R v Forrest (No 4)

Catchwords: CRIME – Sentence – murder – shooting the deceased multiple times – disputed fact – whether the offender participated in the burning of the body – whether this participation in the burning of the body informed the objective seriousness of the murder – absence of remorse – deprived and disadvantaged background reducing moral culpability – countervailing factors that require increased weight to the protection of the community – brutal killing requiring a lengthy period of imprisonment

Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 18(1)(a), 19A
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), s 25C
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 21A(2)(j), 21A(2)(i) 30E(3), 44(2), 47(2), 54D
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 166(1)(b)
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 4(3), 4(4), 165
Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), ss 62(1)(b), 74(1)

Cases Cited: Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37
Callaghan v R [2006] NSWCCA 58; (2006) 160 A Crim R 145
Charbaji v R [2019] NSWCCA 28
Edquist-Wheeler v R [2024] NSWCCA 49
Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29
Knight v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 292; (2006) 164 A Crim R 126
Martino v The King [2024] NSWCCA 93
Mattiussi v R [2023] NSWCCA 289
Panetta v R [2016] NSWCCA 85
Potts v R [2012] NSWCCA 229; (2012) 227 A Crim R 217
R v El-Hayek [2004] NSWCCA 25; (2004) 144 A Crim R 90
R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374
R v Knight [2023] NSWSC 321
R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2
R v Saliba (No 4) [2025] NSWSC 659
R v Watson (No 3) [2022] NSWSC 1693
R v Wilkinson (No 5) [2009] NSWSC 432
Richardson v R [2013] NSWCCA 218
Versluys v R [2008] NSWCCA 76
Wilson v R [2025] NSWCCA 86

Category: Sentence

Parties: Rex (Crown)
Eric Forrest (Offender)

Representation: Counsel:
E Blizard (Crown)
J Hopper (Offender)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
George Sten & Co Criminal Lawyers (Offender)

File Number(s): 2023/00350546

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

1. On or about 25 September 2023, Eric James Forrest (“the offender”) murdered David Collisson (“the deceased”) using a shortened, double-barrelled shotgun at Menah, in the state of New South Wales. This was a brutal killing in which the offender’s intention to kill the deceased was realised when he shot the deceased once to the shoulder/chest area, ran back to the car, reloaded the firearm, and returned to shoot the deceased at least twice more at close range.

2. The offender must now be sentenced for murder, an offence contrary to s 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (“Crimes Act”). The offence carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment (s 19A of the Crimes Act), with a standard non-parole period of 20 years’ imprisonment: see item 1 of the table at s 54D of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“CSPA”).

3. In pre-trial proceedings before me on 1 October 2025, the offender was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to murder. On 8 October 2025, a jury was empanelled, and the trial commenced. On 3 November 2025, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to murder. The sentence proceedings for the offender were conducted before me on 27 February 2026.

4. The offender has been in custody since 25 October 2023, for reasons unrelated to the present offence. He was charged with murder and bail refused for that offence on 4 November 2023. He has not been in custody since 4 November 2023 solely in reference to the murder. It will therefore be necessary to consider issues of accumulation and concurrency and apply the principle of totality.

5. The Crown has made an application pursuant to s 30E(3) of the CSPA for the family’s victim impact statements to be taken into account “with the determination of the punishment for the offence on the basis that the harmful impact of a primary victim’s death on family victims is an aspect of harm done to the community”.

6. This Court may only do so if (a) the prosecutor applies for this to occur, and (b) the court considers it to be appropriate. I note that counsel for the offender has not resisted the application. I grant the application pursuant to s 30E(3) of the CSPA.

7. Three victim impact statements were tendered. The authors of the victim impact statements (the deceased’s son, mother, and older sister) expressed their deep grief, sense of loss, and emotional distress about the loss they suffered. The experience has devastated those left behind.

8. Joshua Collisson, the son of the deceased, stated that the psychological impact has been profound. He is not the same person as he was before the day of his father’s killing. He experienced trauma, shock, fear, anger, and confusion. The experience has made him question his own safety and trust in others. Tragically, before the killing, Mr Collisson and his father were working through their shared pain resulting from the years of separation.

9. Mr Collisson has very eloquently articulated the profound impact of such violent acts, which feed into cycles of pain and trauma that continue to spread through families and communities. He acknowledged that his father was not perfect but that he mattered and was loved.

10. Margaret Jamieson, the mother of the deceased, spoke of the loss of her child, with whom she maintained a relationship throughout the years, and the loss of a significant support for her at this stage of her life.

11. Bronwyn Vandergulik, the sister of the deceased, spoke about her struggles with coming to terms with the death of her brother. The siblings were close and although there were moments when they disagreed, they shared a strong bond. She felt angry when thinking about the unimaginable way in which her brother was taken away.

12. It is appropriate to commence these remarks by acknowledging the life lost. In matters such as this, judges are asked to perform an impossible equation. No human life can ever be equated with any penalty, including a period of imprisonment. No gaol term, of any length, can return a loved one. A life should never be measured simply by the punishment meted out to an offender.

13. The sentence I impose does not, and cannot, measure the value of Mr Collisson’s life. Instead, it reflects the sentencing discretion informed by proper principle. It must reflect adequate punishment, deterrence, and denunciation, in addition to rehabilitation and protection of the community. It must hold the offender to account and reflect the objective seriousness of the offence. It must also reflect the offender’s subjective case, his moral culpability, his prospects of rehabilitation, and the likelihood, or unlikelihood, of future offending.

14. The purposes of sentencing require that the offender be punished and held to account for his actions. He will be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment. The offender’s sentence to a term of full-time custody goes a long way to fulfilling those purposes. Punishment is not, however, the only purpose of sentencing. There are a number of other purposes which will be addressed in due course.

15. The offender is also to be sentenced in respect of two related offences which came before this Court on a certificate pursuant to s 166(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). The related offences are as follows:

(a) Sequence 2 - Use firearm in contravention of firearms prohibition order: s 74(1) Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) (“Firearms Act”). (b) Sequence 4 - Possess shortened firearm (not pistol) without authority: s 62(1)(b) Firearms Act.

