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[2011] QCA 231
General information, not legal advice.
Court of Appeal (Qld)
2011-09-13
Fraser and Chesterman and White JJA, Separate reasons, for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order, made
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v CAZ [2011] QCA 231
PARTIES: R v CAZ (appellant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 196 of 2010 DC No 1556 of 2010
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 13 September 2011
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 5 May 2011
JUDGES: Fraser and Chesterman and White JJA Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made
ORDER: Appeal against conviction dismissed
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – REVIEW OF EVIDENCE – where the appellant was found guilty by a jury of two counts of maintaining an unlawful relationship of a sexual nature with a child under 16 years – where the complainants were the appellant’s son and daughter – where there were a number of inconsistencies between the evidence of each child – where the appellant’s case was that a cousin of the complainants had encouraged or procured them to make false allegations – where the trial judge gave a Robinson direction referring to the young age of the complainants and inconsistencies between the evidence of the children generally – where the appellant argued the trial judge ought to have specified the inconsistencies and referred to the effects of delay on the reliability of the complainants’ testimony and the opportunity for the appellant to explore inconsistencies in their evidence – whether a miscarriage of justice occurred by the trial judge’s failure to address these issues in the summing up / CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – REVIEW OF EVIDENCE – where the trial judge gave a direction on corroborative evidence – where the appellant argued that the direction should have specified the inconsistencies in the evidence of the complainants – where the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to identify the proper use the jury could make of the corroborative evidence for each individual count – whether a miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the trial judge’s directions / HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – THE FEDERAL JUDICATURE – NATURE AND EXTENT OF JUDICIAL POWER – CONFERRAL ON STATE COURTS – where the appellant argued that s 229B(4) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) offends ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution in that it allows a jury to return a non-unanimous verdict contrary to s 80 of the Constitution, and because it removes the requirement for the jury to be satisfied of the material facts on each element of the offence without putting in place adequate safeguards to ensure a fair trial – whether s 229B(4) deprives the court of defining characteristics which set it apart from other decision-making bodies, thereby rendering it constitutionally invalid / Commonwealth Constitution (Cth), ch III, s 80 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 229B, s 229B(3), s 229B(4), s 573, s 632(3), s 668E(1) / AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; [2008] HCA 8, cited Brownlee v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 278; [2001] HCA 36, distinguished Cheatle v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 541; [1993] HCA 44, distinguished Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 67, cited Commissioner of Police v Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383; [1958] HCA 6, cited Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; [1992] HCA 57, cited Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575; [2004] HCA 46, cited Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45; [2006] HCA 44, considered J v Lieschke (1987) 162 CLR 447; [1987] HCA 4, cited Johnson v Miller (1937) 59 CLR 467; [1937] HCA 77, cited K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501; [2009] HCA 4, cited Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; [1996] HCA 24, cited KBT v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 417; [1997] HCA 54, considered Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1, considered Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; [1989] HCA 60, cited Ng v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 521; [2003] HCA 20, distinguished R v DAT [2009] QCA 181, cited R v Kemp (No 2) [1998] 2 Qd R 510; [1996] QCA 514, cited R v WAB [2008] QCA 107, considered Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 [2004] 1 Qd R 40; [2003] QCA 249, cited Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162; [1999] HCA 42, cited Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54, cited Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 278 ALR 1; [2011] HCA 24, considered
COUNSEL: T F Carmody SC, with K M Hillard, for the appellant M J Copley SC for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
FRASER JA: On 26 July 2010, after a six day trial in the District Court at Brisbane, a jury found the appellant guilty of two counts of maintaining an unlawful relationship of a sexual nature with a child under 16 years. The offences were alleged to have been committed between May 2003 and April 2007. The complainants were the appellant’s daughter, aged between two and five years of age at the time of offending, and the appellant’s son, aged between four and seven years of age at the time of offending. At a previous trial the appellant was acquitted of an offence against another of his daughters (“A”). On 27 July 2010 the appellant was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently, and a declaration of a serious violent offence was made.
At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal, the appellant abandoned his ground of appeal that the verdicts were unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The appellant was also given leave to amend his notice of appeal. The amended grounds of appeal are:
There was a miscarriage of justice because the summing up by the learned trial judge was inadequate and defective in failing to provide a Longman/Robinson direction which included reference to the complainant childrens’ apparent unreliability and inconsistencies in the evidence.
There was a miscarriage of justice because the summing up by the learned trial judge was inadequate and defective in that the direction to the jury concerning corroborative evidence failed to identify to the jury apparent inconsistencies in the evidence and the proper use the jury could make of the “corroborative” evidence for each individual count.
The jury were not directed of the requirement to be satisfied of the same sexual acts constituting each maintaining charge before being lawfully entitled to return a unanimous guilty verdict. The failure to do so, and the effect of s 229B of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), offend ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution.
I will discuss those grounds after I have first summarised the evidence.
Summary of the evidence
The complainant daughter (“D”) was five when she made her statement under s 93A of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) on 18 April 2007 and six when she made her second s 93A statement on 27 April 2007 and when she gave pre-recorded evidence on 19 February 2008. She was seven when she gave pre-recorded evidence on 3 November 2008. She described the appellant inserting his penis into her vagina and seeing “white stuff” coming out of his penis; her brother (“S”) being instructed by the appellant to put his penis in her vagina; the appellant putting his penis into S’s anus; touching of her vagina by the appellant and S; and her touching of the penis of the appellant and S.
The complainant son, S, was eight when he made his s 93A statements. He was nine when he gave pre-recorded evidence on 19 February 2008 and 3 November 2008. He described: the appellant placing his mouth on S’s penis; the appellant touching him on his penis and pulling his penis; seeing the appellant touch his sister, D, on the “fanny” in a rubbing action when his other sister, A, was present; seeing the appellant touch A on the fanny; the appellant telling him to touch D’s private parts; the appellant telling him to put his mouth on the appellant’s penis; the appellant inserting his penis into S’s bottom; the appellant instructing S to put his penis in the appellant’s anus; seeing the appellant lick D on the private parts; and watching a pornographic movie where a girl sucked a man’s penis whilst the appellant was making the skin go up and down on his (the appellant’s) penis.
A 16 year old cousin of the complainant children, M, was the only preliminary complaint witness called. She gave pre-recorded evidence that on a day when the appellant moved house and she was in the park with the appellant’s three children, she noticed some bruising on the inside of D’s thigh; D told her that she was not looking forward to going to her father’s house; M asked D if the appellant had ever touched her and D replied “yes”; when asked where she had been touched, D said her “jinie” and pointed to her vagina; M asked S if his father had ever touched him and he said he had on the “willy”. She asked A if her father had ever touched her and she said no. S said that their father had not touched A. M subsequently spoke to D who said that her father had been “putting his finger down below” and put a pillow over her head to stop her from crying. She spoke to D a third time about a month after the day of the appellant’s move. M spoke to the complainants’ mother about what they had told her. M said that D and S told their cousin C about the alleged abuse, and that D had told her mother that her father had touched her. In cross-examination M denied that she told S and D to make up a story about the appellant touching them, and she denied telling their cousin C that she was “just joking” or “kidding”.
Dr Rogers examined S and Dr Waugh examined D. There was no medical or physical evidence of sexual abuse, but both expressed the opinion that the absence of such evidence did not mean the alleged sexual conduct did not occur. Dr Waugh gave evidence of the ability of the hymen to heal without any scar or notches even after trauma.
