R v Bugmy (No 2)

Cases Cited: R v Batey [2025] NSWSC 1585
R v Bugmy [2025] NSWSC 497
R v Jackson [2021] NSWSC 1404
R v Mifsud (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 8 November 1995, unrep)
R v Minani (2005) 63 NSWLR 490; [2005] NSWCCA 226
R v Smith [1999] NSWCCA 126
R v Trinne (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 1457
R v Woodham (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 1345
R v Zvonaric (2001) 54 NSWLR 1; [2001] NSWCCA 505

Category: Procedural rulings

Parties: Rex (Crown)
William David Bugmy (Accused)

Representation: Counsel:
S Coombes (Crown)
R Khalilizadeh (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Solicitors for Public Prosecutions (NSW)(Crown)
Legal Aid NSW (Accused)

File Number(s): 2023/233561

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

1. The accused, William David Bugmy, is charged with the murder of Talbot Ward at Newtown on 21 July 2023.

2. On 21 May 2025, Cavanagh J found pursuant to s 47 of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) [1] that Mr Bugmy was not fit to be tried and would not become fit within the ensuing 12 months: R v Bugmy [2025] NSWSC 497.

3. The Director of Public Prosecutions advised pursuant to s 53 that it was proposed to proceed with the matter, and so it was listed for special hearing pursuant to Pt 4 Div 3 on 2 February 2026.

4. At the outset on 2 February 2026, Ms Khalilizadeh, counsel for the accused, sought an adjournment until the following day to allow her to attend to two matters. One matter was inconsequential but as to the other, she informed the Court that she and the Crown had discussed the potential for the matter to be dealt with under s 31, given the parties had reached an agreement as to the availability to the accused of a defence of mental health impairment under Pt 3. Counsel needed time to discuss this with her client and “to obtain, to the best I can, instructions for the purposes of agreement”. [2]

5. The Crown acquiesced in relation to the adjournment, adding that in the light of a further psychiatric report which was provided by the defence the previous week:

…the Crown’s position is now to concede that there is evidence where the Court could be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was suffering from a mental health impairment at the relevant time and that has now triggered or engaged this process for the defence, that is, to approach it in this way. [3]

6. At the time, I took this to mean that the Crown agreed that the proposed evidence established the defence.

7. When the matter resumed on 3 February 2026, Ms Khalilizadeh indicated that from the defence perspective, there was agreement with the matter proceeding under s 31. However, the Crown had indicated to her that s 31 was not available and the matter must proceed to a special hearing. [4] The Crown Prosecutor confirmed that was the case: [5]

… the Crown does not agree that section 31 can be relied upon in these circumstances given the defendant is unfit.

Legislative framework

8. Section 31 appears within the following legislative framework.

Part 1 “Preliminary”

9. Part 1 (ss 1-6) is largely concerned with definitions, including the meanings of “mental health impairment” and “cognitive impairment”.

Part 2 “Summary proceedings”

10. Part 2 (ss 7-26) is not presently relevant as it only applies to certain criminal proceedings before a Magistrate: s 8.

Part 3 “Defence of mental health impairment or cognitive impairment”

11. Part 3 (ss 27-34) applies to criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court and the District Court: s 27.

12. Section 28 provides for a defence of mental health impairment or cognitive impairment (or both):

28 Defence of mental health impairment or cognitive impairment

(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if, at the time of carrying out the act constituting the offence, the person had a mental health impairment or a cognitive impairment, or both, that had the effect that the person—

(a) did not know the nature and quality of the act, or

(b) did not know that the act was wrong (that is, the person could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether the act, as perceived by reasonable people, was wrong).

(2) The question of whether a defendant had a mental health impairment or a cognitive impairment, or both, that had that effect is a question of fact and is to be determined by the jury on the balance of probabilities.

(3) Until the contrary is proved, it is presumed that a defendant did not have a mental health impairment or cognitive impairment, or both, that had that effect.

(4) In this Part, act includes—

(a) an omission, and

(b) a series of acts or omissions.

13. If the defence is established, the jury (or, per s 6, a judge in judge-alone proceedings) must return “a special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible”: s 30.

