R v Eriksen (Sentence)

Catchwords: CRIME – sentence – murder – offender found guilty by jury at trial – murder of former female partner – domestic violence – 18 stab wounds inflicted – where offender was self-represented – no remorse – no subjective case before the Court – where offender’s history and prospects of rehabilitation are indeterminable – where there are no known mitigating factors – need for specific and general deterrence in a domestic violence context

Legislation Cited: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW)
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW)
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Domestic Violence and Sexual Offences) Act 2025 (NSW)

Cases Cited: Apps v R [2006] NSWCCA 290
Charbaji v R [2019] NSWCCA 28
Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 67
Haak v R [2022] NSWCCA 28
Hili v R; Jones v R (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45
Hraichie v R [2022] NSWCCA 155
Munda v State of Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38
R v Baleinapuka [2022] NSWSC 485
R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374
R v Tammajanta [2024] NSWSC 1180
R v Thompson [2025] NSWCCA 133
Stocco, Gino v R; Stocco, Mark v R [2018] NSWCCA 77
The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54
Versluys v R [2008] NSWCCA 76

Category: Sentence

Parties: The King (Crown)
Anthony Eriksen (Offender)

Representation: Counsel:
D Boyle & P Mulvihill (Crown)
Self-Represented (Offender)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Self-Represented (Offender)

File Number(s): 2023/00113797

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

1. On 24 June 2025 the offender, Anthony Eriksen was convicted by a jury of the murder of Lisa Fenwick. It falls now for me to sentence the offender for this crime.

2. As at the trial, the offender appeared in the sentence proceedings, self-represented having dismissed his counsel and solicitor on the morning of the sentence hearing. That is, of course, his choice and his right. However, the manner in and time at which the offender exercised that right means the Court has little information before it which may go to explaining what caused or contributed to him committing this senseless act of violence. The offender has not put before the Court any material as to his subjective case or which would mitigate his offending. The Court must sentence him on the material it has, applying relevant principles in the instinctive synthesis of sentencing.

3. I will first detail the evidence of the history of the relationship between Ms Fenwick and the offender and then the events leading to her death. I will set out my findings of fact informing the objective seriousness of the offending before considering the relevant purposes of sentencing and handing down the sentence on the offender.

4. Any factual findings I make must be consistent with the jury verdict: Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 67 at [14]; R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374. To take a fact into account in a way adverse to the offender, I must be satisfied of that fact beyond reasonable doubt. If there is a matter to be considered in favour of the offender, that fact must be established on the balance of probabilities: The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 at [27].

Background and contextual facts

5. The evidence in the trial disclosed that the offender and Ms Fenwick had been in an intimate domestic relationship since approximately 2010. They lived together in a unit at Church Avenue, Mascot. At the time of her death Ms Fenwick was 59 years old. The offender was then 61.

6. The offender had been unemployed for a number of years and was being supported financially by Ms Fenwick. The relationship had been deteriorating for some time. In December 2022, Ms Fenwick was made redundant from her role at an insurance firm. This placed additional financial stress on the relationship.

7. By at least this time, and most likely for some considerable time before, Ms Fenwick wanted to end the relationship with the offender. She wanted him to move out of the unit they shared.

8. On 11 February 2023, the offender called MensLine Australia [1] and Link2home [2] seeking emergency accommodation. The calls were recorded. In each call the offender had recounted issues in the relationship with Ms Fenwick. These included that he was unemployed and had little to no financial means. He indicated that Ms Fenwick wanted him to move out.

