R v Feda

Legislation Cited: Bail Act 2013 (NSW)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Drugs Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW)

Cases Cited: McAndrew v Regina [2016] NSWCCA 58
R v BNS [2016] NSWSC 350
R v Fallon (a pseudonym) [2017] NSWSC 1796
R v Feda (unreported 15 October 2025)
R v Goodwin [2015] NSWSC 2107
R v Najem [2015] NSWSC 2108
Tsintzas v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2017] NSWCCA 172

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: Mouhamed Feda (Applicant)
Crown

Representation: Counsel:
B Barrack (Applicant)
L Ernst (Crown)
Solicitors:
Abbas & Co Lawyers (Applicant)
ODPP New South Wales (Crown)

File Number(s): 2025/135442

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

1. In June 2024 Mr Feda was arrested and charged with offences under s 25(2) of the Drugs Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) which attract maximum penalties of life imprisonment. As well as offences under s 93T(4A) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which attract maximum penalties of 15 years imprisonment and offences under s 193C(1) of knowingly dealing with the proceeds of crime, which attract maximum penalties of 5 years imprisonment.

2. He was bail refused and on 11 October 2024 Chen J refused his bail application, concluding that he had not shown cause why his detention was not justified, as s 16A of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) required: R v Feda (unreported 15 October 2025).

3. Mr Feda has made a further bail application, which must be refused unless he establishes that grounds for a further application specified in s 74 exist. That they were established was disputed, as was whether he has shown cause why his detention was not justified. That he has established that he does not pose unacceptable risks was also in issue: s 19.

The proper construction of s 74

4. The cases the parties advanced put in issue the proper construction of s 74(3), which relevantly provides:

“(3) For the purposes of this section, the grounds for a further release application are—

(a) …

(b) material information relevant to the grant of bail is to be presented in the application that was not presented to the court in the previous application, or

(c) circumstances relevant to the grant of bail have changed since the previous application was made, or

(d) …”

5. Its construction was considered in R v BNS [2016] NSWSC 350, where Garling J concluded that:

43 The purpose of s 74 of the Bail Act is not to give an applicant the right to a second hearing of a bail application simply because a lawyer thinks that they might put a better or more persuasive argument to the Court than that put on an earlier occasion. On the contrary, s 74 addresses the issue by first requiring a court to refuse to hear a further release application unless particular grounds are established. Relevantly, in this case, those grounds are that material information is available which was not presented earlier, or that circumstances relevant to the grant of bail have changed.

44 I reject the applicant’s submission that submissions of senior counsel, which may be considered by the author to be more persuasive, are a reason to permit a second bail application.

45 The change in the identity of a surety and a change in the amount offered by the surety are not always to be regarded as a change of circumstances relevant to the grant of bail, nor are they necessarily always to be regarded as material information relevant to the grant of bail. It is always a question of fact and degree. A court needs to assess, in the context of the seriousness of the charge and all of the other circumstances relevant to a bail application, whether a change in the identity of a surety and the sum being offered are “material”.

6. I agree with Garling J and with Campbell J, who observed in R v Fallon (a pseudonym) [2017] NSWSC 1796 at [15] that:

“The additional information sought to be presented will be material if the applicant satisfies the court that the outcome of the previous release application might have been different had the additional information been presented then: see Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; [1990] HCA 33 at 353, by Mason CJ. This is an objective legal standard involving a mixed question of fact and law. It requires an understanding of the reasons for the refusal of bail and an assessment of whether the additional information might have made a difference to that result.”: at [15].

Section 74 is satisfied

7. Chen J concluded that cause had not been shown, the allegation pursued against Mr Feda being that he was principally involved as a manager in a “dial a drug dealer” drug syndicate that between February and June 2024 supplied 2.83 kg of cocaine, sold some 4,000 bags for a total amount of over $1,008,000. He supplying to a controller who had runners deliver to customers and receive payment which was then returned to the manager.

8. Mr Feda had been identified in a police operation in which conversations were lawfully intercepted. His involvement in the syndicate with another senior member of the syndicate was identified to include the roster of when runners would work, as well as daily contact with controllers and runners.

9. Before Chen J it was conceded that the Crown case was of some strength and his Honour was satisfied that nothing had demonstrated any particular weakness in the Crown case. He concluded that there had been no undue delay sufficient to justify cause being shown, despite Mr Feda potentially being on remand for between 18 to 24 months. Further, that the then offered surety of $400,0000 did not, in context, provide a real deterrent or disincentive to ameliorate the risks which Mr Feda posed.

