTLE, Neil Leslie / (applicant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 30 of 2022 / SC No 1497 of 2020 / SC No 11 of 2022
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 27 January 2022 (Boddice J)
DELIVERED ON: 31 October 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 5 June 2025
JUDGES: Bond JA, Freeburn and Sullivan JJ
ORDER: The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in a dangerous drug, two counts of supplying a dangerous drug, two counts of possessing a dangerous drug in excess of 2 grams, one count of possessing a dangerous drug in excess of 200 grams, one count of possessing a dangerous drug in excess of 500 grams, two counts of possessing a dangerous drug and one count of possessing a thing used in connection with the commission of a crime – where the applicant was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment with a parole eligibility date some eight years into the future for count 1 – where the applicant was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment for count 8 – where the applicant was convicted and not further punished on counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 – whether the head sentence of 10 years is manifestly excessive – whether the application for leave to appeal against the sentence should be granted / R v Barker [2015] QCA 215, considered / R v Carlisle [2017] QCA 258, considered / R v Gordon [2016] QCA 10, considered / R v Jacobs [2016] QCA 28, considered / R v Johnson [2014] QCA 79, considered / R v KAQ; R v KAQ; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2015) 253 A Crim R 201; [2015] QCA 98, considered / R v Luu [2018] QCA 281, considered / R v Malone [2021] QCA 76, considered / R v Safi [2015] QCA 13, considered / R v Tran; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2018] QCA 22, considered
COUNSEL: E J Coker for the applicant (pro bono) / D Kovac for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Guest Lawyers for the applicant (pro bono) / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
BOND JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Freeburn J and with the order proposed by his Honour.
FREEBURN J: On 10 December 2021 the applicant, Mr Freemantle, pleaded guilty to 10 counts, namely:count 1 – trafficking in a dangerous drug (between 1 November 2017 and 11 September 2018);count 2 – supplying a dangerous drug (cannabis – 17 February 2018);count 3 – supplying a dangerous drug (cannabis – 10 September 2018);count 4 – possessing a dangerous drug in excess of 2 grams (cocaine – 10 September 2018);count 5 – possessing a dangerous drug in excess of 200 grams (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (‘MDMA’) – 10 September 2018);count 6 – possessing a dangerous drug in excess of 500 grams (cannabis – 10 September 2018);count 7 – possessing a dangerous drug in excess of 2 grams (MDMA – 10 September 2018);count 8 – possessing a dangerous drug (diazepam – 10 September 2018);count 9 – possessing a dangerous drug (testosterone – 10 September 2018); andcount 10 – possessing a thing used in connection with the commission of a crime (heat sealer, black suitcases, money counter and cryovac packaging – 10 September 2018).
On 27 January 2022, Mr Freemantle was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on count 1 with a parole eligibility date some eight years into the future – 27 January 2030. On count 8 Mr Freemantle was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment. On counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 Mr Freemantle was convicted and not further punished.
Mr Freemantle seeks leave to appeal against those sentences. If leave is granted, the sole ground of appeal to be relied on is that the head sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive in the circumstances.
The parties agreed to a statement of facts at the sentencing hearing. That statement recorded that Mr Freemantle conducted his drug trafficking activities from a unit in New Farm. He resided there with his girlfriend.
Mr Freemantle trafficked in high-level ‘wholesale’ quantities of cocaine, cannabis, steroids, MDMA and 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine (‘MDA’) for approximately 10 months between November 2017 to 11 September 2018. In respect of the first nine months or so of that period, from November 2017 and 29 August 2018, the evidence against Mr Freemantle was limited to his excessive expenditure on luxury items, luxury holidays, unexplained income and a drug supply that took place on 17 February 2018 (which formed count 2). In respect of the period from 29 August 2018 until 10 September 2018, the evidence included recordings obtained by means of a listening device. Those recordings show that Mr Freemantle engaged in approximately 30 drug transactions over that period of 12 days or so. The recordings also show that Mr Freemantle engaged in conversations with associates designed to hide the cash proceeds of the drug trafficking activities.