14. Section 31 is in the following terms:

31 Special verdict where defendant and prosecutor agree on impairment

The court may enter a special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible at any time in the proceedings (including before the jury is empanelled) if—

(a) the defendant and the prosecutor agree that the proposed evidence in the proceedings establishes a defence of mental health impairment or cognitive impairment, and

(b) the defendant is represented by an Australian legal practitioner, and

(c) the court, after considering that evidence, is satisfied that the defence is so established.

(Emphasis added)

15. Section 33 sets out the effect of a special verdict.

16. Section 34 provides for referral to the Mental Health Review Tribunal where a special verdict is returned and the defendant is not released unconditionally.

Part 4 “Fitness to stand trial”

17. Part 4 has three Divisions.

Division 1 “Preliminary”

18. Division 1 (ss 35-39) is generally concerned with what constitutes unfitness to be tried and how it may be raised.

Division 2 “Procedure when question of unfitness to be tried raised”

19. Division 2 (ss 40-53) is as the title indicates. Where an accused is found unfit to be tried and will not become fit within the ensuing 12 months, the Director of Public Prosecutions is required to advise whether further proceedings will be taken by the Director in respect of the offence: s 53(2). If no further proceedings are to be taken, the court must order that the defendant be released: s 53(3).

20. Section 48 seems important to the Crown’s contention that the s 31 procedure is unavailable when the accused is found unfit to be tried.

48 Finding after inquiry that defendant will not become fit to be tried within 12 months

(1) If the court determines that a defendant will not, during the period of 12 months after a finding by a court that the person is unfit to be tried for an offence, become fit to be tried for the offence, the defendant is to be dealt with under Division 3. (Emphasis added)

(2) This section does not apply if the court is required to order the release of the defendant because of advice under section 53 that further proceedings will not be taken against the defendant in respect of the offence.

Division 3 “Special hearings”

21. Division 3 (ss 54-68) is concerned with the conduct of special hearings.

22. Section 54 explains the concept of a “special hearing”:

54 Nature of special hearings

In this Act, a special hearing is a hearing for the purpose of ensuring, despite the unfitness of the defendant to be tried in accordance with the normal procedures, that the defendant is acquitted unless it can be proved to the required criminal standard of proof that, on the limited evidence available, the defendant committed the offence charged, or another offence available as an alternative to the offence charged.

23. A special hearing must be held as soon as practicable unless the Director has advised pursuant to s 53(2) that no further proceedings will be taken:

55 When special hearings are held

(1) A court must hold a special hearing as soon as practicable after the court or the Tribunal determines that a defendant will not, during the period of 12 months after a finding that the person is unfit to be tried for an offence, become fit to be tried for the offence.

(2) This section does not apply if the court is required to order the release of the defendant because of advice under section 53 that further proceedings will not be taken against the defendant in respect of the offence.

24. Section 56 sets out certain aspects of the procedure for special hearings which include:

(1) Trial procedure A special hearing is to be conducted as nearly as possible as if it were a trial of criminal proceedings.

…

(3) Representation At a special hearing, the defendant must, unless the court otherwise allows, be represented by an Australian legal practitioner.

(4) The fact that the defendant has been found unfit to be tried for an offence is to be presumed not to be an impediment to the person’s representation.

(5) Plea of not guilty The defendant is taken to have pleaded not guilty in respect of the offence charged.

(6) Defences The defendant may raise any defence that could properly be raised if the special hearing were an ordinary trial of criminal proceedings.

25. There are four verdicts available at a special hearing which include the special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible: s 59(1).

26. Sections 61 to 68 are explanatory of some of the possible verdicts that can be returned and set out consequential actions which may or must be taken. They include in s 67, mirroring s 34, that where a special verdict is returned, a court must refer the defendant to the Tribunal unless there is an order for unconditional release.

Crown submissions as to the unavailability of s 31 where an accused is unfit

27. The Crown Prosecutor explained that the contention s 31 cannot apply is because the accused is unfit to be tried. [6] The Crown conceded that the proposed expert evidence may establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the accused was suffering from a mental health impairment at the relevant time and had the effect that he did not know that the act (of killing the deceased) was wrong: s 28(1)(b). It was further conceded that if the Court was satisfied of that fact, it would then return the special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible under s 61. [7] (It is in fact s 30 which requires the special verdict returned when a defence of mental health or cognitive impairment is established.)

