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[2025] NSWDC 307
General information, not legal advice.
District Court of NSW
2025-05-28
Haesler SC DCJ
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Camara; R v Langlo [2025] NSWDC 307
Hearing dates: 28 May 2025
Date of orders: 28 May 2025
Decision date: 28 May 2025
Jurisdiction: Criminal
Before: Haesler SC DCJ
Decision: Camara – Aggregate imprisonment sentence of 2 years 9 months with a non-parole period of 1 year 6 months
Langlo – Aggregate imprisonment sentence of 2 years 9 months with a non-parole period 1 year and 6 months
Catchwords: CRIME — Property offences — Enter dwelling-house with intent to commit serious indictable offence — Circumstances of aggravation
CRIME — Dealing with money suspected of being proceeds of crime
SENTENCING — Aggravating factors — Record of previous convictions — Breach of conditional liberty
SENTENCING — Mitigating factors — Plea of guilty
SENTENCING — Penalties — Imprisonment
SENTENCING — Relevant factors on sentence — Co-offenders — Joint sentence proceedings — Parity — Moral culpability — Objective seriousness
SENTENCING — Sentencing procedure — Instinctive synthesis — Consideration of an Intensive Correction Order
SENTENCING — Subjective considerations on sentence — Drug addiction — Mental illness and disorders — Childhood trauma — Childhood sexual abuse
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; (2013) 249 CLR 571
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
Moodie v R [2020] NSWCCA 160
R v Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; [1999] NSWCCA 435
Category: Sentence
Parties: Daniel Quintel Camara (the offender)
Kolby Langlo (the offender)
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Representation: Counsel:
A Booker (for the offender Camara)
T Hennessy (for the offender Langlo)
Solicitors:
L McGonigal for Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
File Number(s): 2024/191897; 2024/193373
In the evening of Sunday 5 May 2024, the owner of a business in the Wollongong area locked up his store. The security alarm was in place. CCTV cameras were in place.
At 2.36am on 6 May, the following morning, Kolby Langlo and Daniel (‘Danny’) Camara arrived at the store. Camara disabled the external CCTV camera. Langlo kept watch. The two then broke into the store through a metal security gate by forcing the doors open. They went through the property, which was used to store cigarettes and removed boxes of cigarettes. The security alarm had been activated and was sounding loudly. When their bag was full of cigarettes, they ran from the store.
The owner was notified. He and police were soon on the scene. He ascertained that over $34,000 worth of goods had been stolen and that repair of the damage to his property cost him $3,500.
After a police investigation, Camara was arrested on 23 May 2024. His phone was examined and messages between him and Langlo were extracted. Police found a discussion about Camara selling the proceeds and Langlo wanting to get his share. Langlo was arrested on 24 May 2024 for unrelated matters. He made certain admissions about this matter saying that he only got $1,300 as his share. He did not know how much Danny had sold the cigarettes for.
When they were before the Local Court both Daniel Camara and Kolby Langlo said that they would plead guilty to two offences that arose out of the events that morning. The first, aggravated break and enter in company with intent to steal: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 112(2). The second charge is, knowingly deal with the proceeds of crime: Crimes Act, s 193B(2). Each offender will have their indicated sentences reduced by 25% to reflect the utilitarian value of that plea.
A s 112 offence carries a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. There is a standard non-parole period of 5 years. The knowingly deal with the proceeds of crime has a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment. Those maximums, and where applicable the standard non-parole period, are guides to the exercise of my sentencing discretion. Content has to be given to the standard non-parole period. There are reasons here to depart from it, not the least being the pleas of guilty but also it seems to be agreed, as reflected in the facts, that while serious, this matter falls below the middle of the range of objective seriousness.
I do not think I need to say more about the use of notional scales to assess seriousness other than that I do not find them helpful. I am required to assess the objective seriousness of what occurred, as part of any sentencing exercise. I am also required by s 42A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) to apply the guideline of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; [1999] NSWCCA 435. But the Court in Ponfield, I note, took into account factors that went beyond the solely objective. It really has little work to do since s 21A came into play: Moodie v R [2020] NSWCCA 160. This assessment must be made by reference to the particular facts of the case.
Here, a business premises expected to contain valuable items, cigarettes, was targeted. Entry was forced late at night. The CCTV and other security measures were ignored. There was some planning, but it seemed to be rudimentary, rudimentary disguises were worn but they did not disguise the offender’s tattoos. Frankly, as both men were well known to local police they were soon identified.
This was a crime against property but also a crime against the owners of the property. Small businesspeople work hard, and I make no judgment about tobacco dealers. Offences such as this make all business owners question why they are doing what they are doing. Crimes like this cause people to lose confidence in public institutions. They feel that the police cannot protect them and their business, and they lose trust in others. They have to expend money on either insurance or, as here, making their business premises even more secure. When businesses are broken into, the losses can have a real impact on the bottom line and whether or not that business survives.
