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[2009] VSCA 91
respondent. Application for leave to appeal refused.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Dare received a total sentence of six years and three months for extensive drug trafficking and related offences, including firearm offences and firing shots that narrowly missed a person. He argued that the sentence was too high, that he deserved more credit for courage and good character, and that his sentence was too severe compared with sentences imposed on suppliers who were co-offenders. The Court of Appeal considered the differences in the offenders' conduct and circumstances, found that the sentencing judge had allowed substantial credit, and concluded that the sentences were within range. It refused leave to appeal.
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In R v Dare [2009] VSCA 91, the Victorian Court of Appeal considered Steven Dare's application for leave to appeal against sentences imposed after he pleaded guilty to eight offences. The offences included trafficking in methylamphetamine, cannabis and LSD; possessing cannabis and amphetamine; possessing firearms while a prohibited person; and recklessly engaging in conduct that placed a person in danger of serious injury. The Court refused leave to appeal. Nettle JA gave the principal reasons at [2]–[29]; Vincent JA and Williams AJA agreed at [1] and [30].
The offending arose from a police investigation into a drug network operating in the Geelong area. Police intercepted more than 13,000 calls and SMS messages between December 2006 and June 2007. The evidence indicated that Dare trafficked amphetamine on an almost daily basis, with the judgment estimating the total at about 400 to 500 grams, valued at $80,000 to $100,000 ([4], [11]). The evidence also included cannabis and LSD transactions ([8]–[9]).
A serious violent incident formed part of the offending. During an argument in January 2007, Dare retrieved a cut-down rifle and fired three shots at a person, narrowly missing him. Dare was later heard saying, “I shot at the cunt and everything” and “I thought I got the cunt” ([5]). Police also found an imitation pistol, cannabis and amphetamine when they searched his premises ([10]).
The sentencing judge imposed individual sentences for each count and ordered parts of several sentences to be served cumulatively. The result was a total effective sentence of six years and three months' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years and three months ([15]). In fixing sentence, the judge said that he took account of the guilty plea and a senior police officer's letter recognising Dare's courage and good character. The judge also said that the letter supported reasonable prospects of rehabilitation ([14]).
Dare's appeal grounds focused on three related questions: whether he received enough credit for the character and courage described in the letter; whether his sentences were too severe compared with those of co-offenders who had supplied him; and whether the individual sentences, total effective sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive ([16], [21], [27]).
The Court first addressed the argument about recognition of courage and good character. Nettle JA accepted that, at first glance, the sentencing transcript appeared to show that the judge had misunderstood the proper scope of the credit, apparently restricting it because the character and courage related to other offences ([17]). But that possible misunderstanding did not, by itself, establish that the sentence required appellate correction.
The Court stressed that there is no formula for quantifying this kind of credit. Nettle JA noted that authorities had discussed credits of up to 50 per cent, or even two-thirds, while also observing that such amounts may be excessive in some cases or insufficient in others ([18]). Looking at the seriousness of Dare's offending and the relatively lenient sentences imposed on the major counts, Nettle JA inferred that the judge must have allowed a substantial allowance. He considered that, without such an allowance, sentences on Counts 1 and 7 could have been as much as twice as long and still within range ([19]). The ground therefore failed ([20]).
The parity argument compared Dare's four-year sentence for methylamphetamine trafficking with shorter sentences received by four co-offenders. Counsel argued that the suppliers had more serious roles and could not claim the same character-and-courage credit ([21]–[22]). Nettle JA rejected the comparison as incomplete. He characterised Dare as a sizeable retail dealer at the centre of a distribution hub, obtaining stocks from different suppliers as needed to serve his customers, rather than as a small-scale vendor at the bottom of a distribution structure ([23]).
The Court then examined the differences between Dare and each co-offender. Bidmade's estimated trafficking was about 80 grams, and his youth and rehabilitation considerations were relevant to the sentence he received ([24]). Doherty's involvement was based on a smaller number of calls and a much smaller amount of trafficking than Dare's ([24]). Matthews' trafficking was also on a lesser scale, and his prior convictions and personal background differed ([24]). Waugh's offending came closest in scale, but the Court considered that it still fell behind Dare's ([24]). Those differences mattered to parity.
Nettle JA adopted the parity formulation quoted from R v Jovica Djukic: equal outcomes are required in cases that are relevantly identical, and different outcomes are required where cases differ in a relevant respect ([25]). He also emphasised that parity is not a mechanical rule ([25]). In the circumstances, and taking account of the substantial credit for courage and character, the Court found no “exceptionable disparity” ([26]).