16. The Local Court maximum penalty for sequences 2 and 4 is 2 years’ imprisonment and/or 50 penalty units. There is no standard non-parole period for these offences.

The circumstances of the offending

17. A preliminary issue arises about the factual circumstances underpinning the offending conduct for which the offender must be sentenced. The Crown relies upon the fact that the offender participated in the burning of the deceased’s body as a feature relevant to the objective seriousness of the offence of murder.

18. The offender disputes that he participated in the burning of the body and submits that the Court could not be satisfied of that conduct beyond reasonable doubt.

The principles relevant to fact finding following a jury verdict

19. The principles relevant to fact finding by a sentencing judge following a jury verdict are well established and are summarised in R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 at 377-378:

“1. Where, following a trial by jury, a person has been convicted of a criminal offence, the power and responsibility of determining the punishment to be inflicted upon the offender rest with the judge, and not with the jury: R v Harris [1961] VR 236; see also Kingswell v The Queen (1958) 159 CLR 264 at 283, per Mason J.

2. Subject to certain constraints, it is the duty of the judge to determine the facts relevant to sentencing. Some of these facts will have emerged in evidence at the trial; others may only emerge in the course of the sentencing proceedings. The fixing of an appropriate sentence ordinarily involves an exercise of judicial discretion, and it is for the judge to find the facts which are material to that exercise of discretion: Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1.

3. The primary constraint upon the power and duty of decision-making referred to above is that the view of the facts adopted by the judge for purposes of sentencing must be consistent with the verdict of the jury. This may produce the result that, in a particular case, the view of the facts which the judge is obliged to take is different from the view which the judge would have taken if unconstrained by the verdict: cf Maxwell v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 501. In the present case, for example, a trial judge might have considered that the facts supported a verdict of murder, not manslaughter; nevertheless, the judge would be obliged to sentence on the basis that the case was one of manslaughter. The fact that a judge may not agree with a jury’s verdict, and thus may be required to sentence on a basis different from the judge’s personal view of the case, is an inevitable consequence of the division of functions inherent in trial by jury.

4. A second constraint is that findings of fact made against an offender by a sentencing judge must be arrived at beyond reasonable doubt.

5. There is no general requirement that a sentencing judge must sentence an offender upon the basis of the view of the facts, consistent with the verdict, which is most favourable to the offender: R v Harris. However, the practical effect of 4 above, in a given case, may be that, because the judge is required to resolve any reasonable doubt in favour of the accused, then the judge will be obliged, for that reason, to sentence upon a view of the facts which is most favourable to the offender. When that occurs, it will be because of the application of the principle referred to in 4 to the facts of the particular case, and not because of some principle requiring sentencing on the basis of leniency: R v Lupoi (1984) 15 A Crim R 183 at 184.”

20. There are occasions where it is not possible to make a finding about one or more factual matters pertaining to the events constituting the offending or the roles of individuals involved in the offending. It may be that a sentencing judge is simply unable to make findings either because of the absence of evidence or due to the unreliability of the evidence. So much was recognised in Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 at [70]:

“Certainly, a sentencing judge must do his or her best to find the facts which determine the nature and gravity of the offending, including the facts which inform the offender’s moral culpability. Even so, it is sometimes not possible for the judge to ascertain everything which is relevant, especially where an offender chooses not to offer any evidence on the plea. Where that occurs, the judge must proceed on the basis of what is proved and leave to one side what is not proved to the requisite standard. As was stated in Weininger v The Queen:

‘The sentencing judge may not be able to make findings about all matters that may go to describe [the] circumstances. In particular, an offender may urge a particular view of the nature and circumstances of the offence, favourable to the offender. The sentencing judge may be unpersuaded that the view urged is, more probably than not, an accurate view of the circumstances. In such a case, it is not correct that the judge is bound to sentence the offender on that favourable basis, unless the prosecution proves the contrary beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, in the particular facts of Olbrich, where the offender asserted that he was no more than a courier of the drugs, but the sentencing judge disbelieved him, it was neither necessary nor appropriate to sentence him on the basis that he was a courier.’

That accords with the requirements in s 21A(1) of the Sentencing Act that facts be taken into account only in so far as they are ‘known to the court’ according to the principles of proof laid down in Olbrich.” (Footnotes omitted.)

Facts on sentence

21. As indicated above, the treatment of the deceased’s body after the murder is relied upon by the Crown as an aggravating factor. The Crown must prove the offender’s participation beyond reasonable doubt. It is, therefore, necessary to make findings in respect of this contentious issue. Before I do so, it is appropriate to set out the factual findings of which I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt having had regard to the jury verdict.

22. The deceased was 53 years of age at the time of his death. The offender was 32 years of age at the time of the murder.

23. The deceased was murdered by the offender using a shortened, double-barrelled shotgun which was never found.

24 September 2023

24. On 24 September 2023, the deceased drove with his partner Lesley Plasto and a friend, Scott Walters, from Sydney to Menah, a township not far from Mudgee. They took the journey in a black Kia which had been borrowed from a friend. They intended to stay at the home of Christopher Gillespie on a large farm named Burranah.

25. The deceased and Ms Plasto had stayed at Mr Gillespie’s home on three prior occasions. On the first visit the deceased and Ms Plasto picked up the offender in Dubbo and they drove to Menah together.

26. Either during or after the third visit to Mudgee an agreement had been reached between the deceased and Mr Gillespie that the deceased would take some opals owned by Mr Gillespie to Sydney and sell them. For this the deceased would receive a commission.

27. The purpose of the fourth trip was the collection of the opals. The deceased, Ms Plasto, and Mr Walters arrived at Menah by approximately 8:30am on 24 September 2023. The group spent the day at the farm and at various locations in and around Mudgee.

25 September 2023

28. The offender left Wyoming (on the Central Coast) on the morning of 25 September 2023 in a white Corolla. The GPS showed it was just outside of Gulgong at 12:14pm.