The Agreed Statement of Facts
The agreed statement of facts records that Mr Freemantle participated in the drug trafficking as part of a drug syndicate, and that his role escalated over the trafficking period.
At the beginning of the period, Mr Freemantle’s primary role was to store both dangerous drugs and illegally obtained cash on his premises for others. His residence was used by others for drug transactions. Initially Mr Freemantle did not have any direct involvement in the transactions at his residence, but he was present.
Over time, Mr Freemantle became more involved in the transactions. By the time the listening device was installed at the end of August 2018, Mr Freemantle was engaging in all transactions. Mr Freemantle had a small network of ‘runners’ who moved drugs from Brisbane to interstate. Mr Freemantle informed a customer that another customer owed him “70 grand”. He offered customers a “100% return policy”. Count 3 involved Mr Freemantle selling a customer 8.91 kilograms of cannabis for approximately $50,000.
The value of the dangerous drugs located at Mr Freemantle’s residence was considerable. A table forming part of the statement of facts is as follows:
Drug Amount of drug Value
Cannabis 44.725 kilograms If sold in ounces between $191,678 and $479,205 / If sold in pounds between $118,329 and $394,640
Cocaine 432.7 grams gross (170 grams pure) If sold in grams between $151,445 and $259,620 / If sold in ounces between $69,541 and $139,082
MDMA 2004.2 grams gross (600 grams pure) If sold in grams between $300,630 and $601,200 / If sold in half ounces approximately $472,418
MDA (used price of MDMA) 84.477 grams (10.618 pure) If sold in grams between $12,671 and $25,343.1[0] / If sold in half ounces approximately $19,912.43
Testosterone 30 vials Approximately $5,000
Total Between $681,336 and $1,031,052
The Crown accepted that the dangerous drugs located in Mr Freemantle’s residence belonged to others. However, despite a lack of ownership, Mr Freemantle had knowledge of the existence of the drugs and exercised control over them.
Mr Freemantle was sentenced on the basis that he had no knowledge that the commercial quantity of MDMA was located at his premises. He believed those drugs were left at his residence at the time that other drugs were delivered there for distribution.
The drugs other than MDMA were possessed by Mr Freemantle for a commercial purpose.
Police located a total of approximately $1.5 million in cash at the premises. Some of that cash was stored for persons above Mr Freemantle in the drug syndicate, but a portion was owned by Mr Freemantle personally.
Police seized some luxury items which the Crown contends were tainted property including three Rolex watches, a Breitling watch, a Versace watch and Louis Vuitton luggage.
Mr Freemantle’s tax returns showed an average income of $64,561 per annum in the period 2012 to 2017 but in the period between November 2017 and September 2018 he spent $65,000 renting a luxury house in New Farm. Police analysis showed that Mr Freemantle and his girlfriend received $346,573 during the trafficking period – excluding his interest in the $1.5 million found at the residence.
Submissions of Counsel
The Crown referred the primary judge to R v Malone (discussed below).1 The Crown conceded that in Mr Freemantle’s favour was his plea of guilty. The Crown submitted for a sentence of between 9½ and 11½ years imprisonment.
The primary judge expressed his concerns to defence counsel:
“Of course, I can [have regard to Mr Freemantle’s undiagnosed schizophrenia] and I will, but I’m struggling to see why that necessarily would bring this case to under 10 years. In fact, I’m struggling to see how the Crown could be suggesting that this case is anything other than a case in the order of 11 to 13 years. This is very serious offending over an extended period of time where your client has gone from, in any effect, the keeper of drugs and money…to being an active participant in the trafficking operation which was escalating but for the fact that the police shut it down. He would have been going – making enormous sums of money.”
