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[2025] QCA 224
respondent. The application for leave to appeal sentence was dismissed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Coronel's application for leave to appeal his sentence. The Court held that the sentencing judge had not misunderstood the consequences of offending while on parole: the judge's concern about uncertainty was whether Coronel would serve the outstanding period in actual custody. The Court also considered the sentence against comparable cases, the totality of the sentences and the sentencing remarks. It found that the seriousness and commercial scale of the offending, the additional offences, and the breach of parole and a suspended sentence supported the conclusion that the sentence was not shown to be manifestly excessive. The Court did not resolve a separate statutory question about whether the Parole Board can reduce the unexpired portion following automatic parole cancellation.
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2,172 words · generated 07/10/2026
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Jayc Coronel pleaded guilty to a series of drug and related offences and applied for leave to appeal the sentences imposed by Callaghan J on 16 December 2024. The Court of Appeal, comprising Boddice and Doyle JJA and Wilson J, dismissed the application on 14 November 2025.
The principal offence was trafficking in methylamphetamine over just more than 11 months, between 14 December 2021 and 24 November 2022. Wilson J described a high-end street and low-end wholesale operation. Coronel sourced substantial quantities from unknown suppliers and supplied both sub-traffickers and a customer base. At least 98 supplies to at least 27 people were identified. Many transactions involved an ounce or multiple ounces. The judgment records that $490,936 moved through accounts controlled by Coronel, while expressly cautioning that this was not alleged to be his profit ([10]–[15]).
The Court also described two separate supplies of GHB, both connected with onward sale, and an offence of contravening an order requiring information necessary to access electronically stored information ([16]–[19]). Coronel refused a police request to provide access to an encrypted application on his phone. The judgment notes this was his second conviction for an offence of this kind ([28], [107]).
The offending occurred while Coronel was subject to a three-year sentence and a 4½-year partially suspended sentence imposed in 2020. The new sentences were concurrent with one another, but cumulative upon the earlier three-year sentence. The balance of the suspended sentence was activated concurrently. The sentencing judge declared 561 days of pre-sentence custody as time served ([5]–[7], [40]).
The appeal grounds challenged the contingent liability arising from automatic cancellation of parole, the sentence's nominal starting point, totality and custody credit, the adequacy of reasons, and manifest excessiveness. The Court rejected each ground. The outcome was procedural: leave to appeal was refused, rather than a substantive appeal being allowed or dismissed after leave was granted.
The first issue concerned the relationship between a later prison sentence and an earlier sentence being served on parole. Section 209 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) provides for automatic cancellation of parole if a prisoner is sentenced to another period of imprisonment for an offence committed during parole. Section 211(2) provides that the time from commission of the new offence until the prisoner is returned to custody does not count as time served under the earlier sentence ([44]–[50]).
For Coronel, that period was calculated as 344 days. Wilson J explained that this was not an additional penalty imposed on top of the three-year sentence. Rather, the relevant time did not count as time served under that earlier sentence, leaving an unexpired portion ([49]–[50]).
At sentence, counsel described the liability as something Coronel might have to serve and suggested it might depend on a later decision. The sentencing judge referred to uncertainty and called the situation “a bit speculative” ([51]–[53]). The appeal argued that the cancellation was automatic, so treating it as merely possible was an error. Wilson J rejected that reading of the sentencing remarks. Read as a whole, the judge was referring to whether Coronel would have to serve the period in actual custody, not whether the statutory liability existed. The applicant remained subject to the parole regime, and release on parole was a matter for the Parole Board ([54]–[60]). Section 214 also provides that a prisoner on parole is taken to be still serving the sentence ([58]).
The second issue was the proposed nominal sentence and the use of comparable cases. Coronel relied particularly on R v Galeano, where Gotterson JA described a general range of 10 to 12 years for trafficking dangerous drugs for substantial gain on pleas of guilty, with a possible increase to 14 years in some aggravated circumstances ([65]–[72]). Wilson J emphasised that ranges are not fixed boundaries. They serve as yardsticks, and the sentencing discretion depends on the circumstances of the case ([76]).
The Court considered Galeano of limited assistance because that case included mitigating circumstances not present here, including cooperation and serious enduring health consequences from the offender's arrest. Coronel's case also involved separate GHB supplies, a repeated contravention offence, and offending while subject to parole and a suspended sentence ([73]–[79]). The Court concluded that Galeano did not show that the sentence here was outside the permissible range.
On totality, the Court rejected the argument that the sentencing judge had overlooked the combined effect of the sentences. The judge activated the suspended sentence but ordered it to run concurrently. The judge also explained that the new sentence had to be cumulative upon the three-year sentence and why the 561 days of custody could be declared only from 4 June 2023 ([85]–[90]). Wilson J cautioned against treating time spent offending while on parole as though it were simply time served against the overall sentence: the new offending was independent and breached court orders ([83]–[84]).
The Court also rejected the inadequate-reasons ground. It applied the approach stated in R v Ullman: reasons must identify the principles and main factual findings, while recognising that sentencing is an instinctive synthesis rather than a process of mathematical precision ([94]–[98]). The sentencing remarks addressed the relevant facts, the sentence structure and the interaction with the earlier orders.
Finally, the Court applied the established test for manifest excessiveness. The result must be unreasonable or plainly unjust, and the appellate court must be driven to infer a failure properly to exercise the sentencing discretion ([100]–[101]). It found that the seriousness, duration and commercial character of the trafficking, the additional offences, the repeated contravention, and the breach of parole and a suspended sentence supported a heavy sentence. The Court acknowledged that a lower sentence might have been imposed, but found no basis to infer an unidentified error ([102]–[110]).
The judgment does not announce a new general sentencing range or establish a new rule about the appropriate term for trafficking. Its central contribution is the application of existing sentencing principles to a case involving offending while on parole, an activated suspended sentence, and multiple cumulative and concurrent terms.
On comparable sentences, the Court reaffirmed that a range identified in another case does not set “brick walls” on the sentencing discretion ([76]). Galeano remained a relevant yardstick, but the Court considered the differences in aggravating and mitigating circumstances important. The decision therefore illustrates a fact-sensitive use of comparable cases rather than a fixed tariff.
On parole liability, the judgment applied the text of ss 209 and 211 to explain why the relevant period did not count as time served under the earlier sentence. But it did not resolve every question about how the statutory scheme operates. Wilson J expressly left open whether s 211(3) gives the Parole Board power to truncate the unexpired portion where parole cancellation occurs automatically under s 209 ([61]–[63]). The reasons refer to R v Brutton [2024] QSC 24, which had also identified uncertainty in the statutory wording. Coronel thus records the issue as unresolved; it should not be read as determining that question.