28. The Crown Prosecutor pointed out that “section 59 does not refer to section 31 being available”. [8] However, there is also no express reference in s 59, or elsewhere in the Act, to s 31 not being available. In any event, s 59 provides there are four possible verdicts that are available at a special hearing, one of which is the special verdict. The fact it makes no reference to an alternative means by which a special verdict can be entered, namely under s 31, is of no significance.

29. While the court had not yet commenced a special hearing, the Crown maintained that this was the way the matter must proceed, “because that is the formula that is prescribed within the legislation … where an accused or a defendant is unfit”. [9]

30. The Crown acknowledged that s 31(b) requires that the unfit accused person be represented. It is also notable in my view that the Act requires the accused to be represented at a fitness inquiry (s 44(2)) and at a special hearing (s 56(3)), in either case, “unless the court otherwise allows”. Notwithstanding this requirement, it was submitted that “the Crown cannot agree under section 31(a) where a defendant is unfit for that very reason because the defendant is unfit to enter an agreement; how can the defendant agree where he is unfit, your Honour?” [10]

31. The submissions then qualified the concession earlier stated that the proposed expert evidence established the defence of mental health impairment. When asked whether that concession amounted to an agreement that the evidence established the defence, the Crown Prosecutor responded: [11]

[T]here is a slight difference in the sense that the Crown concedes it can be established on the proposed expert evidence. The Crown does not agree with the defendant. That is the distinction, your Honour, because the prosecutor cannot agree with the defendant when the defendant is unfit.

32. The Crown Prosecutor further explained that just as an accused person who is unfit cannot enter a plea, the same applies to agreeing pursuant to s 31(a) that the proposed evidence establishes the defence of mental health impairment. She reiterated, the only way the matter could proceed was by way of special hearing with the Crown conceding that the defence be upheld. [12] She further indicated that this was a position endorsed by the Director and she was acting on those instructions. [13]

33. At the urging of counsel for the accused, I indicated my view that the procedure under s 31 is available in respect of an accused who is unfit to be tried. The Crown then sought time to further consider the matter.

34. Upon resumption, the Crown’s position had not altered. It was reiterated that following the finding of unfitness and the Director’s advice that further proceedings were to be pursued, according to s 48, the matter can only proceed by way of special hearing under Pt 4 Div 3. [14]

35. There was then a discussion about three known cases in which the Crown had either agreed, or at least acquiesced, in s 31 being applied in respect of an accused who had been found unfit to be tried: R v Woodham (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 1345; R v Trinne (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 1457; and R v Batey [2025] NSWSC 1585. The Crown Prosecutor responded: [15]

Your Honour, the Crown is making submissions consistent with the instructions received, that is, that this is a matter of statutory construction and when looking to the provision in the circumstances that have arisen, this is the position of the Crown.

Whilst the Crown position hasn’t changed, it is really born out of the position of the defence, that is, how can the Crown agree essentially with an accused or a defendant that is unfit.

36. One observation about that response (and the similar response earlier: see above at [31]) is that the issue in s 31(a) is not whether the Crown agrees “with the accused”. What the Crown must agree is that “the proposed evidence in the proceedings establishes a defence of mental health impairment or cognitive impairment”.

37. If the Crown had been prepared to commit itself to agreeing that this was the case, rather than using alternative descriptions of its position such as it “concedes” the special verdict is available, or that “it is open and appropriate in the circumstances”, I would have been inclined to accept that as fulfilling the requirement in s 31(a) on its part. With the clear agreement by the defence that the special verdict is established by the proposed evidence, I would have proceeded under s 31. However, the Crown was not prepared to state in unequivocal terms that it agreed, and so the precondition in s 31(a) could not be satisfied.

38. Submissions on the second day of the hearing concluded as follows: [16]

Your Honour, just for clarity, it is your Honour's view that, given what my learned friend has submitted to the Court, your Honour is of the view that the defendant can agree under section 31?

HIS HONOUR: Certainly the defendant can agree. The problem here is the Crown.