The Sentencing Remarks
In his Honour’s sentencing remarks the primary judge:noted Mr Freemantle’s pleas of guilty which had saved the community and court time and resources;said he regarded the offending as very serious drug offending involving a 10-month period trafficking multiple drugs in high volumes for large cash returns;accepted that initially Mr Freemantle’s role was as the keeper of the drugs and the money, but his involvement morphed into being an active participant so that by the time of the closure of the operation Mr Freemantle’s role in the trafficking had some intensity;noted the evidence that Mr Freemantle received $346,573 – quite separately from the $1.5 million found at the premises;observed the magnitude of the operation by reference to the cash found and the very significant amounts of drugs.
The primary judge noted Mr Freemantle’s age, his largely irrelevant criminal history and the deterioration in his mental health at the time of the offending. However, his Honour was doubtful the evidence established that Mr Freemantle’s undiagnosed schizophrenia had any relationship with his offending. That finding is not challenged.
The primary judge considered the yardsticks of 9½ to 11½ years and decided that this very significant drug trafficking called for a sentence “towards the upper end of those yardsticks.” His Honour specifically considered whether Mr Freemantle’s personal circumstances would warrant the imposition of a sentence of less than 10 years imprisonment, notwithstanding the overall criminality. His Honour expressly considered that factor because the consequence of the legislation was that, if the court imposed a sentence of 10 years of more, Mr Freemantle must serve 80 per cent of that sentence.
His Honour concluded his sentencing remarks in this way:
“That requires this Court, therefore, to consider whether all of circumstances, including your personal circumstances, your cooperation by your pleas of guilty, and the consequences of imprisonment for a person who suffers from a significant mental condition in circumstances of, particularly, the COVID restrictions that are imposed, would represent a just balance between the sentencing principles.
Ultimately, I am satisfied that, even allowing for your personal circumstances, your criminal conduct warrants a sentence of imprisonment in excess of 10 years.
As a consequence of your personal circumstances and the cooperation shown by your pleas of guilty, I intend to impose, instead, a sentence of 10 years imprisonment. That will have the consequence that you must serve 80 per cent because there will be an automatic declaration of a serious violent offence.
Whilst that is unfortunate in your particular circumstances, I am satisfied the circumstances are such that a sentence of less than 10 years would not properly reflect your criminality, even allowing for your personal circumstances.”
Applicant’s Submissions
Mr Freemantle contends that the range of appropriate sentences, taking into account both the objective features of the offending, and the subjective features personal to Mr Freemantle, did not extend to a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Instead, Mr Freemantle submits that a sentence of 9 to 9½ years imprisonment should have been imposed.
It is a narrow window. The contention is that 9 or 9½ year is within ‘range’ but the sentence of 10 years is “outside permissible bounds”.
As Chesterman JA explained in R v Jackson:2
“To succeed the applicant must demonstrate that the sentence imposed was beyond the permissible range, not that it was severe, or that a lesser punishment would have been appropriate, or even more appropriate that the one in fact imposed. There is no one “right” penalty in any case. There is always a range of permissible sentences. Different judges legitimately put weight on different circumstances and their opinions must be respected unless the sentence imposed is beyond the allowable range or is otherwise affected by an error of fact or law.”
“Comparable cases provide a benchmark to help ensure general consistency in sentencing decisions. However, sentencing must still take into account the unique circumstances of each individual case, including any material differences from the cases being compared. As emphasized by the Court in R v Muirhead; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld), the use of comparable cases is meant to offer flexible guidance rather than impose strict rules, acknowledging that no two cases are exactly alike.”
Counsel for Mr Freemantle acknowledged that to demonstrate a ground of manifest excess Mr Freemantle was required to:show more than that the sentence imposed was different, or even markedly different, from sentences imposed in other similar matters;satisfy the court that there has been a misapplication of principle, even though the particular misapplication cannot be discerned.3
The circumstances of the case do not support the conclusion that there was a misapplication of principle.
The Yardstick Cases
The case relied on by the Crown before the primary judge was R v Malone.4 In that case the applicant trafficked in methylamphetamine for a period of 15 months, predominantly at a ‘wholesale level’ although also at ‘street level’. A financial analysis showed that her expenditure exceeded her income by about $300,000. Ms Malone had the benefit of a plea of guilty,5 and had made commendable efforts at rehabilitation since she had been in custody. The head sentence was 12 years.
