R v Eluga [2016] ACTSC 304

CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Judgment and Punishment - Sentence - offences of theft, obtain property by deception and unlawful possession of stolen property - pleas of guilty - significant criminal history - offending linked to use of illicit drugs - consideration under s 63 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act of pre-sentence custody served as a sentenced prisoner - error in entry of earlier sentence orders by court staff - correction of earlier orders and re-sentencing.

Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT)

Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 19, 20, 61, 63(2), 105

Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)

Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 6906

Mill v The Queen [1998] HCA 70; 166 CLR 59

Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; 194 CLR 610

R v Verdins (2007) [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269

SCC 84 of 2016; SCC 85 of 2016; SCC 185 of 2012

1. Peter Eluga has pleaded guilty to three offences as follows:

(a) theft, contrary to s 308 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) and carrying a maximum penalty including 10 years imprisonment;

(b) obtain property by deception, contrary to s 326 of the Criminal Code and also carrying a maximum penalty including 10 years imprisonment; and

(c) unlawful possession of stolen property, contrary to s 324 of the Criminal Code and carrying a maximum penalty including 6 months imprisonment.

3. There was no need for these offences to be dealt with in the Supreme Court, except that they appeared to have been committed in breach of a good behaviour order I made in December 2013. As it turns out, the matter is not nearly so straightforward.

4. As well as the statement of facts for the three new offences, the following material is in evidence before me:

(a) the statement of facts for offences on which I sentenced Mr Eluga in December 2013, and my sentencing remarks at that time;

(b) Mr Eluga's criminal history;

(c) the orders entered by the Court Registry in December 2013, including the good behaviour order itself, an Official Notice of Good Behaviour Order, and the undertaking signed by Mr Eluga in accordance with the good behaviour order;

(d) the Sentence Administration Board order cancelling the periodic detention order I made in December 2013 in relation to Mr Eluga's sentence;

(e) two compensation schedules relating to reparation orders sought arising out of the new offences;

(f) a pre-sentence report prepared for the Magistrates Court in April 2016;

(g) a CADAS report prepared for the Magistrates Court in April 2016; and

(h) a forensic psychiatric report dated 6 July this year;

5. No evidence was offered by the defence, but Mr Eluga has written a letter to the Court detailing his rehabilitation plans and his wish to resume work, to help with the care of his sick mother, and to spend time with his two young sons again.

6. The new offences arose from two separate incidents.

7. On the evening of 21 December 2015, Mr Eluga entered the gaming machine area of the Ainslie Football Club with a set of keys. He managed to open two gaming machines and remove the stackers from them before leaving the club. The empty stackers were later found in the club toilets, and it was established that $315 in total had been taken from them.

8. I note that after Mr Eluga was identified as the offender, club officials indicated that if the keys to the gaming machines were returned they would not pursue criminal charges. Defence counsel submitted that this indicated the offence was not particularly serious, but in my view what it really indicates is that the consequences for the club of having keys to the gaming machines unaccounted for was far more serious than the loss of the $315. One might think, in fact, that the circumstances of the offence raise significant concerns that go even beyond the cost of, for instance, changing the relevant locks. On the other hand, I accept that the offence as charged, namely the theft of $315, is not a serious example of a theft.

9. The second and third offences were committed on 25 January this year. Mr Eluga came into possession of several rare coins that he thought might have been stolen. This was the possession of stolen property offence. In fact, they had been stolen, early that morning, from an auction house in Fyshwick. In two transactions later that day, Mr Eluga sold a total of four coins to a coin dealer in Civic, receiving $787 all up. The sales to the coin dealer constituted the deception offence. Again, Mr Eluga's offences are relatively low-level examples of the offences concerned.