Ground one: failure to provide a Longman**/**Robinson direction which included reference to the complainant childrens’ apparent unreliability and inconsistencies in the evidence
Under the first ground of appeal, the appellant argued that there was a miscarriage of justice because the trial judge’s warning to the jury not to act on the complainants’ evidence unless the jury was convinced of its truth and accuracy did not refer to the complainants’ apparent unreliability and inconsistencies in the evidence.
In addressing the jury defence counsel had relied upon the following inconsistencies in the evidence:
(a) S allegedly said to M that his sister A was touched, however, in S’s s 93A statement he said that A was never touched. D also said that A was never touched.
(b) S said the appellant licked D but D made no complaint about that.
(c) S said no penetration of D occurred but D said that it had happened. S said A was penetrated another time.
(d) Made no mention of oral sex but S said that it had occurred.
(e) S did not say that he had put his penis into D’s vagina, but D said that he had.
(f) S said nothing happened at their “Nan’s” house, but D said that it had. (In fact, S did not clearly give this evidence.).
(g) M said that she was told by one of the children that a pillow was put on their head, however neither child described that.
“In respect of the evidence generally in this trial from the two complainant witnesses upon whom the prosecution case rests, you will need to scrutinise the evidence of each complainant with great care before you could arrive at a conclusion of guilt on each offence. This is because of the following, in my view: firstly, the ages of the complainant children when these offences are alleged to have occurred. On the birth certificates, Exhibits 11 and 12, S was born on the 26th of January 1999. Therefore, at the time of the alleged offending he was between almost five and seven years and five months. That was his age. That is, he was a very young boy with all the imponderables that are inherent in a young person of that age. D was born on 25 April 2001. That is, she was over two years younger than S and during the period of alleged offending in count 1 was between two years and six years. Again a very young little girl.
Secondly, the reason you should scrutinise the evidence very carefully is because of the various inconsistencies in their evidence highlighted by defence counsel in the answers they respectively gave in cross-examination at the pre-recordings when compared with their original statements of complaint to the investigating police officer. Therefore, you should only act on their evidence in respect of each offence if, after considering it with that warning in mind that I’ve just given you, and all the other evidence in the trial, you are convinced of its truth and accuracy; that is of the complaints of sexual abuse that are before you.”
(a) S’s and D’s inability to independently recall the alleged events in the pre-recorded evidence some eleven months after the s 93A statements undermined their reliability.
(b) The effect of the delay between the s 93A statements and their evidence on each child’s reliability, given their young ages.
(c) The effect of the delay in depriving the appellant of the opportunity to explore inconsistencies in the evidence.
(d) Experience has shown that recollection of events occurring in childhood is often erroneous and liable to distortion over time.
(e) Dangers about reliance on the testimony where the evidence of C and the complainant’s mother might lead to an inference that M encouraged or procured the children to make false allegations against the appellant.
Partly in reliance upon the High Court’s decision in Longman v The Queen,2 the appellant argued that the warning to the jury not to act on the complainants’ evidence unless convinced of its truth and accuracy should have been linked to the delay in making a complaint, the young ages of the complainants, the effect of time on the way they gave their evidence, and the lost opportunity for the appellant to investigate evidence that might be given by other people who periodically attended at the house where the alleged offences were committed. The appellant argued that the trial judge’s failure to give such a warning undermined the appellant’s forensic advantage in having evidence concerning the previous trial and the allegations involving A before the jury. The respondent argued that the trial judge was not obliged to itemise the inconsistencies in the evidence and that the directions, considered in the context of the summing up as a whole, did not disadvantage the appellant.
Reference to other directions given by the trial judge demonstrates that the appellant did not lose the forensic advantage of the admission of evidence of his acquittal on the charge concerning A. The trial judge gave the following specific directions on that topic:
“Now, that deals essentially with the elements of the offence. If you have any issues please let me know. Now, the following direction I’m going to give you is a very important one and I want you to listen to it very carefully. You have heard from the complainants in this trial of alleged unlawful sexual activity involving the complainants’ younger sibling [A]. The activity was referred to, you might recall, in the evidence of [S] when he said in his statement of complaint that the defendant was touching [D’s] vagina in [A’s] presence and also touching [A’s] vagina by rubbing it.
You might have wondered, well, why isn’t the defendant also facing a criminal charge in respect of [A]? For example, indecently dealing, or if not it is somewhat prejudicial to lead such evidence in this trial where it is strictly inadmissible. Now, the position is this: the defendant has been tried on a previous occasion before another jury on the same facts as you have heard for the offence of indecently dealing in respect of [A]. That is on [S’s] evidence of what he says the defendant did to [A]. But in that instance he was found not guilty and acquitted of that offence.
I therefore direct you as a matter of law that the evidence you have heard in the complainant child’s statement relevant to that charge against the defendant, which was before another Court on a previous occasion and of which he was acquitted, cannot be used by you for the purpose of challenging or diminishing the benefit to the accused of such acquittal. That is you cannot conclude, ‘Well, I think the jury in that trial was wrong in coming to that conclusion by acquitting the defendant.’ You must not conclude that at all. You cannot go behind that verdict or disagree with it or conclude they were wrong. That offence has been determined and finalised in the defendant’s favour and you must accept that unreservedly but, and this is the important part as well, you can take into account the fact that that evidence from [S] in that previous trial was rejected by that jury in that they were obviously not satisfied to accept it beyond a reasonable doubt and who therefore acquitted the defendant on the charge in question.
So, you can take what happened there into account on the charge in question when you are assessing the complainant’s credibility and reliability of his evidence with respect to the charges that the defendant is presently facing in this Court. The defence case here is that nothing of the sort as described happened. That was also the defence case in the previous trial concerning [A] where the only evidence against the defendant was that of [S]. That was not accepted by that jury, so you are entitled to take that fact into account when you are assessing his evidence in this trial in relation to the two charges which the defendant faces in this Court. I hope I have made myself clear on that.”
Those directions, read also in the context of the trial judge’s other directions quoted in these reasons, ensured that the appellant retained the forensic advantage of his acquittals in the earlier trial.
“The next topic I want to discuss with you is the topic of inconsistencies. You have heard defence counsel, Mr Taylor, address you on that at some length. It is important when you are considering and assessing the evidence that you decide whether there have been any inconsistencies in the evidence of any particular witness or witnesses. You bear in mind, though, that there will almost inevitably be some inconsistencies in the evidence of various witnesses who have been called to give evidence and it would probably be a most exceptional case if that were not so.
…
Obviously one of the matters that you have to think about in terms of assessing a witness’s credibility or reliability is whether there have been any inconsistencies in their versions of what they say occurred, and again it comes back to that fundamental question of commonsense. If the evidence that you have heard from a witness is inconsistent or inconsistent versions have been told, that may raise a doubt in your mind as to whether the version sworn to by the witness in the witness-box, or in any other acceptable manner, is credible. It’s a matter of commonsense.
If a person tells you at one time that a certain version of events occurred and a different version at another time then you may wonder about that. You may wonder whether you are being told the truth. ‘Is it accurate?’ ‘Can I rely upon it?’ If two persons give vastly different accounts as to what they saw or heard of the same subject matter under consideration, that may also raise a doubt in your mind as to who is telling the truth and whether that event even occurred or, if so, what in fact are the real circumstances? So, therefore, you weigh up the evidence and you reach your own conclusions.