On the appeal, counsel for Ms Malone submitted that:the sentencing range open to the judge was between 9½ and 11½ years;the automatic declaration of a serious violent offence if the term was 10 years or more should have been moderated by imposing a sentence at the lower end of the range;whilst the primary judge has recognised the impact of the declaration, the sentence that was imposed (12 years) was insufficiently moderated for that factor.
McMurdo JA (with whom Sofronoff P and Boddice J agreed) reviewed a number of yardstick cases and concluded as follows:
“By those yardsticks, it fairly appears that the sentence in the present case was a heavy sentence. Nevertheless, this was an offence over a relatively lengthy period involving the wholesale distribution of the drug, and it was an enterprise in which the applicant persisted, despite close encounters with investigating police. It might be safely inferred that her profit was in excess of $300,000. There were mitigating factors, as the judge recognised, but the applicant was a mature person with an extensive criminal history. A lower sentence may well have been imposed in her case. Ultimately, however, this sentence is not demonstrated to be so high that it indicates that the judge has made some unidentified error in arriving at it. I would refuse the application for leave to appeal.”
Before the primary judge, Mr Freemantle’s counsel relied on six further Court of Appeal decisions, namely:R v Barker [2015] QCA 215;R v Gordon [2016] QCA 10;R v Jacobs [2016] QCA 28;R v Tran; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2018] QCA 22;R v Carlisle [2017] QCA 258; andR v Luu [2018] QCA 281.
In R v Barker there was a context as to the trafficking period, but the primary judge found that the relevant period was nearly 10 months. The trafficking involved methylamphetamine. A sum of nearly $1 million in cash was found on the applicant’s property. A report established unexplained income of nearly $1.8 million for a 16-month period. There was a timely guilty plea and a limited criminal history.
Philippides JA (with whom Morrison JA and Carmody J agreed) acknowledged the sentencing judge’s reference to R v Feakes as suggesting a range of 10 to 12 years for similar drug trafficking.6 Her Honour considered that the head sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment was within the sound exercise of the sentencing discretion.
R v Gordon involved a young offender who participated in escalating trafficking in methylamphetamine and cannabis over a lengthy period of nearly 5 years. Mr Gordon was involved in the production of methylamphetamine. He claimed to be able to make $335,000 from each production run. The sentencing judge relied on R v Feakes, R v Rodd and R v Galeano in imposing a head sentence of 10 years.7 Gotterson JA (with whom Fraser and McMurdo JJA agreed) was not persuaded that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
In R v Jacobs the offender was trafficking in methamphetamine.8 The head penalty imposed was for 10 years. Mr Jacobs, who had a lengthy criminal history, instructed his lawyers to admit to trafficking over a four-month period but he submitted that by mistake he was sentenced on the basis of a trafficking period of eight months. The court accepted eight months as accurate. McMurdo JA (with whom Fraser and Daubney JJA agreed) concluded that the sentence could not be described even as a heavy one and was not manifestly excessive.
R v Tran was an application by the Attorney-General for leave to appeal on the basis of the inadequacy of the primary judge’s sentence of 9½ years’ imprisonment, with a parole eligibility after 3 years and 2 months, for trafficking in methamphetamine over a five and one-half month period. Mr Tran had boasted of moving $50,000 per week. Boddice J (with whom Philippides and McMurdo JJA agreed) considered that:Mr Tran’s criminal conduct would have attracted a sentence of 10 years imprisonment but for the guilty plea;the primary judge’s reduction of the sentence to 9½ years was very significant because it meant that Mr Tran was not subject to an automatic declaration that he had been convicted of a serious violent offence which would have required him to serve 80 per cent of the head sentence of 10 years;the primary judge’s fixing of parole eligibility at 3 years and 2 months further ameliorated the sentence and had the effect of giving Mr Tran a ‘double benefit’ for his guilty plea;there was no proper basis for affording Mr Tran such a double benefit.