29. By 3:37pm, the offender was in a unit in Dubbo photographing himself with a shortened, double-barrelled shotgun whilst wearing gloves and a mask. The source of the firearm, and for how long the offender had been in possession of the firearm prior to that point, is unknown. The firearm depicted in the photograph (Exhibit T) is the murder weapon.

30. At some point after 3:58pm, the offender picked up Jesse McMillan-Davies in Dubbo. The offender dropped Mr McMillan-Davies’ female friend home. In the bathroom at her home, it is likely the offender and Mr McMillan-Davies injected amphetamines. The offender, Mr McMillan-Davies, and Alison Mudford travelled together in the white Corolla from Dubbo to Menah. Each injected amphetamines on the way while the offender was driving.

31. It is likely that the offender, Mr McMillan-Davies, and Ms Mudford arrived at the farm between 6:42pm and 7:36pm.

32. Earlier in the afternoon/evening the deceased had told Ms Plasto and Mr Walters to return to Sydney to return the borrowed black Kia. The reason the deceased decided to stay at the farm is unknown. The offender, Mr McMillan-Davies, and Ms Mudford arrived at Burranah after Ms Plasto and Mr Walters had already left in the black Kia.

33. When the offender, Mr McMillan-Davies, and Ms Mudford arrived a friend of Mr Gillespie’s, Jamie Curry, was present outside Mr Gillespie’s house. He observed some relatively minor friction between the offender and the deceased about an earlier drug transaction which appeared to resolve.

The offender produced the firearm

34. The deceased, Mr McMillan-Davies, Ms Mudford, and the offender were sitting in the backroom at Mr Gillespie’s house. At this point Mr Gillespie was not present.

35. From inside a pillowcase in a backpack the offender produced the shortened, double-barrelled shotgun.

36. As at 25 September 2023, the offender was the subject of a firearms prohibition order.

37. The firearm was passed around. The deceased used the lever to open the firearm. At this point the barrels were empty, that is the firearm was not loaded. Mr McMillan-Davies heard what sounded like ammunition “tinkling” in the pillowcase. The firearm was out at this stage for about five minutes. The mood in the room was “normal” or “flat”. The firearm was returned to the pillowcase and the backpack.

38. At some point after the firearm was put away Mr Gillespie arrived home. Mr Gillespie, Mr McMillan-Davies, and perhaps the offender, used methylamphetamine.

39. At 9:12pm, the deceased made a call of 105 seconds in duration to Bowen Arrowsmith. In that call the deceased appeared “fine”, and it was “quiet in the background”.

Plan to go to School Hill

40. At some point after 9:12pm, Mr Gillespie said that he wanted to go to School Hill, a remote location on the Ellerslie property, to inspect a fire (which had commenced burning the day before and been marked as “stopped” that afternoon). The offender was present for that conversation. About 20 minutes after Mr McMillan-Davies put petrol in the offender’s white Corolla the offender left the farm, turned right, and drove in the direction of Mudgee.

41. School Hill is 1.2 kilometres from the entrance to the Ellerslie driveway and 2.5 kilometres from the Burranah driveway. It was a part of the property infrequently visited by Catherine Cox, the owner of the property.

The murder

42. Mr Gillespie, Mr McMillan-Davies, and the deceased left Burranah, turned left and travelled to School Hill in one of the farm vehicles. Mr Gillespie drove and parked the vehicle facing a large tree with the headlights on. Mr Gillespie, Mr McMillan-Davies, and the deceased were looking at the tree with their backs to the dirt road when the offender arrived at School Hill driving the white Corolla. He did a U-turn and parked the car facing Wilbetree Road with the headlights turned on.

43. When the three men turned around the offender was pointing the firearm, (that had been passed around at the house), at the deceased. By this point the firearm had been loaded with at least one bullet (it was not loaded when the firearm was passed around earlier at the house).

44. The deceased yelled, “what are you doing?” and the offender said, “you want to treat me like a fucking gronk?”. The deceased yelled, “please don’t. Don’t. You’re my brother. I love you. Please don’t”. The deceased said he had cancer and asked, “why are you doing this?”. Both the deceased and the offender walked backwards in tandem while Mr McMillan-Davies and Mr Gillespie ran to shield themselves behind the open passenger door.

45. The offender discharged the shotgun for the first time and hit the deceased in the right shoulder/chest area. The force of the impact caused him to fall on his back. The deceased was rolling around and “squealing”. Mr McMillan-Davies described what he saw and heard at this point in the following way (Tcpt, 20 October 2025, p 602(27-45)):

Q. What was the next thing that you saw or heard?

A. I just remember the squealing coming out of him, out of Dave.

Q. What did it sound like?

A. I don’t think there is a noise like a stuck pig. Yeah, it was horrendous.

Q. So Dave was on the ground?

A. Like, flicking around. Like, yeah.

Q. When Dave was on the ground where was Eric Forrest?

A. Still in the same spot after he’d pulled the trigger.

Q. You said that Eric Forrest was in the same spot after he pulled the trigger. Did he stay in that spot?

A. No.

Q. Where did he go?

A. So, Dave when Dave hit the ground and he was, like, rolling and squealing, and then he’s got up on his feet.

46. The deceased got up and ran around the top side of the tree.

47. As the deceased ran around the tree the offender ran to the white Corolla. He reloaded the firearm with two rounds (the maximum capacity for that type of weapon) and then followed the deceased around the tree, gaining on him quickly. Mr McMillan-Davies described what he heard from this point in the following way (Tcpt, 20 October 2025, 603(35)-604(3)):

Q. After that 10 or 15 seconds, did you see what Eric Forrest did?

A. Yeah, he was running back up the hill, and he ran and followed and same place Dave was going.

Q. Around the left side as well?

A. Yep.

Q. Are you able to say how much space there was between them?

A. There was a fair bit at the start, but yeah, Eric gained on him pretty quick.

Q. What happened after Eric gained on him?

A. You could hear Dave running down the paddock squealing, where the trees are and around, and then you could hear him running down sort of towards the right-hand side of the tree down to the dark. (Witness indicated.)

