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[2025] QCA 160
respondent. Application for leave to appeal refused.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The Court of Appeal refused Ford permission to appeal her sentence. She did not dispute the five-and-a-half-year prison term, but argued that parole eligibility after 15 months did not give enough weight to the mitigating features of her case. The Court considered the seriousness of the driving, the evidence of alcohol and cannabis use and impairment, the sentencing judge’s consideration of mitigation, and the authorities cited by the parties. It concluded that comparable cases do not set fixed limits and that there was no reason to find the sentencing judge had applied the wrong principles or reached an unreasonable or plainly unjust result.
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2,105 words · generated 07/10/2026
In R v Ford [2025] QCA 160, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered an application for leave to appeal against sentence. The judgment is dated 29 August 2025. Brown JA gave the reasons, and Mullins P and Boddice JA agreed. The Court’s order was that the application for leave to appeal was refused.
Ford had pleaded guilty to one count of dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death while adversely affected by intoxicating substances. The offending occurred in the early hours of 29 October 2023, after Ford had finished work. The agreed facts were that she had consumed approximately four alcoholic drinks and cannabis before driving along Mackay Eungella Road. She was travelling at an estimated speed above the 100 km/hour limit, crossed the centre line and collided head-on with Mr Winn, who was travelling in the opposite direction on a motorcycle. Mr Winn died at the scene.
The evidence included a blood test taken two hours and four minutes after the collision. It showed a blood alcohol concentration of 89 mg per 100 ml and THC at 0.010 mg per litre. A forensic medical officer assessed the likely effects and considered that the combination of alcohol and THC would have severely impaired a person’s ability to drive safely. There was no evidence that Ford braked or took evasive action before the collision. The sentencing judge considered fatigue, following work and consumption of alcohol and cannabis, to be the logical explanation for the vehicle crossing onto the wrong side of the road.
On 17 February 2025, Ford was sentenced to five years and six months’ imprisonment. Parole eligibility was fixed after 15 months of actual imprisonment, and she was disqualified from holding a driver’s licence for five years. Ford sought leave to appeal on the ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive, unreasonable or plainly unjust. Her argument focused on the parole eligibility date, not the head sentence, which she accepted was an appropriate exercise of sentencing discretion.
The judgment records a range of mitigation that the sentencing judge considered: Ford’s age of 23 at the time of the collision, difficult upbringing, lack of prior criminal or traffic history, employment, early guilty plea, remorse, mental health difficulties after the collision, and evidence of negative drug tests since the offence. The judge also considered victim impact statements and the loss suffered by Mr Winn’s family, friends and colleagues. The judge treated general deterrence as significant, while considering personal deterrence less important because Ford was unlikely to offend similarly again.
The judgment supplied here does not include numbered paragraphs. Accordingly, the references below identify the relevant subject matter rather than paragraph numbers.
The Court applied a demanding test for appellate intervention. It explained that showing a sentence was different, or even markedly different, from sentences imposed in other cases is not enough. Intervention is justified where consideration of all relevant sentencing factors, including comparable cases, drives the Court to conclude that there must have been a misapplication of principle, or that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust.
The Court’s focus was not whether another judge might have selected a different parole eligibility date. The question was whether the challenged sentence, considered in context, crossed the threshold for appellate intervention. Brown JA concluded that it did not. The sentencing judge had identified and weighed the factors favouring Ford, as well as the circumstances that made the offending serious.
The objective seriousness was central to the Court’s reasoning. Ford had driven after consuming alcohol and cannabis, and the evidence was that their combined effect would have severely impaired safe driving. The vehicle crossed the centre line and struck a motorcyclist head-on. The sentencing judge also considered fatigue after work. The Court’s account therefore presents the case as involving multiple connected features of risk, not merely a collision following a single moment of inattention.
The Court also considered the authorities cited by the parties. Ford relied on R v Chmieluk; Ex parte Attorney-General [2018] QCA 271. There, a five-year sentence suspended after three months in custody had been found not manifestly inadequate in an Attorney-General’s appeal. Brown JA identified important features of that case: the respondent had rehabilitated during considerable delay before sentence; the deceased was her sister; the deceased’s family asked that she not be imprisoned; and the sentencing judge gave particular weight to rehabilitation and the fact that the respondent would live with the consequences of her sister’s death. The Court held that those features distinguished Chmieluk from Ford’s case. The fact that Ford received a more severe sentence therefore did not itself establish error.