The judgment also restates the demanding threshold for appellate intervention on manifest excessiveness, relying on R v Pham and Hili v The Queen ([100]–[101]). It confirms that the appellate court assesses whether principle was misapplied, not whether it would itself have imposed a different sentence.
At [50], Wilson J states that the contingent liability “is not an additional penalty” but means that part of the original sentence has not been treated as served. In plain English, the 344 days were not a new sentence added for the parole breach. They affected the calculation of the earlier three-year term.
At [54], Wilson J says the sentencing judge was referring to whether the applicant would have to serve the period in actual custody. That distinction was central: the statutory consequence could be automatic, while the timing of release from custody could remain uncertain because parole was involved.
At [63], Wilson J states that, even if the Parole Board lacked power to truncate the unexpired portion, the sentencing judge had recognised the worst-case scenario: that Coronel might not be granted parole and might serve the whole period in custody. The Court did not decide the Board's power; it concluded that the unresolved question did not undermine the sentencing judge's treatment of the liability.
At [76], Wilson J explains that sentencing ranges do not set “brick walls”. In plain English, an earlier case's range is a comparison tool, not an automatic maximum. The Court must examine the particular offending and the principles reflected in comparable decisions.
At [84], Wilson J warns that crediting the parole period as “time served” could obscure that the new offending was independent and committed in breach of court orders. The point was not that totality is irrelevant, but that it should not erase the significance of the further offending or override the statutory calculation.
At [109]–[110], the Court accepts that the sentence was heavy but concludes it was not so high as to indicate an unidentified error and was not manifestly excessive. The appellate question was not whether another sentence could have been imposed, but whether the sentence crossed the threshold for intervention.
The decision is most relevant to sentencing cases where an offender commits further imprisonable offences while on parole and is later sentenced to imprisonment for those offences. In that setting, ss 209 and 211 may affect how much of the earlier sentence is treated as served. The judgment is especially relevant where the offender argues that the sentencing judge treated the resulting liability as uncertain or as an additional punishment. Its reasoning turns on the distinction between the existence of an unexpired portion and the question whether the offender will serve it in actual custody ([43]–[60]).
It is also relevant where a sentence appeal argues that a proposed head sentence exceeds a range mentioned in a comparable case. Coronel demonstrates the importance of comparing the actual features of the cases, including duration, scale, commercial organisation, additional offences, criminal history, breaches of court orders and mitigating circumstances ([71]–[79], [102]–[107]).
The totality discussion may be relevant where new offending overlaps with the operation of an earlier sentence or parole order. The judgment makes clear that the court considered the overall structure of the sentences, but did not treat time spent offending on parole as ordinary credit against the new sentence ([81]–[92]).
The decision should not be treated as determining the Parole Board's power under s 211(3) to reduce an unexpired portion following automatic cancellation. Wilson J expressly left that issue open ([62]).
The judgment itself provides no account of later judicial treatment of Coronel. It was delivered on 14 November 2025, and the supplied text does not cite any subsequent case applying, distinguishing or reviewing it. It would therefore be unsupported to describe a later line of authority or claim that another court has adopted its reasoning.
The judgment does cite R v Ullman [2025] QCA 191 for the general requirements of sentencing reasons ([94]). It also refers to R v Brutton [2024] QSC 24 on uncertainty in the parole-cancellation provisions ([61]). Those are authorities used by the Coronel Court; they are not later treatment of Coronel itself.
For research purposes, the open statutory question identified at [62] is a point to track in any later decision interpreting ss 210 and 211. The judgment does not supply the answer, and its disposition did not depend on resolving it.
The principal open question is whether s 211(3) empowers the Parole Board to direct that a prisoner serve only part of the unexpired portion when parole is cancelled automatically under s 209. Wilson J said that the issue requires statutory interpretation, that the parties had not addressed it, and that it remained for another case ([62]). The reasons reproduce the concern raised in Brutton about differences between the provisions governing cancellation by the Board and automatic cancellation ([61]).
The judgment also records practical complexities where sentences are not “unbroken”, where parole release is set for the later offending, or where a partially suspended sentence is imposed. Those situations were mentioned in the quoted Brutton discussion, not decided by the Court in Coronel ([61]). The judgment therefore does not establish how the provisions apply across those variations.
A separate point for future cases is how sentencing judges should explain the interaction between an automatic statutory liability, parole eligibility on a later sentence, and the possibility of serving the unexpired portion in custody or in the community. Coronel holds that the remarks in this case were adequate because they recognised the possible custody consequence and addressed the sentence structure ([54]–[63], [88]–[98]). It does not prescribe a required form of sentencing remarks for every case involving the same provisions.
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Coronel [2025] QCA 224
PARTIES: R / v / CORONEL, Jayc / (applicant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 276 of 2024 / SC No 341 of 2024 / SC No 1033 of 2024
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 16 December 2024 (Callaghan J)
DELIVERED ON: 14 November 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 15 October 2025
JUDGES: Boddice and Doyle JJA and Wilson J
ORDER: The application for leave to appeal sentence is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – GENERALLY – where the applicant pleaded guilty – where the applicant was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment for trafficking in methylamphetamine, 18 months imprisonment for supplying gamma-hyrdoxybutyryate (“GHB”), 18 months imprisonment for supplying GHB and 2 years imprisonment for contravening order about information necessary to access information stored electronically – where, at the time of the commission of the offences, the applicant was subject to a 4 ½ year suspended sentence imposed on 16 December 2020 – where all terms of imprisonment were concurrent with each other, but cumulative upon a 3-year term of imprisonment also imposed on 16 December 2020 – where 561 days of pre-sentence custody were declared time served under the sentence – whether the sentencing judge erred in treating the contingent liability arising from the operation of s 209 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) as potentially exposing the applicant to a longer sentence, in circumstances where the extension to the sentence is automatic – whether the sentencing judge erred by starting from a nominal sentence of 14 years or more / Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 182, s 209, s 211, s 214 / Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 156A, s 159A, s 161A / R v Brutton (2024) 18 QR 65; [2024] QSC 24, applied / R v Corbett [2018] QCA 341, cited / R v Galeano [2013] 2 Qd R 464; [2013] QCA 51, applied / R v Malone [2021] QCA 76, distinguished / R v Strutt [2017] QCA 195, cited / R v Ullman [2025] QCA 191, cited / R v Volkov (2022) 10 QR 451; [2022] QCA 57, cited
COUNSEL: E D Whitton for the applicant / A D Anderson for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
BODDICE JA: I agree with Wilson J.
