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[2003] QCA 540
mixed. Leave to appeal against sentence granted. Appeal allowed only to the extent that the five-year sentence and serious violent offence declaration were limited to counts 1 and 2, and no further penalty...
The Court of Appeal did not consider Dodds’s five-year sentence for the second indictment too high. It took account of the serious offences, his history of violence and offending while on bail, alongside his early guilty plea and cooperation. However, the sentencing judge had imposed one sentence for the indictment as a whole instead of individual sentences for each count. The Court corrected that error: the five-year sentence and serious violent offence declaration applied to counts 1 and 2, and no further penalty was imposed for counts 3 and 4.
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2,251 words · generated 02/10/2026
R v Dodds [2003] QCA 540 is a Queensland Court of Appeal sentence decision delivered ex tempore on 3 December 2003. McMurdo P gave the substantive reasons. Davies JA and Chesterman J agreed, and the three judges concurred in the orders. The text supplied does not contain numbered paragraphs, so paragraph pinpoints are not available. References below identify the passages by their subject rather than supplying paragraph numbers.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Dodds pleaded guilty on 7 July 2003 to offences contained in two indictments. The sentence application concerned only the second indictment. On the first indictment, he had received an effective three-year term for offences including wilful damage, assault occasioning bodily harm, unlawful use of a motor vehicle and burglary with aggravating circumstances. He also received no further penalty for two summary counts of obstructing police.
The second indictment contained four counts: entering premises with intent to commit an indictable offence with an aggravating circumstance; robbery with violence whilst armed; deprivation of liberty; and unlawful use of a motor vehicle. For that indictment, the sentencing judge imposed an effective five-year sentence and declared Dodds a serious violent offender under s 161B of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). The application did not challenge the sentence on the first indictment. Dodds had originally appealed against conviction as well as seeking leave to appeal against sentence, but abandoned the conviction appeal before the sentence application was determined.
The second indictment arose from events at a Caloundra hostel on 30 January 2003. Dodds and the complainant occupied separate rooms. The judgment recounts that Dodds entered the complainant’s room, punched him repeatedly, threatened him, restrained him with a telephone charger and bed sheet, and put underwear in his mouth. He took the complainant’s wallet and car keys, demanded the PIN, and removed clothing. He told the complainant he would return and threatened to kill him if he had moved. The complainant freed himself and notified police. A victim impact statement described a broken nose, emotional harm, fear, relationship impacts and financial loss.
The sentencing context included a lengthy criminal history. The judgment describes previous convictions for offences including assault occasioning bodily harm and robbery in company with personal violence. It also records that the January 2003 offences occurred while Dodds was on bail. The Court noted his early guilty plea, cooperation with authorities and expression of remorse. His background included family trauma, substance abuse, depression and efforts at rehabilitation while on bail, including part-time security work, SES volunteering and counselling.
The appeal produced a limited correction rather than a reduction of the substantive sentence. The Court held that the five-year term was not manifestly excessive. It nevertheless accepted the parties’ concession that the sentencing judge should have sentenced Dodds on each individual count rather than impose a sentence on the indictment as a whole. The orders were amended so the five-year sentence and serious violent offence declaration applied to counts 1 and 2. No further penalty was imposed for counts 3 and 4.
The Court’s assessment balanced the seriousness and circumstances of the offending against the matters advanced in mitigation. The prosecution had submitted that a sentence between five and seven years was appropriate, and the sentencing judge considered a range of six to eight years before allowance for the guilty plea. The Court accepted that the sentence ultimately imposed was at the lower end of the relevant range after taking the plea into account.
Several features supported the Court’s conclusion that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. The offending involved multiple offences, violence, threats and restraint. The Court described the most serious offences on the second indictment as falling into the category of burglaries and robberies constituting a home invasion. It also emphasised Dodds’s serious history of violent offending and his continued offending while on bail for other offences of violence. McMurdo P described him as a mature man with a history of violence.
