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[2025] QCA 254
respondent. Application for leave to adduce further evidence refused; appeal against conviction dismissed; application for leave to appeal against sentence refused.
The Court of Appeal found that the jury could reasonably accept the complainant’s evidence despite some inconsistencies. Two adult witnesses also supported the account of the strangulation incident. The additional material proposed for the appeal did not show a reasonable probability that a retrial would end in acquittal. The sentence comparison did not establish that the sentence was wrongly imposed or plainly unjust. The conviction appeal and both applications were refused.
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2,104 words · generated 07/10/2026
In R v Bey [2025] QCA 254, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered a conviction appeal, an application to adduce further evidence, and an application for leave to appeal against sentence. Bradley JA, Crow J and Hindman J heard the matter. Crow J gave the principal reasons, with Bradley JA and Hindman J agreeing.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Bey had been convicted of maintaining an unlawful relationship with a child, rape, and choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic relationship. The first two counts concerned alleged sexual offending against his daughter between 30 June 2017 and 1 February 2018, when she was aged 13 to 14. The third count concerned an alleged strangulation incident between 1 August and 1 December 2018: [20]-[22], [41].
The appellant’s conviction ground was that the verdicts were unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence. His appeal outline alleged that the complainant knowingly lied, that her statements and trial evidence were inconsistent, that the jury did not apply reasonable doubt, and that its three-hour deliberation indicated it had not properly considered the case: [5], [8]. He also sought to rely on medical reports and messages, and sought leave to appeal a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment with parole eligibility after five and a half years: [9], [47].
The Court of Appeal refused the further-evidence application, dismissed the conviction appeal and refused leave to appeal sentence. Bradley JA expressly agreed that it was open to the jury to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt on each count: [1]-[3]. Hindman J agreed with Crow J: [51].
The court approached the conviction ground under the independent assessment described in Dansie v The Queen [2022] HCA 25. The appellate question was whether, on the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. That assessment does not displace the jury’s primary responsibility for deciding guilt or its advantage in seeing and hearing witnesses: [17]-[18].
Crow J examined the particular inconsistencies relied on, rather than treating inconsistency as a single, general objection. The complainant had spoken to police in 2019 and testified in 2024 about events said to have occurred in 2017 and 2018. The court recognised that her evidence was not perfectly consistent, but held that there is no rule requiring perfect consistency for a witness to be accepted. The significance of inconsistencies is a matter of fact and degree for the jury: [22]-[24], [37].
Some inconsistencies were relatively minor and had already been raised by defence counsel at trial. The court considered that the jury could evaluate those points alongside the rest of the evidence. For example, there was a difference between the complainant’s police interview description of the frequency of rape and her more qualified trial recollection. Crow J accepted that there was some inconsistency, but noted that defence counsel had raised it and the jury’s verdict showed that it did not cause the jury to doubt the evidence: [33].
The court also considered the appellant’s argument about the PlayStation and the timing of the first rape. The appellant relied on his police interview statement that the PlayStation was not purchased until Christmas 2017, which he said conflicted with the complainant’s account of watching a television show on it before her fourteenth birthday. Crow J identified three difficulties: the alleged point could have been explored at trial, it had not been put to the complainant in cross-examination, and the jury was not required to accept the appellant’s account of when the PlayStation was purchased: [27]-[32]. On the evidence described, the court considered it more logical that the jury had rejected that part of the appellant’s police account than that it had overlooked an inconsistency in the complainant’s account: [32].
The court regarded the strangulation evidence as significant to its assessment of the overall case. The appellant’s account to police was that his daughter had attacked him and that he had gently put her against a wall in self-defence. The complainant and two adults who witnessed the incident described a materially different event: the appellant went towards her, grabbed her and placed her against a wall. The aunt described his hand or hands around the complainant’s throat and said he lifted her slightly off the ground; the ex-wife recalled his hands near the chest area. The aunt also observed red marks on the complainant’s neck: [42]-[44]. The jury could accept those witnesses and reject the appellant’s account: [45].