DOYLE JA: I have had the advantage of reading in the draft Reasons of Wilson J. The issues relied on are such that I would have been minded to grant leave to appeal but for the Reasons given by Wilson J, I would have dismissed the appeal. However, in the circumstances I agree with Boddice JA and Wilson J in the order dismissing the application for leave.
WILSON J: Jayc Coronel, the applicant, pleaded guilty and was sentenced on 16 December 2024 in the Brisbane Supreme Court to the following terms of imprisonment:13 years imprisonment for trafficking in methylamphetamine;18 months imprisonment for supplying gamma- hyrdoxybutyryate (“GHB”);18 months imprisonment for supplying GHB; and2 years imprisonment for contravening order about information necessary to access information stored electronically (“the contravening offence”).
He was also convicted and not further punished in relation to:possessing methylamphetamine in excess of 2 grams;possessing 4-hydroxybutanoic acid lactone and 1,4-butanediol;possessing cannabis;possessing mobile phones that were used in connection with trafficking dangerous drugs; andpossessing utensils or pipes that had been used.
Further, at the time of committing these offences, the applicant was subject to a 4 ½ year suspended sentence imposed on 16 December 2020. The balance of the 4 ½ years was ordered to be served concurrently with the terms of imprisonment imposed on 16 December 2024.
All terms of imprisonment were concurrent with each other, but cumulative upon a 3-year term of imprisonment also imposed on 16 December 2020.
561 days of pre-sentence custody were declared time served under the sentence.
The applicant sought leave to appeal his sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive. Subsequently, the applicant was given leave to add grounds of appeal that the learned sentencing judge erred in four ways by:treating the contingent liability arising from the operation of s 209 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) (“CSA”) as potentially exposing the applicant to a longer sentence in circumstances where the extension to the sentence is automatic (Ground 1);starting from a nominal sentence of what must have been 14 years or more, which is not supportable by reference to any comparable authorities (Ground 2).
Alternatively,
not moderating the nominal sentence of 13 years to account for totality and time in custody which could not be declared (ground 3);
Alternatively,
not providing sufficient reasons for determining that a sentence of 13 years with no reduction for totality and time, which could not be declared, was appropriate (Ground 4).
Circumstances of offending
For just over 11 months, between 14 December 2021 and 24 November 2022, the applicant trafficked methylamphetamine at a high-end street and low-end wholesale level. The applicant was the principal of his business, sourcing large quantities of methylamphetamine from unknown suppliers before on-selling to sub-traffickers and his own customer base. A unique feature of the applicant’s business was the ability for customers to return poor product, for a refund, or exchange it for a new batch of product.
During the trafficking period, the applicant carried out at least 98 supplies to a customer base of at least 27 people and, on average, the quantities of methylamphetamine supplied ranged between a ball (3.5 grams) and multiple ounces, with the following transactions being identified:an ounce/multiple ounces (28 grams) – 40 occasions;half ounce (14 grams) – 16 occasions;a ball (3.5 grams) – 15 occasions; andan unknown quantity – 14 occasions.
As can be seen, a large portion of the applicant’s business was dealing in ounces of methylamphetamine. Further, it is noted that the applicant, at one stage, discussed sourcing a kilogram of methylamphetamine for $140,000.
An insight into the applicant’s business can be gleaned from three drug supplies to an undercover police officer who purchased from the applicant on two occasions, via a sub-trafficker, and, on one occasion, from the applicant directly. In total, across three transactions, the applicant supplied 68.9 grams gross of methylamphetamine for $16,100.
As the applicant used encrypted messaging platforms, the full extent of his trafficking is unknown. However, what is known is that the applicant’s business was operating at a sustainable level sufficient to allow him to sell product on credit. A partial debt ledger recovered by police recorded debts owed to the applicant of up to $31,000. Customers and sub-traffickers often sourced product from him on credit and accrued sizeable debts. Customers either paid the applicant with large sums of cash, ATM deposits, or by transferring money to bank accounts controlled by him. During the trafficking period, $490,936 moved through accounts controlled by the applicant. Most of this amount is made up of third-party transfers (which can be traced back to a number of the applicant’s sub-traffickers) and deposits into bank accounts controlled by the applicant. It is not alleged that the applicant made a profit of $490,936, but it is a useful barometer of the scale of the applicant’s business, and, clearly, he would have received a substantial benefit.
Although the applicant was a heavy drug user, his business far exceeded feeding his own habit and was profit driven, with each supply being organised for financial consideration.
In addition to trafficking in methylamphetamine, the applicant had access to, and arranged to supply, GHB on two occasions whereby he:supplied a person (for on-sale) 600ml of GHB for an unknown amount; andoffered and arranged to supply a person (for on-sale) one litre of GHB for $3,500.
Antecedents
The applicant was born on 28 October 1987 in the Philippines, came to Australia when he was 12, and is not an Australian citizen.
Although the applicant started studying a diploma of Nursing, he did not complete this course due to his partner becoming unexpectedly pregnant. He now has four children to two partners and, when he is abstinent from drugs, can obtain employment. However, drugs have been a long-term problem in his life.
The applicant was introduced to cannabis at the age of 12 and commenced using methylamphetamine in his early 20s. Ms Fercher-Barrett, a consultant psychologist, diagnosed the applicant with a polysubstance use disorder at the severe level and stated that “his offending occurred during a relapse into heavy drug dependency whereby he was using large amounts of methylamphetamine on a daily basis*.*”
The applicant undertook drug counselling in the past and again whilst in custody after being charged with these offences. Such was the extent of his drug dependency that, at the time of sentence, the applicant continued to suffer from cravings despite being in custody for 25 months.
At the time of sentence, his counsel submitted that he was motivated to change as he had grown tired of living a dysfunctional lifestyle and being incarcerated.
The applicant was a mature offender who repeatedly engaged in serious drug activity. He was aged 34 to 35 at the time of the offending and was 37 at the time of the sentence. The applicant had a three-page criminal history commencing in 2006 which is littered with drug offending. Two entries are of particular relevance.
On 25 June 2014, the applicant was sentenced to 2 ½ years imprisonment, with parole release fixed after serving nine months, for possessing 67 grams of pure methylamphetamine with an element of commerciality.