10. Reparation orders have been sought for a total amount of just over $1,100.

11. Mr Eluga was arrested on 5 February 2016, and charged with the coin offences the next day.

12. He had also been unable to return the gaming machine keys to the Ainslie Football Club. He told police that they were in a car that had been written off in an accident shortly before police spoke to him, but he was subsequently unable to trace the wreck through the tow-truck driver. Some days after the arrest over the coin offences, Mr Eluga was also charged with the theft from the gaming machines.

13. Mr Eluga pleaded guilty to the three charges on 22 April this year. This was on the second mention of the theft charge, and the fourth mention for the other two charges, after negotiations with the prosecution. I accept these are relatively early guilty pleas.

14. Before dealing with the difficult legal questions raised by this sentencing, I shall deal with other matters specifically relevant to sentencing Mr Eluga for the new offences.

15. Mr Eluga is now 45. He has an extensive criminal history in the ACT that includes at least 23 burglaries, 28 thefts, an armed robbery and several other dishonesty offences, and a history in New South Wales involving relatively fewer offences but of a similar nature.

16. Mr Eluga had an untroubled early childhood and maintains good relationships with his mother and some siblings.

17. However, he has been deeply damaged by sexual abuse at school from the age of about 9 and then later, at age 14, when he spent time in an institution. ... He has abused cannabis, heroin and alcohol, starting with alcohol when he was 13, and more recently has also taken to using methamphetamine. It seems that the new offences were committed in a context of substantial drug and alcohol abuse costing him around $500 a week.

18. I note at this point that it seems that the pre-sentence report author found Mr Eluga's expressions of victim empathy somewhat inadequate, but it may be that Mr Eluga struggled with the concept in this particular case: it is one thing to realise, for instance, that even thefts from large and well-funded organisations may have impacts in the broader community, but it is quite another thing to expect an offender to empathise with an organisation like the Ainslie Football Club in any real sense of the word.

19. Mr Eluga received financial compensation for his sexual abuse but has spent it all, including on drugs and gambling.

20. In my last sentencing remarks, in 2013, I noted that:

Mr Eluga has a history of making successful attempts at rehabilitation, only to relapse into drug use in response to a personal challenge, such as being asked to relive his sexual abuse during counselling or being prevented from seeing his children. He clearly has some way to go in achieving the resilience necessary to sustain abstinence from illicit drugs.

21. Mr Eluga told the CADAS reporter that his most recent relapse into drug use had come after he was contacted by investigators on behalf of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. He has not yet provided evidence to the investigators, and, sadly, he did not take up the Commission's offer of telephone counselling. Mr Eluga has previously indicated that he has found counselling in itself to present personal challenges leading to stress, and it is hard to see how he is ever going to overcome the damage that has been done to him.

22. Mr Eluga told the pre-sentence report author that he had committed the new offences in the hope of being arrested because he was "sick of this" - it seems that he had been feeling inadequately supported while in the community, especially in relation to drug and alcohol rehabilitation.

23. Mr Eluga has expressed a wish to enter residential rehabilitation, although his current plans seem to involve more in the nature of part-time rehabilitation while maintaining activities in the community. The pre-sentence report author pointed out that such rehabilitation would be available in the AMC or in the community.

24. A forensic mental health report was prepared by Dr Barker. He concluded that Mr Eluga does not appear to suffer from a mental illness. Dr Barker said that Mr Eluga might have had a drug-induced psychotic episode around the time of the offences involving the stolen coins, but he could see no realistic connection between any such psychotic episode and the offences.

25. Dr Barker, noted, however, that Mr Eluga would have an increased risk of suicide compared to that of the general population while he remained in custody. That conclusion was based on the fact that he made a suicide attempt in 1999 (although one that was unlikely to succeed and that Mr Eluga himself apparently identified it as an attempt to get attention), and the fact that detainees in general have a significantly higher risk of suicide than the population in general.

26. Relevantly to the matters identified in R v Verdins (2007) [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269, I infer from Dr Barker's comments that Mr Eluga's possible drug-induced psychosis was not relevant to the commission of any of the new offences, but that his previous suicide attempt means that any custodial sentence would put him at greater risk of suicide than any non-incarcerated person, and possibly at slightly greater risk than other prisoners.