The Crown relied on R v Itshaky [2019] QCA 168. In that case, leave to appeal was refused where a five-year sentence required 18 months’ actual imprisonment. The Court said that Itshaky and the cases treated there as yardsticks supported the sentence in Ford’s case. But it also stressed the qualification given in Itshaky: comparable decisions help identify how courts have treated common factors; they do not dictate the sentence or mark the outer limits of the sentencing judge’s discretion.
The Court therefore rejected the argument that mitigating circumstances necessarily required a shorter period before parole eligibility. It accepted that Ford had substantial mitigating features, but concluded that the sentencing judge had plainly taken them into account. The Court found no basis to infer that the judge had misapplied principle.
The judgment does not announce a change in the law. Its reasoning applies and restates principles about appellate review of sentence and the use of comparable cases. The decision is significant in explaining how those principles were applied to this particular sentence, rather than in establishing a new sentencing formula.
The stated appellate principle is that difference from other sentences, even a marked difference, is not sufficient by itself to warrant intervention. The Court must consider all relevant sentencing factors, including the degree of difference from comparable cases, and be driven to conclude that there was a misapplication of principle or that the result was unreasonable or plainly unjust.
On comparable cases, the judgment adopts the distinction between a useful comparison and a binding range. The Court treated Chmieluk and Itshaky as relevant, but did not treat either as controlling. The judgment also repeats the observation from Chmieluk that dangerous driving causing death can be committed by people of different ages, backgrounds and prior characters, and that there can be no standard range of penalty for these cases. That observation helps explain why matching a sentence to another case by headline sentence alone is inadequate.
The “before” and “after” description should be understood narrowly. The source establishes the principles the Court applied in 2025. It does not provide a survey of earlier law, nor does it identify subsequent decisions applying Ford. It therefore does not support a claim that the case changed the law, or a conclusion about how later courts have treated it.
The Court said it was “not enough to establish that a sentence was different or even markedly different from sentences imposed in other matters”. In plain English, a comparison showing that another offender received a lower sentence does not, without more, prove that the sentence under appeal is legally wrong. The Court must assess the sentencing decision as a whole.
The judgment states that comparable cases “assist a sentencing judge to understand how factors in common should be treated but do not determine the sentence or mark the outer bounds” of discretion. Put simply, earlier cases are reference points. They can help explain how features such as impairment, driving conduct, remorse or personal circumstances have been approached, but they do not create a fixed tariff for an individual case.
The Court also refers to the proposition that there can be “no standard range of penalty” for dangerous driving causing death. The point is that these offences may arise from materially different combinations of conduct and personal circumstances. The judgment uses this proposition to caution against treating a single comparison as setting a standard result.
Finally, Brown JA concluded: “There is no basis for inferring that the sentencing judge misapplied principle in exercising his sentencing discretion.” This is the central conclusion on the appeal. The Court did not say that every feature of the sentence was inevitable. It held that the applicant had not established the kind of error or injustice required for appellate intervention.
The decision is most directly relevant where an offender challenges a sentence on the basis that it is manifestly excessive, unreasonable or plainly unjust, particularly where the argument depends on comparing the sentence with outcomes in other cases. It makes clear that a comparison is one part of the assessment, not a substitute for examining the individual sentencing exercise.
It is also relevant to appeals where the claimed error concerns a parole eligibility date rather than the head sentence. Ford’s challenge focused on the time to parole eligibility, and the Court assessed that complaint under the appellate intervention principles set out in its reasons. The judgment does not create a separate, lower threshold for reviewing that aspect of the sentence.
The factual context includes dangerous operation causing death after alcohol and cannabis consumption, evidence of severe impairment, fatigue, crossing the centre line, and a head-on collision. The decision may be particularly instructive where a sentencing judge has expressly considered both serious objective circumstances and substantial personal mitigation. The Court’s reasoning shows that the presence of significant mitigation does not, without more, establish that the result failed to reflect it.