On 16 December 2020, the applicant was sentenced for multiple drug and drug-related offences, including possessing and supplying dangerous drugs as well as contravening an order about access information. Applegarth J, the sentencing judge, characterised the applicant’s offending in this way:
“It amounts to a serious case of possessing a dangerous drug, and it was not simply that you were in possession of dangerous drugs with a potential to supply, as I have indicated, you were supplying dangerous drugs. A count of trafficking was discontinued today, and I remind myself I am not sentencing you for trafficking. However, your offending puts you in a more serious category than someone who had a substantial quantity of methylamphetamine, but was not holding it for a commercial purpose.”
The applicant possessed three clip seal bags containing around 60 grams of pure methylamphetamine and 232 grams of cannabis. The 6 supply charges involved methylamphetamine which Applegarth J stated, by themselves, would justify a 2-year sentence.
Ultimately, Applegarth J structured the following sentence to give the applicant certainty and supervision:4 ½ years imprisonment, partially suspended after serving 195 days (which was declared as time served under the sentence) for an operational period of 4 ½ years, which expired on 15 June 2025;3 years imprisonment with parole release fixed after serving 195 days (which was declared as time served under the sentence). The full-time expiry of this component of the sentence was on 3 June 2023; andlesser concurrent terms of imprisonment for other offences.
About a year later, the applicant escalated his criminal offending and commenced trafficking in methylamphetamine (the subject of this application). Accordingly, the applicant committed serious drug offences whilst on parole, and a suspended sentence, for serious drug offending. All of this had consequences for the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge on 16 December 2024.
The applicant was remanded in custody when charged on 23 November 2022 and had been in custody for a period of 754 days at the time of the sentence. However, as his parole was suspended on 24 November 2022, the applicant served 193 of these days in relation to the 3-year sentence imposed on 16 December 2022.
The applicant had been solely on remand for this offending for 561 days from 4 June 2023 until 16 December 2024.
Pursuant to s 209 of the CSA, the applicant had a contingent liability of 344 days between the start of the trafficking (15 December 2021) and his suspension of parole on 24 November 2022.
The sentence hearing
The Crown submitted that, taking the Nagy1 approach, a head sentence should attach to the trafficking offence and, having regard to the principles of sentencing and R v Strutt [2017] QCA 195, R v Corbett [2018] QCA 341, R v Volkov [2022] QCA 57 and R v Galeano [2013] QCA 51, a sentence of not less than 10 years imprisonment was appropriate to reflect:the serious nature of this offending;a personal deterrent to the applicant;a general deterrent to others; andthe applicant’s plea of guilty.
The sentencing judge was referred to R v Boyd [2013] QCA 335 and R v Brown [2015] QCA 225 by the applicant’s counsel, who submitted that 9 years imprisonment should be imposed for the trafficking offence with parole eligibility set at 50 per cent. It was submitted that such a sentence would reflect the applicant’s struggle with addiction and the fact there were no threats of violence.
In relation to the suspended sentence imposed by Applegarth J in 2020, both parties submitted that, in the circumstances, it would not be unjust to activate the whole of the suspended sentence to run concurrently with the other terms of imprisonment.
The sentencing judge found that the applicant was “the principal operator of a highly commercial drug trafficking operation.” In describing the applicant as an “enthusiastic and efficient drug dealer”, it was found that, notwithstanding his drug use during the relevant period, he was “functioning at a high level.”
His Honour went on to state:
“[T]he fact that you were operating in this way puts you into a special class of trafficker. You were not one of the hopeless addicts trading in points of a gram at street level. You were spreading large quantities of misery to others in the community.”
The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 13 years imprisonment for the trafficking offence, with lesser terms of imprisonment for the supply offence and contravening an order offence. The unserved balance of the suspended sentence was activated with all terms of imprisonment being concurrent with each other but to be served cumulatively2 upon the sentence of three years imprisonment imposed on 16 December 2020.
As the sentence of 13 years for the trafficking offence was over 10 years imprisonment, the applicant was subject to the serious violent offence regime3 and his parole eligibility is set at 80 per cent of the 13-year term of imprisonment.4
The applicant’s sentence calculation undertaken by Queensland Corrective Services states:the period of imprisonment is 16 years;5the period of imprisonment commenced on 4 June 2020;6the applicant’s parole eligibility is 9 May 2035;7 andthe full-time discharge (custodial end date/earliest discharge) is 12 May 2037. This includes the 16 years imprisonment with the contingent liability of 344 days.
Ground one – contingent liability
The applicant states that the sentencing judge erred in treating the contingent liability arising from the operation of ss 209 and 211 of the CSA as potentially exposing the applicant to a longer sentence, in circumstances where the extension to the sentence is automatic.
Section 209 provides for the automatic cancellation of the prisoner’s parole order, if the prisoner is sentenced to another period of imprisonment for an offence committed whilst the prisoner was on parole:
“209 Automatic cancellation of order by further imprisonment
If a prisoner is sentenced to another period of imprisonment for an offence committed, in Queensland or elsewhere, during the period of the prisoner’s parole order, the order is taken to have been automatically cancelled on the date on which the offence occurred.
Subsection (1) applies—
whether or not the prisoner is sentenced to the other period of imprisonment before or after the parole order has expired; and
subject to section 205.
However, subsection (1) does not apply if—
the prisoner is required to serve the period of imprisonment mentioned in the subsection in default of—
paying a fine or another amount required to be paid under a court order; or
making restitution required to be made under a court order; or
the period of imprisonment mentioned in the subsection—
is required to be served under an intensive correction order; or
is wholly suspended under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, part 8; or
is required to be served until the court rises.”
It is the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment which acts as the trigger to cause the automatic cancellation of the parole order pursuant to s 209(1), which is what occurred in the applicant’s case.
Section 211 then sets out the effect of the cancellation of the prisoner’s parole order:
“211 Effect of cancellation
This section applies if a prisoner’s parole order is cancelled—
under section 205(2)(a)(i) because the prisoner failed to comply with the parole order; or
under section 205(2)(a)(ii) because the prisoner posed a serious risk of harm to someone else; or
under section 205(2)(a)(iii) because the prisoner posed an unacceptable risk of committing an offence; or
under section 205(2)(a)(iv) because the prisoner was preparing to leave Queensland, other than under a written order granting the prisoner leave to travel interstate or overseas; or
under section 205(2)(b) because the parole board received information that, had it been received before the parole order was made, would have resulted in the parole board making a different parole order or not making the parole order; or
under section 209 because the prisoner was sentenced to another term of imprisonment for an offence committed, in Queensland or elsewhere, during the period of the parole order.