Q. What could you hear?

A. Like, squealing, like Dave yelling, “Please, don’t. Stop. Stop.” And then couldn’t hear Eric say nothing. And then that’s when we heard another bang, and then heard Dave, like, squeal, and then another bang and then it went quiet.

48. The offender ran back to the white Corolla and threw the firearm in the back. He drove away. Mr McMillan-Davies went to the deceased, used his foot to roll the deceased’s body to inspect his face. Mr McMillan-Davies saw the deceased’s eyes were open and he was dead. Mr McMillan-Davies and Mr Gillespie returned to the Burranah farmhouse.

49. The precise motive for the murder is unknown.

50. In an intercepted call on 24 October 2023, the offender said the following:

“He could’ve stopped me from doing it mate. If anyone was going to stop me it was, it happened over him. Him fucking saying old mate was going to try and stand over me for the land and the opals.”

Events after the murder

51. Later, before daybreak, Mr McMillan-Davies drove back to School Hill on a large tractor. When he arrived, the offender was already there with one of the farm vehicles. The offender was wearing gloves and going through the deceased’s pockets. The offender gestured to Mr McMillan-Davies who then drove the tractor to the body, lowered the hay tines to the ground, and the offender rolled the deceased’s body onto the tines.

52. The offender walked towards the large tree and gestured to a spot at the back of the tree where there was significant foliage. Mr McMillan-Davies lowered the hay tines, and the offender rolled the deceased’s body off into the brush. The offender walked to the left side of the tree and picked up the deceased’s bumbag and mobile phones from the grass.

53. Later that day the offender attempted to turn on the deceased’s phones. The phones were never recovered.

54. On 27 September 2023, (on four occasions) the offender used, or attempted to use, the deceased’s Westpac bank card at a service station in Mudgee to purchase strawberry milk, online vouchers, and cigarettes. He used the card until there were no available funds.

Disputed fact - disposal of the body

55. What remains is the disputed fact that the offender participated in the disposal and the burning of the deceased’s body.

56. The Crown case at trial was that the offender directed Mr McMillan-Davies to move the body and in the hours or days following, participated in the burning of the deceased’s body. The Crown’s position is that the offender had done so with the assistance of Mr Gillespie.

57. The deceased’s body was burnt inside a large hollow tree stump metres from where Mr McMillan-Davies left the body. The body was stoked up several times with additional wood and accelerant.

58. A portion of the deceased’s bones and teeth were discovered by police inside the tree stump on 26 October 2023. Seventeen teeth and fragments of the bones of the skull, long bones, vertebrae, ribs, pelvis, shoulder, hands, and feet were located. The majority of the bone fragments were not identifiable as to origin due to the size and the degree of the distortion and deterioration caused by the fire.

59. The Crown contended that I would be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender played a role in the disposal of, and burning of, the body of the deceased based on the combination of the following circumstances:

(a) As at 14 September 2023, the deceased weighed 137 kilograms. The total of what remained was less than 4.6 kilograms including debris and other items mixed in with the bones. Mr Gillespie was 51 years of age who despite having conducted physical labour also appeared consistent with his chronological age. The Crown submitted that, even with the use of farm equipment, more than one person would have needed to manoeuvre the deceased’s remains into the tree stump. (b) Within 1-2 days of the BP transactions (27 September 2023) the offender was observed by Jamie Curry driving one of the farm Landcruiser vehicles out of the Burranah farm and turning left onto Wilbetree Road (travelling in that direction on Wilbetree Road leads to School Hill). (c) Mr Gillespie told Suanne Peacey about the murder, including using the words that the offender had “hunted him down like a dog and old mate was running away pleading”. As part of the same conversation Mr Gillespie said that “they” went back with the tractor. Whilst Mr Gillespie did not name the offender at this point of the conversation it was part of a short conversation (of approximately 40 seconds) where he was speaking about how “Forrest” had shot the deceased in the face. This conversation occurred between 7 and 25 October 2023. (d) Shortly before the police started searching on 25 October 2023, Mr Gillespie told Wade Patterson that he burnt the body in a stump with the offender (who he referred to as “Forrest”) and that they had stoked it (put more wood on the fire) three times. (e) On 19 October 2023, the offender made admissions to Malika Naden that:

(i) He “shot someone and put them in a log and burnt them”; (ii) “[T]hey put a heap of petrol on it”; (iii) “[T]hey wrapped the bloke up in something before they put him in the log and burnt him”; (iv) There were other people there (but he didn’t say who); and (v) That “it happened on a large farm just outside of Mudgee and they took the body a bit away from the property”.

60. With respect to circumstances (c) and (d) above, which concern the representations of Mr Gillespie, the offender submitted that the Court would apply the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (“Evidence Act”) in determining the weight of this evidence. Essentially, an application was made that I give myself a s 165 warning in respect of that evidence, given that Mr Gillespie was an unavailable witness in the trial. The offender submitted that even having regard to the circumstances relied upon (taken together rather than assessed in isolation), the Crown had not established beyond reasonable doubt that the offender participated in the disposal of the deceased’s body.

61. Although the Evidence Act does not apply to sentencing proceedings, s 4(3) of the Evidence Act provides that the Court must make a direction if (a) a party to the proceeding applies for such a direction in relation to the proof of a fact, and (b) in the court’s opinion, the proceeding involves proof of that fact, and that fact is or will be significant in determining a sentence to be imposed in the proceeding. Section 4(4) provides that the court must make a direction if the court considers it appropriate to make such a direction in the interests of justice.

62. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make a direction that the Evidence Act applies to a discrete area in these proceedings, namely, in respect of a warning pursuant to s 165 of the Evidence Act in relation to the evidence of Mr Gillespie.

63. Accordingly, I warn myself that Mr Gillespie’s evidence may be unreliable for the following reasons:

(a) Firstly, because Mr Gillespie was not available, there was no direct account of the murder from him. There was no opportunity to assess his demeanour as a witness and to assess the credibility and reliability of his account. (b) Secondly, his account as told to the witnesses, was not given on oath or affirmation in a court. (c) Thirdly, and importantly, his account could not be tested or challenged by way of cross examination. The defence at trial did not have the opportunity to cross examine Mr Gillespie and test his account. (d) Fourthly, Mr Gillespie is a person who was or might have been criminally concerned in the events giving rise to the proceedings.