The court rejected the claim that a three-hour deliberation demonstrated that the jury had not discharged its duty. It said there was no material supporting the submission that the jury had failed to apply the standard of proof or had not carried out its obligations. It also noted the presumption that juries follow the judge’s instructions on the law: [38]-[39]. The ultimate finding was that the verdicts were open on the whole of the evidence: [40]-[46].
The judgment presents the relevant legal principles as established rules applied to the particular appeal, rather than as a change in the law. On an unreasonable-verdict appeal, the appellate court independently evaluates the whole evidence and asks whether the jury could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. In performing that task, it must not disregard the jury’s responsibility or its opportunity to observe witnesses. The judgment quotes that formulation from Dansie and applies it: [17]-[18].
For witness inconsistency, the judgment states that there is no rule that a witness must be perfectly consistent to be accepted. Nor is there a set level of inconsistency that automatically requires rejection. The fact-finder weighs inconsistencies in context, as a matter of fact and degree: [23]-[24]. The decision illustrates the distinction between identifying a discrepancy and establishing that the discrepancy makes a verdict unreasonable. The jury’s task is to evaluate the evidence as a whole, including explanations, context and competing accounts.
On additional evidence, the judgment distinguishes “new evidence” from “fresh evidence”. The material proposed by Bey was characterised as new evidence: material available, or discoverable with reasonable diligence, before trial. The court stated that an appellant relying on new evidence must show a miscarriage of justice, ordinarily by demonstrating that guilt was not reasonably open or that there is a reasonable probability of acquittal at a retrial on the combined evidence: [10]-[11]. The distinction mattered because the applicant’s own outline described material that his legal team had but had not used: [9].
For sentence appeals, the judgment applied the principle that comparative difference is not enough. A sentence may be different, even markedly different, from sentences in other cases without that alone establishing manifest excess. The difference must point to a misapplication of principle or show that the sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust: [48]. The court did not announce a new sentencing test. It applied that stated test to the comparator and circumstances put forward in this case.
At [17], Crow J set out the appellate question from Dansie: whether, on the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. In plain English, the appeal court does its own assessment of the evidence, but it does not simply retry the case or ignore the jury’s role.
At [18], the court described the jury as “the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence” and noted that jurors saw and heard the witness. This explains why an appellate court takes the jury’s assessment of credibility seriously, while still conducting the required independent review.
At [23], Crow J said that consistency is a matter for the fact-finder and that a witness need not be perfectly consistent to be accepted. The practical point is that discrepancies must be assessed for their significance in context. The judgment does not say that inconsistencies are unimportant; it says they do not automatically decide credibility.
At [32], the court rejected the claimed PlayStation inconsistency as a basis for concluding that the complainant’s account was unreliable. The jury could reject the appellant’s statement about when the PlayStation was purchased. In plain English, the alleged conflict depended on accepting the appellant’s account, and the jury was not compelled to do so.
At [45], the court said the jury was entitled to prefer the evidence of the complainant and the two adult witnesses over the appellant’s police account. It also considered that rejection of his account about the strangulation incident could inform the jury’s assessment of his account and the complainant’s evidence on the other counts. The point is not that rejection of one account automatically proves other charges, but that the evidence was assessed as a whole in this case.
At [48], Crow J explained that a different sentence, even a markedly different one, does not by itself establish manifest excess. A relevant error must be shown through misapplication of principle or a sentence that is unreasonable or plainly unjust.
The decision is relevant where an appellant argues that a jury’s verdict was unreasonable because a witness gave inconsistent accounts, changed details over time, or was not credible. It indicates that the court will examine the alleged discrepancies against the whole record and consider whether they were raised at trial, whether the witness had a chance to respond, and what other evidence supported or contradicted the account: [19]-[37].
It is also relevant where the prosecution case includes both disputed witness credibility and independent witnesses to an event. In Bey, the sexual offending counts were described as having no witnesses other than the complainant and the appellant, whereas the strangulation count involved two adult witnesses: [41]-[44]. The court considered the different evidential footing of those counts as part of its whole-evidence assessment.