The Court did not overlook the mitigating matters. Dodds had pleaded guilty at an early stage and cooperated with the authorities. He had expressed remorse. While on bail, he had made attempts to rehabilitate through work, volunteering and counselling. The reasons also record a difficult personal background, depression and continuing alcohol and amphetamine use. The Court’s conclusion was that the sentence adequately reflected cooperation and appropriately recognised the seriousness of the offending, reoffending on bail, maturity and prior violent history. It did not accept that the mitigation required a lower sentence or removal of the declaration.
The Court also addressed comparable decisions. It considered R v Grogin and R v Gills, but noted that the offences in those cases pre-dated the 1997 amendments to the Penalties and Sentences Act that introduced the power to declare an offence a serious violent offence under Part 9A. The judgment therefore treated them as limited comparators in a sentencing framework changed by those amendments.
R v Thornton was distinguished. Thornton had received a five-year sentence without a Part 9A declaration for armed robbery and other offences, but the Court considered the circumstances materially different. Thornton was younger and had no prior convictions for violence. Dodds was older and had a substantially more serious history of violent offending. The difference in record and personal circumstances meant that Thornton did not demonstrate that Dodds’s five-year sentence was excessive.
The Court also referred to R v Jones and R v Sinden in connection with the appropriate range for home-invasion offending. It accepted the sentencing judge’s assessment of a six-to-eight-year range before the guilty plea was taken into account. It then approved the sentencing judge’s integrated approach, referring to R v Bojovic. The decision does not reproduce the reasoning in those authorities, so their broader principles should not be inferred beyond the use made of them in this judgment.
The judgment expressly identifies a statutory change relevant to the cases cited by Dodds. It says that Grogin and Gills concerned offences committed before the significant 1997 amendments to the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), including the introduction of the power to declare an offence a serious violent offence under Part 9A. That observation explains why the Court did not treat those cases as straightforward comparators for the sentencing exercise before it.
The decision applies s 161B and Part 9A to the second indictment. The Court’s order limited the serious violent offence declaration to counts 1 and 2. It also states that a declaration could not be made in respect of count 4, unlawful use of a motor vehicle. The supplied reasons do not set out the statutory criteria in detail, so the case should not be used as a substitute for the text of the Act or a fuller account of Part 9A.
The judgment also records a procedural sentencing error. The sentencing judge imposed a five-year term on the indictment rather than imposing individual sentences for each count. Both counsel conceded the error, and the Court amended the orders accordingly. The case therefore illustrates the distinction between an effective sentence for a group of offences and the formal need, in the circumstances accepted by the Court, to impose sentences count by count. It does not provide a comprehensive discussion of the general requirements for sentencing on multiple counts.
The decision does not set out a before-and-after account of the law beyond those points. Nor does the supplied text provide later judicial treatment. Any account of subsequent developments or current statutory wording would require sources beyond this judgment.
McMurdo P said: “The sentence cannot be said to be manifestly excessive.” In plain English, the Court rejected the argument that the five-year sentence was so high, in the context of this case, that it warranted appellate intervention. This conclusion was reached after considering the offences, the applicant’s history, offending on bail, his plea and cooperation.
The President said that the sentencing judge “correctly adopted the integrated sentencing process referred to in R v Bojovic”. The Court accepted that the sentencing judge could assess the combined offending and the consequences of imposing a serious violent offence declaration as part of an integrated sentencing exercise. The judgment does not reproduce Bojovic’s reasoning, so this passage should not be expanded into a more detailed statement of that case’s doctrine.
The Court described the applicant as having “a history of violence” and having “continued to commit violent offences even whilst on bail for other offences of violence”. This identifies the aggravating features that weighed heavily in the Court’s assessment. The passage helps explain why the Court did not regard the mitigating evidence as making the sentence excessive.
On the comparator Thornton, the Court said the case was “immediately distinguishable” because its facts differed and the applicant in Dodds was more mature and had a much more serious record for violent offending. In plain English, the same five-year term in another case did not control the result here, because the offender’s record and circumstances were materially different.