9. Ms Fenwick had been discussing problems in her and the offender’s relationship with her family and friends. She told her friend Michelle Roberts in text messages that she was fearful of the offender. She said:

“i (sic if) anything happens to me believe I am of sound mind…”

“i hate living in fear” [3]

10. Ms Fenwick had also been attending counselling from March 2023. The notes made by the counsellor after the first session on 8 March 2023 record that Ms Fenwick was finding her situation increasingly difficult and was beginning to resent the offender as he was financially dependent on her. The notes record she said that as the offender was unemployed, he was reliant on her for all financial matters including rent, food, clothing, bills and incidentals. Ms Fenwick told the counsellor that the financial pressure was getting to her, particularly since she was made redundant. [4] The counsellor’s notes recorded that Ms Fenwick said she could not move forward with her life whilst he was weighing her down, but she could not figure out how to remove the offender from her life without feeling guilty. [5]

11. Ms Fenwick told Ms Roberts by text messages about some of these counselling sessions. [6] She also told another friend, Robert Srjararian, about that counselling in text messages. [7] In the text messages to each of them on 8 March 2023 she asked them to keep in touch as she did not feel safe with the offender. [8]

12. The notes made by the counsellor after the third session on 4 April 2023 record that Ms Fenwick told the counsellor that the relationship between her and the offender had irretrievably broken down, and that she finally realised she had to leave. The notes recorded that Ms Fenwick told the counsellor that she was contacting local real estate agents to search for an apartment in the area with her long-term goals being to leave the offender, find a new place to live and get a fulfilling job. [9]

13. On 9 April 2023, CCTV footage from in and around the unit complex where Ms Fenwick and the offender lived showed that they were at home during the day. [10] In the morning, the footage showed the offender leaving at 10:54am to walk Ms Fenwick’s two dogs. The offender was shown returning to the unit at 11:09am. The offender did not leave the unit again until the police arrived later that night.

14. At 3:31pm the offender received a text message from Ms Fenwick with a link to “flatmates.com.au”. Under a minute later at 3:32pm Ms Fenwick sent a message to him stating: “not sure if they will want a 60 year old man though”. [11] I infer the link sent by Ms Fenwick was for a place at another unit on that website that the offender could move to with the second message casting doubt on whether the offender would be considered suitable because of his age.

15. The CCTV footage also depicted Ms Fenwick leaving the unit and the unit complex to take the dogs for a walk at 5:17pm. She returned to the unit at 5:24pm. She appeared to be intoxicated. [12]

16. From the time Ms Fenwick returned to the unit, each of Ms Fenwick and the offender were inside the unit.

17. At 6:04pm the offender called 000. He said there was an emergency at the unit address. The recording of the 000 call has the operator asking the offender what happened, he said: “Uh, we’ve got into an argument”. When asked again what happened he told the operator: “Well, I put a knife into her…”. [13]

18. The police and ambulance responded and at 6:16pm the first police and paramedics had arrived at the unit complex. [14] After some difficulty in getting access to the floor on which the unit was located, as ambulance officers approached the unit the offender came out into the hallway in a robe talking on his mobile phone to the 000 operator.

19. Ms Fenwick was found lying on the bedroom floor with multiple stab wounds. She was not breathing, had no pulse and was pronounced dead at 6:25pm. [15]

20. Police arrived and saw a silver knife in the kitchen sink with blood on the blade that appeared slightly watery. [16]

21. The offender was arrested, cautioned and handcuffed in the hallway outside the unit. Police observed a small amount of blood on his face, right hand and foot which were photographed. [17]

22. The police spoke to him and recorded the conversation on body worn video. The offender was asked what happened. He said: “Ah, it was just a huge argument”. [18]

23. The offender was then recorded as saying:

“It’s just like living life is so stressful. I haven’t had a job for 5 years and she, it’s she just criticises me all the time and I want to have a job but I don’t have a job.” [19]

24. When talking to another police officer, the offender said: “Oh, life”. When asked what he meant by that, the offender said:

“It’s stressful, that’s it, it’s, uh, it’s just, I’m trying to get a job…

That’s life. Guess I’m going to gaol now.” [20]

25. Later, at the police station, he asked police officers about the condition of Ms Fenwick. When told that she had died, he said: “There has been issues for the past seven to nine months”. [21]

26. A postmortem was undertaken on the body of Ms Fenwick by forensic pathologist Dr Kendall Bailey. Dr Bailey observed the following injuries:

(a) At least 18 sharp force injuries to Ms Fenwick’s torso, with at least 11 of those injuries penetrating the chest and abdominal cavities, causing damage to the heart, aorta, the pulmonary trunk, inferior vena cava, left main bronchus, right lung, oesophagus and liver; [22] (b) A 240 ml haemothorax in the left thoracic cavity and a 540 ml haemothorax in the right thoracic cavity; [23] (c) Six sharp force injuries to the right arm, five of which penetrated the subcutaneous tissue and a scratch like mark; [24] (d) One scratch like mark on the upper left arm; [25] and (e) Two sharp force injuries to the right thigh. [26]

27. A toxicology analysis was undertaken of Ms Fenwick’s blood which showed a blood alcohol level of 0.191g per 100 ml. [27]

Findings of fact

28. From the evidence I have referred to, I make the following findings of fact beyond reasonable doubt:

29. Between 5:24pm and 6:04pm the offender and Ms Fenwick got into an argument in the unit in which they lived. This finding is supported by the offender stating to the 000 operator and the police that there had been an argument between him and Ms Fenwick.

30. During or after the argument, the offender armed himself with a kitchen knife and stabbed Ms Fenwick multiple times. The offender had admitted to the 000 operator that he had put a knife in her, being Ms Fenwick.

31. Ms Fenwick was stabbed in the bedroom. This was where Ms Fenwick’s body was found surrounded by blood and there was no other significant blood deposits or blood trails in other parts of the unit indicating that she had been stabbed elsewhere and had moved to the bedroom.

32. Ms Fenwick suffered at least 18 stab wounds to her torso. 11 of those penetrated her chest and abdominal cavities.

33. Ms Fenwick suffered six sharp force injuries to her right arm and two to her right thigh. These sharp force injuries were caused by the offender stabbing her with the kitchen knife and I infer those to her arm were caused whilst she was trying to protect herself. The knife that was used by the offender was the knife found in the sink when the police arrived.

34. The cause of death was the injuries to Ms Fenwick’s torso caused by the multiple sharp force injuries resulting from her being stabbed multiple times by the offender.

35. Ms Fenwick was unarmed during the stabbing.

36. The offender had a small cut to the inside of his left index finger but was otherwise uninjured during the incident.

37. Ms Fenwick was affected by alcohol at the time of her death with a blood alcohol reading of 0.191 g per 100 ml.

38. The offender had consumed some alcohol telling police he had drunk a couple of drinks of red wine that day: [28] but it cannot be concluded that he was affected in any significant way by that amount of alcohol.

Objective seriousness

29. One of the matters relevant to assessing the objective seriousness of this offence is the state of mind of the offender at the time he stabbed Ms Fenwick. If I conclude that the offender intended to kill Ms Fenwick this is a consideration generally tending to greater objective seriousness of the crime of murder than if he had an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm. I note, however, that the question of the offender’s intention is not the only relevant consideration to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the crime of murder: Charbaji v R [2019] NSWCCA 28 at [180]; Apps v R [2006] NSWCCA 290 at [49] and Verslu**ys v R [2008] NSWCCA 76 at [32].

30. The Crown submits that in the context of this case a factual finding that the offender intended to kill Ms Fenwick can be inferred from the following circumstances

(a) The nature of the injuries inflicted by the offender, including the number of wounds and their location; (b) The weapon used by the offender to kill Ms Fenwick, being a kitchen knife; (c) The fact the offender armed himself with the knife and took it into Ms Fenwick’s bedroom to inflict the fatal injuries; and (d) The relationship evidence which demonstrated that at the time of Ms Fenwick’s death the relationship between Ms Fenwick and the offender had irretrievably broken down, and there was a significant degree of tension and animus between the two.

31. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender did intend to kill Ms Fenwick at the time he stabbed her. As the Crown submitted there were a significant number of stab wounds suffered by Ms Fenwick. The forensic pathologist gave evidence of at least 18 wounds to the torso of Ms Fenwick with 11 of them penetrating her chest and abdominal cavities. The number of wounds indicates a repeated and frenzied attack by the offender on Ms Fenwick. This was not just a momentary loss of control or a fit of temper - the offender kept up the attack stabbing Ms Fenwick multiple times in her upper body.

32. Further, he used a kitchen knife to inflict the wounds. The blade was 15 cm long. [29] He must have taken that knife from where it was ordinarily kept into the bedroom and stabbed Ms Fenwick in the manner described following the “huge argument” (in his words) that he had had with her. Whether the argument was as a result of the evident tensions in the relationship between the offender and Ms Fenwick as demonstrated by the context and relationship evidence I have described above, or as a result of the offender’s perceived criticisms of him by Ms Fenwick, or for some other reason does not matter. What followed the argument was a repeated series of violent stabbings of Ms Fenwick in her bedroom resulting in significant and fatal wounds.

33. I find that the offender intended to kill her by attacking her the way he did, stabbing her multiple times armed with the knife.

34. The crime of murder carries with it a maximum penalty of life imprisonment with a standard non-parole period (“SNPP”) of 20 years. I am required to take into account the SNPP. These penalties serve as a legislative guidepost of the seriousness with which such crimes are rightly regarded. For completeness, I note that the recent amendments made by the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Domestic Violence and Sexual Offences) Act 2025 (NSW) to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“Crimes (SP) Act”) which mandate a SNPP of 25 years for the murder of a current or former intimate partner do not apply to this matter as the offence was committed before the amendments came into effect. [30]

35. The circumstances of this offending have been described. There is no doubt that the relationship between Ms Fenwick and the offender had been in trouble for some months. Ms Fenwick wanted it to end and had discussed this with several of her friends and the counsellor she was seeing. She had said she was fearful of the offender. She was frustrated with financially supporting the offender who had no job. She herself was made redundant, only making the financial position more stressful.

36. On the afternoon of the murder, she was significantly affected by alcohol. She had sent the offender a link to flatmates.com, I infer to a listing of accommodation suggesting he may live there, which is further evidence she wanted him to leave. As I have described, sometime after she returned to the unit having walked the dogs at 5:24pm and before 6:04pm when the offender called 000, there had been an argument. The offender referred to it being a “huge argument”. He armed himself with the kitchen knife and in a prolonged and violent attack repeatedly stabbed Ms Fenwick, who was vulnerable being affected by alcohol, in the chest and upper body, intending to kill her. Ms Fenwick was unarmed and unable to fight back. She suffered wounds to her arm I infer in trying to deflect the knife from her body. It must have been a terrifying last few minutes of life being so savagely attacked by a partner.

37. There is no evidence that the attack was premeditated. It may have resulted from the argument which itself flowed from the relationship issues I have described, or from some other cause. It is not necessary for me to make a finding as to why the argument occurred. The relevant matters are the findings I have made that following the argument the offender, armed with a knife, attacked and killed Ms Fenwick in the way I have described.

38. Having regard to all of these matters, this murder, which occurred in a domestic setting is a serious example of this type of offending. If I was to use the notional gradation, I would assess it as being at the mid-range of objective seriousness.

Aggravating and mitigating factors

39. The offending is aggravated as it occurred in Ms Fenwick’s home where she was entitled to feel safe: s 21A(2)(eb) of the Crimes (SP*)* A**ct. The offender has no prior criminal record, other than one offence of common assault (domestic violence related) committed against Ms Fenwick on 23 March 2014. The Crown rightly does not suggest this is an aggravating factor. Whilst that offending was dealt with by bond, it was also a domestic violence offence against Ms Fenwick. Apart from this, the offender has otherwise led a life free of infraction of the criminal law. However, I accept the Crown submission that the offender is a mature man and is not entitled to the leniency a youthful offender may get.

40. The Crown rightly accepts that whilst the offending involved the use of a weapon, namely the kitchen knife, this should not constitute an aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(c) of the Crimes (SP) Act.