The new-evidence analysis is pertinent where an appellant seeks to introduce material that was available, or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, before trial. The judgment requires more than identifying documents or material not used at trial; the proposed evidence must meet the miscarriage-of-justice threshold described at [11]. The court assessed the medical reports and communications for relevance and their capacity to affect the result: [12]-[16].
The sentence discussion is relevant where an appellant relies on sentences imposed in other cases or compares their sentence with another prisoner’s sentence. The comparison must be sufficiently grounded in comparable offending and must demonstrate the kind of sentencing error identified at [48]. In this case, the details of the other prisoner’s offences were unknown, so that comparison did not establish the claimed error: [49].
The provided judgment does not discuss any later decisions applying, distinguishing or otherwise treating R v Bey. It was delivered on 12 December 2025, and the supplied text identifies no subsequent judicial treatment. No conclusion about how later courts have treated it can therefore be drawn from this source alone.
The judgment itself relies on earlier authorities. It applies Dansie to the unreasonable-verdict ground and Fenton as a sentencing comparator. It cites Spina and Hodges concerning the distinction between new and fresh evidence, Davidson and SDT on the miscarriage-of-justice threshold, and Abdullah on manifest excess: [10]-[11], [17], [48]-[49]. Those are the authorities identified in the judgment; the supplied text does not establish any later treatment of the Bey decision.
The judgment does not set out a numerical or categorical rule for deciding when inconsistencies become sufficiently serious to make a verdict unreasonable. Instead, it describes the assessment as one of fact and degree and applies that approach to the particular evidence: [23]-[24]. The precise significance of an inconsistency will therefore depend on the record and context in a case.
The decision also does not determine what result would follow if a proposed item of new evidence were admissible and directly contradicted important prosecution evidence. Here, the medical reports did not support the asserted physical limitation, and the communications were found to offer no relevant admissible means of discrediting the complainant: [12]-[16]. The judgment’s conclusion is tied to those materials.
On sentence, the judgment does not provide a comprehensive comparison of all relevant sentencing factors or establish a general tariff for offences of this kind. It addresses the comparator raised and the appellant’s submission, concluding that neither demonstrated the required error: [49]-[50]. The reasoning should therefore be read as applying the manifest-excess test to the arguments presented, not as fixing a standard sentence.
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v BEY [2025] QCA 254
PARTIES: R / v / BEY / (appellant/applicant)
FILE NO/S: CA No 228 of 2024 / DC No 213 of 2022
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Appeal against Conviction & Sentence
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Ipswich – Date of Conviction: 3 October 2024; Date of Sentence: 4 October 2024 (Kent KC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON: 12 December 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 21 October 2025
JUDGES: Bradley JA, Crow and Hindman JJ
ORDERS: **1.****Application for leave to adduce further evidence refused.****2.****Appeal against conviction dismissed.****3.**Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where at trial the appellant was convicted of one count of maintaining an unlawful relationship with a child, one count of rape, and one count of choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic relationship – where the appellant appeals his conviction on the ground that the conviction is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal his sentence on the ground that the sentence is manifestly excessive – whether the conviction is unreasonable and cannot be supported – whether the sentence is manifestly excessive / Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651; [2022] HCA 25, applied / R v Abdullah [2023] QCA 189, cited / R v Davidson [2014] QCA 348, cited / R v Fenton [2015] QCA 125, applied / R v Hodges [2019] 1 Qd R 172; [2018] QCA 92, cited / R v SDT (2022) 11 QR 556; [2022] QCA 159, cited / R v Spina [2012] QCA 179, cited
COUNSEL: The appellant/applicant appeared on his own behalf / M A Green for the respondent
SOLICITORS: The appellant/applicant appeared on his own behalf / Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
BRADLEY JA: Having assessed the sufficiency and quality of the evidence at the trial, my conclusion accords with that of Crow J. On the whole of the evidence, it was not unreasonable for the jury to have decided there was no reasonable doubt as to the proof of the appellant’s guilt in respect of each count on the indictment. So, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt.