The time for which the prisoner was released on parole before one of the following events happens counts as time served under the prisoner’s period of imprisonment—
the prisoner failed to comply with the parole order as mentioned in subsection (1)(a);
the parole order was cancelled for the reason mentioned in subsection (1)(b), (c), (d) or (e);
the prisoner committed the offence mentioned in subsection (1)(f).
Despite section 206(3)(b), the parole board may, by written order, direct that the prisoner serve only part of the unexpired portion of the prisoner’s period of imprisonment.”
Section 211 provides that the time for which a prisoner was released on parole prior to a cancellation counts as time served under the prisoner’s period of imprisonment.
When parole is automatically cancelled under s 209, then the time the prisoner was released on parole before committing the offence (for which imprisonment was later imposed) counts as time served under the term of imprisonment for the original offence.8
Ground one relates to the unexpired portion of the 3-year term of imprisonment imposed on 16 December 2020, which is calculated from the start of the trafficking period to when the applicant returned to custody. This period does not count as time served in relation to the 3-year term of imprisonment and the applicant has 344 days outstanding. This period is commonly referred to as a contingent liability.
The contingent liability is not an additional penalty imposed on top of the 3-year term. Effectively, the consequences of the applicant offending on parole means that the 344 days does not count as time served under the 3-year sentence and, until the applicant serves this time, this sentence has not expired.
In this case, the Crown’s written submissions at the sentence expressly recognised that the applicant had a contingent liability of 344 days and counsel for the applicant referred to the contingent liability in this way:
“MR LYNCH: He – the other thing that should be said that because he was on parole, there will be a contingent liability under 209 and 211 from the commencement of the trafficking date, which is 14 December ’21, through to 24 – 23 November, when he was arrested, which is another 11 months that he is probably likely to serve on top of whatever your Honour imposes.
HIS HONOUR: Well, how does that work, then? Because if I order it to be cumulative – and I have to order it to be cumulative upon the sentence of three years, was it?
MR LYNCH: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: Three years’ imprisonment imposed by Justice Applegarth on 16 December 2020. That sentence has expired – am I following this right?
MR LYNCH: It – yes. Yep.
HIS HONOUR: I – it’s a question. I’m not – that sentence has expired, such that I can’t take into account the pre-sentence custody he spent serving it up until the 3rd of June last year, and I was working on the basis that whatever sentence I imposed would start, in effect, from the 4th of June, but I would declare that 561 days between then and today.
MR LYNCH: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: So what impact does the contingent liability have- - -
MR LYNCH: That adds - - -
HIS HONOUR: - - - on that?
MR LYNCH: If it’s activated – and he won’t know until near the end of the sentence – that will be added on to the end of the sentence.
HIS HONOUR: He won’t know until the end of whatever sentence I impose?
MR LYNCH: It will be close to the end of that when he’ll know whether they’re adding that on, presumably to see how his behaviour is and see how it all proceeds. It might also – they might also take into account what Border Force are doing. I don’t know.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. It would have been – could they not have done it sooner? How many days do you say - - -
MR LYNCH: That’s 11 months.
HIS HONOUR: Eleven months. So about 330, say.
MR LYNCH: And it’s upon conviction, obviously.
HIS HONOUR: Okay. Well, what do I do with that? Just bear it in mind as a possibility?
MR LYNCH: Just bear it in mind as a possibility. I’m told that it doesn’t always occur - - -
HIS HONOUR: No.
MR LYNCH: - - - oddly enough – and I’m not sure of what the features are for the discretion for the department, but it doesn’t always occur, apparently.”
The applicant states that his counsel’s submissions at sentence were wrong, as it is an automatic consequence of s 209 of the CSA that this time is added to the sentence. Further, the applicant states that the sentencing judge acted on these submissions when sentencing him, and the difference between the possibility that this extra 11 months may be served and the certainty that it will be served is an error.
The sentencing judge noted that the applicant faced some speculation as to whether he would be required to serve the contingent liability:
“I will declare that and I will take into account the fact that there may be some contingent liability from that sentence, and it may be something approaching another year in prison, some 11 months. It is a bit speculative but it’s not a very satisfactory system that leaves you in doubt as to whether or not you will be required to serve that term. Leaves you in doubt, that is, until some point nearing the conclusion of your sentence.”
However, the sentencing judge did not proceed on a wrong basis. In my view, reading the sentencing judge’s remarks as a whole, he was referring to whether the applicant would have to serve this period (some 11 months) in actual custody.
The applicant acknowledges that the parole regime applies to the unexpired portion of the 3-year sentence and, accordingly, the applicant may not serve this period in actual custody.
The applicant was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment cumulative upon 3 years imprisonment (where he still owed 344 days for the unexpired portion). Accordingly, taking into account these periods of imprisonment, the applicant has a full-time discharge date of 12 May 2037. However, parole eligibility is set at 80 per cent of the 13-year term.
Accordingly, the applicant is subject to the parole regime with a parole eligibility date of 9 May 2035. If the Parole Board grants parole, then he will be serving the remainder of the 13-year term and the unexpired portion in the community. If the Parole Board does not grant parole, at any time during this period, then he will serve the remainder of the 13-year term and the unexpired portion in custody.
It is a matter for the Parole Board when the applicant will be released on parole, and s 214 of the CSA makes it clear that a prisoner released on parole is taken to be still serving the sentence imposed on the prisoner.
The reference to “speculation” by the sentencing judge was in relation to whether the applicant will have to serve the term in custody. The sentencing judge expressly recognised the applicant may serve “something approaching another year in prison.”
The sentencing judge did not err by taking the contingent liability into account as time the applicant could be expected to serve.
It should be noted that in R v Brutton [2024] QSC 24, Bowskill CJ considered the provisions dealing with cancellation of parole in the CSA confusing and unclear:
“[32] There is one curiosity that arises from close consideration of the words used (and not used) in s 211(3) of the Corrective Services Act. It is unnecessary, in the circumstances of this case, to resolve this, because the defendant has served the whole of the “unexpired portion” of his period of imprisonment. But in a case where a prisoner has not, by the time of the later sentence, served the whole of the unexpired portion (for example, because they remained in the community for a period of time, after the breaching offence) it may be necessary to address the following issue.”
[33] Section 211 is the only section in subdivision 4 headed “effect of cancellation”. Whilst s 211(1) states that the section applies if a prisoner’s parole order is cancelled either by the board, under s 205, or automatically, under s 209, s 211(3) is specifically limited to s 206(3)(b), which applies only where the parole board has exercised its power to cancel a parole order. There is, as I have said, an equivalent provision, s 210(3), where the cancellation operates automatically under s 209. But there is no mention of s 210 in s 211(3).