Finally, McMurdo P stated that it was “necessary to technically grant the application and allow the appeal in order to make those ancillary amendments.” This explains the mixed outcome. Dodds did not succeed in having the substantive sentence reduced as manifestly excessive, but he did obtain a formal correction to the way the sentences and declaration were recorded.
The judgment contains no numbered paragraphs. The quotations above are consequently not assigned invented paragraph references.
The decision is most directly relevant to sentence appeals involving a combination of violent offences and a serious violent offence declaration under Part 9A of the Queensland sentencing legislation. Its factual setting includes a home-invasion category of offending, violence against a person in accommodation, restraint, threats, theft, and multiple counts on one indictment.
The sentencing factors that featured in the Court’s reasoning include a serious history of violent offending, offending while on bail, maturity, an early guilty plea, cooperation with authorities, remorse, personal hardship, substance abuse and attempts at rehabilitation. The judgment does not say that any single factor determines the sentence. Its reasoning depends on the combined circumstances and the sentence imposed.
The decision is also relevant where a party compares a sentence with an earlier case. Dodds shows the Court examining the comparator’s facts, criminal record, age and the statutory sentencing context. Thornton did not establish that the same sentence was excessive because the offender there had no prior violent convictions and was younger. Grogin and Gills were treated cautiously because they pre-dated the relevant statutory amendments.
A separate practical feature is the form of the sentencing orders. Where several counts appear on an indictment, the Court accepted that individual sentences should have been imposed rather than one sentence on the indictment as a whole. The decision’s correction was specific: the five-year sentence and declaration were limited to counts 1 and 2, and no further penalty applied to counts 3 and 4. It should not be assumed from this judgment alone that every multi-count sentencing error has the same remedy.
The supplied judgment contains no discussion of decisions delivered after 3 December 2003 and provides no subsequent citation history. It is therefore not possible, on this source alone, to say whether later courts have followed, applied, distinguished or criticised R v Dodds.
Within the judgment itself, the authorities are treated as follows. Bojovic is applied as the authority for the integrated sentencing process. Jones and Sinden are cited in support of the range accepted for the home-invasion offences. Thornton is distinguished because of differences in the offending and the offender’s history. Grogin and Gills are considered but treated as limited comparisons because they pre-dated the 1997 statutory amendments.
Those relationships describe how the Court used the authorities in Dodds, not how later courts treated Dodds. A later-treatment account would require access to subsequent judgments or a citator, neither of which is included in the material supplied here.
The judgment does not provide the full text of s 161B or the detailed statutory test for a serious violent offence declaration. It records that the declaration was made and then limited to counts 1 and 2, and that it could not apply to count 4. The source does not explain the detailed basis for treating each count in that way.
The decision also does not reproduce the relevant reasoning from Bojovic, Jones or Sinden. It identifies the integrated sentencing approach and the range accepted in this case, but does not set out a general method for calculating a sentence across multiple offences or determining how a declaration affects that assessment.
The precise individual sentences ultimately imposed on counts 1 and 2 are not set out in the supplied judgment. The orders state that the five-year sentence and declaration are limited to those counts, with no further penalty for counts 3 and 4, but do not specify a separate term for each of counts 1 and 2.