I also agree with his Honour’s conclusions with respect to the applications for leave to adduce further evidence and for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed upon him by the learned primary judge, for the reasons expressed by his Honour.
It follows that I concur with his Honour’s conclusion that the appeal against conviction should be dismissed, and that leave to adduce further evidence and leave to appeal against sentence be refused.
Background
CROW J: The appellant was convicted of one count of maintaining an unlawful relationship with a child, one count of rape, and one count of choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic relationship.
The appellant appeals his conviction on the sole ground that the conviction is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
The appellant also applies for leave to appeal his sentence on the sole ground that the sentence is manifestly excessive.
The appellant’s one-paragraph outline of argument raises several submissions as to why the conviction is unreasonable but does not contain any submissions as to why the sentence is manifestly excessive.
The appellant submits that his conviction ought to be set aside as the complainant knowingly lied in the witness box, there were inconsistencies between her statement to police and the evidence given by her in the witness box, and “the jury did not see or use ‘reasonable doubt’ in their judgment”. The appellant also submits the jury wrongfully convicted him as “the jury only took 3 hours to come up with a conviction of guilty”.
Application to Adduce New Evidence
The last two sentences of the appellant’s outline of argument refer to “new evidence which my legal team had but didn’t use, such as doctors reports and text messages between myself and [complainant], [complainant’s mother], and [ex-partner of the accused]. Also the interview of [friend of complainant] which [friend of complainant] did tell me on the phone on or around the 18th August 2020.”
The correct part of the appellant’s submission is to describe the matters referred to in those sentences as “new evidence” which is evidence which was (or with reasonable diligence could have been) available prior to trial as opposed to “fresh evidence” which is evidence of which the accused was unaware at the time of trial and could not have discovered with reasonable diligence.1
Where new evidence is sought to be relied upon in an appeal against conviction the appellant must show there has been a “miscarriage of justice”. This usually requires the appellant to show that the conclusion of guilt was not reasonably open2 or that there is a “reasonable probability”3 that the appellant would be acquitted in a re-trial based on the new evidence and the evidence at trial.
The appellant wishes to use the “doctors’ reports” as new evidence to suggest that reasonable doubt ought to have existed in respect of the strangulation offence, which was alleged to have occurred between 1 August 2018 and 1 December 2018. The reports show that the appellant had an ultrasound of his right shoulder on 22 May 2018, as he was having some pain in his right shoulder at that time. The appellant argued that he could not have strangled his daughter in the manner alleged, that is, by lifting her slightly off the floor, because it was impossible due to his right shoulder injury.
The difficulty for the appellant is that no part of any of the reports support the submission that the appellant could not have lifted his daughter off the floor whilst attempting to strangle her, and such a submission is directly contrary to not only the complainant’s evidence but the two adult witnesses who observed the event.
As to the text messages, the appellant seeks to adduce into evidence, 14 pages of documents which appear to be communications on the Instagram platform, perhaps the Facebook platform and some actual texts. The first of such documents, referred to by the appellant, is said to be a screenshot of Instagram messages commencing with the date 23 October 2018. That document, however, is not new evidence as it was Exhibit C for identification in the trial and was utilised by the appellant’s counsel in cross-examination of the complainant.
Appeal Against Conviction
“[8] That understanding of the function to be performed by a court of criminal appeal in determining an appeal on the unreasonable verdict ground of a common form criminal appeal statute was settled by this Court in M. The reasoning in the joint judgment in that case establishes that ‘the question which the court must ask itself’ when performing that function is ‘whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty’, that question being ‘one of fact which the court must decide by making its own independent assessment of the evidence’.
[9] The joint judgment in M made clear that ‘in answering that question the court must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses’… ”
[footnotes omitted]
The appellant’s submission that the complainant “did knowingly lie on the witness stand” is very much a matter for determination by the jury, as that is “the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence”, and that body “has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witness”.