27. General deterrence is always relevant for offences of this nature, and it is clear that Mr Eluga needs continuing personal deterrence, although far less clear that any particular punishment is likely to have any deterrent effect.

28. As mentioned earlier, this sentencing exercise has raised several complex legal issues.

29. The first and least complex relates to the proper treatment of different kinds of pre-sentence custody.

30. Mr Eluga has been in custody since his arrest on 5 February this year. On 1 March this year, the Sentence Administration Board cancelled the un-served part of the period of two years periodic detention that I had ordered in December 2013, and between then and 3 May this year, Mr Eluga was in custody as a sentenced prisoner in respect of that sentence. Between 5 February and today, 28 July, Mr Eluga has spent a total of 112 days in custody solely attributable to the new offences, and another 64 days, as mentioned, during which he was a sentenced prisoner serving the last part of the periodic detention that I imposed in December 2013.

31. The prosecutor submitted that 64 days as a sentenced prisoner had to be disregarded in determining any backdating of the sentences on the new offences. I am not persuaded by this submission.

32. Section 63(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) says that if a sentence is to be backdated, time in custody since the offender was arrested or remanded in custody for the offence must be taken into account (although not necessarily accounted for in any mathematical sense). Section 63(3) excludes several examples of time in "custody" from the calculations (for instance, custody for less than a full day, or the term of a fully suspended sentence). However, time as a sentenced prisoner since that arrest is not excluded from the calculations. I cannot see how, as a matter of statutory interpretation, a provision that explicitly excludes the period of several kinds of custody (including the period of a fully suspended sentence which would not necessarily be thought to be included in the expression "custody" anyway), can be read as necessarily excluding another unarguable form of custody that occurs after an arrest on a particular offence but before an offender is sentenced for that offence. Furthermore, such an interpretation would impose a surprising constraint on the recognised capacity, if not obligation, of a sentencing judge to take account of totality in sentencing, and to use techniques such as accumulation and, significantly, concurrency to ensure that all offences are properly recognised in a sentencing process, but that the total effect of the sentences is proportionate to the totality of the offender's criminal behaviour (Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; 194 CLR 610 at [45]; Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; 166 CLR 59 at [8] and [9]).

33. As it happens, in this case I do not need to reach any firm conclusions about whether any of the time Mr Eluga has served in full-time custody to finish his periodic detention should also be directly included in any backdating - any extra weight to be given to his recent period as a sentenced prisoner can be managed in determining the extent of concurrency between the sentences from the 2013 hearing and the sentences I must now impose for the new offences.

34. The more complicated issues relate to the sentences Mr Eluga is currently serving and their relationship with the new offences and the new sentences.

35. As already mentioned, the relatively minor new offences were committed to the Supreme Court for sentence because it seemed that they had been committed in breach of a good behaviour order I made on 16 December 2013. It is unfortunately necessary to go into some detail about that 2013 sentencing.

36. On that day, 16 December 2013, I sentenced Mr Eluga for 11 offences, involving burglaries, thefts and property damage, and took into account 8 other similar offences. I also imposed a sentence of 27 months in respect of three earlier burglaries and thefts that had initially been suspended by Refshauge J in 2010. The total sentence, taking account of the 2010 sentence, was 4 years, 11 months imprisonment. Three and a half years of that period represented sentences I imposed to some extent concurrently with Refshauge J's sentences.

37. I note at this point that the sentences originally imposed by Refshauge J had all been completed by the time Mr Eluga finished the periodic detention I imposed in 2013.