[34] As a matter of construction, if it was intended that the parole board have a discretion to direct that a prisoner serve only part of the unexpired portion, regardless of whether the cancellation was the act of the board or automatic (following imposition of a later sentence by the court), one might have expected s 211(3) to commence by saying “[d]espite s 206(3)b) and s 210(3)…”
[35] Section 211(3) was enacted in essentially its present terms in 2006 (the only change has been to refer to parole board, rather than Queensland board). The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill, which became the 2006 Act, does not assist in terms of identifying the legislative intention, although does seem to assume that the power conferred on the board by s 211(3) applies where the parole order is cancelled by the board or automatically. The relevant part reads:
‘Clause 211 operates where a prisoner’s parole order has been cancelled in the circumstances provided for under clause 205(2) or clause 209 of the Bill.
Subclause (2) of the Bill also provides the circumstances where the time for which the prisoner was released under parole counts as time served for the prisoner’s period of imprisonment.
Example—
A prisoner is sentenced to 6 years imprisonment to commence on 15 June 2006 which will expire on 14 June 2012. The prisoner is released on parole on 15 June 2009. On 30 June 2011 the prisoner is convicted of an offence committed on 15 June 2010 and sentenced to imprisonment. The 4 year period from 15 June 2006 (the day the sentence commenced) to 14 June 2010 (the day before the commission of the new offence) is taken to be time served in relation to the 6 years imprisonment. This 4 year period incorporates 3 years in custody and 1 year on parole. The 1 year parole period from 15 June 2005 to 14 June 2006 is commonly referred to as “street time”.
The 380 day period from 15 June 2010 (the day the offence was committed) to 29 June 2011 (the day before the prisoner was returned to prison) is not counted as time served in relation to the 6 years imprisonment. Effectively the prisoner has served 4 years imprisonment and now has to serve the remaining 2 years imprisonment.
The prisoner’s period of imprisonment will now expire on 30 June 2013. The clause also provides that despite the effect of clause 206(3)(b) the Queensland Parole Board may, by written order, direct that the prisoner serve only a part of the unexpired period of imprisonment rather than the 9 entire unexpired portion of their period of imprisonment. Only the Queensland Parole Board may make such an order.
Example —
Clause 206(3)(b) provides for the arrest of a prisoner, and if the order was cancelled, the prisoner is to serve the unexpired portion of the prisoner’s period of imprisonment.
However, referring to the example given for subclause (2) the Queensland board may order that the prisoner serve 18 months of the remaining 2 years imprisonment. The prisoner’s period of imprisonment would then expire on 30 December 2012.’
[36] I did initially consider that there was a rational explanation for the choice of wording in s 211(3), limited as it is to s 206(3)(b) (which relates to the situation where the board cancels a prisoner’s parole order). That is, that for there to be an automatic cancellation of a prisoner’s parole order, a court must have imposed a sentence of imprisonment for the later offending. In that context, it might be thought inappropriate, or at least surprising, for the parole board to retain a discretionary power to determine how much of the “unexpired portion of the prisoner’s period of imprisonment” the prisoner has to serve, when a court has exercised its discretion to impose a subsequent term of imprisonment and to make orders for the time and circumstances in which the prisoner should be, or be eligible for, release. However, the complexities continue because that analysis is only straightforward when the later term of imprisonment forms part of the overall “period of imprisonment” and a parole eligibility date is fixed. Different considerations would arise where the periods of imprisonment are not “unbroken”, a parole release date is set for the later offending or a partially suspended sentence is imposed.
[37] This particular dilemma remains to be resolved in another case, where it arises for determination, and so I will say no more about it other than to observe that, given these provisions concern the liberty of individuals, it is unsatisfactory that they are confusing and unclear.”
Whether s 211(3) empowers the Parole Board to truncate the unexpired portion when parole is cancelled pursuant to s 209 involves an exercise of statutory interpretation which the parties did not undertake. Unfortunately, the issues raised by the Chief Justice remain to be considered and determined in another case.
However, this does not detract from what occurred in this case. Even if the Parole Board has no power to truncate the unexpired portion pursuant to s 211(3), the sentencing judge took into account the contingent liability by recognising that the applicant may serve “something approaching another year in prison”. Accordingly, the sentencing judge recognised the worst-case scenario for the applicant being that he is not granted parole and has to serve the entire period in custody.
Ground two – a nominal starting point of 14 years or more
The parties provided the sentencing judge with cases which they relied upon to support their submissions as to sentence.
However, the sentencing judge sentenced the applicant to a higher sentence than contended for by the Crown and his counsel. In sentencing the applicant, the sentencing judge referred to the cases provided by the parties in this way:
“I’ve been referred to a number of other cases, all of which can be compared to yours in one way or another. But, as I have observed in exchanges with Crown counsel, I’m guided by the statement made in the case of R v Galeano [2013] QCA 51 as to the width of the applicable range”.
“[31] These cases do suggest a range generally of 10 to 12 years for trafficking in dangerous drugs for substantial gain on pleas of guilty. That range is one that may be exceeded, up to 14 years, where the offending has been aggravated by trafficking in a drug as dangerous as heroin on a large scale as in George or by repeat offending whilst on bail as in Raciti.”
The applicant states that the nominal sentence contemplated by the sentencing judge must have well exceeded that of 14 years for it to be reduced to 13 years, taking into account the plea of guilty, moderation for totality, and time served which could not be declared.
The applicant states that there are no authorities which support such a high nominal starting point.
Whilst the applicant acknowledges that the sentencing judge clearly referenced the cumulative effect of the sentence to be imposed, the applicant states that there is no indication as to how the sentence was moderated for totality and the time spent in prison which could not be declared.
The applicant submits that Gotterson JA’s observations in Galeano do no more than to suggest that the nominal range can extend to 14 years in a combination of various circumstances such as those present in R v Christensen [2002] QCA 113, R v George [2001] QCA 135, and R v Raciti [2004] QCA 359. The applicant submits the circumstances in Galeano, and each of the cases referred within, were arguably at least as serious as the applicant’s matter, and none of them ultimately attracted a sentence of more than 11 years.