The appellant’s principal argument is that inconsistencies between the complainant’s statements to police and her evidence ought to have led the jury to have reasonable doubt and thus acquit him. Although the appellant’s outline of argument did not specify which inconsistency of statements he was relying upon, the appellant did submit four pages of alleged inconsistencies which were helpfully referenced to the appeal book record. The appellant made oral submissions in support of some, but not all, of the alleged inconsistencies referred to in that four-page document.
The submissions relating to inconsistency must be assessed with reference to the different charges. In particular, count one alleged that, the appellant, as an adult, maintained an unlawful sexual relationship with his daughter, a child under the age of 16. The allegation was that the offence occurred over a period of seven months from 30 June 2017 to 1 February 2018. The offence was alleged to have occurred when the complainant was aged 13 and 14.
The timeline of the events in question is important. The complainant’s allegations were that she was sexually abused between the ages of 13 and 14, between 30 June 2017 and 1 February 2018, with count two, the offence of rape, also occurring in that period.
The complainant’s evidence was that count three, the strangulation offence, occurred in late August 2018. The complainant’s interview with police occurred on 6 February 2019, and then the complainant gave evidence and was cross-examined on 1 October 2024. The complainant was 13 to 14 when she alleged the events occurred, 15 when she had the police interview on 29 January 2019, and then 18 when she gave evidence and was cross-examined at the trial on 1 October 2024.
The level of consistency or inconsistency in any witness’s evidence is a matter for determination by the tribunal of fact and may or may not be important in the tribunal of fact undertaking its important task of assessing the credibility and reliability of any witness’s evidence. There is no rule that a witness must be perfectly consistent to be accepted, nor that there is any particular level of inconsistency requiring a tribunal of fact to reject that witness’s evidence.
It is always a matter of fact and degree for the tribunal of fact that is entrusted with the determination of those important questions of fact. Inconsistencies in evidence are common and often the subject of submissions to the tribunal of fact.
As the appellant did not give evidence, the prosecutor at the conclusion of the trial was first to address the jury. The prosecutor submitted to the jury that the prosecutor expected that defence counsel would raise issues relating to some inconsistencies between the evidence of the witnesses as the basis for a rejection of the evidence. The prosecutor then put forward arguments as to why that ought not to occur. The prosecutor was right to anticipate that a substantial part of defence counsel’s address to the jury would be in the nature of a submission that as a result of the inconsistencies in the evidence, the jury ought not to convict the accused as they could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he had committed the offences as alleged.
Application for Leave to Appeal Against Sentence
As to the application for leave to appeal against the sentence, the appellant submits that the sentence imposed upon him of nine years’ imprisonment with parole eligibility after five and a half years is manifestly excessive.
In order to succeed on an application on the ground that the sentence is manifestly excessive, it is not enough to establish that the sentence imposed was different or even markedly different from sentences imposed in other matters. It is necessary to demonstrate that the difference is such that there must have been a misapplication of principle, or that the sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust.4
One comparator sentence relied upon before the primary judge was R v Fenton [2015] QCA 125, where a sentence was imposed of nine years’ imprisonment with Fenton eligible for parole after five years and five months. There are some similarities and some differences between the appellant’s offending and Fenton’s offending. In Fenton, the 13-year-old foster daughter was the subject of numerous penile rapes and a threat to kill, which took place over a period of 19 months. In the present case, the complainant was the 13 to 14-year-old daughter of the appellant who was the victim of numerous digital and penile rapes over many months. There was also, however, serious other violence inflicted upon the complainant. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the sentence imposed in the present case was markedly different to Fenton. The appellant did not refer to Fenton to establish a “difference” in sentencing, but rather submitted that his sentence is unfair as a fellow unnamed prisoner who had committed unknown sexual offences was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment whereas the appellant received nine years’ imprisonment. It has not been demonstrated that there was any misapplication of principle or that the sentence imposed on the appellant is unreasonable or plainly unjust.
I would refuse the application for leave to appeal against sentence.
HINDMAN J: I agree with Crow J.