10. That context was explained in the Crown case statement to be the Strike Force investigation into the dial a dealer supply of cocaine in Sydney which had identified the syndicate and Mr Feda’s involvement in it, from January to June 2024. Mr Feda having been arrested at his home where one of the phones used by the syndicate was found on his bedside table. The proceeds of crime involved in that offending was over $1 million.

11. Mr Feda relied on the offer of his cousins to provide surety of $300,000 in addition to the $400,000 earlier offered by his wife, as well as changes in the apparent strength of the Crown case and increased delay in the hearing of the charge, to satisfy the s 74 requirements, as well as an apparent misunderstanding of the factual position when Chen J considered the first application.

12. They were not accepted as establishing any change since the first bail application, or material information not presented on that application.

13. Campbell J concluded in Fallon that the earlier assessment that the Crown case was likely to be one of not insignificant strength, was not altered by the additional information of a witness there relied on: at [24]. He having explained the limitations on the ability of a bail court to assess the strength of the Crown case, which “must be at best impressionistic. It is generally impossible for the Court to make any assessment of the reliability of individual witnesses, who are not called anyway. It would be pointless to attempt to do so as the question of reliability is quintessentially a matter for the tribunal of fact, whether magistrate or a jury, at the hearing or trial.”: at [20].

14. The Crown did accept that service of the brief has cast light on the Crown case statement not available before Chen J. For example, that what was observed at [119] of the Draft Crown Case Statement that “The transporter was surveilled attending Ventrella and Feda’s address on 11 March 2024, 15 April 2024, 29 April 2024 and 6 May 2024”, must be understood as indicating that the transporter was observed attending Mr Feda’s address only on 6 May 2024.

15. Further, it was Mr Ventrella, not Mr Feda who resided at the Annangrove address and that it was Mr Ventrella who operated the drug run phone, with Mr Feda only operating it on one occasion: at [9] and [10] of the Crown case statement.

16. Garling J concluded in BNS, where the applicant had also been charged with offences under s 25(2) of the Drugs Misuse and Trafficking Act, that the applicant’s mother being willing to provide a surety of $1 million as a condition of a grant of bail, compared to the earlier offer of BNS’ fiancé to provide a surety of $50,000, constituted “material information relevant to the grant of bail … that was not presented to the Court in the previous application”: at [46].

17. In this case, while none of the matters relied on alone might have established that material information relevant to the grant of bail was not presented before Chen J, I consider that in combination, they do satisfy the requirements of s 74.

Cause is not shown

18. But I am not satisfied that cause why Mr Feda’s detention was not justified was shown.

19. The written submissions were directed to this being the applicant’s first time in custody; the time he had to wait until trial; family hardship; medical concerns; strength of the Crown case; electronic monitoring; the presumption of innocence and right to be at liberty; surety; and proposed strict bail conditions. Reliance was also placed on BNS and decisions such as:

20. R v Goodwin [2015] NSWSC 2107 where it was held that being a young man and in gaol for the first time demonstrated “a sufficient indication that he has shown cause why his continued custody is not justified”: at [4];

21. Tsintzas v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2017] NSWCCA 172 where it was held that “a particular vulnerability experienced by a family member or members may, either alone or in combination with other matters, be sufficient to show cause. There is no authority for the proposition that any form of hardship to a family will necessarily establish that cause is shown. Rather, the court makes an evaluative judgment in each case”: at [42];

22. McAndrew v Regina [2016] NSWCCA 58 where it was held that “The prospect that an applicant for release was suffering from a life threatening or even only a significant medical condition that could not adequately be managed in or from a correctional facility would seem to be a stark example of a circumstance likely to satisfy the show cause requirement.”: at [9]; and

23. R v Najem [2015] NSWSC 2108 where it was held at [9] that “Any person in the care of the Corrective Services Department, whether they are a sentenced prisoner or a prisoner held on remand, has to have access to appropriate and proper medical treatment and if that is not occurring then that would appear to be a dereliction of the duty that the Department has to adequately care for inmates. That would be a matter of concern to the Court. It is certainly a matter which is capable of being relied upon to discharge the onus in relation to showing cause why the applicant’s detention is not justified.”