41. There are no mitigating factors of the type prescribed in s 21A(3) of the Crimes (SP) Act or otherwise. As I have stated, the offender chose to terminate instructions to solicitors and counsel who had been engaged for the sentence proceedings. That termination took place on the morning of the sentence hearing. Whilst the offender’s counsel had forwarded submissions on behalf of the offender to the Court in accordance with prior directions, the offender expressly chose not to put those submissions before the Court or rely upon them.

Subjective case

42. There is no subjective material put before the Court by the offender. He refused to participate in the preparation of a sentence assessment report. He had refused to engage with a psychologist to assess him; an appointment having been made by his then legal representatives.

43. The offender has expressed no remorse for the offence. He has not shown any insight into the impact that the death of Ms Fenwick has had, and will have, on her friends and family. There is nothing on which the Court could make a sensible assessment of the prospects of his rehabilitation, although now at 64 years of age and having regard to the lengthy period of time he must inevitably spend in custody, his age on his release to parole will mean that it is relatively unlikely that he may commit offences of this nature again.

44. The Court is in the unusual position of knowing nothing about any relevant aspects of the offender’s history or subjective case which may impact upon the sentence. But that is a matter of his choice. It is unknown why he chose to terminate the services of his lawyers on the sentence proceedings, refused to engage in a psychological assessment arranged by them or in the preparation of the sentence assessment report. The Court must therefore sentence the offender absent consideration of matters which may otherwise have been raised in his subjective case.

45. The best that could be said for the offender is that he had admitted that he stabbed Ms Fenwick (although that admission was in the face of an overwhelming case, including the 000 call when he had said he had put a knife in her). He limited the issues at trial to whether the Crown could prove that his act in stabbing Ms Fenwick was wilful and voluntary. He did not waste time by asking irrelevant questions of any witness. This did reduce the time the trial took and the distress to the family of Ms Fenwick.

46. There is nothing which reduces the moral culpability of the offender for the heinous and brutal murder of his partner.

Sentencing principles

47. I must have regard to the purposes of sentencing in s 3A the Crimes (SP) Act. The offender must be adequately punished and made accountable for his actions. The conduct of the offender must be, and is, denounced. I recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community in general. The issue of general deterrence of offending such as this in a domestic violence context which also has prominence in this sentencing exercise must be emphasised.

Murder in a domestic violence context

48. It is becoming too common for judges of this and other courts all over our country, to have before them matters which expose the prevalence of domestic violence in our society. As Bell CJ recently described it, domestic violence is a scourge afflicting modern Australia: R v Thompson [2025] NSWCCA 133 at [1] (“Thompson”).

49. As the Chief Justice further noted in Thompson at [8], domestic violence has been, rightly, described as a national emergency and an ongoing national priority; so much so that action has been taken as reflected in the recent amendments to the SNPP for murder in the domestic violence context that I have mentioned.

50. Today, another male perpetrator of violence against his female partner is before the Court for sentence. The violence in this case, as in so many others, led to the taking of the life of an innocent woman in her own home who was vulnerable and unable to break free from the shackles of the relationship.

51. In Munda v State of Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38 at [54] the plurality of the High Court made the following observations of the role of criminal law in the context of domestic violence offending:

“… First, the proper role of the criminal law is not limited to the utilitarian value of general deterrence. The criminal law is more than a mode of social engineering which operates by providing disincentives directed to reducing an acceptably deviant behaviour within the community. To view the criminal law exclusively, or even principally, as a mechanism for the regulation of the risks of deviant behaviour is to fail to recognise the long-standing obligation of the state to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community’s disapproval of that offending, and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the state to the vulnerable against repetition of violence…”

52. In R v Tamma**janta [2024] NSWSC 1180 at [137] N Adams J, in sentencing an offender for the murder of his intimate partner said:

“The sentencing principles in relation to sentencing for domestic violence offences are well established. It cannot be doubted that the community has become increasingly concerned in recent times at the levels of domestic violence being inflicted on women by men who are supposed to love or have loved them.… It has long been recognised that there is a need for specific and general deterrence as well as a requirement of powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct. Recognition of the harm done to the community as a result of crimes of domestic violence is also important….”