Finally, the source does not establish how later courts have treated the decision, whether the relevant statutory provisions have since changed, or how current sentencing practice compares with the range discussed in 2003. Those questions require additional legal sources and should not be answered from this judgment alone.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on, relying on, or using this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Dodds [2003] QCA 540
PARTIES: R v DODDS, David Anthony (applicant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 251 of 2003 / DC No 82 of 2003
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Maroochydore
DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON: 3 December 2003
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 3 December 2003
JUDGES: McMurdo P, Davies JA and Chesterman J / Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made
ORDERS: Application for leave to appeal against sentence granted****Appeal allowed to limit sentence imposed of five years imprisonment with a serious violent offence declaration to counts 1 and 2 and in respect of counts 3 and 4 order that no further penalty be imposed
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT – SENTENCE – FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT – where applicant pleaded guilty to a number of offences contained in two indictments – where sentenced to effective term of three years imprisonment on first indictment and to effective term of five years imprisonment and declared “serious violent offender” on second indictment – where application related only to second indictment which involved robbery with violence whilst armed and deprivation of liberty – where long criminal history – where pleaded guilty and cooperated with authorities and expressed remorse – where made attempts to rehabilitate whilst on bail – where sentence imposed on indictment instead of individual sentences – whether sentence manifestly excessive / R v Jones [2000] QCA 84; CA No 393 of 1999, 17 March 2000, considered / R v Sinden [2000] QCA 408; CA No 163 of 2000, 2 October 2000, considered / R v Thornton [1999] QCA 78; CA No 422 of 1998, 18 March 1999, distinguished
COUNSEL: N V Weston for the applicant / D Meredith for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
THE PRESIDENT: The applicant pleaded guilty on the 7th of July 2003 to a number of offences, contained in two indictments. The first indictment contained two counts of wilful damage, one count of assault occasioning bodily harm, one count of unlawful use of a motor vehicle, and one count of burglary with circumstances of aggravation. He was sentenced to an effective term of 3 years' imprisonment on those charges. He also was dealt with for two summary matters of obstructing police, arising from offences on this indictment, but was not further penalised. He then pleaded guilty to a second indictment, charging one count of entering premises with intent to commit an indictable offence with a circumstance of aggravation, one count of robbery with violence whilst armed, one count of deprivation of liberty, and one count of unlawful use of a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to an effective term of five years' imprisonment on this indictment. The sentencing Judge, under s 161B of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ("the Act"), declared that the applicant was "a serious violent offender". Declarations as to time already served under the sentence of 198 days as to the first indictment, and 155 days as to the second indictment, were also made. The applicant originally appealed against his conviction, and sought leave to appeal against his sentence on the second indictment, but yesterday abandoned the appeal against conviction. His application for leave to appeal only relates to the sentence of five years' imprisonment imposed on the second indictment with a declaration under Part 9A of the Act. In considering whether that sentence is manifestly excessive, it is necessary to review the offences to which the applicant pleaded guilty on the first indictment.
The applicant was 34 years old at the time of the offences, and 35 at sentence. He had a lengthy criminal history. He was convicted in the Ipswich Magistrates Court of two counts of break, enter and steal in 1989, and was sentenced to a community based order. In 1992, he was convicted of a number of offences, the most serious of which was assault occasioning bodily harm and was sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The next month he was convicted and sentenced to three and a-half years' imprisonment, with a recommendation for parole after 18 months, for a robbery in company with personal violence. In 2000, he was sentenced to two years imprisonment for assault occasioning bodily harm in company. In 2002, he was convicted and fined $400 for common assault. He also had an assortment of minor property and vagrancy offences.
The offences on the five-count indictment, the first in time, occurred as follows. On 19 June 2002, the complainant's wife was inside her home unit and heard loud swearing and banging noises outside in the stairwell. She contacted her husband, the complainant, by telephone and he returned home. He found the applicant kicking a screen door and swearing in front of the next-door neighbour's unit. The complainant said, "Are you all right, mate?". The applicant said, "Who the fuck are you?" and punched the complainant to the left of his jaw. The complainant retreated to his home, closing the door behind him. He then heard an object smash against his front door, and the applicant yelling abuse. He called police, who noticed that a clay pot had been smashed against the complainant's door, causing damage to the pot and door of $780.
On about 20 July 2002, the applicant took car keys from Mr Davies, with whom he shared premises. He drove a vehicle to the home of his former wife at about 2 a.m. He entered her house without permission whilst armed with a pick handle. He used crude and demeaning language towards her. He hit her across the back of the legs with the pick handle. She telephoned triple-0. When police arrived, the applicant told them to "Fuck off, you dogs", and continued to threaten his former wife. Police struggled to detain him, and eventually subdued him with capsicum spray.
This incident also encompassed the two summary counts of obstructing police.
The applicant was remanded in custody, and released on bail after serving 43 days, on the 4th of September 2002.