“The cited cases indicate that when the principals of large scale drug operations like Jacobs, Barker and Gordon plead, they often receive sentences of around 10 years, and when they do not plead, or plead very late, they receive sentences of 13 years (Milos), 13 years (Nabham, a late plea which he sought to withdraw), 15 years (Markovski) and 12 years (Versac).
On that basis, the starting point for a subordinate like the applicant should be substantially less than 13 to 16 years without the benefit of a plea.
Cases of trafficking by defendants on their own account in apparently smaller operations than the one in which the applicant was engaged cluster around the 10 year mark. Bradforth is an example of an effective sentence of 11 years for someone who was 24 to 25 years old, with a significant criminal history and who was in business on his own account. He was not an addict but a drug user.”
His Honour decided that an effective sentence of 11 years with a non-parole period was manifestly excessive. The sentence was reduced from 10 to 9 years’ imprisonment. The automatic serious violent offence declaration was set aside.
It is important to note that in R v Carlisle, Applegarth J was not intending to divide the cases into cases where the offender is the ‘principal’ and those cases where the offender is a ‘subordinate’. The precise nature of the offender’s participation will vary, as will the nature and scale of the criminal enterprise.
In R v Luu, the applicant was charged with trafficking in a number of dangerous drugs.10 The trafficking occurred over a lengthy period of nearly four years. She allowed her home to be used to warehouse drugs but there was no allegation that she was engaged directly in the supply of drugs. Nearly $1.8 million in cash was found in her premises. An analysis showed that she had unsourced income of $834,765 over the trafficking period. She was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment for the trafficking offence and convicted and not further punished for six associated possession charges. She was also sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for fraud offences to be served concurrently on the nine years for trafficking. Her parole eligibility was set at a date after 5½ years (that is, after one-half of the total of 11 years).
In R v Luu, the applicant argued that the sentence was excessive because, given the early plea of guilty, genuine remorse and the steps towards rehabilitation, the applicant was entitled to the ‘double benefit’ discussed in R v Tran. Douglas J (with whom Sofronoff P and Fraser JA agreed) considered that the sentence of nine years’ imprisonment for the trafficking was a considerable benefit to the applicant because it removed the requirement that she serve 80% of the sentence before being eligible for parole. The circumstances did not require the primary judge to set an earlier parole eligibility date.
Three further cases can be mentioned. In R v Johnson McMurdo P (with whom Holmes and Fraser JJA agreed) said:11
“In R v Feakes [2009] QCA 376, the applicant pleaded guilty to trafficking in an assortment of Sch 1 and Sch 2 dangerous drugs and to other related drug offences. He applied for leave to appeal against his 10 year sentence. He was 30 and 31 when he offended and 34 at sentence. He had some relevant but minor criminal history. The trafficking was committed in breach of a good behaviour bond when he was subject to “drug diversion”. His offending consisted of supplying drugs on 11 particularised occasions over a seven month period to covert police operative. He supplied 32 grams of cocaine, almost 5,000 tablets containing 330 grams of the then Sch 2 drug MDMA, and 110 grams of the Sch 2 drug MDEA. His benefit from drug related activity was over $56,000 and about $115,000 passed through his hands during the trafficking period. His trafficking was commercially motivated. After reviewing the cases of R v Kashton [2005] QCA 70; R v Assurson (2007) 174 A Crim R 78, [2007] QCA 273; R v Rodd; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2008] QCA 183 and R v Raciti [2004] QCA 359 this Court noted that, absent extraordinary circumstances, in cases of trafficking in Sch 1 drugs on this scale mature offenders who have pleaded guilty can expect a sentence of at least 10 years imprisonment. Younger offenders without a significant criminal history and with excellent rehabilitative prospects may be sentenced to slightly lesser terms. Feakes had a grossly dysfunctional upbringing and had made real efforts to overcome his dependence on cannabis and other drugs so that he had promising prospects of rehabilitation. Whilst a sentence of nine years imprisonment could have been imposed, the 10 year sentence was not manifestly excessive.”