53. There are many other authorities, regrettably too numerous to include all of them in these remarks, which speak of the need for a strong element of personal and general deterrence for offences such as this one, committed in the domestic violence context. Those authorities speak of offending, such as the offending here, which involves aggression by a man who was physically stronger than his female victim who is often vulnerable and unable to defend herself against attack. Too often the Court sees cases, such as this, where the male partner attacks and kills a female with whom he is, or has been, in an intimate relationship which is ending, or has ended, with a desire expressed by the female that the male leave. Attacks, such as the one carried out in this case by the offender, are cowardly and inexcusable and the sentence to be imposed must reflect the Court and the community’s denunciation of such conduct. It must be known that offending of this type will be met with significant punishment.

54. The sentence imposed must also vindicate the dignity of Ms Fenwick and hold the offender to account for his actions: R v Hossain [2023] NSWSC 1621 at [39].

Victim impact statements

55. The Court received victim impact statements from Leonore Fenwick, Ms Fenwick’s mother, and Richard Fenwick, her brother. Ms Fenwick attended court and read her statement herself. Mr Fenwick was unable to attend, and his statement was read by the Officer in Charge.

56. Each spoke of the impact that the death of their daughter and sister had on them. There is understandably a significant and continuing sense of loss and grief. Richard spoke of the callous, senseless act of violence leading to his sister’s death at the hands of the offender.

57. I recognise the harm caused to each of the authors of those statements by the death of Lisa. I also recognise the strength they have shown in coming forward to make those statements reflecting their grief and sorrow. I hope the sentencing process may assist them in moving forward with their lives.

Comparable cases

58. I have been provided by the Crown in their written submissions (at [57]-[62]) reference to a number of what are described as “comparable cases”. Each of the sentences referred to in those cases are for offences of unpremeditated domestic violence murders. The sentences imposed in them properly reflect sentencing patterns confirming the need for significant penalties for offences of this type.

59. I do not consider it is necessary to recite the facts and sentences in each of those matters. I have had regard to them all with the aim of providing consistency in sentencing and as a yardstick against which I should examine the sentence I intend to impose: Hili v R; Jones v R (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 at [54]. Of course, all sentences are based on the factual findings, objective seriousness of the offence in question, aggravating and mitigating factors, the offender’s subjective case and the other matters including the purposes of sentencing informing the instinctive synthesis of the sentencing process. This case is unique amongst the cases identified by the Crown in that here unlike those cases, there is no subjective material put forward by the offender of any sort, in particular which may go to mitigating his offending or lead to a more lenient sentence.

60. The most comparable of the matters referred to is R v Baleinapuka [2022] NSWSC 485. In that case, Fagan J sentenced an offender to 26 years and 8 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 years for the murder of his partner. At the time of the murder the offender was living with his partner. Each had been drinking. The offender stabbed the victim 14 times with two knives. Three of the wounds would have caused massive blood loss, in particular a stabbing wound which penetrated the victim’s aorta. There was evidence that the offender had pursued the victim through different parts of the place they lived during the attack. The offender fled the scene but was apprehended. He admitted in a police interview that he had stabbed the victim in a jealous rage. He gave evidence at the trial recanting his confession to the police. He blamed the stabbing on a third-party. He was 55 when he committed the offence and the victim 51. He had no prior convictions.

Determination

61. It is plain that for this offence the s 5 threshold has been crossed and that no other sentence other than one of full-time imprisonment is appropriate.

62. I do not consider that a finding of special circumstances should be made so as to depart from the statutory ratio between the head sentence and the non-parole period. There is no evidence that the offender suffers from any physical or psychological condition, nor is there any evidence of another reason which may make his time in custody more onerous. I do not regard his age as a reason alone for finding special circumstances and his age does not compel such a finding: Haak v R [2022] NSWCCA 28 at [31] (Beech-Jones CJ at CL, Davies and Bellew JJ agreeing).