38. The sentence orders I pronounced in 2013 were:

(a) first, that the sentence was backdated to 26 October 2012 (just under 14 months) to take account, among other things, of time already served;

(b) that the next two years of the sentence were to be served by periodic detention (which would have been from 16 December 2013 until 15 December 2015); and

(c) finally, that the remainder of the sentence (roughly 21 months) was to be suspended from 16 December 2015; a good behaviour order for two years was made, requiring Mr Eluga to sign a good behaviour undertaking for two years from 16 December 2015 to 15 December 2017.

Incorrect recording and implementation of sentence orders

39. For reasons that have not become apparent, these orders were entered - by which I mean recorded in the Court Registry - as including:

(a) the suspension of the outstanding part of the sentence, not from the date two years away when Mr Eluga was to have finished his periodic detention but from the day on which I sentenced Mr Eluga; and

(b) a good behaviour order requiring him to sign a good behaviour undertaking for two years from the day of that sentencing.

40. In other words, as well as the periodic detention order running for two years from the sentence day, the good behaviour order requiring him to sign a good behaviour undertaking (as entered), and the good behaviour undertaking Mr Eluga signed, were both expressed to expire after the same two years, that is, on 15 December 2015.

41. This created the bizarre outcome that Mr Eluga appeared to be serving four years of his sentence in double time, in that the two years of periodic detention and the 21 months suspended were, in effect, running concurrently rather than consecutively as I had specified, thus reducing his effective sentence from nearly five years to three years and two months.

42. This oddity was apparently not recognised by anyone involved; Mr Eluga accordingly signed the good behaviour order and, among other things, apparently accepted Corrective Services supervision for a period of ten months, until Corrective Services, being satisfied with Mr Eluga's responses, terminated the supervision in September 2014.

43. The immediate consequence of Mr Eluga having signed the undertaking he was offered is that since the good behaviour order entered, and the good behaviour undertaking signed, expired on December 2015, none of Mr Eluga's new offences was committed in breach of the order as entered or the undertaking as signed.

44. The more difficult question is what, if anything, to do about the rest of the inaccuracy in the sentence orders as entered.

Correction of other inaccuracies in sentence orders

45. Taking account of Mr Eluga's recent remand in custody (although not the period while he was in full-time custody finishing his periodic detention), he has now completed just over two years of the three and a half year sentence that I attempted to impose in December 2013.

46. The question is how to deal with the sentences imposed in 2013 to ensure two things:

(a) first:

• (i) that Mr Eluga is properly credited with the time he has already spent in custody since my earlier sentencing;
• (ii) that he is not inappropriately disadvantaged by the offences committed after he had served out the term of the undertaking that he signed without re-offending; and
• (iii) ideally, that he receive some minor credit for the period he spent subject to a good behaviour order, relatively incident-free, while he was also performing periodic detention; but

(b) secondly, that he does not at some later point find himself treated as not having served some or all of the sentences affected by the incorrect orders.

47. Those aims would not necessarily be adequately served by simply correcting the orders entered.

48. I have accordingly devised an approach which, as far as I can see, can be sourced in various parts of the sentencing legislation and does not seem to be excluded by any part of that legislation.

49. First, I propose to correct the orders entered in relation to the sentences imposed on 16 December 2013. This can be done, probably under r 6906 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), but possibly requiring an exercise of the powers under s 61 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. Accordingly, for the purpose of possibly correcting orders under s 61, I have invited submissions from the parties and they have, as I understand it, made the comments they wished to make upon that proposal.

50. Accordingly, I now correct the orders entered in relation to the sentences imposed on 16 December 2013 as follows: Order 5 in the document headed "Good Behaviour Order" is corrected to read as follows:

(a) With effect from the date on which Mr Eluga completes his periodic detention, the remainder of the sentence is suspended.

(b) On the date on which Mr Eluga's periodic detention is completed, he is to sign a good behaviour undertaking to comply with his good behaviour obligations for two years, with security in the amount of $1,000, and the following conditions:

• (i) for such period not exceeding two years as Corrective Services considers necessary, to accept the supervision of ACT Corrective Services and obey all reasonable directions of the Director-General, or her delegate; and
• (ii) to undertake such counselling, courses, programs or treatments as directed by the supervising officer.