64. Having conducted the careful analysis of the evidence and applied the relevant warning, I am satisfied that the circumstances relied upon by the Crown (considered as a whole), establish beyond reasonable doubt that the offender did participate in the burning of the deceased’s body. The Crown relied upon those acts as relevant to an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence of murder.

65. During the sentence proceedings, I expressed some reservations about whether the evidence can be used in the way contended for by the Crown given that the burning of the deceased’s body took place some hours after the killing and appeared to me to be more relevant to the issue of remorse.

66. However, the offender’s counsel does not take issue with the way in which the evidence can be used. Put another way, it is accepted that if I find beyond reasonable doubt that the offender did participate in the burning of the deceased’s body, this is a factor that can increase the objective seriousness of the murder.

67. In Knight v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 292; (2006) 164 A Crim R 126 at [28]-[29], McClellan CJ at CL (Adams J agreeing on this point and Latham J agreeing) said:

“The applicant submitted that her mutilation of the deceased’s body following his death was not relevant to the objective seriousness of the offence. In my opinion this submission must be rejected. As this Court said in R v Yeo (2002) NSWSC 315 at [36] the offender’s treatment of the deceased’s body can be taken into account in assessing the seriousness of the offence (see also R v Garforth unreported, NSWCCA, 23 May 1994; DPP v England (1997) 186 A Crim R 99).

This was a violent and cruel crime during which the deceased must have suffered extreme trauma. He was stabbed numerous times. The violation of his body reveals an utter contempt for the deceased and for his children.”

68. In R v Wilkinson (No 5) [2009] NSWSC 432 at [61], Johnson J observed that care must be taken in considering whether post-offence conduct may be taken into account in assessing the objective seriousness of the crime itself. In that case, his Honour distinguished post-offence conduct such as the offender’s subsequent false statements to police and others concerning the whereabouts of the body and the failure to reveal the true whereabouts of the body from the disposal and concealment of the body. The former was not considered in the assessment of the objective seriousness of the murder but thought to bear upon the offender’s lack of remorse and contrition and prospects of rehabilitation.

69. In Richardson v R [2013] NSWCCA 218, Hoeben CJ at CL (with Latham and Beech-Jones JJ agreeing) addressed this issue at [84]-[89], concluding that a trial judge was entitled to have regard to an offender’s treatment of the corpse as an integral part of the killing itself.

70. This position has been affirmed in subsequent decisions of this Court: see Panetta v R [2016] NSWCCA 85 at [64]; R v Watson (No 3) [2022] NSWSC 1693 at [72]-[74].

71. I was not taken to any authority that propounded a contrary position. Accordingly, notwithstanding my preliminary misgivings, I am bound by the authorities to which I have been referred and proceed on the basis that the offender’s participation in the burning of the deceased’s body is a matter relevant to an assessment of the objective seriousness of the murder.

Objective seriousness

72. The statutory guideposts, the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, and a standard non-parole period of 20 years’ imprisonment is indicative of the profound seriousness of the unlawful taking of another person’s life.

The state of mind of the offender

73. The offender shot the deceased once to the shoulder/chest area, returned to the car, reloaded the firearm, and chased the deceased and shot him at least twice again at close range until he died. I am satisfied to the requisite standard that the offender intended to kill the deceased and continued to shoot him until this goal was achieved.

74. The Court of Criminal Appeal has accepted that an intent to kill is a consideration generally tending to greater objective seriousness than an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm: Charbaji v R [2019] NSWCCA 28 per Beazley P, Price and Wilson JJ at [180]; Versluys v R [2008] NSWCCA 76 per McClellan CJ at CL (Simpson and Price JJ agreeing) at [32].

The offence was premeditated and a cold-blooded execution

75. During the trial the motive for the offence was not established and remains unknown.

76. The offender had brought the firearm with him to Mr Gillespie’s home. However, I am not satisfied that at that time, he had an intention to use the firearm either to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to the deceased. Indeed, I cannot be satisfied that he had an intention to use the firearm in any way to cause harm to any individual when he arrived at the residence.

77. When the firearm was shown to Mr Gillespie and Mr McMillan-Davies at the house, it was not loaded. The “mood” amongst those present at the house was “normal” and those present were joking around and engaging in general banter.

78. The offender was aware that the deceased had travelled to School Hill and prior to arriving there himself, the offender loaded the firearm with at least one bullet.

79. Prior to discharging the first shot, the offender pointed the gun at the deceased and said, “you want to treat me like a fucking gronk?”. It can be readily inferred that the offender was angry about something and that the anger was directed at the deceased. However, the evidence does not allow for a finding as to the offender’s motive or the reason for his anger.

80. The offender reloaded the firearm and returned to the vicinity of the deceased, pursued him, and shot him again. Immediately prior to the fatal shot the deceased was yelling “[p]lease, don’t. Stop. Stop”. The offender persisted in shooting the deceased after the first shot had been discharged in circumstances where the deceased was pleading for his life.

81. Following the murder the offender searched through the deceased’s pockets and took the deceased’s mobile phones and bank card, which was used until there were no more available funds.

82. I am not satisfied that the murder was premeditated, in the sense that it was planned or organised criminal activity. Instead, I am satisfied that the offender was angry with the deceased (for a reason that has not been established on the evidence) and that he formed an intention to kill the deceased shortly before the first shot was discharged. Once that shot was discharged, the offender persisted in pursuing the deceased and discharged the firearm again in what was a brutal and cold-blooded act.

83. The offender’s actions cannot be described as spontaneous. However, to the extent that there was planning, it does not rise to the level of constituting an aggravating factor.

The treatment of the deceased’s body after the murder

84. The Crown highlighted the extent of which the deceased’s body was destroyed to the point where many of the bones were unrecognisable. The deceased’s family were deprived of the opportunity of a proper burial.