CROWN PROSECUTOR: Your Honour, the Crown hears that but, if that is the decision of the Court or your Honour's ruling without reasons, that needs to be considered and the Crown would seek a short amount of time to get clarity on that position.

39. The Crown sought and obtained an adjournment overnight to further consider the matter. The following morning, it adhered to the position as previously submitted. [17] A special hearing then commenced.

Determination

40. The utility of the procedure provided by s 31 was explained by Johnson J in R v Jackson [2021] NSWSC 1404:

[9] In the absence of s.31, a criminal trial would take place for the purpose of determining whether the defence of mental health impairment had been established. A criminal trial is conducted as adversarial litigation where an accusatorial process is involved, in which the prosecutor bears the onus of proving the elements of the crime charged: Robinson v R (2006) 162 A Crim R 88; [2006] NSWCCA 192 at [138]. In this case, if the matter proceeded to trial, it would be for the Crown to prove that the Accused committed the act in question and the other elements of the crime of murder (apart from the question of intention) and it would be for the Accused to establish, on the balance of probabilities, the defence of mental health impairment under s.28(2) of the Act.

[10] Section 31 is a statutory modification of these usual procedures and permits the Court to consider the agreed position of the parties without the need for a criminal trial. In R v Siemek (No. 1) [2021] NSWSC 1292, reference was made (at [19]) to the origin of s.31 as explained in the second reading speech:

“In the second reading speech for the MHCIFP Bill, the Attorney General explained that s.31 ‘aims to avoid the need for an expensive and lengthy trial when the prosecutor and defence are in agreement that a special verdict should be found’ (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 3 June 2020, page 2352). The Attorney General observed that the Bill added ‘extra safeguards’ in that ‘the defendant must be legally represented and the court must be satisfied that, on the evidence, the defence is established’. This was in line with the recommendation of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report 138, ‘People With Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in the Criminal Justice System – Criminal Responsibility and Consequences’, 2013, paragraphs 3.159-3.160.”

(Emphasis added)

41. The “extra safeguards” referred to by the Attorney General in the second reading speech (the accused being represented and the court also being satisfied the special verdict should be entered) are important.

42. A key feature of the Crown’s contention that s 31 cannot be applied in the case of an accused person who is unfit to be tried and is scheduled to undergo a special hearing is that such accused persons lack the ability to agree that the proposed evidence establishes a defence that would result in entry of the special verdict.

43. In the present case it may be assumed that, unaided by a lawyer, the accused was probably not equipped with the knowledge, skill, intellect and capacity for rational assessment of an important legal question to enable him to decide whether to agree that the proposed evidence established the defence of mental health impairment. However, he was aided by a lawyer.

44. The possible invocation of the s 31 procedure was raised by Ms Khalilizadeh, counsel for the accused, when she sought a short adjournment at the outset on Monday 2 February 2026: [18]

KHALILIZADEH: The experts from both sides agree that the defendant is not criminally responsible for the act and so we were discussing the prospect of this proceeding by way of a section 31 special verdict, rather than the Court receiving all of the evidence. In order to do that, I will need to obtain, to the best I can, instructions for the purposes of agreement. He is not fit, but I might be able to, today, obtain those instructions to proceed in that manner which means that, if that is something that can be done, the parties would anticipate just providing your Honour with the reports, the experts wouldn't need to be called.

HIS HONOUR: I see.

KHALILIZADEH: And then your Honour could just make orders for the referral to the Tribunal, which then means that the witnesses, which I think we have got about ten witnesses, need not be called and it can be done on the basis of a Crown Case Statement or a document of matters that are not in dispute.

HIS HONOUR: I see. What is the Crown's position in relation to that second matter?