63. The Crown has indicated it does not contend that a sentence of life imprisonment be imposed in this case (s 61 of the Crimes (SP) Act and s 19A(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)). I agree with that submission.

64. In imposing the sentence I am about to deliver, I am conscious that the term of imprisonment to be served ought not be crushing. The offender is 64 years old and, by reason of the length of the sentence I will impose, he will spend most, perhaps all, of the balance of his life in custody. Some may consider it a de facto life sentence. But this is a consequence of the seriousness of the objective criminality of his offending which must be reflected in the sentence imposed. After taking into account the objective seriousness of the offending, the complete absence of remorse or insight into the effect of his conduct, the lack of any subjective material which may have mitigated the sentence or informed the offender’s moral culpability and the purposes of sentencing, if I were to impose a lesser sentence merely because of the offender’s age and because of the possibility of him not being released to parole before he dies, I would be imposing a sentence that is not just and appropriate for the crime committed: Stocco*, Gino v R; Stocco, Mark v R* [2018] NSWCCA 77 at [190] (Hoeben CJ at CL, Johnson and Schmidt JJ agreeing); Hraichie v R [2022] NSWCCA 155 at [73] (Beech-Jones CJ at CL, RA Hulme and N Adams JJ agreeing).

65. The offender has been in custody solely related to this offence since his arrest on 9 April 2023. The sentence will be backdated to commence on that day.

66. The offender is advised that pursuant to s 25C(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) that the offence for which he has been convicted is a serious violence offence under s 5A(1)(a) of that act. In summary, this means the State can apply to the Supreme Court for an order that you continue to receive supervision or be held in detention at the end of your sentence if the Court considers you would be a “high risk offender” who poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious offence.

67. I am satisfied that it is appropriate pursuant to s 12(2) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) the offence for which the offender has been convicted be recorded on his criminal record as a domestic violence offence and there will be a direction to that effect.

ORDERS

68. Anthony Eriksen, for the murder of Lisa Fenwick for which you were convicted by a jury on 24 June 2025, I sentence you to a non-parole period of 20 years with a balance of term of 6 years and 8 months. That is a total sentence of 26 years and 8 months. The sentence will be backdated to commence on 9 April 2023 and expire on 8 December 2049. The first date you will be eligible for release to parole is 8 April 2043.

69. The offender is warned that the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 200**6 (NSW) may apply to him.

70. Pursuant to s 12(2) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) I direct that the offence for which the offender has been convicted be recorded on his criminal record as a domestic violence offence.

**********

Endnotes

Ex. K.

Ex. L.

Ex. A, p 13.

Tcpt, 11 June 2025, 118.15-25.

Tcpt, 11 June 2025, 118.35-40.

Ex. A, p 15.

Ex. B(1), p 1.

Ex. B(1), p 1 (Mr Srjararian) and Exhibit A, p 15 (Ms Roberts).

Tcpt, 11 June 2025, 119.20-25.

Ex. E.

Ex. F.

Ex. E.

Ex. M.

Tcpt, 12 June 2025, 193.35-40, 199.10-12.

Tcpt, 12 June 2025, 195.29-30, 196.44-45.

Tcpt, 12 June 2025, 213.7.

Ex. N, pp 2-5.

Ex. Q.

Ex. Q.

Ex. R.

Tcpt, 18 June 2025, 514.23.

Tcpt, 18 June 2025, 476.40-50.

Tcpt, 18 June 2025, 476.50-477.5

Tcpt, 18 June 2025, 477.5-9.

Tcpt, 18 June 2025, 477.9-10.

Tcpt, 18 June 2025, 477.9-10.

Tcpt, 18 June 2025, 505.25-30.

Ex. Q.

Ex. V, p 14.

See schedule 2, s 97 of the Crimes (SP) Act.