What is important, however, to consider and to decide is whether they are significant inconsistencies which go to the essence of their credibility or whether they are slight inconsistencies which you are entitled to overlook as not affecting a person’s credibility but are more the foibles of human nature. Different people may see things differently or be mistaken, as I’ve given you an example before. Memories fade over the passage of time. So there again you bring your own experiences of human nature to bear when you are considering and weighing up the pros and the cons. It is for you to decide whether they are major inconsistencies or minor inconsistencies, whether they strike at the core of what has to be established to satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt of the elements of the offence and that the accused has therefore committed the offence or offences in question, and whether you are satisfied of that beyond a reasonable doubt. So you decide on the evidence you have heard on what you consider credible and reliable.
…
Obviously you take into account also any inconsistency between the preliminary complaint or complaints made before the official complaint. I repeat to you, the evidence of what was said on those occasions may, depending on the view that you take, bolster a complainant’s credibility because of consistency, but it does not independently prove anything. Likewise, any inconsistency between those accounts which were given to the cousin and the complainant’s evidence before you may cause you to have doubts about the complainant’s credibility or reliability.
So, whether consistencies or inconsistencies impact upon the reliability of a complainant is a matter for you to determine. As I said before, inconsistencies of describing events are relevant to whether or not evidence about them is truthful and reliable and any inconsistencies are matters for you to consider in the course of your deliberations, but the mere existence of inconsistencies does not necessarily mean that you must reject the evidence. What you make of the evidence is entirely a matter for you.
…
[The trial judge gave the directions quoted in [14] and [17] of these reasons].
…
[Defence counsel] reminded you that children develop at various stages of their life and you will have seen evidence of that from the video evidence that you saw in this trial, how they had developed over that passage of time which was a relatively short time. [Defence counsel] suggested to you that experience has shown that young minds can be mistaken and can fantasise, so therefore you must look carefully at their evidence and that these children, he suggested to you, were under the influence of older people.
The defence case is, effectively, that the witness [M] has told these children to make a complaint. That’s what the defence says has occurred here. You have only a limited view of the family dynamics. You will recall the evidence of [D], what she said in her evidence. You must bear in mind the possibility of suggestions or persuasion to young children. You’ll recall he reminded you of the doctors’ evidence of there being pitfalls in interviewing children where their reliability may be affected and that the first allegation that was made here was allegedly made to the witness [M] when she had the children at the park and that [M] told [D] to make a complaint, that [M] was cross-examined on the sequence of when these matters arose, whether it be at the park, at the shops, in the backyard. There were differences in her evidence and one of the ways of telling whether a person is telling the truth is whether the story changes.
[Defence counsel] suggested to you that [M] is contradicted by [D]. You’ve got to consider carefully what [D] says and that there would be no reason why she wouldn’t complain to her mother if the allegations were true. He mentioned to you that [D] used the word ‘genie’ but that wasn’t a word she appeared to use herself.
You’d also be satisfied that the children had been exposed to pornographic material from what you heard. He then reminded you of the inconsistencies in the two - in the evidence of the two children. He reminded you about a number of aspects of their evidence and how they were inconsistent. He reminded you of the medical evidence of the state of her hymen and that generally you bring your own experiences to bear on all of these matters.
He asked you to consider the contradictions between the versions of the children. When it came to the evidence of the defendant, he gave sworn evidence, which he was not obliged to do, where he denied that any of these things occurred, that there was a real opportunity that [D] had been inappropriately exposed to this pornographic material when they were - this pornographic material, that they were experimenting with each other - that is the two siblings. The allegations just don’t fit with the general nature of the environment. He suggested that in all the circumstances the evidence was most unsatisfactory and that you would find him not guilty.
…
By way of final summary, therefore, I merely remind you of this: the defence case is that you could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the offences with which he is charged taking into account the many inconsistencies in the complainants’ respective evidence highlighted by the cross-examination in their prerecorded evidence when that is compared with the allegations made in the initial 93A statements.
The defence case is that the defendant did not do what is alleged against him, [M] put the children up to it and when the allegations were revealed to the children’s mother [M] said she was only joking. Ultimately, the defence says, you could not fail to have a reasonable doubt on the state of the evidence before you and that you would therefore find the defendant not guilty of each offence.”
There is no reason to think that the jury omitted to take into account those inconsistencies to which the trial judge adverted after defence counsel had relied upon them in his address to the jury.
As to the additional matters in [15] of these reasons which were not addressed by defence counsel, it must be borne in mind that it was not submitted that defence counsel’s forensic decisions about the matters to be emphasised in his address themselves evidenced any miscarriage of justice. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the trial judge’s warning required the jury to decide whether it was convinced of the truth and accuracy of the complainants’ evidence after considering their evidence together with “all the other evidence in the trial”. That tended to be overlooked in some of the appellant’s arguments that the warning was inadequate because it did not expressly advert to particular parts of the evidence.
In relation to the additional matters identified in [15](a), (b) and (d) of these reasons, the trial judge’s warning expressly encompassed the “imponderables” inherent in the complainants’ very young ages as well as the inconsistencies between their answers in cross-examination and their statements to the investigating police officer. Furthermore, the trial judge’s warning was given after the directions quoted in [18] of these reasons that it was important for the jury to consider “whether there have been any inconsistencies in the evidence of any particular witness or witnesses.” After giving the warning, the trial judge went on to emphasise defence counsel’s submissions about the inconsistencies between the evidence of the complainants. Again, in the redirections quoted in [29] of these reasons, the trial judge reminded the jury that in some instances witnesses contradicted each other and directed the jury to take those inconsistencies into account.
As to the additional matter mentioned in [15](e) of these reasons, the trial judge reminded the jury of defence counsel’s submission that the complainants were “under the influence of older people” and that M “has told these children to make a complaint.” The trial judge then directed the jury that it “must bear in mind the possibility of suggestions or persuasion to young children.”
As to the additional matter mentioned in [15](c) of these reasons, the appellant referred to the delay between the starting points of the charge periods, the time when the s 93A statements were given, and the time when the pre-recorded evidence was taken. The delay was, as the appellant accepted, much more significant for D than it was for S. In D’s case, she was two years of age at the commencement of the charge period in May 2003 (and a week short of six at the end of the charge period in April 2007), five and six when she gave her s 93A statements in 2007, and six and seven when she gave her pre-recorded evidence in 2008. The delay between the time when the offence was alleged to have commenced and the time, some four years later, when the s 93A statement was taken, together with a further delay until the pre-recorded evidence was taken in November 2008, was said to be particularly significant in the context of a child of such a young age. It was submitted that the delay had the effect that the complainants appeared frequently not to have an independent recollection of the offences by the time they gave their pre-recorded evidence, thereby affecting the ability to test the s 93A statements.