R
BEY [2025] QCA 254
(2022) 274 CLR 651
Application for leave to adduce further evidence refused; appeal against conviction dismissed; application for leave to appeal against sentence refused.
It was utilised to try to discredit the complainant who had sworn evidence that she was afraid of the appellant, whereas the communication suggested the contrary. The balance of the texts, Instagram extracts and/or Facebook extracts offer nothing of any relevance and could not be used in any admissible way to discredit the complainant.
The appellant cannot succeed upon his application to admit new evidence as he cannot show there is a likelihood or a reasonable probability that the appellant would have been acquitted on a retrial based on the new evidence and the evidence at trial. The application to admit new evidence, therefore, ought to be refused.
The appellant’s four-page particularisation of inconsistencies, to a large extent, mirrors the same inconsistencies relied upon by defence counsel and addressed to the jury. The first seven particulars of inconsistency are the subject of defence counsel’s address to the jury, and concern relatively minor inconsistencies between the evidence of the complainant and her friend, who was a fresh complaint witness.
As to the next alleged inconsistencies, the appellant argues that the complainant’s evidence of the first time that she was raped by the appellant ought not to be accepted as she variously claimed that it occurred before her 14th birthday, that is before October 2017, and yet occurred on an occasion she was watching a particular television show on her PlayStation. The appellant’s argument is that because he told the police officer during his interview that the PlayStation was not purchased until Christmas 2017, this meant that the first occasion of rape could not have occurred as reported by the complainant.
However, the inconsistency between the complainant’s allegations of the particular television show being watched by the complainant upon her PlayStation and the fact that the PlayStation was not purchased prior to her 14th birthday, was not raised by defence counsel in his address to the jury.
There are three difficulties for the appellant. The first difficulty is that the name of the television show was revealed to the defence in the complainant’s police interview, as was the allegation that the television show was being watched in the complainant’s bedroom. If the PlayStation inconsistency was meant to be a major plank of the defence case, then that is a matter that could easily have been proved.
The second difficulty is that that alleged inconsistency was not put to the complainant in cross-examination to enable her to comment upon it.
The third difficulty is that the jury were not compelled to accept the appellant’s version in his police interview that the PlayStation was purchased at Christmas 2017.
Rather, what the jury heard was a consistent version between the complainant’s police interview and her evidence as to what occurred at the time of the first rape. In this context, it seems to me that it cannot be concluded that there was any inconsistency as the more logical conclusion is the jury simply did not accept the accused’s statement to police officers that the PlayStation was not purchased until Christmas 2017.
The appellant also alleges an inconsistency in the frequency that the complainant said the appellant raped her. In her police interview she said “[i]t happened almost every night”. In cross-examination at trial, the complainant said she did not exactly remember how often it occurred, but it was quite often, that she could not remember the exact timeframes and sometimes it could be a couple of times a week. It is fair to conclude that the complainant was slightly inconsistent in this aspect of her evidence as compared to her police interview. However, that inconsistency was raised by defence counsel before the jury, and the jury through its verdict concluded that such inconsistency did not cause them to doubt the credibility or reliability of the complainant’s evidence.
The appellant also criticises the complainant’s evidence as being inconsistent because in respect of one of the rapes, the complainant said she blacked out, but thought that the rape occurred over 10 to 15 minutes. The appellant’s complaint is that this is inconsistent because if the complainant blacked out, she would not know how long the rape lasted. This is not an attractive argument, however, when the complainant’s evidence is read in context. The complainant explained that she was unsure but recalled seeing a television show, blacking out and then seeing the remainder of the television show, and that is how she estimated the 10 to 15 minutes. That is not an inconsistency but really an explanation of how the time of the rape was estimated.
The appellant also submits that the complainant was inconsistent because she alleged that he was wearing Star Wars shorts at the time he first raped her, because “I did not own Star Wars shorts”. The allegation as to what the appellant was wearing when he first raped his daughter is contained in the police record of interview of the appellant and so if it were a major or important point, then one would have expected it to have been the subject of some evidence rather than it not being addressed.