51. Having corrected that order, the effect should be that as of 3 May 2016, when the periodic detention was completed, the remaining term of Mr Eluga's 2013 sentence was suspended and he was required to sign a good behaviour undertaking. However, for obvious reasons, he has not signed an appropriate undertaking.

52. Section 105 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act is as follows:

1. Good behaviour - consequences of failure to sign undertaking

(1) This section applies if an offender fails to sign the undertaking mentioned in section 13 (2) for a good behaviour order made in relation to the offender.

(2) The court that made the good behaviour order may re-sentence the offender, or convict and sentence the offender, as if the order had not been made.

(3) To remove any doubt, if the offender is re-sentenced by the court under this section, the offender has the same rights of appeal as the offender would have had if the good behaviour order had not been made.

53. Under s 105(2), I consider that as a result of Mr Eluga's failure to sign the good behaviour undertaking, I have the power to re-sentence him as if the good behaviour order had not been made. That is what I am relying on to tidy up the rest of these sentencing difficulties.

54. I note, first, that there is however a theoretical question, which fortunately does not arise in this case, about the status of the associated order suspending the sentence. The Crimes (Sentencing) Act, while requiring a court that suspends a sentence also to make a good behaviour order, does not express the suspension to be conditional on the making of the good behaviour order or indeed on the signing of the undertaking, and it is possible that a suspension, once ordered, is operative despite the failure of the offender to sign an associated good behaviour undertaking. As a practical matter, the issue is unlikely to arise, because the offender would generally not be released from custody pursuant to the suspension until the good behaviour undertaking is signed, and any delay in signing the good behaviour undertaking could be quickly dealt with under s 105. In the current case, because Mr Eluga has been in custody on the new offences since the date of effect of the original orders as corrected, that issue also does not arise.

55. It seems to me, then, that in reliance on s 105, I should re-sentence Mr Eluga on the basis that:

(a) he has completed his periodic detention;

(b) his earlier sentences may not have been running since he completed his periodic detention on 3 May this year;

(c) his recent remand custody since he was arrested after the new offences (that is, the 112 days mentioned at [30] above) is to be taken into account in any re-sentencing;

(d) the offences that he committed last summer were not committed in breach of any good behaviour order; and

(e) there is scope for some concurrency between the earlier sentences and the sentences I shall impose for the new offences.

56. In re-sentencing, I shall also have regard to the following propositions:

(a) First, that although the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) does not identify a specific right of Mr Eluga that could be said to have been infringed through the incorrect entry of the sentence orders in 2013, it would in my view be inconsistent with the general import of the Human Rights Act to disadvantage an offender who has generally complied in good faith with the erroneous implementation, by court and corrections officials, of a court order.

(b) Secondly, that Mr Eluga has no claim to any actual reduction in sentences originally imposed on him, nor any special leniency in relation to the subsequent offences (except that, as already mentioned, he should not be treated as having committed the new offences in breach of a good behaviour order).

57. When I dealt with Mr Eluga in December 2013, the sentences were structured so that a number of them would be completed by the time he finished his periodic detention in December 2015. Those were all the sentences originally handed down by Refshauge J as well as three of the more recent offences, being two damage property offences and one theft. Now that Mr Eluga has completed his periodic detention, albeit only in May this year, those sentences have all been completed. I note that completion, but do not need to do anything more about those sentences. What I will do, however, is just to specify the three from my original sentencing that have been completed.

58. The three sentences that have now also been completed as a result of completion of the periodic detention are the sentences for:

(a) an ex officio charge of an offence committed on 25 March 2012, being the damage property offence;

(b) another ex officio damage property offence committed on the same day, 25 March 2012; and

(c) a theft also committed on the same day, 25 March 2012, being CC2012/4840.