Ground two: failure in the direction to the jury concerning corroborative evidence to identify to the jury apparent inconsistencies in the evidence and the proper use the jury could make of the “corroborative” evidence for each individual count
Under the second ground of appeal, the appellant argued that a miscarriage of justice occurred because the trial judge, when directing the jury on corroborative evidence, failed to identify apparent inconsistencies in the evidence and the proper use the jury could make of the corroborative evidence for each individual count. The appellant submitted that if the direction on corroboration should have been given at all, the trial judge should have: accompanied the direction with a warning as to the inconsistencies in the evidence and a reminder of the potential unreliability of the evidence of children; “[m]ade it clear to the jury that they must first accept the evidence of the child who made the corroborating statement as reliable and true before considering the issue of corroboration”; and “[t]old the jury that if they found the evidence of one complainant supported the case for the other complainant, that finding did not bolster their own complaint against the Appellant.”
A warning that the evidence of children could be unreliable because they were children would offend s 632(3) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) (“the Code”), which provides that a judge “… must not warn or suggest in any way to the jury that the law regards any class of persons as unreliable witnesses.” However it was appropriate for the trial judge to direct the jury that they must first accept as reliable and true the evidence of the child who made the statement which was said to be corroborative of the other child’s evidence. The trial judge did give such a direction to the jury in the course of the following directions about corroboration:
“The next topic that I want to direct you on is this question of corroboration. Frequently - and corroboration means tending to support or confirm. A big word, I know, but that’s what it means. Frequently in criminal trials one of the criteria for which juries might look to assist them in their deliberations is whether there is any support or confirmation of the complaint or complaints made which constitute the charge or charges before the Court. Now, that again is a matter of commonsense. It permeates our criminal justice system. It is not an ingredient - an essential ingredient for these offences that a complainant’s testimony be corroborated before a jury may be - before a defendant may be convicted by the jury; that is, before you may be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.
But frequently in criminal trials, as in our everyday life, we look to whether there is any supporting evidence to define a particular issue or determine whether a particular event occurred. Here in this trial there is some evidence from respective witnesses which is capable of corroborating the evidence of the other provided [that] you accepted that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, [S] gives evidence of seeing the defendant touching [D’s] vagina of which she also complains. So, to that extent if you were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that [S] was telling the truth, then that corroborates or supports [D’s] evidence on point. But these issues are matters for you to accept or reject as you are the only judges of the facts.
Another example would be where [D] describes the defendant putting his penis into [S’s] anus in front of her at the house with the blue roof. [S] also describes that happening to him while the sisters were present. In that example [D’s] evidence, therefore, corroborates [S’s] evidence of that unlawful sexual act. They are examples of corroboration, but you must accept that evidence beyond reasonable doubt before it can be accepted as corroborative evidence.” (emphasis added)
“Now, that was the evidence of those two witnesses. As I said, the evidence of preliminary complaint is only used to test the credibility of the witness. That was the evidence that was given by those two witnesses so far as what [M] had said she was told. As I said before, you have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt so far as these allegations are concerned.
Now, on the question about corroboration, I gave you those two examples where the evidence is capable of corroborating each other from those witnesses. Of course, there were other instances, as you will remember, where the witnesses contradicted each other. So you take everything into account in the overall assessment of the evidence that you have heard; all right? Inconsistencies and other parts of the evidence are also factors that you take into account when you are considering whether the evidence in one respect is capable - from one witness is capable of corroborating the other. So you’ve got to put everything into the mix. Right?” (emphasis added)
Ground three: the jury were not directed of the requirement to be satisfied of the same sexual acts constituting each maintaining charge before being lawfully entitled to return a unanimous guilty verdict. The failure to do so, and the effect of s 229B of the Code**, offend ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution**
[31] Under the third ground of appeal, the appellant invoked the limitation upon State legislative power which was established by the High Court’s majority decision in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW).3
[32] Section 229B of the Code creates the offence of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child. In KBT v The Queen4 the High Court held that the actus reus (guilty act) of the offence created by s 229B prior to its amendment in 1997 was, as specified in s 229B(1A), the commission of three acts constituting certain offences of a sexual nature, so that a person could not be convicted of the offence unless the jury was agreed as to the commission of the same three or more illegal acts. The present s 229B, which was substituted by s 18 of the Sexual Offences (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 with effect from 1 May 2003, differs in significant respects from the provision considered in KBT. Section 229B now provides:
“(1)Any adult who maintains an unlawful sexual relationship with a child under the prescribed age commits a crime.
Maximum penalty—life imprisonment.
(2)An unlawful sexual relationship is a relationship that involves more than 1 unlawful sexual act over any period.
(3)For an adult to be convicted of the offence of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child, all the members of the jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence establishes that an unlawful sexual relationship with the child involving unlawful sexual acts existed.
(4)However, in relation to the unlawful sexual acts involved in an unlawful sexual relationship—
(a) the prosecution is not required to allege the particulars of any unlawful sexual act that would be necessary if the act were charged as a separate offence; and
(b) the jury is not required to be satisfied of the particulars of any unlawful sexual act that it would have to be satisfied of if the act were charged as a separate offence; and
(c)all the members of the jury are not required to be satisfied about the same unlawful sexual acts.”
[33] The effects of the section which form the essential bases of the appellant’s argument under this ground of appeal are that: it relieves the prosecution of the obligation of alleging the particulars of any unlawful sexual act that would be necessary if it were charged as a separate offence; it provides that the jury is not required to be satisfied of such particulars; and it dispenses with the requirement that all members of the jury be satisfied about the same unlawful sexual acts.
Summary of the arguments
[34] The appellant argued that s 229B(4) offends ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution (“the Constitution”) because: the jury can effectively return a non-unanimous verdict contrary to the requirements for a trial by jury and a unanimous verdict under s 80 of the Constitution (the appellant referred to Cheatle v The Queen5 and Ng**v The Queen6); a unanimous verdict by a jury satisfied of the material facts beyond reasonable doubt on each element of the offence is an essential feature of a jury trial; and a District Court judge, as a repository of the power of the federal judicature, cannot ensure an accused’s right to a fair trial where the practical effect of s 229B(4) means that there are no adequate protections or safeguards to protect the rights of the accused. Section 229B was submitted to offend the “Kable principle” because it required the District Court to “act in a manner which is incompatible with Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution” and because there were no safeguards to protect the rights of defendants such as were present in the legislation considered in Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld)7 and K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court.8 The necessity for a unanimous verdict in trials of State offences, which was qualified only by a provision allowing substantial majority verdicts in a narrow range of cases and subject to legislative safeguards,9 was eroded because the practical effect of s 229B(4) was to enable the jury to return a non-unanimous verdict “on an element of the offence”, namely the alleged unlawful sexual acts of the defendant.
[35] The appellant also submitted that those unlawful sexual acts were analogous to “intermediate facts which constitute indispensable links in a chain of reasoning towards an inference of guilt”10 which the prosecution was obliged to prove beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant emphasised the removal in the current form of s 229B of the requirement for the unlawful sexual acts to be properly particularised, and the absence of safeguards, such as a provision for the use that the jury might make of generalised sexual conduct or for the taking of a special verdict as to the alleged unlawful sexual acts.11 The Crown was now excused from proving beyond reasonable doubt “each element of the offence of maintaining” and the trial judge was prevented from ensuring a fair trial. The appellant argued that Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW)12 supported the proposition that the Kable principle was infringed.