There are also, as the appellant submits, some minor inconsistencies concerning the facts relating to the strangulation of the complainant by the appellant. But again, they were the subject of submission from defence counsel to the jury. The minor points of inconsistency relate to what occurred prior to the complainant re-entering the house, that is, prior to the strangulation event occurring. The jury were entitled to consider these inconsistencies in the antecedent conduct together with the consistency relating to the evidence of what occurred at the time of the strangulation and conclude, as they did, beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had momentarily strangled his daughter.
In conclusion, this appeal involves events that occurred over several months in 2017 and 2018, the subject of a police interview in 2019 and evidence in 2024. It can be demonstrated that the evidence of the complainant was not perfectly consistent in every manner. The relatively minor inconsistencies demonstrated by the appellant were in the main put to the jury, who must be taken to have concluded that despite those minor inconsistencies and because of the circumstances of the case, they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt.
The appellant’s third submission, that the jury applied the wrong standard of proof, is not supported by any material, and cannot be accepted as juries are presumed to follow judges’ instructions upon the law.
The appellant’s last submission or complaint that “the jury only took three hours to come up with a conviction of guilty” is also a submission that the jury did not carry out its lawful obligations, without any material to support such a submission.
Nonetheless, the submission being made that the convictions were unreasonable requires consideration of the whole of the evidence.
In that respect, the appellant was convicted of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with his 13/14-year-old daughter between 30 June 2017 and 1 February 2018. The appellant was also convicted of the rape of his daughter on a date unknown between 30 June 2017 and 1 February 2018. Count three on the indictment was the charge that on a date unknown between 1 August 2018 and 1 December 2018, the appellant strangled his daughter. The sexual offending, the subject of counts one and two, occurred in circumstances when there were no witnesses and so the jury’s conclusion depended upon the jury’s assessment of the credibility of the complainant and the appellant. However, the offending the subject of count three involved an incident that was witnessed by two other adults.
The appellant gave an interview to police denying not only the allegations of sexual violence, the subjects of counts one and two, but also denying the strangulation the subject of count three. The appellant’s version to police was that the strangulation did not occur, but rather, what had occurred was that his daughter had attacked him twice. The appellant’s version was that when his daughter attacked him on the second occasion, he did not strangle her, but rather “put his hand on the side of her face with his thumb on her cheek” and “gently” and put her against the wall explaining to her that she could not attack him and he was entitled to defend himself.
The complainant and the two adult witnesses swore a very different version of the incident. All three witnesses swore there was no such incident where the appellant gently guided his daughter back against the wall. Rather, the consistent version of the complainant and the two adults who witnessed the incident was that after an argument, the child went to get off her chair and move towards the front door and it was the appellant who went at or lunged at her, grabbed at her and put her up against the wall. One witness (the aunt) reported that occurred with at least one of his hands around her neck; the other (the ex-wife) thought the hands were near the chest area. The aunt observed the appellant hold the child up against the wall and lift her slightly off the ground with the appellant’s hand or hands around her throat. She also observed red marks around the child’s neck after the incident.
The jury were therefore faced with a stark choice as to the evidence as to what occurred in relation to count three; that is, the appellant’s self-serving account of being attacked by an aggressive child and merely and gently defending himself, and the evidence of the complainant and the two other adult witnesses of the appellant coming at or lunging towards the child, grabbing her, and placing her up against the wall.
Plainly, the jury were entitled to, having observed each of the witnesses, accept the evidence of the complainant and the two adult witnesses in preference to the appellant’s version to police. Furthermore, the jury having rejected the appellant as a witness of truth in respect of the strangulation incident, the subject of count three, the jury were entitled to assess the appellant’s version and the complainant’s evidence on counts one and two and reject the appellant’s version. It is unremarkable that “the jury only took three hours to come up with a conviction of guilty” because the jury may have found it quite easy to reject the appellant’s version and accept the complainant’s evidence, and to conclude that beyond reasonable doubt, that all of the offences had been committed.
I would dismiss the appeal against conviction.