I well recall a victim in a similar matter telling the Court; “You work your bum off and someone just comes in and takes what they want … it teaches you not to be trusting”. A comment that is equally applicable here. It is no excuse to say, “Well, the premises are insured”, because not everything is insured and even if they were, the community pays increased costs because the increased costs of insurance premiums on business are passed on to consumers.
It is not in dispute that the break and enter offence was serious, not the least because of; what was done, how it was done and the value of the property taken. So serious it is conceded that a custodial sentence of some length must be imposed.
There were two separate offences. In relation to the objective seriousness of proceeds of crime offence, it is axiomatic that when business premises are broken into and goods such as tobacco targeted, that the reason and motivation for the offending, the breaking and entering, was to obtain goods which would then be disposed of. It is axiomatic that the offender’s involved would then be dealing in the proceeds of crime when they did dispose of the gods taken. This requires care be taken when I assess each offence and the totality of the criminality for both offences, to ensure that what the aggregate sentence is just and appropriate to what they did. In apportioning individual indicated sentences, I have to be careful of double-counting matters that aggravate or are common to both of them, but I must because the proceeds offence still requires some independent punishment.
There are two offenders here for sentence. Camara is older, and he was on parole at the time. Langlo is younger but he has a fairly extensive criminal history, which is sadly well-known to me. I have sentenced him on prior occasions. They played different roles, but any differences were minor.
Camara seemed to have come up with the idea, but Langlo went along with him. Both professed to have the same motivation for committing the offence, that is, to repay their drug dealers because they were in debt because of heavy addiction to the drug methylamphetamine or ice.
While a real difference between individuals can justify a difference in sentence, principles of parity mean that like should be treated alike. I will not attempt to parse their backgrounds. They are different. But, in the scheme of things, all relevant factors seem to even out here. I think it only fair that the same sentence be imposed on each of them.
Each offender requires individual consideration by the Court. In that regard, I have received subjective material, which is not controversial, with one possible exception. Neither of the offenders gave evidence but the reports before me seem to fairly reflect the people for sentence.
The one controversial aspect is, both claim, that they were heavily in debt to a drug dealer, it may have been the same person. Both said they were motivated to commit this offence to get cash by selling the cigarettes to repay those dealers. Mr Langlo made an assertion as to how much money he in fact made. In the absence of sworn evidence, I cannot accept that assertion. I am prepared to accept that both were in debt to a drug dealer, both were motivated to get money because without money they would not have been able to get drugs. That was no excuse for commission of this offence.
And it appears there were no obvious consequences for the failure to repay all of the debt that they asserted they had. There is no evidence before me as to whom the cigarettes were given. There is no evidence before me that I could accept, as to how much was made and how much, if any, was given to upline suppliers. That does not mean I do not take into account their drug addiction and their motivation, but it cannot, and does not, excuse what they did.
Camara has a criminal record. He is not entitled to the leniency often given first offenders. He was subject to a Community Corrections Order, and he was on parole at the time. Those facts aggravate the sentence that must be imposed and require this sentence start sometime after he went into custody to reflect the breach of parole.
I have the benefit of a Sentence Assessment Report*.* I have the benefit of a psychological report of Mr McLean, a psychologist. It is clear that Camara has, and had, considerable family support from prosocial members of the community. Some are here today. He has a number of children. His first wife died in dramatic circumstances. He has a trade, and he could go back to it, but he has not done so. He has a long history of methylamphetamine addiction. Because of his drug use he has been unable to work for some time.
He told the authors of both reports that he wants to change. He has engaged, where possible, in interventions. And on release, a supervision plan can be put in place. Mr McLean noted his “poor upbringing” and “unstructured” early life. Camara asserts he was abused by a parish priest when he was a young altar boy but there is no objective evidence to support that assertion. However, it does seem to accord with him struggling at school. He left school at an early age. He took up an apprenticeship but was never able to fully apply himself because of his drug use, which commenced when he was quite young, coincidentally at the time of the abuse.
His second marriage has ended, mainly due to his drug problem, but he still has support from her. There has been abstinence in custody this time, and he appears to have benefitted significantly from the Buvidal program.
Mr McLean notes past diagnoses of; anxiety, depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Mention is made, but it is not verified, that he may have a Bipolar Disorder.
Mr McLean notes what he calls “a distal nexus” between Camara’s long-term drug addiction and the commission of this offence. He also notes that compared to the “average general offender”, Camara would suffer his time in gaol harder than others. Sadly, I do not think there is an average general offender who did not have a problem with drug addiction or abuse as a child, sexual or otherwise. They all seem to be a common factor to most offenders. It is clear Camara needs continued drug and alcohol assistance to avoid relapse into drug and alcohol abuse. He clearly needs a mental health care plan. He needs vocational counselling and, most importantly, he needs to avoid mixing with pro-criminal associates, the very people he is mixing with in custody.