In Galeano, the offender was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment which was reduced to nine years on appeal, with no parole eligibility date set. The relevant circumstances of the offending in Galeano are: the offender sold significant quantities of methylamphetamine, and, on occasions, cannabis and MDMA to a number of customers over a period of more than two years;there was a large client base where relatively large or smaller quantities of the drugs were provided to customers on a regular basis;the business was cynically commercial and appeared to be expanding over the course of police surveillance;drugs with an unsubstantiated value of $390,000 were sold by the offender over the trafficking period;the offender supplied about $60,000 to a woman who he lived with in exchange for sex;the offender had a relevant criminal history, including a previous conviction for trafficking; andthe offending did not breach any court order.
Gotterson JA in Galeano referred to a range generally of 10 to 12 years imprisonment for trafficking in dangerous drugs for substantial gain on pleas of guilty and that the offending in Galeano was at, or near, the top of that range.
However, in Galeano, there were a number of relevant mitigating factors that are not present in this case, namely that the offender:provided a moderate degree of co-operation with the police; andsustained substantial physical and psychological injuries upon his arrest which contributed to an enduring psychiatric disorder requiring medication.
“[41] ... sentencing Judges must have regard to what has been done in other cases. Those other cases may establish a range of sentences which have been imposed. But that history does not establish that the sentences which have been imposed mark the outer bounds of the permissible discretion. The history stands as a yardstick against which to examine a proposed sentence. What is important is the unifying principles which those sentences both reveal and reflect…”
Here, the applicant’s offending has aggravating features that were not present in Galeano, including additional offences of supplying GHB (that were in addition to the trafficking enterprise) and the contravention offence. It is noted that this was the applicant’s second conviction for contravening an order about information necessary to access information stored electronically. A cumulative sentence could have been imposed for these additional offences.
Considering the aggravating features of the applicant’s offending with the lack of significant mitigating circumstances, the sentence imposed in Galeano is of little assistance as a yardstick.
Galeano does not support that a nominal sentence in excess of 13 years for the applicant is well outside the permissible range.
Ground three – no moderation for totality
The applicant submits that an alternative to ground 2 is that, if 13 years was a reduction from the top of the permissible range of 14 years to reflect only the plea of guilty, then the sentencing judge has overlooked the need to moderate the overall sentence for totality and the time in custody which cannot be declared. Had the sentencing judge done so, and been guided by the observations of Gotterson JA in Galeano, then the applicant submits that the nominal sentence should not have exceeded 14 years.
Totality was the last issue addressed by the applicant’s counsel at the sentence hearing:
“So there is also that – there is some totality involved in terms of that period that is – where he was serving out the past sentence. That's – that undeclarable time can be still taken into account, and that was a significant period of itself.”
The applicant submits that the sentencing judge ought to have looked at the totality of the criminal behaviour (that is, the offending for which the applicant was sentenced in 2020 and the offending before the Court in breach of that sentence order) and determined what the appropriate sentence for all the offending was in the circumstances before him.
It is noted that the applicant places emphasis on the outcome being that “the applicant is serving an overall sentence of 16 years and 11 months”. To be clear, the applicant was not sentenced to 16 years 11 months. He was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment as the 13-year term was cumulative upon the 3-year term. However, ss 209 and 211 of the CSA precludes the applicant from being taken as having served time on parole while he was engaging in a highly commercial drug trafficking operation.
In circumstances where the applicant offended while on parole for a period of 11 months gives rise to a risk of the misapplication of the totality principle. By simply crediting that time as essentially ‘time served’ under the overall period, sight may be lost of the fact the further offending was independent and committed in breach of court orders.
In sentencing the applicant, the sentencing judge took into account totality issues and expressly referred to two issues arising from the sentence imposed by Applegarth J on 16 December 2020, both of which necessarily relate to the overall sentence. The first issue related to the suspended sentence and the second related to the parole order.
In dealing with the first issue, it is apparent the sentencing judge considered the effect of the overall sentence. His Honour activated the entire balance of the four and-a-half-year sentence of imprisonment that had been suspended but ordered it to be served concurrently. In doing so, his Honour “found that it is not unjust to require you to serve that term in that way”.
This approach tends against the argument no account was given to totality.
As to the second issue, the sentencing judge specifically addressed the time already spent in custody, including the time that could not be declared:
“The other issue arising from his Honour’s sentence is the consequence of having committed these offences whilst on parole, or in particular the trafficking offence whilst you were on parole. That means I must impose a sentence that is cumulative upon the sentence of three years imprisonment imposed by his Honour on 16 December 2020. In practical terms that means that, even though that sentence expired on the 3rd of June last year you cannot be given credit for the time spent in custody since your arrest on the charges for which I am now going to sentence you until you reach the point of 4 June last year, from which time I can declare the time that you have spent in custody already.”
The way the issue was addressed was necessary due to the interrelationship between ss 156A and 159A of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld).9
As already noted, the contingent liability was also taken into account by his Honour.
This is a case in which the cumulative nature of the sentence was necessary because of the commission of further offending while subject to parole. This offending breached court orders imposed by Applegarth J that had been structured to support his rehabilitation.
The sentencing judge specifically addressed the issues that affected the overall sentence. Accordingly, it is not the case that a relevant issue was not overlooked or not taken into account.
Ground four – insufficiency of reasons
The applicant submits that, if it was the sentencing judge’s intention to not moderate the sentence of 13 years for totality, or for the time spent in custody that could not be declared, then reasons for this very unusual approach ought to have been given. The applicant states this is especially so given the very lengthy overall period of imprisonment which resulted.
As to the adequacy of reasons by a judge in the sentencing process, Doyle JA in R v Ullman [2025] QCA 191 stated:
“[20] Judges have a duty arising out of discharge of their judicial function, to provide reasons for their judgments. The content and detail will vary according to the nature of the jurisdiction which the court is exercising and its subject matter. The reasons must, however, be sufficient to identify the principles of law applied and the main factual findings upon which the judge has relied … It must be recognised, however, that the jurisdiction being exercised, the process of sentencing, is not one which is capable of analytical precision … It is to some extent an instinctive synthesis process; with the ultimate question the sentencing judge must consider being whether the overall sentence is the appropriate one to impose.”
[Citations omitted]
In this case, there is no demonstrated failure by the sentencing judge to give reasons which ought to have been given.
The sentencing judge set out all relevant matters, including a broad outline of the relevant facts and the essential grounds upon which the sentence was based.
The sentencing remarks, delivered ex tempore, articulated the reasoning for the sentence imposed and why it was just in all the circumstances.
Critically, for the purpose of this ground of appeal, the sentencing judge showed he had taken account of the overall sentence in explaining how the sentence imposed by Applegarth J on 16 December 2020 would interact with the sentence to be imposed for the further offending.