[36] The respondent argued that the Kable principle was infringed only where the conferral by State legislation upon a State court of a particular power or a particular function was repugnant to one or more of the defining characteristics of a court, and thereby compromised that court’s capacity to exercise federal judicial power. That was not the effect of s 229B(4), because s 229B(3) required that the jury be unanimously satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the central element that the respondent maintained an unlawful sexual relationship with the child involving unlawful sexual acts. The absence of any requirement that the jury be unanimously satisfied about the same unlawful sexual acts (s 229B(4)(c)), and the absence of a requirement that the jury be satisfied of the particulars of any unlawful sexual act which would have required satisfaction if that act were charged as a separate offence (s 229B(4)(b)), were unremarkable. It was not unorthodox to admit evidence of previous sexual acts for a variety of purposes, despite the absence of full particularity and although the evidence is of a general kind. The exemption afforded by s 229B(4)(a) is confined to an exemption from providing the same particulars which would be necessary if the act were charged as a separate offence.
[37] The respondent argued that trial judges retain the power to direct the prosecution to furnish particulars identifying the nature of the alleged unlawful sexual acts relied upon to prove the existence of an unlawful sexual relationship, and they retain the discretion to exclude evidence of unlawful sexual acts where its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value. Section 229B does not authorise a trial in which the absence of particularity results in an accused person being unable to answer the charges. A conviction after such a trial would be overturned on the ground that the trial was unfair. The statutory policy identified in the explanatory notes and reflected in the text of s 229B responded to the nature of offences which might take place over a prolonged period of time while the victim is of tender years, creating difficulties in particularising individual offences.
Consideration
[38] The appellant did not argue that s 229B was outside the legislative power of the State to make laws for “the peace welfare and good government” of Queensland.13 Rather, the appellant argued that there was a limitation upon the legislative power derived from ch III of the Constitution. The basis and content of the relevant principle were explained by Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission:14
“Because Ch III requires that there be a body fitting the description ‘the Supreme Court of a State’, it is beyond the legislative power of a State so to alter the constitution or character of its Supreme Court that it ceases to meet the constitutional description. One operation of that limitation on State legislative power was identified in Kable. The legislation under consideration in Kable was found to be repugnant to, or incompatible with, ‘that institutional integrity of the State courts which bespeaks their constitutionally mandated position in the Australian legal system’. The legislation in Kable was held to be repugnant to, or incompatible with, the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court of New South Wales because of the nature of the task the relevant legislation required the Court to perform. At the risk of undue abbreviation, and consequent inaccuracy, the task given to the Supreme Court was identified as a task where the Court acted as an instrument of the Executive. The consequence was that the Court, if required to perform the task, would not be an appropriate recipient of invested federal jurisdiction. But as is recognised in Kable, Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) and North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley, the relevant principle is one which hinges upon maintenance of the defining characteristics of a ‘court’, or in cases concerning a Supreme Court, the defining characteristics of a State Supreme Court. It is to those characteristics that the reference to ‘institutional integrity’ alludes. That is, if the institutional integrity of a court is distorted, it is because the body no longer exhibits in some relevant respect those defining characteristics which mark a court apart from other decision-making bodies.” (citations omitted)
[39] State legislation will be invalid on that basis if it deprives a court in which federal jurisdiction is vested of those “minimum characteristics” of institutional independence and impartiality identified in decisions of the High Court.15 There is no decision of the High Court which decides that legislation which diminishes the common law requirement for particulars of an offence is invalid, but there are considered statements of justices of the High Court which bear upon that issue. In Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) the plurality applied the decision in Forge that it is beyond the legislative power of a State to alter the constitution or character of a “court” to the extent that it ceases to meet that constitutional description, in holding that State legislation which purported to remove a State Supreme Court’s power to grant relief for jurisdictional error by inferior courts was beyond power “because it purports to remove a defining characteristic of the Supreme Court of the State.”16 That is not directly relevant here, but the plurality also discussed a defendant’s common law entitlement to particulars of the factual bases of a charge:17
“In John L Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW), it was explained that the older cases established that an information could be quashed as insufficient in law if it failed to inform the justices of both the nature of the offence and the manner in which it had been committed. In more recent times the rationale of that requirement has been seen as lying in the necessity of informing the court of the identity of the offence with which it is required to deal and in providing the accused with the substance of the charge which he or she is called upon to meet. The common law requirement is that an information, or an application containing a statement of offences, ‘must at the least condescend to identifying the essential factual ingredients of the actual offence’. These facts need not be as extensive as those which a defendant might obtain on an application for particulars. In Johnson v Miller, Dixon J considered that an information must specify ‘the time, place and manner of the defendant’s acts or omissions’. McTiernan J referred to the requirements of ‘fair information and reasonable particularity as to the nature of the offence charged’.” (citations omitted)
[40] The plurality held that the absence of necessary particulars would result in the Industrial Court being placed in the position described by Evatt J in Johnson v Miller18 “where it would act as ‘an administrative commission of inquiry’ rather than undertake a judicial function”.19 Whether or not State legislation which dispensed with the prosecution’s requirement to provide particulars would fall outside State legislative power was not in issue in Kirk because the New South Wales legislation under consideration did not have that effect,20 but this aspect of Kirk is nevertheless significant for present purposes. The common law rule which requires the prosecution to particularise alleged offences fulfils one of the requirements of natural justice or, as it is now more commonly called, procedural fairness.21 In Commissioner of Police v Tanos,22 Dixon CJ and Webb J observed that the application of the rules of natural justice “in the established courts is a matter of course.” It is therefore not difficult to accept that the application of the rules of procedural fairness is one of the defining characteristics of a court in which federal jurisdiction is vested.
[41] Other authorities to that effect are discussed by Williams JA in the course of his Honour’s extensive analysis in Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002.23 Furthermore, in Wainohu v New South Wales,24 French CJ and Kiefel J stated in terms that the application of procedural fairness was one of the “defining characteristics” of a court:
“Decisions of this Court, commencing with Kable, establish the principle that a State legislature cannot confer upon a State court a function which substantially impairs its institutional integrity, and which is therefore incompatible with its role, under Ch III of the Constitution, as a repository of federal jurisdiction and as a part of the integrated Australian court system. The term ‘institutional integrity’, applied to a court, refers to its possession of the defining or essential characteristics of a court. Those characteristics include the reality and appearance of the court’s independence and its impartiality. Other defining characteristics are the application of procedural fairness and adherence, as a general rule, to the open court principle. As explained later, it is also a defining characteristic of a court that it generally gives reasons for its decisions. In the case of the Supreme Courts of the States, that characteristic has a constitutional dimension by reason of the appellate jurisdiction conferred on this court by s 73 of the Constitution.” (citations omitted)
[42] For these reasons I would accept that State legislation which denied to a State court in which federal jurisdiction was vested the power to order the prosecution to supply to the defendant particulars of an offence charged against State legislation which were necessary to fulfil the requirements of procedural fairness of a trial in that court would be constitutionally invalid. Such legislation would require the court to conduct a trial which was “repugnant to the judicial process in a fundamental degree.”25 It would so distort the “institutional integrity” of the court that it “no longer exhibits in some relevant respect those defining characteristics which mark a court apart from other decision-making bodies.”26
[43] The appellant did not argue that State legislation which regulated a court’s power to direct the prosecution to provide particulars of an alleged offence was necessarily invalid. Rather, the appellant’s argument in this respect was that invalidity flowed from the extent to which defendants were deprived of the right to particulars together with the absence of compensating safeguards. It is arguable that s 229B does depart to some extent from the common law requirement for particulars, but it does not on that account necessarily infringe the relevant principle derived from ch III of the Constitution.27 It is not practicable to offer any precise definition of “procedural fairness”. Its content may vary according to the nature of the proceeding28 and with changing social standards and circumstances.29 Thus the rules of procedural fairness are sufficiently flexible to accommodate different degrees of particularisation being required in different circumstances. Again, it is not practicable to attempt to define the extent of the permissible relaxation of the rules of procedural fairness, and reference to the established entitlement of all persons to a “fair trial”30 does not provide any more precise definition.