The Sentence Assessment Report notes Camara’s shame and embarrassment and his desire to live a normal life in the community. He said he wanted to be someone his family can be proud of. These are powerful motivating factors. He shows some insight, but his progress has been slow. There are reasons here continue to allow him to be motivated to change. While his prognosis, that is his chance of reoffending, must be guarded, given his past history, I will give him an opportunity by the structure of the sentence and some leniency in the aggregate term, to prove himself in the community. If he breaches his parole, he knows he will be returned to custody.
Turning now to Langlo. Sadly, Langlo is well-known to me, as he is well-known to Court. I have sentenced him on two previous occasions. And I presided over a trial where he was acquitted when he was a very young man. I appreciate that the impact of that trial and the allegations that led to that trial were significant. I have dealt with his background on two prior occasions in 2020 and 2017.
He was arrested in this matter and bail refused for 186 days, on my calculation. He then spent about a month in the Oolong House rehabilitation facility, which is quasi-custodial. That period will be taken into account. It is the quasi-custody that it is taken into account, not whether it is successful or not. I will backdate his sentence by 210 days, to give him that benefit and to give him some encouragement. He will be entering custody off bail. I am sorry to see him go to gaol once again.
We send people to gaol in the hope that they will use the time think about what brought them there. It is hoped that that the experience of gaol will stop them reoffending. Langlo has not done his previous gaol easy. He recently lost a brother, who died in custody. Gaol is not a place where he wants to be, yet he keeps on returning. For those who say harsher and harsher penalties will cause people to stop reoffending, they need to think again. There are other ways.
Sadly, his background attracts the principles expounded by the High Court in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; (2013) 249 CLR 571. He also attracts the principles explained in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194. His mental health problems must be given full weight. They help explain why he has failed to engage for any lengthy period in the rehabilitation programs he needs.
It is not all his fault. He has little personal capacity to be proactive about entering programs. And, sadly, the programs that he desperately needs are hard to come by. And I accept the evidence given from the bar table that his family and supporters have been trying to find an alternative place for him to go. He has support from others who are helping him, but he requires motivation to engage with them and take their help.
A parole report indicates that he is inconsistent in his responses to supervision but has, as a positive, accepts that he clearly needs rehabilitation. He needs to engage in programs. He will need residential support on release, a reason, despite past failures, for a finding of special circumstances.
A report from Ms Spatz sets out his background, which, is one of neglect and deprivation. Despite the strong support of his family, he was exposed to a high level of violence as a child. He has a number of underlying mental health problems. His grandmother, as I well know, tried to do the best for the many children in her care. His background has led to a provisional diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. There is also mention of Stimulant Use Disorder and a Gambling Disorder.
The indicated sentences reflect a 25% reduction for the plea of guilty. I will take care that the benefit is not eroded by the process of accumulation.
The indicated sentence for the break and enter is 2 years, 3 months with a 1 year, 3 months non-parole period.
The indicated sentence for the goods in custody is 1 year, 10 months.
The total aggregate sentence will be 2 years and 9 months. It will commence on 23 July 2024 which means that Camara will be released to parole on 22 January 2026. There will be a parole period of 1 year and 3 months, reflecting my finding of special circumstances which will expire on 22 April 2027.
To reiterate; 2 years, with 2 months in custody before the commencement of the sentence. It commences on 23 July, with a 1 year, 6 months non-parole period and then 1 year 3 months on top of that.
In relation to Langlo, I will also take into account, as I must, his early plea of guilty.
In relation to the break and enter, there will be a sentence of 2 years and 3 months, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 3 months.
As with Camara, the indicated sentence for the disposal of property offence is 1 year and 10 months.
I will take into account 210 days. The sentence should start on 30 October 2024, the non-parole period will be 1 year and 6 months, which means he is to be released to parole on 29 April 2026. There will be parole period of 1 year and 3 months, which makes the aggregate sentence expiry date 29 July 2027.
So; backdated 210 days, from 30 October 2024, release date 29 April 2026, 1 year 3 months on parole.
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(2013) 249 CLR 571
(2010) 79 NSWLR 1
(1999) 48 NSWLR 327
He is “willing”, she says, “to make positive changes in his life and work against [the many] risk factors but there are significant risks of reoffending”. She asks that I consider the effects of incarceration on his mental health.
I have done so. I will, recognising that mitigating factors can only go so far, seek to reduce the period of custody that he must serve, and to allow him the benefit of parole, so that he can, if possible, engage in a full-time residential rehabilitation program.