Finally, the Court rejected the submission that the sentences were manifestly excessive. The offending was not treated as a collection of unrelated, isolated transactions. The cannabis and LSD counts formed part of the broader illicit drug activity, although Dare could be sentenced on those counts only for the conduct they involved ([28]). The Court accepted that the sentences on Counts 7 and 8 were stern, particularly the sentence on Count 8, but considered them in the setting of the broader offending ([28]). Its conclusion was that the individual sentences and total effective sentence were within range ([28]).
The judgment did not present itself as establishing a new sentencing formula. Its discussion instead applied existing principles to the particular sentencing grounds raised.
On parity, the judgment described an established principle: sentences should not differ between co-offenders who are equally culpable and otherwise equally positioned, but identical sentences are not appropriate where relevant differences exist ([25]). Nettle JA quoted R v Jovica Djukic [2001] VSCA 226 and referred to R v Tien & Ors [1998] VSCA 6, as well as the High Court's decision in Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64, in support of the proposition ([25]). The practical emphasis in Dare is that a parity comparison requires attention to the actual scale, duration and circumstances of each offender's conduct, rather than comparison of headline sentence lengths alone.
On credit for courage and good character, the Court confirmed the case-specific nature of the assessment. Nettle JA said that “there is never necessarily a correct amount” of credit and that the appropriate allowance depends on the circumstances ([18]). The Court did not establish a percentage or fixed sentencing discount. It resolved the appeal by assessing the sentencing judge's apparent approach alongside the sentences imposed and the seriousness of the offences ([17]–[20]).
On manifest excessiveness, the decision records the Court's conclusion that these sentences were within range. It does not set out a general numerical range for drug trafficking or for the combined offending. The judgment gives the statutory maximum penalties as context for the sentencing exercise ([12]), but its conclusion is specific to the offending and sentencing record before it.
The supplied judgment contains no account of later treatment of Dare. Accordingly, it supports an explanation of what the Court decided in 2009, but not a claim about whether later courts have followed, limited or distinguished it.
At [18], Nettle JA explained that there is no necessarily correct amount of credit for courage and good character. In plain English, a court cannot simply apply a standard percentage across cases. The significance of the evidence depends on the case, and the same percentage may be too much in one matter and too little in another.
At [19], Nettle JA concluded that the sentencing judge must have allowed a “most substantial amount of credit” on the major counts. The reasoning was inferential: the judge's sentences were relatively lenient given the seriousness of the conduct, so the Court considered that the sentences already reflected substantial mitigation. The paragraph is important because it shows that the Court assessed the practical effect of the sentencing decision, not only the apparent error in the judge's stated understanding.
At [25], Nettle JA quoted the principle that equal justice requires the same outcome in relevantly identical cases and different outcomes where there is a relevant difference. In plain English, parity is a comparison of like with like. It does not mean that all participants in the same drug network must receive matching sentences.
At [23]–[24], the Court applied that comparative approach. Dare's role, estimated quantities and period of offending were compared with those of the suppliers. The judgment treated the extent of offending and the offenders' personal and criminal circumstances as relevant distinctions. Its point was not that a retail dealer always has a more serious role than a supplier; it was that the evidence in this case placed Dare at the centre of a substantial retail operation.
At [28], Nettle JA said that the individual sentences and total effective sentence were “within range”. He also cautioned that the cannabis and LSD counts had to be understood in context as part of a broader pattern, while making clear that Dare was not to be sentenced on those counts for more than the offending they themselves entailed. The paragraph explains both the contextual approach and its limit.
The judgment is most directly relevant where an offender challenges sentence on the basis that co-offenders received shorter sentences. Dare indicates that the comparison should address whether the offenders were genuinely similar in culpability and circumstances. Potentially relevant distinctions identified in this judgment include the quantities involved, the duration and frequency of trafficking, the offender's position in the distribution activity, prior convictions, age, personal history and rehabilitation considerations ([23]–[26]).
It is also relevant where the sentencing judge may have misunderstood the treatment of character evidence or courage, but the sentence itself appears comparatively lenient. Dare shows that the Court examined whether the sentence reflected a substantial practical allowance, even though the judge's apparent explanation raised a concern ([17]–[20]). It does not establish that an apparent error is immaterial in every case; its conclusion rested on its assessment of the sentences and offending before it.