The case also offers a caution for comparisons with Chmieluk. The Court did not treat the lower period in custody in that case as a benchmark. It identified features particular to Chmieluk, including delay, steps towards rehabilitation, and the deceased’s family asking that the respondent not be imprisoned. The judgment therefore supports careful comparison of the facts and sentencing context, rather than reliance on a single headline outcome.
These observations describe what the Court decided on the record before it. They are not a formula for predicting the result in another appeal.
The judgment supplied for analysis contains no decisions after Ford and no account of later treatment of Ford. It is therefore not possible, on the provided material, to say whether subsequent courts have followed, distinguished, applied or criticised it.
Within its own reasoning, Ford relies on and distinguishes earlier authority. It distinguishes Chmieluk by explaining why the circumstances that produced the short custodial period there were particular to that case. It considers Itshaky supportive of the sentence, while adopting the caution that comparable cases guide but do not determine the exercise of discretion.
The judgment itself thus illustrates one way the principles from those cases were used. It does not establish how later courts have interpreted Ford, or whether they have treated its discussion of parole eligibility as having wider significance. Any account of that later history would require sources beyond the judgment provided here.
The judgment does not specify a numerical method for deciding when a parole eligibility date is unreasonable or plainly unjust. It applies the general appellate test to the circumstances before it and does not define a minimum or maximum period that would be appropriate in other cases.
Nor does it establish a particular weighting for mitigation in dangerous driving causing death cases. It records the mitigating features accepted by the sentencing judge and concludes that they were taken into account. It does not say that any one mitigating feature, such as an early plea, remorse, rehabilitation evidence or mental health consequences, must carry a fixed weight.
The judgment also does not set out a detailed framework for evaluating the relative contribution of alcohol, cannabis and fatigue in a case involving combined impairment. It records the forensic opinion and the sentencing judge’s findings, then considers the overall seriousness of the offending for the appellate question before it.
Finally, the source does not provide paragraph numbering or subsequent case history. A more complete account of the decision’s later precedential treatment would require later judgments or other legal sources. The decision’s own limits should be kept in view: it refused leave on the record and arguments before the Court, and it did not turn the comparative cases into a standard sentencing range.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
[2025] QCA 160
COURT OF APPEAL
MULLINS P
BODDICE JA
BROWN JA
CA No 42 of 2025
DC No 148 of 2024
THE KING
v
FORD, Amy Ellen****Applicant
BRISBANE
FRIDAY, 29 AUGUST 2025
JUDGMENT
BROWN JA: The applicant, Ms Ford, was convicted on 17 February 2025 on her own plea of guilty of one count of dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death while adversely affected by intoxicating substances. She was sentenced to five years and six months’ imprisonment, with parole eligibility set for 17 May 2026, after the applicant had served 15 months of actual imprisonment. The applicant was also disqualified from holding a driver’s licence for a period of five years.
The applicant seeks leave to appeal against the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge on the ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive, or unreasonable or plainly unjust on the basis of the parole eligibility date set.
Circumstances of the offending
The circumstances of the offending was subject to an agreed statement of facts.
Late in the evening of 29 October 2023, the applicant had finished work, and had then consumed approximately four alcoholic drinks before she drove along Mackay Eungella Road towards her home in the early hours of the morning. She had also consumed cannabis. At the same time, Mr Winn was travelling on his motorbike along Mackay Eungella Road in the opposite direction.
The applicant was travelling at speed estimated to be in excess of 100 km/hour in a 100 km/hour zone on a straight stretch of road. She crossed the central line and drove her vehicle on the wrong side of the road and collided head-on with Mr Winn. Mr Winn came to rest 15 metres from the point of impact on the edge of a sugar cane paddock next to his bike.
The impact inflicted catastrophic injuries upon Mr Winn, and he died at the scene. There was no evidence in the form of tyre-marks or otherwise that indicated the applicant braked or took any “evasive action to avoid the collision”. The applicant’s vehicle was severely damaged. A bong and cannabis were found in the footwell of the front passenger footwell of the front passenger side.
After the collision, the applicant remained at the scene and called emergency services.
The applicant sustained superficial injuries. She was visibly distressed, repeating, “What did I just do? What the fuck did I just do? What have I done? I’ve killed him”.