[44] The particular circumstances which informed the legislative purpose underlying s 229B were made clear in the explanatory notes to the 2003 amending Act:31
“In KBT v R (1997) 72 ALJR 116 the High Court held that the actus reus of the offence in section 229B is the doing of an act which would be an offence of a sexual nature on three or more occasions, rather than the maintaining of a relationship. The jury must be agreed as to the commission of the same three or more acts. This by necessity requires three or more distinct occasions to be identified, despite the intention behind the provision that dates and exact circumstances need not be established.
The Queensland Court of Appeal criticised the interpretation of the section in this way and said in R v S [1999] 2 Qd R 89, at 94 –
If s 229B(1) is to perform its function in most future prosecutions of this kind, legislative attention is needed to ensure that … s 229B(2) operates only as an evidentiary aid or exclusion and is not expressed in a form capable of being regarded as serving to define the offence or its actus reus under s 229B(1).
Where the accused has engaged in persistent sexual abuse of a child, the child may be left with no means of identifying any particular occasion with a sufficient degree of particularity to enable a single charge to be laid, or to identify the three acts required to demonstrate the relationship. Even if the accused admits to the behaviour, there is no offence that can be charged.
The offence as redrafted removes the requirement to prove three acts of a sexual nature, and instead the offence is established by proof of the relationship (that is, a course of conduct). This reflects the original intent of the provision, and is similar to the other course of conduct offences, such as trafficking in a dangerous drug.”
[45] The legislative assumption is that children who are the victims of the particular offence created by s 229B might often be unable to recall sufficient details of the specific offences committed in the course of the relationship to enable the prosecution to supply those particulars that might be required in charges of specific sexual offences. That reflects the experience of the courts that many children give convincing evidence that they have been victims of regular sexual offending by an adult even though they are unable clearly to distinguish the details of one particular act of sexual misconduct from many other such acts committed in the course of the sexual relationship maintained by the adult. Of course it remains necessary for juries to assess the veracity and reliability of the child’s evidence in each case, but there is no ground for holding that the legislative assumption which underlies s 229B is not justifiable. The appellant did not argue that there was. That underlying premise of the legislation therefore justifies some flexibility in the application of the common law requirement for particulars. Otherwise, the procedure might reasonably be perceived as skewed against child complainants to such an extent as ultimately might shake public confidence in the court’s ability to do justice in such cases. Equally, however, any adaptation of the traditional requirements of procedural fairness must not go so far as to preclude the ability of the courts to ensure a fair trial for the defendant. In my opinion the section does not have that effect, even though it plainly does make the prosecution’s task easier than otherwise would be the case.
[46] In reaching that conclusion I have taken into account that an offence against s 229B is not established merely by proof of more than one unlawful sexual act. The prosecution must also prove that the defendant maintained a “sexual relationship” with the child. The Court has consistently held, and trial judges have regularly directed juries, that s 229B in its previous forms required proof beyond reasonable doubt of sufficient continuity or habituality to justify the inference that the defendant maintained a sexual relationship with the child.32 In this case, for example, the trial judge gave the conventional direction to the jury that the prosecution was required to prove “an ongoing relationship of a sexual nature between the defendant and the complainant” and that there “must be some continuity or habituality of sexual conduct, not just isolated incidents.” There is no indication in the explanatory notes or in the text of the current section that this requirement has been discarded. To the contrary, s 229B(3) seems consistent only with the conclusion that it is a requirement.
[47] The prosecution may therefore be directed to provide particulars of the alleged relationship, including as to the nature of any unlawful sexual acts from which the prosecution infers the alleged relationship. The exemption from giving particulars is limited to a dispensation from giving the particulars of each unlawful sexual act “that would be necessary if the act were charged as a separate offence”. Subject only to that qualification, the District Court remains empowered by s 573 of the Code, to “direct particulars to be delivered to the accused person of any matter alleged in the indictment” and to “adjourn the trial for the purpose of such delivery.”
[48] Those particulars should inform a defendant of the essential allegations of fact made by the prosecution in sufficient detail to enable the defendant to understand and to meet the charge. An example is provided by the particulars supplied by the prosecution in this case, which were attached to the appellant’s outline of submissions. It is sufficient in that respect to refer to the particulars of the count involving D. The particulars of that count appear in Annexure A to this judgment.
[49] The appellant criticised those particulars as being so extensive and detailed as to obscure rather than to identify the alleged facts, but the particulars conveyed the “time, place and manner of the defendant’s acts”33 with sufficient clarity to enable the defendant to understand the essential factual bases of the charge and to prepare his defence.
[50] Where the particulars are limited, that may be taken into account by the trial judge in exercising the discretion to ensure a fair trial by, for example, excluding evidence of previously unidentified sexual acts on the ground that the prejudicial value of the evidence exceeds its probative value. In R v WAB34 Keane JA, with whose reasons I and Lyons J agreed, observed:
“It is also important to state that, while s 229B(4) is clearly intended to facilitate the conviction of offenders of a contravention of s 229B(1) even though the evidence against the accused is not sufficiently particularised to establish a charge of a separate sexual offence, that circumstance makes it all the more important to ensure that the accused has the benefit of the other procedures calculated to ensure a fair trial. In this regard, it is, of course, important that the accused should have every opportunity to meet the case made against him or her by the Crown.”
[51] Accordingly, s 229B does not have the effect of authorising an administrative inquiry or a trial where the accused is given so little information about the charge as to render it impractical properly to prepare a defence. It does not remove the trial judge’s powers to ensure a fair trial or the Court’s power to set aside a conviction on the ground that there was a miscarriage of justice.35
[52] The appellant also sought support in s 80 of the Constitution. In that respect the appellant’s argument reflected the generality of Williams JA’s statement in Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 200236 that the principle derived from the majority judgments in Kable was that “a State Supreme Court as one of the judicial institutions invested with federal jurisdiction may not act in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of Ch. III of the Constitution.” I do not construe that as conveying that State courts must act in all respects in the same way as federal courts must act. That is not the case.37 The High Court decisions cited by the appellant38 concerned the effect of s 80 as conferring a “constitutionally entrenched status”39 upon the essential features of the institution of trial by jury at common law at the time of federation, but the expressed limitation that s 80 applies only to trials of offences “against any law of the Commonwealth” precludes any implication that the Constitution requires a jury in trials in State courts of offences against State law.