For manifest-excessiveness arguments, the judgment is pertinent to cases where multiple drug offences are said to be small or isolated when viewed count by count, but the evidence shows a broader pattern of offending. The Court considered the individual counts in the setting of the overall drug activity, while observing that a person must not be sentenced on a count for conduct beyond that count ([28]).
The decision should not be read as prescribing a sentence for drug trafficking generally. It dealt with a particular combination of extensive drug offending, firearm offences, a serious shooting incident, a guilty plea, character evidence and the co-offenders' circumstances.
The supplied judgment does not contain any subsequent decisions or later judicial treatment of R v Dare. On this source alone, it is not possible to state that later courts have applied, distinguished, followed or limited the decision.
The judgment itself refers to earlier authorities. It cites R v Perrier (No 2), R v Cartwright, R v Su and R v Ngui and Tiong in discussing the variable amount of credit for courage and good character ([18]). It refers to R v Tien & Ors and R v Jovica Djukic on parity, and cites Wong v The Queen in the passage from Djukic ([25]). Those references explain the sources used in Dare; they do not establish later treatment of Dare.
The judgment does not determine a fixed method for quantifying credit for courage and good character. It expressly says there is no necessarily correct amount and resolves the case by considering the sentencing outcome as a whole ([18]–[20]). A question left open by the text is what evidence and reasoning would be sufficient in another case to show that such credit was properly assessed.
Nor does the judgment supply a precise measure for deciding when a difference in co-offenders' roles or circumstances is material enough to justify different sentences. It identifies relevant comparisons in Dare's case, but the assessment remains fact-specific ([23]–[26]).
The Court also did not decide a general sentencing tariff for trafficking, or a general rule about how individual drug counts should affect an overall sentence. Its observations at [28] concern the particular counts and the wider course of offending before it. The judgment's remarks about rigorous punishment are general observations, not a substitute for the fact-specific sentencing analysis.
Finally, the reasons do not disclose the contents of the senior police officer's letter, which was placed in a sealed envelope ([14]). The Court records the sentencing judge's stated use of it, but the published reasons do not permit a fuller assessment of the letter's contents or evidentiary detail.
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CRIMINAL LAW - Sentencing - Trafficking and possession of a drug of dependence - Applicant sentenced to a total effective sentence of six years and three months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years and three months - Manifest excessiveness - Parity - Recognition of applicant's courage and good behaviour - Whether judge took applicant's personal circumstances sufficiently into account - Application refused - R v Djukic [2001] VSCA 226 referred to.
1 I have read the judgment of Nettle JA and agree that the application should be refused for the reasons given by his Honour.
2 This is an application for leave to appeal from a total effective sentence of six years and three months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years and three months imposed on the applicant on pleading guilty in the County Court at Geelong to one count of trafficking in methyl amphetamine (Count 1), one count of being a prohibited person possessing an unregistered firearm, namely, an imitation pistol (Count 2), one count of possessing cannabis (Count 3), one count of possessing amphetamine (Count 4), one count of placing persons in danger of serious injury (Count 5), one count of being a prohibited person in possession of an unregistered firearm, namely, a sawn-off rifle (Count 6), one count of trafficking cannabis (Count 7) and one count of trafficking in LSD (Count 8).
3 The circumstances of the offending are described in the sentencing judge's sentencing remarks as follows. Late in 2006 police commenced an investigation into a sophisticated drug ring operating in the Geelong area. An extensive network of people was involved using mobile telephones to organise the supply and delivery of amphetamines and other drugs. Methyl amphetamine, cannabis, ecstasy, LSD and steroids were all trafficked. The applicant was found to be at the centre of the drug ring with several persons involved in supplying him with drugs which he then sold at street level.
4 Between 4 December 2006 and 10 June 2007 police intercepted over 13,000 telephone calls and SMS messages to mobile telephones operated by the applicant, which he had obtained by using a variant of his name and false addresses. The evidence thus derived established that the applicant trafficked amphetamine on an
almost daily basis throughout that period. Between 22 January 2007 and 2 March 2007 a covert police operative made eight separate drug purchases from the applicant involving in total $1340 of amphetamine. Additionally, between December 2006 and June 2007 mobile telephone intercepts revealed the applicant showing amphetamines to numerous other persons. In general, such transactions were for small amounts of money and involved small amounts of the drug. But on 10 January 2007 one Gabel Fullarton sought to purchase 14 grams at $2,000, although subsequently the order was amended to seven grams. Those are the facts which comprised the count of trafficking in methyl amphetamine (Count 1).