The applicant showed signs of intoxication when walking into the ambulance, and her breath smelt of alcohol. She admitted to police that she had had a couple of drinks after work. She later told the paramedics she had consumed four Jack Daniels spirits prior to the collision, but she denied consuming any drugs.
The applicant was transported by ambulance to the Mackay Base Hospital where she provided a blood specimen. At the time of the blood test, two hours and four minutes post-collision, the applicant had a blood alcohol content of 89 mg per hundred ml of blood and had .010 mg per litre of Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), a metabolite of cannabis, in her system.
A forensic medical officer provided a report on the effects of the applicant’s consumption of alcohol and THC. The officer estimated what the likely concentration was at the time of the accident and considered the combination of alcohol and THC would have resulted in a person’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle being “severely impaired”.
Matters considered by the sentencing judge
Detailed reasons for sentence were provided by the sentencing judge. The applicant was sentenced on the basis that she operated her vehicle dangerously while driving at speed, by crossing centrelines and driving onto the wrong side of the road and driving whilst intoxicated by both THC and alcohol which rendered her adversely affected. In considering the circumstances of offending, the sentencing judge considered that the only logical explanation for the applicant’s vehicle ending up on the wrong side of the road was that it was a consequence of fatigue after she had finished work and had consumed both alcohol and cannabis.
The sentencing judge considered the circumstances of aggravation, namely, that the applicant was adversely affected by alcohol and drugs. His Honour considered that the evidence as to alcohol and THC levels “always rendered the case against you as being a particularly compelling one.”
The sentencing judge took into account the applicant’s antecedents. She was 23 at the time of the accident. She had had a difficult upbringing and had overcome challenges in her life after she and her brother became their mother’s full-time carer when she was in grade 10. She finished grade 12 and obtained full-time employment. During the time she was employed she had completed a management course. She had no prior criminal or traffic history. At the time of the offence she was in full-time employment.
The sentencing judge accepted that the applicant had entered an early plea of guilty and accepted that there was a plethora of evidence demonstrating that the applicant was genuinely remorseful for her offending. He took into account evidence showing that the applicant had suffered a deterioration in her mental health as a result of the accident, including being diagnosed with a depressive disorder and an adjustment disorder with features of PTSD.
The sentencing judge also took into account the fact that the applicant had provided evidence of numerous negative drug tests undertaken by the applicant demonstrating that she had not consumed illicit substances since the collision.
His Honour also had regard to the victim impact statements provided by the deceased’s family, friends and colleagues and the “insurmountable loss” they each had suffered.
Aside from the factors identified in s 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act, the sentencing judge considered and analysed a number of authorities put before him by counsel.
The sentencing judge identified deterrence, denunciation and rehabilitation as particularly relevant to the sentence imposed. His Honour however considered it was unlikely that the applicant would offend in a similar way again and did not consider personal deterrence loomed large in the sentence to be imposed, but general deterrence was of significant relevance.
His Honour carefully balanced what he found was a “serious example of dangerously operating a motor vehicle” against the applicant’s favourable antecedents. Considering the gravity of offending, comparative authorities and the importance of general deterrence, his Honour considered the applicant’s offending fell above what would justify a five year sentence. His Honour sentenced the applicant to a head sentence of five and a half years’ imprisonment.
His Honour acknowledged that by setting a head sentence at five and a half years he was limited to fixing a parole eligibility date. However, his Honour took into account the several mitigating factors favouring the applicant and fixed the applicant’s parole eligibility at 15 months, seven months below the one third point. His Honour also suspended the applicant from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for five years.
Should leave be given?
In order to satisfy this Court that a sentence is manifestly excessive, it is not enough to establish that a sentence was different or even markedly different from sentences imposed in other matters. Appellate intervention will only be justified where, after considering all the relevant sentencing factors, including the degree to which the impugned sentence differs from sentences that have been imposed in comparable cases, the Court “is driven to conclude that there must have been some misapplication of principle”, or that the sentence is “unreasonable or plainly unjust”.
The applicant does not challenge the head sentence of five and a half years, but seeks to contend that by setting the parole eligibility date after fifteen months, the sentencing judge did not reflect the “plethora of features … favouring mitigation” which he had, in his sentencing remarks, acknowledged existed.