The offences contained in the second indictment, the four-count indictment, occurred as follows. The complainant and the applicant resided in separate rooms at a Caloundra hostel. On the 30th of January 2003, the applicant knocked on the complainant's door, entered his room and without warning punched him on the nose, causing pain and bleeding. The complainant fell onto his bed, and the applicant punched him a further three or four times. The applicant said, "I'm sick of you Christian cunts; I asked you for some money and wouldn't give it to me." The applicant spat in the complainant's face. He asked the complainant if he wanted to suck his penis. The complainant refused. The applicant picked up a mirror, and threatened to hit the complainant with it. He ordered the complainant to face the wall. As he did so, the applicant said, "I'm not going to hit you, you stupid dopey cunt." He tied the complainant's ankles together with a mobile telephone charger and cord, placed some underwear in the complainant's mouth, and tied the complainant's wrists and ankles together with the bed sheet. He took the complainant's wallet and car keys and demanded his PIN. The complainant complied. The applicant took several items of clothing belonging to the complainant and placed them in a bag. He told the complainant he was going to steal his money and his car; he would return in two hours and if the complainant had moved, he would kill him. As he left, he told the complainant not to make a noise or he would stab him. The complainant did not accede to the applicant's threats, freed himself, and notified police who intercepted him in Fortitude Valley. A tendered victim impact statement recorded that the complainant suffered a broken nose and also suffered emotional damage. He feared for his life. His relationship with others has suffered. He has lost hundreds of dollars from his wallet and this affected him financially. He says that no amount of money could compensate him for his emotional damage.
The Prosecutor at sentence contended that because of the applicant's previous history for offences of violence, and that the second series of offences were committed whilst on bail, a sentence of between five and seven years was appropriate.
The applicant had a dysfunctional, indeed tragic, background. He was one of 11 children. When he was 14, he witnessed the murder of his brother. At 15, his father died of cancer. He left school, and commenced to abuse alcohol and drugs. He has no real work skills or job training. He moved to Queensland at 19 and obtained some unskilled work but continued to drink heavily. He was married at 29 and has four children, two of that marriage, and two adopted. He and his wife had separated about six months prior to the first series of offences. He was distraught at the break up of his family, and the loss of his wife and alienation from his children. He abused alcohol and amphetamines and committed these offences of which he has little memory.
Whilst on bail, he made attempts to rehabilitate by obtaining part-time security work at Golden Beach Tavern, and joining the SES as a volunteer. A letter from the Caloundra City SES confirmed that he had done volunteer work for him from October 2002 to January 2003. He sought counselling for his depression from the Sunshine Court and Gympie Health Services and from the Indigenous Mental Health Unit. The stressors of his marriage break-up and his separation from his children became too much for him. Nevertheless, the applicant continued to abuse alcohol and amphetamines and this was a major factor in his commission of the offences, including the second series of offences.
He pleaded guilty at an early stage, cooperated with the authorities and expressed remorse at sentence for his offending. His counsel at sentence did not quibble with the range suggested by the Prosecutor, but asked the Judge to moderate the head sentence if making a serious violent offence declaration.
The learned primary Judge considered that the range of imprisonment for this combination of offences, given the applicant's previous convictions for violence, was six to eight years, before taking into account the plea of guilty, and then, consistent with the submissions made to her, determined that an effective sentence of five years' imprisonment with a declaration under Part 9A of the Act was the appropriate penalty here, recognising the various competing interests.
The applicant contends the learned sentencing Judge's starting point of eight years' imprisonment is too high and that the applicant has received insufficient benefit for his plea of guilty; his attempts at rehabilitation whilst on bail; his depression and apparent remorse. The applicant contends the appropriate sentence is either five years' imprisonment with no declaration under Part 9A of the Act or four years' imprisonment with such a declaration. The applicant also points out that her Honour sentenced the applicant to five years' imprisonment on the indictment, instead of sentencing the applicant on each of the individual counts in the second indictment, and that a declaration under Part 9A could not be made in respect of count four on the indictment, unlawful use of a motor vehicle.