5 During the evening of 11 January 2007 and the early hours of 12 January 2007 the applicant was involved in an argument with Fullarton and other persons at the applicant's premises at Thomastown. The argument concerned the fact that Fullarton had lost his wallet. As the argument escalated, the applicant went to the corner of his unit and retrieved a cut down .22 rifle which he had hidden in the corner. Fullarton realised that the applicant was serious and left the unit. But the applicant followed him out and fired three shots which only narrowly missed him. Then in a subsequent telephone conversation, the applicant was heard to say: 'I shot at the cunt and everything' and subsequently: 'I thought I got the cunt'. Those are the acts which comprise the count of recklessly engaging in conduct placing persons in danger of serious injury (Count 5).
6 On 22 February 2007, a covert police operative made a purchase of amphetamine from the applicant. Before the transaction took place, the applicant had shown the undercover policeman a cut down firearm approximately 50 cm in length. It was a cut-down rifle with a metal barrel, bolt action, black magazine and brown wooden stock. The weapon was not recovered by police when they subsequently arrested the applicant.
7 On 1 August 2002, the applicant was before the Magistrates' Court at Frankston and sentenced to four months' imprisonment in respect of offences of theft and driving while unlicensed. It was directed that that term of imprisonment be served by way of intensive correction order and by reason of that the applicant became a prohibited person pursuant to s 3 of the Firearms Act 1996. Count 6 thus relates to the cut-down firearm which the applicant showed to the undercover policeman.
8 Between 30 March 2007 and 20 May 2007, the police investigation revealed that the applicant was trafficking in cannabis on numerous occasions in small quantities for sums ranging between $30.00 and $400.00. They are the acts which comprise Count 7.
9 Police telephone intercepts also revealed that on 6 June 2007 the applicant sold LSD to a person who sought to purchase ecstasy. The applicant was unable to source the ecstasy which his customer wanted and instead offered the customer some 'trips'.[1] Each LSD tab was worth $15 and the customer requested that the applicant bring a couple. Those are the facts which comprised Count 8.
10 On the morning of 13 June 2007, the police executed a search warrant and arrested the applicant in the bedroom of his house. When they searched the premises, they found a black coloured imitation pistol in a leather holster beneath the bed. It looked remarkably like a real pistol. Those are the facts which comprised the count of being in possession of an unregistered firearm (Count 2). They also found a small quantity of loose leaf cannabis (Count 3) a 'Glad' brand zip-lock plastic bag containing 7.8 grams of amphetamine and a further small zip-lock plastic bag containing amphetamine (Count 4) as well as a mobile phone, which they believed was used for drug trafficking, and a set of working digital scales.
11 When interviewed by police, the applicant made no comment responses to questions put. But it is apparent from all of the evidence which the police assembled that, between 6 December 2006 and 9 June 2007, the applicant trafficked approximately 400 to 500 grams of amphetamine valued at between $80,000 and $100,000.
12 As the judge said, the offences to which the applicant thus ultimately pleaded guilty were extremely serious. The offences of trafficking in drugs of dependence carried a maximum penalty of 15 years' imprisonment and the offence of possession of cannabis carried a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. The offence of possession of amphetamine carried a maximum penalty of either one year's imprisonment or 30 penalty units or, if the applicant were unable to persuade the judge that the amphetamine was not for the purpose of trafficking, five years' imprisonment or 500 penalty units, and the applicant was unable to persuade the judge that the amphetamine was not for a purpose of trafficking. The maximum penalty for recklessly engaging in conduct to place a person in danger of serious injury is five years imprisonment, which as the judge rightly observed is an inadequate penalty for serious examples of the offence.
13 The applicant's personal circumstances are also dealt with in the judge's sentencing remarks. The applicant was born on 20 April 1967 and thus was 40 years of age at the time of the offending. His parents separated when he was five or six years of age and he left school when he was 15 or 16 years of age and thereafter was apprenticed and qualified as a motor mechanic. He lived in a de facto relationship in the 1980s and 1990s and he has an 18 year old son as a result of that relationship. The boy moved to Queensland, however, to live with his mother when he was 10 years old. As a child, the applicant suffered from leukaemia and had several years of chemotherapy, but he is now in full remission. He worked effectively as a motor mechanic for some 12 or 13 years but since 1996 he has had little employment in that trade. He was for a number of years a member of the Rebels Motor Cycle Club but over the last few years before arrest had sought to distance himself from that organisation. He had used cannabis and amphetamine throughout his adult life but it was only in later years that he began to assist people to acquire drugs and that developed into the offending behaviour for which he stood to be sentenced. The judge noted in the applicant's favour that, although his offending conduct was extremely serious, there was no evidence that he gained financially from it. He lived in rented premises and observed a modest life style. Following his arrest and remand in custody, he had ceased using drugs and had undergone some courses and it was said that there was a job as general labourer available to him upon his release.