59. That means that apart from the new sentences that I must impose, what is left from the earlier sentencing are:

(a) four burglaries;

(b) two thefts; and

(c) two damage property offences;

and I will re-sentence Mr Eluga for those offences.

60. Mr Eluga, please stand. I record convictions on one charge each of theft, obtain property by deception, and unlawful possession of stolen property.

61. Under s 19 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, I order that you pay $787 to Edlins of Canberra in respect of the stolen coins that you sold to that business, which were subsequently recovered by police, and under s 20 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, I order that you pay $315 to the Ainslie Football and Social Club in respect of the theft from the poker machines. Ms Hayunga will explain to you, if you want to talk to her about it, that if and when you are in a position to make those payments they are to be made into court and not directly to the complainants.

62. I now sentence you to imprisonment as follows:

(a) for the theft - to three months imprisonment reduced from four months for your plea of guilty;

(b) for the obtain property by deception - to three months imprisonment reduced from four months, to add one month to the total sentence;

(c) for the unlawful possession of stolen property - to one month's imprisonment reduced from six weeks to be served concurrently with the deception sentence.

63. That gives a total of four months imprisonment for the three new sentences, and two months of that period will be served concurrently with the sentences that I am about to re-impose.

64. Having corrected the orders incorrectly entered on 16 December 2013 to require you to sign a good behaviour undertaking when you had finished your periodic detention, I note that you have not signed that good behaviour undertaking, and so I must re-sentence you under s 105 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act for the offences in respect of which sentences were to be completed after you completed your periodic detention. I shall at the same time specify the terms of the new sentences I have just imposed.

65. Mr Eluga, I will just stop at this point, because I expect you will have a discussion with Ms Hayunga after this, and I hope you will have that opportunity, but I just want to make it clear that when I say to you there was a requirement to sign a good behaviour order when you finished your periodic detention and you did not do it, that is purely a technical process by which I can get to the point of cleaning up this whole mess. You are not actually being punished for the fact that you did not sign an undertaking when the suspension would have cut in. Do you understand that?

67. HER HONOUR: It is purely a technical correction method.

68. The new and the old sentences will run for these dates:

(a) For the old sentences:

• (i) For CC2012/4394, the Surgicentre burglary, the sentence is 25 months, and that is to be served now, backdated to 18 July 2014 and ending on 17 August 2016.
• (ii) For CC2012/4911, the burglary at the Ainslie Arts Centre, a sentence of 19 months to be served from 18 June 2015 until 17 January 2017.
• (iii) For CC2012/4913, the burglary at Metro Car Care, the sentence is 19 months and it is to be served from 18 October 2015 until 17 May 2017.
• (iv) There is an ex officio charge of theft committed between 3 and 4 April 2012, the sentence for which was seven months, and I am re-sentencing you to serve that between 29 December 2015 and 28 July 2016, so that one is finished today.
• (v) For CC2012/4915, a damage property offence, the sentence was eight months to be served from 29 November 2015 to 28 July 2016, so that again has been completed today.
• (vi) For CC2012/4914, a burglary at Narrabundah, the sentence was 22 months and that is to be served from 18 February 2016 to 17 December 2017.
• (vii) For CC2012/4847, a theft, the sentence for which was eight months, that is to be served from 18 February 2016 to 17 October 2016.
• (viii) There is an ex officio charge of damage property committed on 17 April 2012, the sentence for which was eight months. That is also to be served between 18 February this year and 17 October this year.

(b) For the new offences:

• (i) CC2016/1603, the theft, the sentence is three months, and that is to be served from 18 October 2017 to 17 January 2018.
• (ii) CC2016/1851, obtain property by deception, there is a penalty of three months which is to be served from 18 November 2017 to 17 February 2018.
• (iii) CC2016/1852, unlawfully possess stolen property, there is a sentence of one month which is to be served from 18 November 2017 to 17 December 2017.