Ground five – the sentence is manifestly excessive
The applicant submits that, if the other grounds do not demonstrate a specific error, then a sentence of 16 years and 11 months is manifestly excessive. The applicant states that there are no authorities to support a sentence of this length, even for repeat offending while subject to a Court order. Again, the applicant refers to the observations of Gotterson JA in Galeano and the sentence imposed in that case.
Appellate intervention on the ground of manifest excessiveness or inadequacy is not warranted unless, having regard to all of the relevant sentencing factors, including the degree to which the impugned sentence differs from sentences that have been imposed in comparable cases, the appellate court is driven to conclude that there must have been some misapplication of principle.10
The result of the impugned sentence must be “unreasonable or plainly unjust” and the appellate court must infer “that in some way there has been a failure to properly exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance”.11 That discretion is governed by the application of relevant legal principles to the facts of the case.12
The sentencing judge was correct in considering that the applicant’s offending fell within the category of cases that may warrant a sentence of up to, and beyond, 14 years imprisonment on pleas of guilty. To that end, the following matters are relevant:the applicant operated his trafficking business for a period of 11 months and 10 days, stopping only because he was arrested;the trafficking was a “high-end street and low-end wholesale level operation”, which involved “sub-traffickers”;the quantities of methylamphetamine supplied were predominantly in amounts of an ounce or multiple ounce;the trafficking business was profit driven and the turnover of money through bank accounts demonstrates the highly commercial operation undertaken by the applicant;the applicant also supplied GHB on two separate occasions in circumstances where what was supplied was going to be on sold to others;having previously been convicted of failing to provide police access to his phone as required, the applicant again refused to provide access to his mobile device in contravention of an order directing him to do so;the applicant was a mature offender with a relevant criminal history; andthe offending occurred during the operation of a suspended sentence and parole order for significant drug offending.
The sentencing judge acknowledged the applicant’s personal circumstances (including his drug addiction), the psychological assessment, and the plea of guilty.
R v Nagy [2003] QCA 175. ↩
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 156A. ↩
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 161A. ↩
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 182. ↩
This takes into account the 13 years cumulative upon the 3 years imposed on 16 December 2020. ↩
This is when the 3-year term commenced (with the declarable pre-sentence custody taken into account) as imposed by Applegarth J on 16 December 2020. ↩
This is 80% of the 13-year term (with the declarable pre-sentence custody taken into account) as imposed by the sentencing judge on 16 December 2024. ↩
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 211(2)(c). ↩
R v Braeckmans (2022) 10 QR 144, 154 at [30] (McMurdo JA). ↩
R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550, 559 at [28] (French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ). ↩
Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 538-9 at [58]-[59] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), citing House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. ↩
R
Coronel [2025] QCA 224
(2015) 256 CLR 550
(2010) 242 CLR 520
(2014) 253 CLR 58
(1936) 55 CLR 499
The application for leave to appeal sentence was dismissed.
These two supplies are separate, and in addition, to the applicant’s trafficking business.
On 23 November 2022, police executed a search warrant at the applicant’s house and found items related to the applicant’s trafficking business as well as small amounts of other drugs and drug paraphernalia, namely:four clip seal bags located throughout the home containing a combined total of 33.47 grams of methylamphetamine within 69.14 grams of substance;cutting agent;a clip seal bag containing 11.52ml of liquid substance in which 4-hydroxybutanoic acid lactone and 1,4-butanediol were detected;a total of approximately 91 grams of cannabis located through the house;six mobile phones; andfive glass pipes and one water pipe used to smoke methylamphetamine and cannabis.
At the conclusion of the search, the applicant was arrested, declined to be formally interviewed, and was remanded in custody. Later that evening, police requested that the applicant provide access to an encrypted application on his mobile phone. He refused to do so.
The applicant only ceased his trafficking business and drug offending upon being arrested. He did not cease of his own volition.
Gotterson JA found that the offender’s time in prison in Galeano would be more difficult than for an offender without his health problems. Consequently, Gotterson JA found that the sentence of 9 years imprisonment gave due allowance for the totality of these mitigating circumstances. Such a sentence reduced a head sentence of 12 years by a quarter to 9 years imprisonment.
Gotterson JA considered the range for trafficking in dangerous drugs for substantial gain on pleas of guilty could extend to 14 years where the offending occurs on bail. In this case, the applicant’s offending breached a parole order and a suspended sentence.
It must be noted that a range identified in any one case does not set brick walls as to the limits of sentencing discretion; higher or lower sentences may be imposed depending upon the circumstance of each case. In Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58, the plurality described the relevance of comparable cases to sentencing:
In R v Malone [2021] QCA 76, a sentence of 12 years imprisonment was not disturbed on appeal in relation to a mature offender with a relevant criminal history who committed a lengthy and serious trafficking offence. Malone involved trafficking for 15 months in methylamphetamine in wholesale amounts but also sometimes in street level amounts. It was inferred the profit was in excess of $300,000.00. The trafficking carried on despite encounters with investigating police.
Ultimately, in Malone McMurdo JA described 12 years as a heavy sentence but not so high as to indicate some unidentified error.13 However, in this case, there are distinguishing features that support a higher sentence being imposed.
It is noted that the offender in Malone breached a suspended sentence of four months. In this case, the applicant breached a sentence of 4 ½ years and also a parole order.
In addition to trafficking in methylamphetamine, the applicant supplied GHB on two separate occasions. The facts in relation to both supplies make clear that GHB was going to be onsold to others. Further the contravention offence is an aggravating factor. This is the second occasion the applicant committed such an offence, being one “that strikes at the foundation of the criminal justice system”.14 A not insignificant cumulative sentence for these offences could have been well justified.
In my view, whilst a lower sentence may have been imposed, it cannot be said that the sentencing judge made some unidentified error. The applicant was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment cumulative upon 3 years, with a contingent liability of around 11 months. The applicant faces a long sentence. However, this is the product of committing a lengthy and serious trafficking in addition to supplying GHB and the contravention offence, all whilst on parole and a suspended sentence.
In this case, whilst the applicant was sentenced to a heavy sentence, it is not so high as to indicate some unidentified error.
In all of the circumstances, the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
None of the applicant’s five grounds have any bases and the application should be dismissed.
Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 535 at [49] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). ↩
R v Malone [2021] QCA 76 at page 5. ↩
Ross v Commissioner of Police (Qld) (2019) 278 A Crim R 159, at [58] (Wilson J). ↩