The case of R v Chmieluk; Ex parte Attorney-General [2018] QCA 271 is the only authority relied upon by the applicant. In that case where the sentence imposed was five years suspended after three months in custody for dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death while adversely affected by alcohol. On an Attorney-General’s appeal it was found not to be manifestly inadequate. In that case, both sisters were intoxicated when they got into a car. The respondent drove the vehicle speeding in an erratic manner and finally crashed into a pole killing her sister who was a passenger. She was older than the applicant aged 29 years of age at the time of the accident. The respondent had suffered significant injuries. Objectively the applicant’s driving in the present case was at least as dangerous as the respondent’s driving in Chmieluk. While there were a number of mitigating factors in that case which were similar to the present case, there were particular features which drove the short period the respondent was ordered to spend in custody. There was considerable delay in the applicant being sentenced during which she had taken steps to rehabilitate herself. The deceased’s family in that case who were also the respondent’s family pleaded for the respondent not to be imprisoned. The Court of Appeal noted that the sentencing judge had given particular weight to the respondent’s rehabilitation and to the fact that the respondent’s actions had resulted in the death of her sister for which she would serve a life sentence out of custody.
The fact that the applicant’s sentence is more severe than that imposed in Chmieluk does not support a conclusion that the sentence imposed in the present case was not the result of a proper exercise of discretion and manifestly excessive. It has distinguishing features from the present and was an Attorney-General’s appeal.
In contrast to Chmieluk, the Crown relies on R v Itshaky [2019] QCA 168 as supporting the head sentence imposed. In that case, this Court refused leave where a sentence of five years to serve 18 months actual imprisonment had been imposed, rejecting the contention that the sentence was manifestly excessive. That case involved a twenty three year old with a minor traffic history who drove home after finishing a late shift and drinking with friends with a blood alcohol of .12 per cent. He drifted off the roadway striking the deceased, after a limited period of unsafe driving. It was accepted he was unlikely to have known that he hit the deceased. He was sentenced on the basis that his ability to safely control the vehicle had been moderately impaired as a consequence of the alcohol intake. The sentencing judge found that the incident occurred “by reason of fatigue and alcohol intoxication”. Although the applicant did not co-operate with and initially lied to police about driving, he was otherwise found to have had a prior good character and remorse.
The sentence in Itshaky and cases considered by the Court as yardsticks in that case support the present sentence. However, as was observed by Justice Boddice in Itshaky, comparable cases assist a sentencing judge to understand how factors in common should be treated but do not determine the sentence or mark the outer bounds of a sentencing judge’s discretion.
An offence of dangerous driving causing death unlike many offences, is one which “anybody of any age and in any walk of life of previous good or bad character and with or without any previous criminal history, might commit.” As a result, as was said in Chmieluk, “in cases of dangerous driving causing death, there can be no standard range of penalty”.
In the present case, the applicant, in effect, argues that the sentence is manifestly excessive or unreasonable or plainly unjust because not enough weight was given to the mitigating features.
The offending in the present case was objectively serious notwithstanding the mitigating features in the applicant’s favour. All mitigating features were plainly taken into account by the sentencing judge. The sentence was reached after the sentencing judge carefully considered the relevant authorities and weighed all of the competing factors performing the required task of instinctive synthesis.
The applicant accepts that the head sentence of five and a half years was an appropriate exercise of sentencing discretion. The requirement that the applicant spend less than a third in custody, given she was driving with alcohol and THC in her system where there was evidence that their presence severely impaired her ability to drive whilst fatigued, even taking into account significant mitigating features in the applicant’s favour does not constitute an unreasonable or plainly unjust sentence. There is no basis for inferring that the sentencing judge misapplied principle in exercising his sentencing discretion.
The applicant has not established that sentence is manifestly excessive or unreasonable or plainly unjust. I would refuse leave.
MULLINS P: I agree.
BODDICE JA: I agree.
MULLINS P: The order of the court is application for leave to appeal refused.
The Court will have the next matter. You might terminate the video link first.
R
Ford [2025] QCA 160
Application for leave to appeal refused.