CROWN PROSECUTOR: Yes. Your Honour, the Crown takes no issue with that approach that my learned friend has sought of the Court and the reason for that is this …

(Emphasis added)

45. The following was said the next morning when the Court resumed: [19]

KHALILIZADEH: Your Honour, I asked for time yesterday, because there is no contest between the experts, to obtain some agreement for the matter to proceed under section 31 of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

KHALILIZADEH: I have that agreement and from my perspective it was anticipated that your Honour could then proceed on the basis of those reports and an exhibit that would be prepared, including a Crown case summary, and then the orders referring to the Tribunal could be made.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

KHALILIZADEH: As of this morning, I understand the Crown's position is that section 31 is not available for this Court and the matter must proceed to a special hearing. I don't agree with that position …

(Emphasis added)

46. Two things are clear from this. First, counsel for the accused obtained instructions that her client agreed that the proposed evidence established the defence of mental health impairment and the matter should proceed under s 31. Second, the Crown seemingly changed its position from one of acquiescence to one of opposition to the matter proceeding in that way. This was despite the fact the Crown conceded that the defence was made out by the proposed evidence.

47. There are, to my knowledge, few appellate cases which include discussion of the degree to which, if at all, an accused who is unfit to be tried may participate in decisions as to how their case should be conducted in a special hearing. In R v Smith [1999] NSWCCA 126, the appellant contended (unsuccessfully) as follows:

[44] … It was submitted that if an accused person is represented at a special hearing, then, as a matter of law, for so long as the accused person is represented, all decisions about how the defence of the accused person should be conducted, including whether he should give evidence or make a statement (if that procedure is open to the accused person) are to be made by the legal representative, and not by the accused. …

48. James J referred to the provision in s 21(1) of what was then the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW) (subsequently renamed the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act [20] but later repealed and replaced by the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act) which, like s 56(1) of the current Act, provided that a special hearing is to be conducted “as nearly as possible as if it were a trial of criminal proceedings”. He continued:

[47] I have already referred to s21(2) of the Act, which provides that at a special hearing the accused must, unless the court otherwise allows, be represented by counsel or solicitor. At an ordinary criminal trial, if an accused is represented, then, although the legal representative gives advice, decisions on fundamental matters, such as whether the accused should give evidence or make a statement (if that procedure is open), are made by the accused person himself, who instructs his legal representative accordingly. At a special hearing the capacity of the accused to make decisions and give instructions is absent or at least diminished. Accordingly, it must follow, in my opinion, that at a special hearing the accused’s legal representative has a greater power to make decisions, without receiving instructions from his client, than would be the case in an ordinary trial. In many cases, it will be impossible for the accused’s legal representative to obtain instructions. However, I have reached the conclusion that I should not accept the submissions made by counsel for the appellant that at a special hearing the power to make decisions on behalf of the accused is exclusively vested in the accused’s legal representative, to the exclusion of the accused himself, with the consequence that a judge at a special hearing makes an error of law, if he permits the accused to take a step which is opposed by the accused’s legal representative.

[48] In my opinion, even in the case of a person who has been found unfit to be tried, a court should be cautious in finding a legislative intent that an accused person has been deprived of fundamental rights which he would have had in an ordinary trial, in the absence of clear legislative provision to that effect. I do not consider that such a clear legislative provision can be discerned in the Act.

49. In R v Zvonaric (2001) 54 NSWLR 1; [2001] NSWCCA 505 the Court was concerned with the same legislation as in R v Smith in its application to a special hearing conducted in the District Court. A number of issues were raised on appeal in relation to how the proceeding was conducted, which prompted Spigelman CJ to say (at [3]) there had been a “degree of informality”, including that the indictment was simply handed up without the charge being read aloud. Adams J found that there was error in the fact that the prosecution case comprised unsworn witness statements that had been tendered with the consent of the defence. However, Spigelman CJ and Sully J did not agree. Relevantly for the present issue, the Chief Justice observed:

[12] A special hearing is conducted where a person has been found unfit to be tried. Nevertheless, it is expected that a special hearing will occur with the assistance of legal representation on behalf of the person found to be unfit. Questions of instruction from an accused are necessarily problematic in such circumstances. Nevertheless the legislative scheme assumes such representation and, in its practical operation, the scheme requires the court to rely on the professionalism of that legal representation.

50. Given the current Act is based upon the former legislation, these cases have continued relevance.

51. It was appropriate for counsel to consult her client in relation to the s 31 issue. How it came about that “agreement” for the purposes of s 31(a) was arrived at is not known and, having regard to client legal privilege, is a matter between the accused and his lawyers.