[53] In any event, s 229B does not purport to dispense with trial by jury. Indeed, s 229B expressly contemplates trial by jury and requires jury unanimity upon the essential allegation that the defendant maintained a sexual relationship with a child that involved more than one unlawful sexual act. The appellant argued that a direction to the jury (in conformity with s 229B(3)) that all jurors must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of one or more unlawful sexual acts, but (in conformity with s 229B(4)(c)) not necessarily of the same acts, is inconsistent with the conventional directions that the prosecution must prove each element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt before it may convict and that the jury’s verdict in respect of each offence must be unanimous. There is no such conflict. The jurors could be unanimously satisfied that the defendant maintained an unlawful sexual relationship with the child involving more than one unlawful sexual act whilst at the same time disagreeing about which two or more of numerous alleged unlawful sexual acts were proved beyond reasonable doubt.
[54] Because jurors might differ about which unlawful sexual acts are proved and which are not, a verdict that the defendant is guilty of an offence against s 229B may leave unresolved some matters that bear significantly upon the defendant’s culpability, such as the frequency and seriousness of the unlawful sexual acts involved in the unlawful sexual relationship. In the result, trial judges may be required to make significant findings of fact in the sentencing process. In this respect s 229B, like some other provisions (such as those which create the offence of trafficking in drugs) reduces the role of the jury in the fact finding process and to that extent erodes the safeguards traditionally associated with trial by jury of more specific offences,40 but that is not an unconventional feature of trial by jury.41 These results are necessary corollaries of the qualified dispensation from alleging particulars given by s 229B(4)(a) and are justifiable by the considerations I have already discussed.
[55] In my opinion, s 229B does not work such a serious diminution upon the necessary extent of particularisation of the offence, the usual requirement for jury unanimity (or majority verdicts in certain cases), or other procedures designed to ensure a fair trial, as to justify the conclusion that the trial court no longer exhibits any of the defining characteristics which mark it apart from other decision-making bodies. I would hold that s 229B of the Code is not constitutionally invalid on any of the grounds argued by the appellant.
Proposed orders
[56] The appeal should be dismissed.
[57] CHESTERMAN JA: I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Fraser JA.
[58] WHITE JA: I have read the reasons for judgment of Fraser JA and agree with his Honour for those reasons that the appeal should be dismissed.
ANNEXURE A
R v CAZ
Count Date and Place Offence Comp Age Particulars Evidence
Count 1 / [D] Maintaining a sexual relationship with a child under 16 2 - 5 [D] provided her 93A to police on the 18th of April 2007. / The sexual interaction with [D] included both direct sexual contact, encouragement of sexual contact between [D] and her brother as well as direct sexual contact between the defendant and her brother in front of the complainant. / The complainant recalled the following forms of sexual interaction with the defendant: / - touching of the complainant's vagina and her bottom when they were alone / - touching of the complainant's vagina when she was with her siblings / - touching of the complainant by her brother on her vagina at the behest of the defendant / - placing of the penis inside the complainant by her brother at the behest of the defendant on two occasions (these both happened downstairs - once at lunch and once at night) / - the complainant touching the defendant's penis / - the complainant touching her sibling brother's penis at the behest of the defendant / - penile penetration of the complainant child's vagina by the defendant (she recalled that this happened all the time) - it happened at night but it also happened once in the morning / - exposing the complainant to the sodomy by the defendant upon her sibling brother / [S] also provided his 93A to police on the 18th of April 2007. / He corroborates the account given by his sister through the following: / - [S] saw the defendant touch [A] and [D] in front of him / - [S] saw the defendant lick [D]’s vagina on 4 - 5 occasions / - [S] recalled the defendant getting [D] to touch the defendant's penis / The incidents would occur in [the complainant mother’s] absence. [D]’s 93A statement / [S]’s 93A statement
Act 1 / [D] 2 - 5 The defendant touched [D]'s vagina with his fingers. / Detail of act : / [D] said, “And he touch my fanny”. His fingers touched her fanny and she described a wiggling motion. It did not last very long. She said, "no" during this touching. It occurred when she was alone with the defendant, but her brother [S], sister [A] and [other siblings] were present in the house. / Prior to the incident she had been walking to the bathroom and it was night time. Marnie was not at the house. / She was with the defendant in his and Marnie's bedroom as the defendant took her there. She wore pants, a shirt and underwear. The defendant pulled them down. / (See also [S]’s account of the defendant touching [D]'s vagina and [D] saying ‘no’ - pages 20-21 of [S]’s s 93A statement of 18/4/07) / [D] also described [S] touching her on the vagina in the same way as this act is described. [[D]'s 93A statement page 14, bottom half of page] / [D] also described the defendant having her touch [S]'s penis. [[D]'s 93A statement page 16] [D]’s 93A statement of 18.4.07 / Page 12, half way down the page to page 15.
Act 2 / [D] 2 - 5 A similar occurrence to Act 1 occurred at a time when the defendant's bedroom was in the downstairs lounge room. [D] said that she lived downstairs first and then the family moved upstairs. [D]’s 93A statement of 18.4.07 / Page 16
Act 3 / [D] 2 - 5 The defendant had [D] touch his penis. / She recalled an incident that happened once in Marnie’s and the defendant's bedroom and it was upstairs. / The defendant wore pants, shirt and underpants. The defendant pulled his own pants down exposing his penis. He was standing. He told [D] to touch his penis which at that time was down. / [D] touched the defendant's penis and ‘pulled it up straight.’ She wiggled her fingers about the penis. [D]’s 93A statement / Pages 17, 1/3 down the page - 19
Act 4 / [D] 2 - 5 The defendant had [D] touch his penis. / She recalled an occasion when she touched the defendant's penis when they were downstairs. / The defendant wore pants, underwear and no shirt. The defendant pulled his own pants and underwear down. He told her to touch his penis. His penis hung down at that time. / She touched his penis with her fingers. [D]’s 93A statement / Page 18 - 20
Act 5 and / multiple other occasions [D] 2 - 5 The defendant put his penis inside [D]'s vagina. / She recalled that at Nanna's house the defendant put his penis inside her vagina downstairs. / This happened in the lounge room. / Nanny, Marnie, [S] and [A] were all downstairs as well. [M] was in *[*C’s] room. This was at night time. The defendant pulled his pants and underwear down. / The defendant was standing and he picked her up. His penis was hanging down. / He placed his penis inside and 'he puts his doodle in the hole in my fanny.' The penis felt too hard and it hurt a lot. / [D] said, "..just move my fanny open and....then he puts his doodle in in the hole".[page 22, half way down the page] / She said this happened once in the morning but everyday at night [page 22]. [D] described "white stuff" that is like "cough or spit out" that came from the defendant's penis.[page 26] / [D] described [S] also doing the same to her [page 22, half way down to the bottom of page 23]. She stated [S] did this because her dad tells him to do it. This happened twice in the Ioungeroom downstairs [page 24, bottom half of page to page 25]. [D]’s 93A statement / Pages 21 - 26
Act 6 / [D] / Also a particular of [S]’s count 4 - 7 The defendant put his penis into [S]’s anus in front of [D]. / House with blue roof - […] Street / The defendant put her on his bed; the defendant took her pants off. The brother was also present. The defendant told her brother to lift his pants up. / The defendant opened her brother's [S]’s 'bum' and then placed his penis inside the hole. / This only occurred once. / Corroboration: / [S] in his 93A gives an account of a similar incident with both of his sisters present when he himself was sodomised. [D]’s 93A statement / Pages 27 - 28 / [S]’s 93A statement / Pages 35 - 38