85. Having found beyond reasonable doubt that the offender participated in the burning of the deceased’s body, it is a factor that increases the objective seriousness of the offence.

86. Although not a premeditated murder, the offender’s intention was to kill the deceased and that intention was realised by the offender shooting the deceased on more than one occasion in what was a brutal killing in circumstances where the deceased was pleading for his life.

87. Having considered all of the matters relevant to the commission of the offence and the offender’s treatment of the deceased’s body, I am satisfied that the objective seriousness of the offence is above the middle of the range, although not at the higher end of the range.

Breach of conditional liberty

88. At the time of the offence, the offender was on parole for offences of robbery, shoplifting, driving offences, and dishonestly obtaining financial advantage by deception. The breach of conditional liberty is an aggravating factor pursuant to s 21A(2)(j) of the CSPA. This aggravating factor does not operate to increase the objective seriousness of the offence, but it is a matter relevant to the appropriate penalty.

Subjective circumstances

89. The offender is a 35-year-old, single, Indigenous man with two children aged 12 and 14.

90. The offender’s background is set out in the psychiatric report prepared by Dr Richard Furst on 8 February 2026.

91. The Officer in Charge made inquiries into various aspects of the offender’s background raised in the psychiatric report, namely, the criminal history of his stepfather, the domestic violence and drug use history of his mother and stepfather, and the sexual assault of the offender whilst in juvenile detention. The offender’s subjective circumstances, in these respects, are not disputed by the Crown.

Family background

92. The offender grew up in Wellington, New South Wales and is one of 8 children on his mother’s side and 4 sisters on his father’s side. He has an additional 6 siblings from foster care.

93. There is a history of drug addiction in the offender’s family. His mother, stepfather, and biological father used and/or sold drugs. The offender’s father was not present in his formative years due to his drug addiction, and his mother was also absent for a significant portion of his upbringing. The offender’s father suffered a stroke then had a fatal heart attack in 2012 as a result of his drug use.

94. The offender reported regular conflict between his mother and stepfather which resulted in him having witnessed domestic violence on a regular basis.

95. Between the ages of 6-16, the offender reported being “bashed and raped” by his stepfather. He disclosed that his mother knew about the assaults but did not do anything about it which made him angry.

96. The offender was removed from his parents’ care at various stages during his childhood.

Psychiatric history

97. The offender had no apparent birth complications, however, there was a history of apparent learning difficulties. The offender attended primary school and high school in Wellington. He was slow in learning to read and write and was placed in special education classes in both primary and high school.

98. There were emotional and behavioural problems at school. He was expelled from school in the first month of Year 11.

99. The offender is prone to mood-swings and had anger issues at school. He said he had nightmares from his childhood sexual abuse victimisation that persist up to the current time.

100. The offender did not make a complaint to police about his stepfather, however, his stepfather was convicted and incarcerated for the sexual abuse of his younger half-sister and for the abuse of other children.

101. The offender also disclosed that at 16 years of age he was sexually assaulted whilst in juvenile detention at Orana Youth Justice Centre. This purportedly took place on 3 or 4 occasions. A civil claim commenced in 2020 and ended with a successful settlement in his favour in December 2023.

102. A letter dated 15 December 2023 from the Department of Communities and Justice addressed to Mr Forrest was tendered in these proceedings. The letter extended an apology on behalf of the State of New South Wales to the offender for the abuse he suffered as a young person in juvenile detention.

103. A Community Corrections case note report dated 17 October 2023, noted that the offender was “experiencing nightmares and not sleeping” and he had expressed that “ICE is not working for him as he believes that it can stop intrusive thoughts about childhood trauma, from the age of 6 years to 16 years he was sexually abused”.

104. The offender was prescribed various psychotropic medications between 2019-2020 including Avanza and Olanzapine. During this period, he experienced mood swings. The offender developed a tendency to rely upon substances to block the negative thoughts and feelings as it would “clear his head”.

105. Dr Furst opined that the offender developed antisocial attitudes and pro-criminal values as a teenager and had ongoing anger issues and interpersonal difficulties, both in the community and in custody.

106. He noted that the offender has maladaptive coping in the form of aggressive tendencies and through habitual drug use. Dr Furst opined that the offender meets the criteria for the following diagnoses: antisocial personality disorder, childhood conduct disorder, and complex post-traumatic stress disorder.

107. Importantly, Dr Furst explained the childhood sexual abuse and other forms of sexual assault are strongly correlated with mental disorder, including but not limited to, depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol abuse, substance use disorders, eating disorders, low self-esteem, personality disorders, and deliberate self-harm.

Drug and alcohol history

108. The offender has a history of drug abuse and drinking which dates back to when he was around 10 years of age. He commenced smoking cannabis from 12-13 years of age and used ice (methylamphetamines) from 13-14 years of age. This substance use continued in his teenage years through to his 20s. The offender had “easy access” to drugs as a teenager due to the fact that his parents were selling drugs.

109. Dr Furst opined that the offender’s drug addiction was largely a product of his genetic vulnerability coupled with the traumatic effects of parental abuse and neglect, including the purported sexual abuses.

110. Dr Furst opined that the offender meets the criteria for the diagnosis of substance use disorder.

Criminal History

111. The offender has an extensive criminal history which dates back to 2009 when he was 16-17 years of age. He has a criminal record primarily made up of driving related offences and drug related offences. The offender was charged with robbery in 2022. In almost 13 years, since 2013, the offender has not spent more than 6 months in the community.

112. It is clear that the offence for which the offender is to be sentenced today is a significant escalation in his offending.

113. During his time in custody, the offender has incurred a number of goal-based charges/violations including for intimidation of officers; possession of blades and syringes; disobeying directions; and for fighting. He has spent multiple periods in segregation over the past 2-3 years.

Moral culpability

114. Evidence of the offender’s background of deprivation and disadvantage may materially impact on a sentence, including the reduction of moral culpability: R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2 at [69] (per Simpson J, with Bathurst CJ and Adamson J agreeing); Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 at [43]-[44].