14 The judge said that he took into account the applicant's plea of guilty and that because of it he was allowing a reduction in the sentence which would otherwise be imposed. His Honour also took into account a letter from a senior police officer (Exhibit C) which the judge said showed that the applicant had demonstrated admirable courage and good character. The judge stated that the contents of the letter were also evidence of reasonable prospects of rehabilitation and that he had reduced the sentence which he would otherwise have imposed 'to reflect these matters'. But the judge did not otherwise disclose the contents of the letter and he placed it in a sealed envelope.
15 The judge sentenced the applicant on the count of trafficking methyl amphetamine (Count 1) to four years' imprisonment; on the count of being a prohibited person in possession of an unregistered firearm, namely, the imitation pistol (Count 2), to six months' imprisonment; on the count of possessing cannabis (Count 3), to a fine of $500.00; on the count of possessing amphetamine (Count 4), to six months' imprisonment; on the count of conduct placing persons in danger of serious injury (Count 5), to two years and six month's imprisonment; on the count of being a prohibited person in possession of an unregistered firearm, namely, the sawn-off rifle (Count 6), to 12 months' imprisonment; on the count of trafficking cannabis (Count 7), to three years' imprisonment; on the count of trafficking LSD (Count 8) to 12 months' imprisonment. His Honour further ordered that 20 months of the sentence imposed on Count 5, six months of the sentence imposed on Count 7 and one month of the sentence imposed on Count 8 be served cumulatively on each other and on the sentence imposed on Count 1, making a total effective sentence of six years and three months' imprisonment, and set a non-parole period of four years and three months.
(i) Ground 2 - Recognition of courage and good character
16 Under cover of Ground 2, counsel for the applicant contends that an error occurred below which resulted in the applicant not receiving full recognition for the courage and good character referred to in Exhibit C.
17 At first blush, there appears to be something in that contention. It seems from the transcript of the plea that the judge was acting under a misapprehension that the credit should be restricted because the applicant's courage and good character related to other offences.
18 On the other hand, the quantification of the credit to be allowed for that sort of courage and good character is never an easy task and as this Court has observed on other occasions, there is never necessarily a correct amount. There are some decisions which suggest a credit of up to 50%, or perhaps even as much as two thirds.[2] But it is inevitable that circumstances will differ between cases. In some instances, virtually any amount of credit would be thought of as excessive.[3] In others, it may be that 50% would not be enough.[4]
19 In this case, it seems to me that the level of credit is approximately right. For despite the judge's apparent misapprehension, when one has regard to the seriousness of the applicant's offending and the relatively lenient sentences which he received, there can be little doubt that the judge must have allowed a most substantial amount of credit in respect of the major counts. But for that allowance, I should have thought that sentences on Counts 1 and 7 of up to twice as much would have been within the range.
20 In the result, I am not persuaded that Ground 2 is made out.
21 Under Ground 3, counsel for the applicant argued that the sentences imposed on the count of trafficking offended the principle of parity when compared to the sentences imposed on the co-accused, Bidmade, Waugh and Doherty who supplied the amphetamines to him. In particular, counsel emphasised that:
22 In counsel's submission, an objective observer would share the applicant's sense of grievance at what counsel called the disparity between the sentence imposed on the applicant on Count 1 (four years' imprisonment) and each of the sentences imposed on the co-offenders on the corresponding counts, particularly given that the four co-offenders (although dealt with for lesser quantities and periods) had what counsel described as a more serious role, in the sense that it was they who supplied the applicant, and none of them could claim a discount for character and courage.
23 I do not agree. This was not the case of a small scale street level vendor in effect positioned at the base of a distribution pyramid. On the contrary, as I apprehend the evidence, the applicant was at the centre of the distribution hub, a relatively sizeable retail drug dealer acquiring stocks piecemeal from a range of disparate suppliers as needed to service his clients. Although the total amount which he trafficked is unknown, it involved at least the combination of each of the amounts trafficked by the co-offenders and the duration of his offending was also longer or as long as that of any of the others.