The applicant was a mature man with a history of violence who has continued to commit violent offences even whilst on bail for other offences of violence. The only significant factor in his favour was his early plea of guilty and cooperation with the authorities in the administration of justice.
The applicant has referred to three cases said to be comparable in support of his contention that the sentence is manifestly excessive. Two of those R v Grogin [1998] QCA 361; CA No 198 of 1998, 27 August 1998 and R v Gills [1996] QCA 034; CA No 443 of 1995, 2 February 1996 concerned offences which were committed prior to the commencement of the significant 1997 amendments to the Act including the power to declare an offence to be a serious violent offence under Part 9A of the Act.
The third matter relied upon by the applicant was R v Thornton [1999] QCA 078, CA No 422 of 1998, 18 March 1999. Thornton pleaded guilty to one count of armed robbery in company, one count of entering premises with intent, one count of deprivation of liberty, three counts of wilful damage and two counts of breaking and entering premises and committing an indictable offence therein. He was sentenced to an effective term of five years' imprisonment without a declaration under Part 9A. The offences concerned the armed robbery in company of a Red Rooster store at Labrador. The applicant carried a machete, an accomplice a crowbar and the other accomplice a replica pistol. Each was masked and wore dark clothing. They broke into the store and then tied up a 14 year old member of staff and ordered the female assistant manager to open the safe. She, too, was bound and a considerable quantity of cash and property stolen. Thornton was 24 when he committed the offences and 25 at sentence. He had a substantial criminal history involving motor vehicle offences and minor drug offences with some convictions for dishonesty but none for violence. Two of the three victims suffered psychological problems as a consequence of the offence. This Court held that the sentence of five years' imprisonment with no recommendation for parole was not manifestly excessive.
This matter is immediately distinguishable from Thornton not only because its facts are obviously different but also because this applicant was a more mature man with a much more serious record for committing offences of violence.
The respondent rightly points out that the most serious offences on the second indictment, counts 1 and 2, were in the category of those burglaries and robberies constituting a home invasion. The schedule of offences provided by the respondent for offences of home invasion with intent to steal confirms the submission made at first instance, as adopted by the learned sentencing Judge, that the appropriate range in all the circumstances here was six to eight years' imprisonment before taking into account the plea of guilty: see R v Sinden [2000] QCA 408; CA No 163 of 2000, 2 October 2000 and R v Jones [2000] QCA 084; CA No 393 of 1999, 17 March 2000.
The learned sentencing Judge correctly adopted the integrated sentencing process referred to in R v Bojovic [2000] 2 QdR 183 and in deciding to impose a declaration under Part 9A of the Act sentenced the applicant to a term of imprisonment at the lower end of the appropriate range. The sentence imposed adequately reflects the mitigating factor of the applicant's cooperation with the authorities in the administration of justice and also appropriately recognises the seriousness of the applicant's multiple offending which included re-offending whilst on bail, his maturity and his extensive previous criminal history for serious offences of violence. The sentence cannot be said to be manifestly excessive.
Both counsel concede the learned sentencing Judge erred in sentencing the applicant to five years' imprisonment on the second indictment instead of imposing individual sentences in respect of each count. It is therefore necessary to technically grant the application and allow the appeal in order to make those ancillary amendments.
I would allow the application for leave to appeal against sentence and allow the appeal to the limited extent only of limiting the sentence imposed of five years' imprisonment with a serious violent offence declaration to counts 1 and 2 and in respect of counts 3 and 4 order that no further penalty be imposed. I would otherwise refuse the appeal.
DAVIES JA: I agree.
CHESTERMAN J: I agree.
THE PRESIDENT: They are the orders of the Court.
R
Dodds [2003] QCA 540
Leave to appeal against sentence granted. Appeal allowed only to the extent that the five-year sentence and serious violent offence declaration were limited to counts 1 and 2, and no further penalty was imposed for counts 3 and 4. The appeal was otherwise refused.