69. That leaves you, Mr Eluga, with a bit over 18 months still to serve. The remaining sentences, so all of those sentences that I have just mentioned that still have time to run, will be suspended with effect from 17 August this year, so that is about two and a half weeks. That will clean off one more sentence, the one for the Surgicentre burglary, and will give you exactly 18 months left to serve out (ideally through compliance with good behaviour orders). I would like to think, Mr Eluga, that not suspending the sentences for another couple of weeks will also give you a chance to get yourself a bit organised and to think about how you are going to deal with being in the community again. In particular, it might help you to organise things of the sort that you have mentioned in your letter, like employment and whatever rehabilitation support you can engage with.

70. Before you are released, possibly today, but only if they have got the right dates on them, before you are released you are to sign three separate undertakings to comply with good behaviour obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT). In this case, as I say, I propose to make three different good behaviour orders applying to different groups of the sentences and operating for different periods having regard to the length of the outstanding sentences:

(a) there will be a 6-month good behaviour order for the three sentences that will expire in October this year or January next year;

(b) then there will be a 10-month good behaviour order for one sentence that is due to expire in May next year; and

(c) finally, there will be an 18-month good behaviour order for the remaining four sentences which are to expire late in 2017 or early 2018.

71. What that means, in particular, is if you can maintain your good behaviour for six months, for instance, stay out of trouble for six months, then those first three offences are finished and they will not have to be dealt with again. That may not make a great difference to you but it certainly makes a difference if you come back. It makes a difference in terms of how complicated things are.

72. There is only one sentence attached to the second good behaviour order, the 10-month good behaviour order, which you will finish on 17 May next year, and then the last four sentences are covered by the 18-month good behaviour order. With luck, you will manage to complete all the good behaviour orders and clear off all the surviving sentences, but even if you only make it past the first or the second good behaviour order, that will give you credit for finishing some sentences and will make some things tidier next time.

73. Each of the good behaviour orders is subject to the conditions:

(a) that you give security in the amount of $500 for your compliance with the good behaviour order (I might just mention at this stage, in case it is of concern to anyone looking at the records, that the good behaviour order that was originally signed has been completed and so the security for that one is finished with; there is no scope for anyone coming back and trying to enforce that);

(b) that you accept the supervision of ACT Corrective Services and obey all reasonable directions of the Director-General or her delegate; and

(c) that you undertake such counselling, courses, programs or treatments as directed by your supervising officer.

74. I was, in fact, going to include in that last condition a reference to a residential rehabilitation program, but I understand that is not exactly what you have in mind at the moment, and that you do have other commitments or obligations that you would like to perform, including in relation to your mother, so I will not specify a residential rehabilitation program, but I would recommend that you try and find something satisfactory in the way of serious rehabilitation help.

75. You will be given written copies of the three good behaviour orders, and I would expect that either at the court or in the AMC they will be read to you by the officials, but in short what they mean is, and I am speaking in a global sense now, for the next 18 months, you need to keep out of trouble, keep in contact with Corrective Services and do what they say for the 18 months when you are released, including in relation to counselling and other programs that might help you. Especially I would recommend in relation to anything they offer you that might help with the substance abuse, so that is the drug rehabilitation, alcohol rehabilitation, but also with the psychological problems caused by the child sexual abuse. I do understand, Mr Eluga, that is a very difficult thing to deal with, but until you deal with it, you are really at risk of this just going on and on.

76. If you commit another offence during the good behaviour order period, or if you otherwise breach your undertakings, you may find yourself back before this Court to be re-sentenced for however many of today's sentences are still outstanding, as well as possibly losing your security amount, and depending on exactly how you breached the good behaviour undertaking, you could find yourself back serving some or all of the remaining part of the sentence in full-time custody.

77. Is there anything you want to ask me about this at this stage? Otherwise you will have a chance to talk to Ms Hayunga.

I certify that the preceding seventy-seven [77] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice Penfold.