115. I am satisfied that the offender’s background of trauma is a matter that reduces his moral culpability. That background has the capacity to explain the nature and gravity of the offender’s recourse to violence. He was exposed in his formative years to drug use and domestic and family violence. He was himself the victim of abuse. These subjective circumstances do not justify or excuse his crime.

116. However, it is a background that contextualises his conduct, shedding some light on the normalisation of violence in his life and his recourse to significant violence on the occasion of his offending.

Remorse

117. Section 21A(3)(i) of the CSPA provides that the Court can take into account as a mitigating factor the remorse shown by the offender for the offence, but only if (i) the offender has provided evidence that he or she has accepted responsibility for his or her actions, and (ii) the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his or her actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both).

118. During the interview with Dr Furst, the offender stated that he had met the deceased about three weeks before his death through a friend. At the time the offender was residing with friends at Green Point. The offender said he had helped the deceased financially because he was in debt and the pair were “hanging around together” over the following weeks. The two then had a falling out over drugs and/or drug supply.

119. In relation to the murder, the offender admitted that he shot the deceased although continued to deny participating in the burning of the body. He claimed that he and the deceased had a falling out over drugs and that the deceased had threatened him and his children with violence which made him fear for his life.

120. The offender stated, “[t]hey said he was going to get me. I understood him to be threatening. I thought he got out of jail for murder and was with the Banditos. I wanted to scare him so he would learn to leave me alone. The two people who gave me up got rid of the body. I should’ve pleaded guilty”.

121. The offender’s expression of remorse in Dr Furst’s report is, to some degree, inconsistent with his own words in telephone intercept product 114 (dated 23 October 2023) where he can be heard saying, “[h]e could’ve stopped me from doing it mate. If anyone was going to stop me it was, it happened over him. Him fucking saying old mate was going to try and stand over me for the land and the opals”.

122. I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the deceased threatened harm to the offender and do not proceed upon the basis that there was any degree of provocation or self-defence.

123. I am not satisfied that the offender has established remorse pursuant to s 21A(3)(i). All that can be said on behalf of the offender is that he has at least now admitted that he was responsible for shooting the deceased. However, that acknowledgement (without more) is not a factor that operates to mitigate his sentence.

Prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffending

124. The offender’s background, and in particular his entrenched substance abuse issues, militate against a positive finding in respect of his prospects of rehabilitation. It was accepted on behalf of the offender that this Court would find the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation are guarded.

125. Dr Furst made a recommendation that the offender engage in drug and alcohol counselling along with psychological treatment and/or counselling aimed at improving coping skills, aggressive tendencies, and addressing childhood trauma/abuse issues.

126. The offender is now 35 years of age. The material before me establishes that in almost 13 years he has not spent more than 6 months in the community. It was submitted on behalf of the offender that he has become institutionalised.

127. Further, the Crown submitted that the Court could not make any positive findings with respect to the offender’s likelihood of reoffending.

128. The offender does not have a significant record for offences of violence. Prior to these proceedings the most serious matter on his record was for robbery. It was accepted that the offence in which he is to be sentenced for is a dramatic escalation from prior offending.

129. At the time of the offence, the offender was on parole for offences of robbery, shoplifting, driving offences, and dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception. I have already had regard to the fact that conditional liberty is an aggravating factor.

130. In Potts v R [2012] NSWCCA 229; (2012) 227 A Crim R 217 at [167]-[168] Johnson J (McClellan CJ at CL and Fullerton J agreeing) (noting that Potts was being sentenced for his second murder) said:

“In Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) [2004] HCA 46; 223 CLR 575, Gleeson CJ observed at 589-590 [12]:

‘No doubt, predictions of future danger may be unreliable, but, as the case of Veen shows, they may also be right. Common law sentencing principles, and some legislative regimes, permit or require such predictions at the time of sentencing, which will often be many years before possible release.’

A sentencing Judge is entitled to take the circumstances of the offence into account, together with the offender’s prior history, in determining the question of future dangerousness. In R v Garforth (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW, No 60500 of 1993, 23 May 1994), the Court (Gleeson CJ, McInerney and Mathews JJ) said:

‘We return to the concepts of dangerousness and rehabilitation. It is now well settled that the protection of society - and hence the potential dangerousness of the offender - is a relevant matter on sentence. (Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; 33 A Crim R 230). This factor cannot be given such weight as to lead to a penalty which is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence. But it can be used to offset a potentially mitigating feature of the case, such as the offender’s mental condition, which might otherwise have led to a reduction of penalty.’”

131. In assessing the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffending I have taken into account the following factors:

(a) The nature of the offence, being an execution style murder in front of two eyewitnesses. (b) The offender’s participation in the burning of the deceased’s body. (c) The offender’s failure to show any remorse. (d) The offender’s record reveals persistent offending between 2013-2023 (noting the most serious conviction to date is for a robbery committed in 2022). (e) There has been a long and entrenched history of substance abuse.

132. Having considered the above factors, I am guarded about the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation and am unable to make a positive finding regarding his likelihood of reoffending. I acknowledge that having regard to the lengthy period the offender will spend in prison, it is difficult to predict with any certainty his prospects and likelihood of reoffending upon release. Much will depend upon the supports he receives at that time to readjust to life in the community.

Purposes of sentencing

133. Section 3A of the CSPA provides:

3A Purposes of sentencing

The purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows-

(a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence,

(b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences,

(c) to protect the community from the offender,

(d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender,

(e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions,

(f) to denounce the conduct of the offender,

(g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.

134. The purposes of sentencing overlap and are sometimes conflicting. In R v Knight [2023] NSWSC 321, I made the following observations, at [101]:

“Section 3A, in setting out the various purposes of sentencing, does not identify a single overarching purpose, neither does it identify a primary purpose or establish any priority among the various purposes. In particular, it reflects the necessity to reconcile and rationalise the s 3A purposes in considering the sentence appropriate to the particular offence. I must engage in a process of ‘instinctive synthesis’ which takes account of and balances the ‘conflicting and contradictory’ factors which bear upon the sentencing exercise: see R v MA [2004] NSWCCA 92 at [23]; R v King [2004] NSWCCA 444 at [130]; R v MMK [2006] NSWCCA 272 at [10]; R v Burns (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 140 (Burns (No 2)) at [64].”