Act 7 / [D] / Act 1 / [S] [D] / (2 - 5) / [A] / (6 months - 2) The defendant touched [D]'s vagina in front of [A] and [S]. The defendant touched [A]'s vagina in front of [D] and [S]. / [S] recalled that the defendant would touch [D] on her vagina [page 20 line 22]. This happened in the other house (the […] Street flat) [page 20 line 55]. / The defendant called the [S] and his two sisters into the bedroom. The defendant told his sister [D] to pull her pants down (then all three of them had their pants down). They were in the defendant's bedroom near the bed. [S] and his two sisters were all standing whilst the defendant was kneeling. The defendant wore pants. / The defendant touched [D] on the vagina and it was a rubbing motion. It lasted for 30 minutes [page 21 line 19]. / The defendant asked [D] whether it felt good to which [D] replied n [page 21 lines 30 - 40]. / The defendant touched [A]’s vagina and it was in a rubbing motion [page 21 line 51 to page 23 line 30]. This based the evidence regarding [A]'s count on the previous trial. / The defendant touched [S’s] penis by the pulling of the skin up and down [page 23 line 48 to page 24 line 5]. [S]’s 93A statement / Pages 20 - 24 & 26 - 28
Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162. ↩
(1989) 168 CLR 79. ↩
(1996) 189 CLR 51. ↩
(1997) 191 CLR 417. ↩
(1993) 177 CLR 541. ↩
(2003) 217 CLR 521. ↩
(2004) 223 CLR 575. ↩
(2009) 237 CLR 501. ↩
Jury Act 1995 (Qld), s 59, s 59A. ↩
Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 579. ↩
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 624. ↩
(2010) 239 CLR 531. ↩
Constitution Act 1867 (Qld), s 2. ↩
(2006) 228 CLR 45 at 76 [63]. ↩
R
CAZ [2011] QCA 231
(2008) 232 CLR 438
(2001) 207 CLR 278
(1993) 177 CLR 541
(2001) 209 CLR 1
(1958) 98 CLR 383
(1992) 177 CLR 292
(2004) 223 CLR 575
(2006) 228 CLR 45
(1987) 162 CLR 447
(1937) 59 CLR 467
(2009) 237 CLR 501
(1996) 189 CLR 51
(1997) 191 CLR 417
(2010) 239 CLR 531
(1989) 168 CLR 79
(2003) 217 CLR 521
(1999) 197 CLR 162
(1986) 161 CLR 141
(2011) 278 ALR 1
(1997) 72 ALJR 116
(1990) 170 CLR 573
(2011) 243 CLR 81
The appellant’s wife at the time of the alleged offences gave evidence in the Crown case about the living arrangements of the appellant, the complainants, and their mother (who lived in the house as a friend of the appellant after their relationship ended).
The appellant gave and called evidence. He denied any inappropriate contact with the complainants, but gave evidence that both complainants required cream to be put on their private areas, including cream that was prescribed by a doctor when S caught his penis in his zipper.
The complainants’ mother gave evidence that M was not trusted and that she did not trust her to look after the children on her own. Both D and S required cream for heat rash on their legs and private areas. She did not have any cream for when S caught his penis in his pants zipper but she recalled that he was required to keep it clean. She could not remember all of the details. On one of the days that she was moving house in February 2007, the complainants’ cousin C told her what M had said about the appellant abusing the complainants. M said that it was a joke and that she was kidding. The complainants’ mother asked C to talk to D and S. The following day she asked D if the appellant had touched her inappropriately and D said he had not. In her opinion D was not lying. She never asked S or the complainants’ sister A about whether the appellant had touched them.
The complainants’ cousin C gave evidence that D and S told her that the appellant had “been touching” them. M was present at the time they said this to her. She then spoke to D and S separately and each said that M had told them to tell her that the appellant had touched them. She argued with M after she spoke to the children. She later told the complainants’ mother what she had been told about the alleged abuse. M said it was a joke and that she did not mean any of it. C did not recall seeing chaffing on the complainants’ bodies but the appellant had told her that he had put cream on parts of their bodies for chaffing. She had once seen the appellant put cream on the girls inside their legs. She did not mention M putting the children up to making the allegations until she was in foster care. She conceded that she wanted to get out of foster care.
The appellant also argued that a significant aspect of the delay was that the medical evidence suggested that, particularly in relation to S, an earlier medical examination might have proved that the children had not been subjected to the most serious examples of the alleged sexual misconduct. However, that was disclaimed as a basis for the warning which defence counsel asked the trial judge to give; defence counsel submitted that “it’s not one of those cases whereby the mere effluxion of time one can see that evidence may have been lost.” Defence counsel instead submitted that what had been lost was the opportunity to investigate whether evidence of the people and activities in the house at the time might have provided useful defence evidence.
The trial judge specifically directed the jury’s attention to the dates of birth and ages of the children during the period of the alleged offending and referred to the inconsistencies between their evidence and their original statements which were highlighted by defence counsel. Ideally, the trial judge’s directions might have referred to the potential effect of the delay upon the opportunity to investigate the alleged offences, but in the context of the summing up as a whole the appellant was not materially prejudiced by that omission. Importantly, the trial judge warned the jury of the need to scrutinise the evidence of each complainant with great care and only act on it if convinced of its truth and accuracy.
There is no reason to think that the jury did not heed that clear warning. In my opinion no miscarriage of justice was produced by the trial judge’s failure specifically to refer to all of the matters relied upon by the appellant.
K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501 at 544 [153] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ. ↩
(2010) 239 CLR 531 at 566 - 567 [55]. ↩
(2010) 239 CLR 531 at 557 - 558 [26]. ↩
(1937) 59 CLR 467 at 495. ↩
(2010) 239 CLR 531 at 559 [30]. ↩
(2010) 239 CLR 531 at 558 - 559 [29]. ↩
Johnson v Miller (1937) 59 CLR 467 at 497 - 498 per Evatt J. ↩
(1958) 98 CLR 383 at 396. ↩
[2004] 1 Qd R 40 at 49 [33] - 50 [37]. ↩
(2011) 243 CLR 81, 208-209. ↩
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 at 132 per Gummow J. ↩
Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45 at 76 [63]. ↩
Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575 at 600 - 601 [41] per McHugh J. ↩
J v Lieschke (1987) 162 CLR 447 at 456 per Brennan J (Mason and Dawson JJ agreeing). ↩
Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 328 - 329 per Deane J. ↩
See Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 at 145 per Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ, approving the expression of the “general principle” in Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 at 67. ↩
Explanatory Notes, Sexual Offences (Protection of Children) Amendment Bill 2002 (Qld), p 5. ↩
See R v Kemp (No 2) [1998] 2 Qd R 510 at 511 per Macrossan CJ, at 512 per Pincus JA, and at 518 per Mackenzie J; R v DAT [2009] QCA 181 at [12] per Holmes JA (Muir JA agreeing) and at [22] per McMurdo J. ↩
Johnson v Miller (1937) 59 CLR 467 at 486. ↩
[2008] QCA 107 at [28]. ↩
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 668E(1). ↩
[2004] 1 Qd R 40 at 52 [44]. ↩
K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501 at 529 [84] per French CJ. ↩
Cheatle v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 541; Brownlee v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 278; Ng v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 521. ↩
Ng v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 521 at 526 [9] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ. ↩
See AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438 at 470 [90] - 474 [98]. ↩
See, for example, Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1 at 10-11 [6]-[10] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ. ↩