“It is not necessary to discuss all of the many cases to which the Court was referred because the most relevant sentencing decisions have been extensively analysed in recent decisions of this Court: R v Galeano [2013] QCA 51 at [26] – [31], R v Ryan [2014] QCA 78 at [43] – [45], and R v Johnson [2014] QCA 79 at [43]-[46]. Of course there are various differences between this case and each of those cases and the cases examined in them, and each sentence must be determined by an exercise of discretion with reference to the distinctive facts and circumstances of the particular case. Even so, significant guidance for this case can be derived from those analyses. They reveal that for substantial trafficking in a Sch 1 dangerous drug of the order of the trafficking in this case, offenders who have pleaded guilty and invoked a range of mitigating factors have commonly been sentenced to terms of imprisonment upheld on appeal of between ten and twelve years (with the automatic declaration that the offence was a serious violent one).”
Some Conclusions
That non-exhaustive survey of the cases illustrates that:there are frequently differences in the nature of the criminal enterprise, as well as the nature of the offender’s role;there are also a range of mitigating factors which will bear on the discretion;the cases provide some guidance for ‘principals’ in a range of 10-15 years without a plea or with a late plea;those offenders with the advantage of a plea or with a ‘subordinate’ role might receive a sentence either side of 10 years;the court will often give weight to the effect of an automatic serious violent offence declaration which involves the mandatory non-parole period.
As the Crown submits, comparable cases provide a benchmark to help ensure general consistency in sentencing decisions, but sentencing must still take into account the unique circumstances of each individual case. As emphasised in R v Muirhead; Ex-parte Attorney-General (Qld), the use of comparable cases is meant to offer flexible guidance rather than impose strict rules, recognising that no two cases are alike.15
The maximum penalty for trafficking in dangerous drugs is 25 years’ imprisonment. In imposing the head sentence in this case, of 10 years’ imprisonment, the primary judge took into account the seriousness of the offending, the mitigating factors, the plea of guilty, the yardstick cases and the consequences of a serious violent offence declaration if the penalty imposed was of 10 years or more.
The applicant has not established any misapplication of principle, or that the sentence is plainly unreasonable or unjust. An appeal against sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive would be unsuccessful.
The application for leave to appeal should be dismissed.
SULLIVAN J: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Freeburn J and with the order proposed by his Honour.
[2021] QCA 76. ↩
[2011] QCA 103 at [25]. ↩
See R v Eaton [2019] QCA 147 at [71], quoting R v MCT [2018] QCA 189 at [240]. ↩
[2021] QCA 76. ↩
The plea was described by the primary judge as not being a timely plea. ↩
[2009] QCA 376. See also R v Johnson [2014] QCA 79. ↩
[2009] QCA 376; [2008] QCA 341; [2013] 2 Qd R 464. ↩
[2016] QCA 28. ↩
[2017] QCA 258. ↩
[2018] QCA 281. ↩
[2014] QCA 79 at [45]. ↩
[2015] QCA 13 at [18]. ↩
[2015] QCA 98. ↩
The trafficking in that case was for a period of nine months. He was described as the “clear leader of the Townsville drug trafficking syndicate”. He used a number of people to assist in the criminal enterprise.
R
Freemantle [2025] QCA 208
The application for leave to appeal against sentence was dismissed. The sentences imposed at first instance were not disturbed.
The Court of Appeal set aside the parole eligibility date but did not disturb the imprisonment term of 9½ years.
In R v Carlisle the primary judge had fixed a nominal sentence of 12 years for trafficking over a period of eight months.9 The primary judge reduced that nominal sentence to 10 years by reason of an early plea and a year spent in custody which could not be declared. Mr Carlisle had been engaged by another participant in the enterprise to be in charge of large quantities of drugs and cash held in two storage sheds. Large quantities of MDMA and cash ($426,000) were found in the sheds. There was a very early plea.
Applegarth J (with whom Gotterson and Morrison JJA agreed) analysed a number of similar cases. He distinguished between ‘subordinates’ as compared with ‘principals’. His Honour summarised the cases in this way:
[2019] QCA 244 at [65]. ↩