24 Bidmade's trafficking was minor by comparison. It involved daily transactions between 4 December 2006 and the 10 June 2007 and it was estimated that he had trafficked a total of only 80 grams. Bidmade also had less significant prior convictions than the applicant and was a youthful offender in relation to whose sentencing the judge correctly observed that rehabilitation was the primary consideration, with the consequence that the sentence which he received was justifiably lower than one would otherwise have expected. Doherty's involvement was also small by comparison. It was based on only 100 telephone calls occurring between December 2006 and June 2007 with a number of specific transactions confirmed by telephone intercepts, including a particular transaction apparently of 5.9 grams. The amount of trafficking in which he was involved was therefore much less than the applicant. Matthews' trafficking was on a lesser scale, too. It involved 89 telephone conversations between 20 May 2007 and 9 June 2007 and Matthews had less serious prior convictions than the applicant and a more problematic and tragic background. Only Waugh's offending was in any way close in scale to the applicant's activities and, on the evidence, still fell well behind it.
25 It is also necessary to bear steadily in mind that the concept of parity in sentencing 'is not to be likened to a principle of physics or mathematics which is necessarily to be applied, or necessarily to be withheld from application, in a particular case'.[5] As Vincent JA stated in R v Jovica Djukic:[6]
The concept of parity of treatment is fundamental to our notions of justice and is integral to both the procedures and substance of our legal system. It is regarded as inherently unjust to discriminate, in the sentences imposed upon them, between equally culpable and otherwise equally positioned co-offenders. It is also accepted that there is no justice in the imposition of the same penalty upon persons who are not equal in these senses.
Equal justice requires identity of outcome in cases that are relevantly identical. It requires different outcomes in cases that are different in some relevant respect.[7]
26 In any event, were it not for the character and courage credit which I take the judge to have allowed, I consider that the judge would have been warranted in imposing a sentence on the applicant much longer than the sentences imposed on the co-offenders. I am not persuaded that there is any exceptionable disparity.
27 Finally, under the heading of Ground 1, counsel for the applicant submitted that the individual sentences, total effective sentence and non-parole period were all manifestly excessive having regard to the applicant's early pleas of guilty, the credit to be allowed him for his character and courage, the lack of prior convictions for violence and drug trafficking, the fact that no betterment was alleged, that the applicant's trafficking had grown out of the applicant's background as a user, that the trafficking in cannabis was confined to relatively short periods and small amounts, that the second count of trafficking in amphetamines (Count 8) was based on a single transaction of a small quantity, and the rehabilitation achieved by the applicant since his incarceration and likely to be achieved upon his release.
28 It will be apparent from what I have already said concerning the other grounds of appeal that I reject that contention. In my view, the individual sentences
and total effective sentence were within range. I allow that the sentences imposed on Counts 7 and 8 were stern, and particularly stern in the case of Count 8. But those counts are to be seen in context. They were not isolated aberrations but two offences among a host of not dissimilar offences comprising the applicant's illicit trade in drugs. And while the applicant was not to be sentenced on those counts for anything more than the offending which they entailed, there is equally no doubt that the nature and gravity of that offending was informed and exacerbated by his other delinquent conduct. Lest there be any doubt about it, persons who engage in the business of trafficking in illicit substances, whether for profit or not, are liable to receive rigorous punishment involving substantial terms of imprisonment, and those who are guilty of re-offending or do not demonstrate genuine remorse and reasonable prospects of rehabilitation should expect even longer terms of imprisonment.
29 For the reasons which I have given, I would refuse the application for leave to appeal.
30 I agree that the application should be refused for the reasons given by Nettle JA.
[1] A 'trip' is a demotic appellation for LSD.
[2] See, for example, R v Perrier (No 2) [1991] VicRp 38; [1991] 1 VR 717, 726 (McGarvie J).
[3] R v Cartwright (1989) 17 NSWLR 243, 252-3; R v Su [1997] 1 VR 1, 78-9.
[4] R v Ngui and Tiong [2000] VSCA 78; (2000) 1 VR 579, 584 [13].
[5] R v Tien & Ors [1998] VSCA 6, [39] (Tadgell JA).
[6] [2001] VSCA 226, [25]-[26]. (My emphasis.)
[7] Citing Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 207 CLR 584, 608, [65] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), my emphasis.
R
Dare [2009] VSCA 91
(1989) 17 NSWLR 243
(2000) 1 VR 579
(2001) 207 CLR 584
Application for leave to appeal refused.