52. The extent by which the accused understands a question such as this is different to the level of understanding required in relation to other issues that have arisen under the former mental health forensic provisions legislation. The ability of an accused to understand what is involved in making an election for a special hearing to be heard by a judge alone, and not a jury, used to be governed by s 21A of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act. It required the accused to make the election and the judge to be satisfied that before making the election the accused had sought and received advice from a barrister or solicitor. In R v Minani (2005) 63 NSWLR 490; [2005] NSWCCA 226, reference was made by Hunt AJA (at [14]) to Gleeson CJ having said in R v Mifsud (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 8 November 1995, unrep):

[I]t is not sufficient that a barrister or solicitor merely tenders advice, which may or may not be understood by the person to whom it is tendered. What is required is that the person should be willing to be advised on the matter and should understand the advice that is tendered.

53. Hunt AJA said (at [16]) that the obligation placed on the judge was not to satisfy him or herself that the accused properly understood the nature of the election being made. It was an obligation to be satisfied that the barrister or solicitor was satisfied that the accused properly understood the nature of the election being made.

54. It is noted that under the present legislation the default position for special hearings is provided in s 56. It reverses the previous position and specifically allows for an election to be made by the accused’s lawyer:

(9) Judge to try proceedings, unless jury election The question of whether the defendant at a special hearing has committed an offence charged or another offence available as an alternative is to be determined by the judge alone unless an election to have the matter determined by a jury is made by —

(a) the defendant and the court is satisfied that the defendant sought and received advice about the election from an Australian legal practitioner and the defendant understood the advice, or

(b) an Australian legal practitioner representing the defendant, or

(c) the prosecutor.

55. In relation to s 31 of the present legislation, there is no statutory requirement for the accused to have received advice, nor for the presiding judge to be satisfied in relation to this.

56. The question is concerned with how the proceedings will be conducted procedurally. If an accused is advised by their lawyers that the proposed evidence establishes a defence under s 28, there is no reason why it should be presumed by a court that the accused is incapable of accepting such advice. The fact the accused is unfit to be tried is presumed not to be an impediment to their representation: s 56(4). Further, as Spigelman CJ observed in R v Zvonaric (see above at [47]), courts can and should rely on the professionalism of that legal representation. Even in a normal criminal trial, it is likely that many accused would not have the capacity to determine for themselves whether the proposed evidence established a s 28 defence and instead would rely upon the advice of their lawyers.

57. Additionally, there is nothing in, or relating to, s 31 that confines its application to normal criminal trials. In its terms, the procedure is available “at any time in the proceedings”. The “proceedings” for which s 31 applies are those for which Pt 3 is concerned: “criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court … and the District Court”: s 27. Pt 4 has the same breadth of application: s 35. There is nothing in the Act that excludes s 31 from applying because the accused is unfit or because a special hearing has been ordered. There is nothing in the second reading speech of the Attorney General that evinces an intention that s 31 would not apply to persons found unfit to be tried.

58. The Crown likened an agreement under s 31(a) to the non-entry by an accused of a plea at a special hearing. As previously noted (at [23]), the question of whether to plead guilty or not guilty is taken out of the accused’s hands as they are taken to have pleaded not guilty. The comparison is, with respect, inapt. The question whether to plead guilty or not guilty is fundamentally one for an accused person and cannot be decided for them. Decisions as to procedural matters are of a different character and are made in the context of the requirement for legal representation. Moreover, whilst the legislation explicitly takes the entry of a plea out of the accused’s hands, it does not do the same in respect of s 31.

Conclusion

59. For the reasons above, I was not persuaded that the procedure under s 31 is not available in these proceedings because the accused was unfit to be tried.

**********

Endnotes

Hereafter, all references to legislation are to that Act unless otherwise stated.

T2.5.

T2.30.

T5.17-37.

T6.11.

T6.10; T10.10-13.

T7.40-45.

T7.49.

T8.20-22.

T9.37-39.

T10.30-34.

T11.14-47.

T11.49-12.2.

T14.33-18.21.

T19.2-9.

T21.15-25.

T23.

T2.2-24.

T5.17-33.

Amended by the Mental Health Legislation Amendment (Forensic Provisions) Act 2008 (NSW).

Amendments

13 February 2026

13/02/2026 - Formatting change to coversheet.