135. I have already made a finding that given the offender’s background of deprivation and disadvantage his moral culpability is reduced. For the same reasons I find that the weight to be afforded to general deterrence and denunciation is moderated. I am cognisant of the fact that the promotion of the rehabilitation of the offender is a relevant consideration in the sentencing exercise.

136. However, there are countervailing factors including the importance of denouncing the offender’s conduct, protecting the community, recognising the harm done to the community, and making the offender accountable for his actions. Specific deterrence is also a relevant consideration.

Disposition

137. This Court has a broad discretion under s 47(2) of the CSPA in relation to backdating a sentence: see Edquist-Wheeler v R [2024] NSWCCA 49 at [43] (per Sweeney J, Adamson JA and Lonergan J agreeing); Callaghan v R [2006] NSWCCA 58 at [21]-[23]; (2006) 160 A Crim R 145 (per Simpson J, James and Hall JJ agreeing); Martino v The King [2024] NSWCCA 93 at [79] (per Chen J, Harrison CJ at CL and Walton J agreeing); Mattiussi v R [2023] NSWCCA 289 at [49] (per R A Hulme AJ, Adamson JA and Button J agreeing).

138. In Wilson v R [2025] NSWCCA 86, Dhanji J at [33] (Adamson JA and Weinstein J agreeing) reiterated that where an offender’s custody is referable both to the present offence/s and the earlier sentence, a sentencing judge has a broad discretion as to whether to backdate a sentence, and if so, the extent to which it should be backdated.

139. The offender has been in custody since 25 October 2023. The offender was charged with this offence on 4 November 2023. Since 4 November 2023 the offender has not been in custody solely in reference to the murder.

140. The following periods of custody are referable to other matters:

(a) 25 October 2023 - 1 June 2024: balance of parole. The matters for which he served the balance of parole were robbery, shoplifting, driving while disqualified, and obtaining a financial advantage by deception. He received an aggregate sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 months. (b) 25 October 2023 - 24 January 2025: the offender was serving a sentence of imprisonment for a police pursuit matter.

141. The offender has been in custody referable to this matter alone since 25 January 2025. The sentence I impose will be partially accumulated to have regard to the principle of totality. In exercise of my discretion, I am satisfied that the sentence for the murder is to commence on 4 May 2024.

Special circumstances

142. There is no exhaustive list to determine whether special circumstances exist. There are several factors that could justify a finding of special circumstances. The question as to whether such a finding is made will depend upon the circumstances of the individual case: R v Saliba (No 4) [2025] NSWSC 659 at [120].

143. It was submitted on behalf of the offender that this Court would make a finding of special circumstances which would warrant a reduction of the non-parole period below that of the statutory ratio pursuant to s 44(2) of the CSPA. The offender noted that considerations of factors giving rise to a finding of special circumstances are not always limited to the rehabilitation and reform of the offender but will often be the purpose of such a finding: R v El-Hayek [2004] NSWCCA 25 (at [105]); (2004) 144 A Crim R 90 per Howie J.

144. The offender relied upon his background, the abuse experienced in juvenile detention, and the fact that he is institutionalised as factors which make being in custody more onerous for the offender, thus supporting a finding of special circumstances.

145. The Crown submitted that there is an absence of evidence about onerous conditions in custody, such as to justify a finding of special circumstances. Furthermore, the Crown submitted that given the length of the sentence to be imposed, the statutory ratio provides a sufficient period in the community on parole.

146. I make a finding of special circumstances warranting a variation of the statutory ratio, although the variation of the statutory ratio will not be significant.

147. I make that finding for the following reasons. Firstly, the offender’s subjective circumstances and in particular his background of deprivation and disadvantage means that he will require a longer than usual period on parole so that he can receive the treatment and support necessary to reduce the risk of reoffending and to assist him in readjusting to life in the community. Secondly, I am satisfied that the offender is institutionalised and for that reason will require additional supports in obtaining housing and income upon his release. Thirdly, the offender was diagnosed as meeting the criteria for a number of mental health conditions which, it is reasonably open to infer, would make his conditions in custody more onerous.

148. In addition to the offence of murder, the offender must be sentenced in relation to two offences on the s 166 certificate (sequences 2 and 4). The Crown accepts that having regard to the length of the sentence for the murder, it is open to impose wholly concurrent sentences in respect to the s 166 matters.

149. I intend to proceed in that way.

150. Finally, the offence carries a standard non-parole period of 20 years’ imprisonment (for an offence in the Table to Division 1A of the CSPA which is in “the middle of the range of seriousness”). Notwithstanding the fact that the objective seriousness of this offence falls above the middle of the range, I do not intend to impose a non-parole period in excess of 20 years because I have determined that the offender’s moral culpability is reduced by reason of his deprived and disadvantaged background.

Sentence

1. Mr Forrest is convicted.
2. In respect of the offence of murder, Mr Forrest is sentenced to a non-parole period of 20 years’ imprisonment commencing on 4 May 2024, with an additional term of 10 years’ imprisonment. The total term of imprisonment is 30 years. The first date upon which Mr Forrest will be eligible for release to parole is 3 May 2044.
3. In respect of sequence 2 on the s 166 certificate, an offence of using a firearm in contravention of the firearms prohibition order (contrary to s 74(1) of the Firearms Act) Mr Forrest is convicted and sentenced to a fixed term of six months commencing on 4 May 2024 and expiring on 3 November 2024.
4. In respect of sequence 4 on the s 166 certificate, an offence of possessing a shortened firearm without authority (contrary to s 62(1)(b) of the Firearms Act), Mr Forrest is convicted and sentenced to a fixed term of 12 months commencing on 4 May 2024 and expiring on the 3 May 2025.
5. In compliance with s 25C of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), I note that the provisions of that Act have potential application to Mr Forrest. I direct that Mr Forrest’s legal representatives advise him of the existence of the Act and its application to this offence.

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