24. In oral submissions Mr Feda relied on the matters advanced in respect of s 74, as well as claimed changes since Chen J’s decision and a misapprehension of the facts advanced in the Crown case statement.

25. What has not changed is the state of the evidence about Mr Feda’s source of income. There was a dispute before Chen J about its source. On this application it was his case that he had been employed as a kitchen installer, his employer having been identified by counsel. But that was not established by evidence, as presumably, it could have been if that person had been the employer. Other than his wife’s belief that he had such employment, there is no evidence which establishes that Mr Feda had a legitimate source of income.

26. In the result, I consider that the application must be approached with some caution. It seems that Mr Feda has been in Australia since 2013 when he arrived from Lebanon to study here. He married, had a family and acquired property, all without any apparent income. On what is before the Court it appears he has been involved in large scale commercial drug supply.

27. That he is likely to be convicted of the charges is disputed. The Crown’s case against him is circumstantial. Evidence has now been served, including an analysis of intercepted phone conversations which on Mr Feda’s case is not persuasive. That will be for a jury to decide, it having to consider all of the evidence as a whole. DNA evidence is also said not to link him to the drugs, unlike the other alleged offenders.

28. That resulted in Mr Feda’s submission that the Crown’s circumstantial case is problematic, even though there seems to be no issue about the phones used in the drug supply business. What will fall to the jury to decide will have to be determined in circumstances where there is also no issue that one of those phones was found on Mr Feda’s bedside table. It was also contended that this could only establish his possession on one day, but that cannot be determined on this application.

29. Given all else that the police investigation into this drug syndicate uncovered, that Mr Feda is at real risk of conviction on the charges he faces must be accepted. That there is likely to be an acquittal was not. The nature and extent of his involvement in the syndicate will be determined on the evidence and will be important on his sentencing. But that he faces a significant custodial sentence on conviction, longer than any period he has to serve on remand, it must be accepted is also likely.

30. Chen J did not consider that a delay of 18 to 24 months before trial would involve any undue delay. While the usual committal timetable has not been adhered to and it is likely that there will be a joint trial, that there will be a trial within that timeframe still appears likely. It appearing that a trial in 2026 will be fixed later this year.

31. The circumstances in which Mr Feda’s wife finds herself are difficult, it is apparent, given that she has sold their house, suffers ill health and has had to give up her employment to care for her children who miss their father. Significant further surety is also offered by Mr Feda’s cousins. But in the context of this drug syndicate, the involvement of Mr Feda which text messages suggest, consistent with he having a senior role and the funds which it generated, over $1 million identified by police during the strike force investigation, I am satisfied that the further surety offered does not show cause.

32. Nor does Mr Feda’s health help establish such cause. On her affidavit his wife refers to an unidentified issue with his spine and her understanding of referrals to a doctor in custody, examination by a nurse months later and his pain not being adequately managed. That he has a condition which is not adequately managed in custody is not thereby established.

Unacceptable risks

29. Even if I had concluded that cause had been shown I would have been unable to conclude that even the stringent bail conditions proposed would establish a basis on which it could be concluded that he did not pose unacceptable risks. Section 19 requires that the application be dismissed, if that is not established.

30. The bail concerns and risks the Crown identified were risks of non-appearance, of commission of a serious offence, of danger to the community and of interference with witnesses or evidence. Only the latter was in issue, but given the circumstantial case advanced against him, I accept that Mr Feda does pose such a risk. I thus accept that all these concerns and risks are established.

31. There may be a disincentive for Mr Feda to return to Lebanon, but the funds this drug syndicate generated suggest access to means for travel. The drug supply in which Mr Feda appears to have been involved poses obvious dangers, as does any potential further involvement in such activities, which cannot be entirely removed, no matter how stringent the conditions imposed on the applicant are.

32. In custody Mr Feda is said to be a model prisoner and his criminal record is limited. But it was in 2021 that he was convicted of a drug supply offence, as well as a proceeds of crime offence in respect of which a conditional release order was made on 31 May 2022, which did not expire until May 2024. On what is before the Court, Mr Feda did not comply with that order.

33. No grant of bail is risk free. In Mr Feda’s case I am not persuaded that there is any basis for confidence that he would comply with the stringent conditions which would have to be imposed upon him, if released on bail. They still leaving his family without apparent means of support, while he remains subject to home detention.

34. For these reasons the application is refused.

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